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3“En las buenas conciencias de Europa, y a veces también en las malas,
han irrumpido desde entonces con más ímpetus que nunca las noticias
fantasmales de la América Latina, esa patria inmensa de hombres alucina-
dos y mujeres históricas, cuya terquedad sin fin se confunde con la leyenda.
[...] Pues si estas dificultades nos entorpecen a nosotros, que somos de su
esencia, no es difícil entender que los talentos racionales de este lado del
mundo, extasiados en la contemplación de sus propias culturas, se hayan
quedado sin un método válido para interpretarnos.”
“[T]he Europeans of good will – and sometimes those of bad, as
well – have been struck, with ever greater force, by the unearthly
tidings of Latin America, that boundless realm of haunted men and
historic women, whose unending obstinacy blurs into legend. [...]
And if these difficulties, whose essence we share, hinder us, it is un-
derstandable that the rational talents on this side of the world, exal-
ted in the contemplation of their own cultures, should have found
themselves without valid means to interpret us.”
Gabriel García Márquez (1982): La soledad de América Latina1
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22 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Why do different European countries have different foreign policies towards
Latin America? What factors determine these different policies? While the
EU is attempting to craft a common Latin America strategy, Member States’
approaches to the region vary. Such disparate national approaches can poten-
tially hamper a coherent European policy, making it slow to react to political
and economic change – all this in the relationship with a region that has sup-
posedly been a “Strategic Partner” for the EU since 1999 (European External
Action Service (EEAS) 2011a).
In order to understand such inconsistencies arising at national or even at
the European level, we have to understand the driving factors behind national
foreign policies as well as the interaction between the national and the EU
level. This study purports to reach such an understanding by first systematic-
ally mapping the variation in policy activity towards Latin America of several
European countries in economic, governance, and EU-related affairs. I focus on
the foreign policies of three countries: Germany, Spain, and the United King-
dom. On the basis of theoretical relevance and the variation uncovered in the
first step, I then select two policy areas for in-depth study: development policy
and the interaction between national policy towards Latin America and the
EU’s strategy vis-à-vis the region. Through the in-depth study of these areas I
then seek to determine factors that play a role in causing various levels of for-
eign policy activity towards Latin America. Situated within a Foreign Policy
Analysis (FPA) approach and based on an extended liberal theoretical account,
the present investigation develops a framework that can shed light on policy-
making towards Latin America in EUMember States. Empirically, the study is
based on a series of semi-structured interviews carried out with officials at the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs as well as Development Ministries and Agencies
of the countries under study. This evidence is complemented and contrasted
with further interviews of European Union officials and Latin American dip-
lomats based in Brussels, as well as government documents and, in the case
of development policy, data available from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).
The study finds that, in accordance with utilitarian-liberal theorising, for-
eign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe is determined mainly
by domestic political and economic interests. However, both in development
policy towards the region and in the interaction between national and EU
policy, other factors also play a role. These include domestic norms, but also
the impact of international and European socialisation, rational adaptation to
international and European rules, as well as, in the case of national-EU level
interaction, the effect of the distribution of competences within the EU. These
independent variables interact with one another in unique ways, thus produ-
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cing country-specific policy outcomes.
1.1 Foreign Policy-Making towards Latin America
in Europe
In this investigation, I seek to uncover factors that influence foreign policy-
making towards Latin America on behalf of three EUMember States: Germany,
Britain, and Spain. The following section brieflymotivates the choice for policy
towards Latin America as the subject of analysis, as well as the choice for the
three countries whose policies towards the region this investigation sets out to
assess.
1.1.1 Why Latin America?
In 1999, the first bi-regional Summit of Heads of State and Government from
the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Rio de
Janeiro, inaugurated the European Union’s bi-regional “Strategic Partnership”
with the region (EEAS 2011a).1 Latin America has, over the past decade, exhib-
ited relatively solid economic growth. It is rather stable politically, and some of
its countries have gained considerable political clout on the world stage, with
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico being members of the G20. While these factors
may lead one to expect a greater focus and more homogeneous policies and
levels of policy activity towards Latin America across the EU, this has not been
the case. Activity on behalf of different EU Member States towards the region
varies widely. Overall, the EU and its Member States have been sluggish to
respond to economic and political change in the region as a result of this vari-
ation. Only very recently have EU members other than Spain and Portugal
slowly appeared to begin taking an increased interest in the region, as its coun-
tries seem – thus far – largely unfazed by the global economic and financial
crisis. Why do EU Member States carry out policy towards one and the same
region in such different ways and at very different levels of activity? It is the
task of this study to seek an explanation for this variation, and I will tackle the
question using the toolbox of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), with a focus on
an extended liberal theoretical account.
1Nowadays, the word ‘strategic’ is often omitted, and two countries of the region, Brazil and
Mexico, now have their own “Strategic Partnerships” with the EU. A recent study mapping the
EU’s strategic partnerships around the globe does not include the bi-regional partnership with
Latin America, but focuses on bilateral EU relations with Mexico and Brazil (Grevi and Khandekar
2011). The term “Strategic Partnership”, however, continues to appear on the European External
Action Service (EEAS)’s web site to describe the EU’s relationship with the region (EEAS 2011a).
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From an FPA perspective, Latin America may at first sight seem an odd
choice for the purpose of studying foreign policy-making, since it is not a
region that is particularly ‘exciting’ in terms of events that might provoke a
foreign policy response by EU Member States or the EU as a whole. Indeed,
many studies located within an FPA framework focus on special events or par-
ticular crises – think, for instance, of Graham T. Allison’s seminal work on
“The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Allison 1971).
Latin America, on the other hand, does not exhibit these characteristics. It
is neither outstandingly poor (such as Sub-Saharan Africa) or unstable (such
as the Middle East), nor does it match the vertiginous economic rise of parts
of Asia. Instead, as outlined above, the region is relatively democratic,2 with
steady but not extravagant economic growth across most of the region during
recent years. It is not subject to the same periodic attention as a crisis region
or to the same consistent awareness as the EU’s neighbourhood, for example.
The relatively low-key approach to the relationship with Latin America on be-
half of the EU and most of its Member States is why foreign relations with the
region have overall not received a great deal of scholarly attention, especially
in a comparative framework. Even with respect to country-specific studies,
the literature is highly disparate, with a plethora of studies covering Spain, a
medium amount on Germany’s policy towards the region, and a very scarce
coverage for the UK (examples include del Arenal (2009a) on Spain, Maihold
(2008) on Germany, and Grugel and Kippin (2006) on the UK). Other studies
analyse the performance of various countries within the EU’s policy towards
the region (Freres and Sanahuja 2006; Ruano forthcoming 2012), but these tend
to be edited volumes with a chapter focusing on each country rather than ex-
plicitly comparative projects contrasting countries directly.
This is an unfortunate state of affairs for several reasons. Firstly, as I have
discussed above, the different levels of policy activity towards Latin America
are surprising given the characteristics of the target region, as one might ex-
pect more homogeneous policies towards a strategic partner region of the EU
with rather stable economic growth and political – even democratic – stability.
Secondly, relations with Latin America cover the entire foreign policy spectrum
from economic to cultural relations, making them a fascinating subject of study
for their breadth. This investigation therefore sets out to comparatively analyse
policy towards a region that is largely based on tranquil, day-to-day foreign
relations, an aspect of policy that has hitherto received little attention despite
2Democratic stability varies across Latin America. The vast majority of countries falling under
this study’s definition of ‘Latin America’ (see App. A) are classified as electoral democracies by the
Freedom House “Freedom in the World” reports since 2004. Countries not classified as electoral
democracies in the region include Cuba at all times and, at different times, Haiti (2004-6; 2011),
Venezuela (since 2009), and Honduras (since 2010; Freedom House 2011).
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such ‘normal relations’ constituting an important share of Western democra-
cies’ foreign affairs.
1.1.2 Defining Latin America
Latin America, for the purposes of this study, includes the countries of Cent-
ral and South America as well as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti
(the three non-Anglophone independent Caribbean island nations).3 In par-
ticular, the decision to include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti was
also cross-checked with interviewees and found to be appropriate. The issue of
the Caribbean is somewhat problematic in any study of policy towards Latin
America in the European context, because it is included in the EU-LAC Stra-
tegic Partnership, yet the Caribbean countries are also included in the African-
Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group under the Cotonou Agreement and therefore
receive different treatment regarding trade agreements (indeed, the first re-
gional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) under the Cotonou framework
was concluded with the Caribbean countries assembled in CARIFORUM; see
EEAS 2011b; European Commission 2011). Additionally, Germany includes the
Caribbeanwithin its Latin America policy (Auswärtiges Amt (AA) 2010), while
the UK excludes the Anglophone Caribbean (Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice (FCO) 2007; interviews), and Spain is just beginning to step up involve-
ment with the Caribbean, as interviewees stated. Given these unclear differ-
entiations, the decision was taken to largely leave the Caribbean outside this
study’s focus. Even so, it is important to bear in mind that boundaries are fluid
in this respect.
At this point it is also worth mentioning Cuba, which remains a special case
in policy towards the region. I do not dedicate special attention to the Cuban
case in this study. The reason is that Cuba would make a perfectly fine case
study of its own, and it is outside the scope of this investigation to analyse it
in the depth this would require. Nevertheless, in particular during the case
study on national-EU level interaction, it is practically impossible to avoid the
subject, because the country plays such an important part in the EU’s policy
towards the region that it “comes up practically every month as an issue”, as
one interviewee put it. Cuba is certainly one of the most politicised aspects
of Latin America policy in Europe. Therefore, it will be mentioned when re-
quired, but not covered in specific detail. The focus of this study, instead, is
on Latin America policy more broadly defined. Policy towards different Latin
American countries will serve as examples in some cases. In others, where
3The countries included are listed in Appendix A, based on the UN Statistics Division’s data
(2009).
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particular countries stand out, this is also highlighted.
1.1.3 Foreign Policy towards Latin America
I conceptualise foreign policy in line with Christopher Hill’s definition as “the
sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually
a state) in international relations” (Hill 2003: 3), a decision discussed in de-
tail in Chapter 2. Additionally, I divide it into different policy areas adapting
the framework of Otto Czempiel (1981), who conceptualised the foreign policy
areas of security, well-being (in the economic sense) and governance. The res-
ulting framework for policy towards Latin America includes three dimensions:
economic policy (including trade and investment as well as development),
governance (including political dialogue, cultural relations, and Civil Society
involvement in official policy towards the region), and finally, the European
dimension that characterises EU Member States’ foreign policies nowadays.
As indicated above, the foreign policies towards Latin America on behalf of
different EUMember States have not previously been placed in a comprehens-
ive framework enabling their direct comparison. In fact, the comparison of for-
eign policy-making in different countries presents methodological challenges
independently of the target region. In order to facilitate comparison, in Chapter
3 I measure policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of the three coun-
tries under study: howmuch activity do they direct towards the region on each
of the three dimensions specified above? Foreign policy is often carried out in
country-specific ways that are not directly comparable, and data do not always
come in a handy numerical format that lends itself to systematic comparison
across different indicators. The present investigation thus faces the challenge
of integrating context-specific indicators, a frequent issue in comparative polit-
ical research (see e.g. Przeworski and Teune 1970; van Deth 1998). What is
more, it also faces the problem of making qualitative and numerical data com-
parable. I thus develop an index based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (fsQCA; see e.g. Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Ragin 2008), which offers
the enormous advantage of being able to place these different types of data on
an equal footing and making them directly comparable across countries and
policy dimensions. This represents a methodologically innovative approach
inspired by the works of Gran (2003) and Kvist (2007) on fuzzy-set ideal type
analysis, and contributes to the further expansion of the fields to which fsQCA
can be fruitfully applied. On the basis of the variation systematically exposed
by this index and their theoretical relevance, I then go on to select two cases for
in-depth study in order to ascertain the motivations underlying policy-making
towards Latin America: development policy, a subcomponent of the economic
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foreign policy dimension, and the interaction between national foreign policy
and the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the region.
In this study, I focus on current policy towards Latin America rather than
on historical processes. This means that the time frame covered by the findings
ranges from the mid-2000s roughly until the first half of 2011, when the final
interviews were carried out. This ensures keeping the context within which
policy is made relatively constant, as well as exogenising the thorny issue of
foreign policy change as much as possible (see e.g. Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson
1999), which would give this investigation an entirely new dimension. At the
same time, keeping the time frame relatively short allows for in-depth cross-
country analysis. Finally, because the analysis is based mainly on interviews
with policy-makers, there is a practical factor that has to be considered. The in-
stitutional memory of diplomatic services with a turnover time of three to four
years tends to be relatively short. Although some of the officials interviewed
for this study do have long-standing, in some cases decades, of experience with
the Latin America policy of their country, it is wise to err on the side of caution
by focusing on more recent issues.4
Even so, a few time-related issues deserve mentioning. Firstly, in two of the
countries – Germany and the UK – there was a government change during the
time period covered. The 2009 German and the 2010 British general elections
each brought in Conservative-Liberal governing coalitions.5 This is a factor of
which the researcher needs to be aware, as some parameters of foreign policy
may change with the government and have indeed done so, as this study will
show. Nonetheless, I assume that foreign policy tends to be constant enough
for the analysis to remain largely valid. As Manners and Whitman (2000: 260f)
state, foreign policy is slow to adapt to changes, in part because the bureaucrats
carrying out the policy do not normally change with the government, so that
changes take time to trickle down. Nonetheless, government changes must
be borne in mind. Secondly, the EU context within which states operate is cur-
rently changing substantially as a result of the Lisbon Treaty.6 This is discussed
in more depth in Chapter 6, but again, the changing European institutional
context is something that is worth taking into consideration. Finally, there is
the question of economic crisis, an issue particularly relevant for Spain, which
4This is not to deny the value of an historical analysis. Yet aside from wanting to keep as many
context parameters as possible constant, it must also be noted that space, time, and resources of
any research project are necessarily limited. It was therefore felt that a more historical perspect-
ive would have compromised the depth of the cross-country analysis. The development of each
country’s Latin America policy over time, however, remains an issue worthy of further research.
5While the 2011 Spanish general election lies outside the time frame under analysis here, it is
important to be aware that it is also likely to develop some effects on policy towards Latin America.
6For an in-depth analysis of the possible changes resulting from this institutional reconfigura-
tion, see Trueb (2012a).
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is seeing its foreign policy circumscribed by the effects of the crisis, which set
in about half-way through the period studied by this investigation, in 2008.
The full effects have been felt since 2010, and analysts consider that this may
be the closing of a cycle of the internationalisation of Spanish foreign policy
that began with democratisation and its entry into the EU in the 1980s (Molina
and Tovar 2011: 378). Spanish foreign policy is therefore now operating under
new constraints that led, for example, to a merger between the Secretariats of
State for Iberoamerica and for External Affairs into the Secretariat of State for
External Affairs and Iberoamerica.7 For the purposes of this study, a long-term
effect of the crisis cannot yet be determined, but it appears that it has led to a
certain stagnation of foreign policy.
1.1.4 Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom
This investigation focuses on the policies towards Latin America of Germany,
Spain, and the UK, a selection that must be carefully considered. In the first
place, while this may sound trivial, in order to study foreign policy-making
towards Latin America it is indispensable that the countries under considera-
tion actually have national policies towards the region.8 The new EU Member
States, for instance, which might be fruitfully studied in the EU context, simply
do not have national relations with Latin America that are intense enough for
in-depth study.9
In addition, comparing Spain, Germany, and Britain allows the researcher
to keep several factors constant, allowing me to base this investigation on a
Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD; della Porta 2008: 214ff) and honing in on
country-based factors that might explain the variation in their policies towards
Latin America. MSSDs are based on reducing “the number of ‘disturbing’ vari-
ables to be kept under control” (ibid.: 214) by exogenising them, thus facilitat-
ing the attribution of variation in the dependent variable to those independent
variables that can still take different values. Nonetheless, MSSDs risk the over-
7‘Iberoamerica’ is often used to designate Latin America in the Spanish context; in fact, the
term often includes the Iberian peninsula as part of ‘Iberoamerica’ (del Arenal 2004: 3). This is
the case, for instance, with the Iberoamerican Community, which includes the Spanish-speaking
countries of Latin America and Brazil, but also Spain, Portugal, and Andorra (Secretaría General
Iberoamericana (SEGIB) 2011).
Most recently, the new Conservative government redistributed the state secretaries of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs to create the post of Secretary of State for International Cooperation and
Iberoamerica.
8Germany and Britain have even formulated their policies towards the region in policy strategy
papers or speeches (AA 2010; FCO 2007; 2010). While Spain does not do so – indeed, Gratius (2010)
poses the provocative question of why Spain does not have a “policy towards Latin America” –
this is because its policy vis-à-vis the region is extremely broad rather than limited.
9To a large extent, they are slowly coming by policies towards Latin America through the EU
context. For an insight into this process, Kaczyn´ski (forthcoming 2012) provides an analysis of
Polish policy towards Latin America in the context of the Europeanisation.
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determination of the outcome variable because the contexts of the compared
situations are not normally similar enough to permit considering the influence
of the environment as entirely non-existent (Przeworski and Teune 1970; see
also della Porta 2008: 215). This problem is considered by the investigation’s
theoretical framework, which I outline below, as well as in Chapters 2 and 4.
Nevertheless, the MSSD framework allows the researcher to keep the number
of independent variables under control, whereas in a Most Different Systems
Design (MDSD) the number of independent variables would become rather
unwieldy (della Porta 2008: 215) and, as some would argue, involve far more
independent variables than a small-N study is able to handle (the so-called
‘degrees of freedom problem’ or underdetermination, see e.g. George and Ben-
nett 2005: 28ff). But, as George and Bennett (ibid.) point out, in small-N case
studies based on process-tracing, the logic behind determining the impact of
independent variables is quite different from that operating in large-N studies
based on regression analysis, so that the ‘degrees of freedom problem is largely
irrelevant.10 In Chapters 2 and 4, I assess the advantages and limitations of this
approach in depth. In the following, I focus on the factors that make Germany,
Spain, and Britain suitable for comparison under an MSSD approach.
Firstly, all three countries under study can – within reason – be considered
middle powers in the international system, thus keeping the influence of such
systemic factors relatively small. Nevertheless, this is where the problem of
environmental impact is probably the strongest.11 The study’s explanatory
framework therefore has to remain context-aware. Secondly, the three are in-
fluential EU Member States. The EU is now an important factor in the foreign
policies of its Member States, so that it makes sense to hold EU membership
constant in order to keep the differential impact of this potentially influential
“‘disturbing’ variable” (della Porta 2008: 214) minimal. In this case, all three
countries under study have the potential to leave their mark on EU policy to-
wards the region, and vice versa. Germany and the UK are traditionally pivotal
members of the Union, while Spain’s special relationship with Latin America
catapults it to such a position in this case – although even without this spe-
cial relationship it is one of the larger and more vocal states. In addition, all
three have been EU members for quite a long time by now and are therefore
10The ‘degrees of freedom problem’ refers to the idea that there may not be more independent
variables than there are cases studied. This is, however, very often the case in small-N research,
including this study. George and Bennett (2005: 28ff) elucidate why this is not a problem: there are
many observations along the way of a process-tracing case study to make inference valid (such as,
in the case of this investigation, the observations from a total of 37 interviews), and the in-depth
study of few cases allows for finding inconsistencies in the theories.
11The UK holds, for instance, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which the other two
countries do not.
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not subject to the same pressures as new Member States might be.12 Taken to-
gether, these factors keep the intensity with which the EU level exercises any
sort of force on their national foreign policies relatively constant – its differ-
ential impact leading to variation in the EU dimension therefore ought to stem
from other factors.
When discussing the selection of cases for study under a small-N research
design, one question invariably arises: “Why not others?” In the case of this
study, one might ask why Italy, France, or Portugal are not taken into account.
They mostly fulfil similar criteria as Germany, Spain, and Britain: an autonom-
ous national foreign policy towards Latin America, long-standing EU mem-
bership, and – perhaps with the exception of Portugal – global middle power
status. The question of why Germany, Spain, and Britain were chosen over
these countries – or why they were not included – is thus a valid one. Yet,
as with any research project, the time and resources of this investigation were
limited, so that a choice had to be made. In a study like the present one, any
expansion of the number of countries studied necessarily comes at the expense
of the depth with which they can be analysed. Spain, Germany, and the UK
were thus chosen as representatives of the population discussed above (influ-
ential EU Members with an autonomous national policy towards Latin Amer-
ica). Portugal, for instance, shares several of Spain’s characteristics. Most im-
portantly, it is a former colonial power in Latin America and acceded the EU
at the same time as Spain. France and Italy, on the other hand, are similar to
Germany in that they are founding members of the EU. Regarding their global
positions, Italy may be considered similar to Spain, and France similar to both
the UK and Germany. The one factor that sets the UK apart is its sceptical at-
titude towards the EU, which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 6. Thus,
while there are almost certainly some country-specific factors that would dif-
ferentiate the policies towards Latin America of Portugal, France, or Italy from
those of Spain, Germany, and the UK, they are sufficiently similar to be able
to choose a sample that allows the researcher to carry out an in-depth cross-
country study. This discussion leads directly to the question of the extent to
which the results of the investigation can be generalised, which is addressed in
the next paragraph.
12Nevertheless, I will take into account that Spain is, relative to the other two, a ‘late joiner’ not
just to the EU but also to the international community more generally. Although the UK joined the
European Communities a mere 13 years earlier than Spain, it was arguably already a part of the
Western international community beforehand. Spain, on the other hand, became incorporated into
both very rapidly after democratisation in the late 1970s (Aixalà i Blanch 2005), joining NATO in
1892 and the EC in 1986. Although by now, Spanish policy-makers have had ample time to soak
up the potential effects of joining and membership is no longer a process in development (Barbé
2011: 132f), it is wise to take this particular aspect into consideration.
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1.1.5 Generalisability of the Results
It is important in the context of country selection to consider the generalis-
ability of this investigation’s results, though this is discussed in more detail
in Chapter 4. The choice of Germany, Spain, and the UK as policy-making
countries and the choice of Latin America as a target region limits the general-
isability of the results to the extent that factors held constant by this investiga-
tion would vary if policy-making in countries or ‘recipient’ regions of foreign
policy were concerned. As Donatella della Porta puts it, “in comparing similar
systems, we cannot go beyond [...] theories that apply only in a certain area”
(della Porta 2008: 214). In the cases at hand, this applies to factors such as EU
membership and length thereof, as well as country ‘size’, that is, geopolitical
and economic standing within the wider international community and the EU.
Likewise, factors influencing policy towards Latin America may be different
from those impacting foreign policy towards other regions or countries. Lastly,
the generalisability of the study’s findings is circumscribed by the two cases
that are studied in greater detail: development policy and interaction between
the national and the EU level. It is therefore important not to overgeneralise
from the present investigation’s findings (Bennett and Elman 2006a; George
and Bennett 2005).
Nevertheless, the factors that are shown to matter in this study may well
apply beyond the countries and cases subject to research here. The results can
therefore provide important pointers regarding the sources of foreign policy-
making in Europe and even in the wider world. However, it must be con-
sidered that if the study’s theoretical model is extended to other countries,
policy areas, and ‘target regions’, other influencing factors and interaction me-
chanisms are likely to be at play and must be incorporated into the theoretical
framework. It is to the discussion of the theoretical model applied in this in-
vestigation that I now turn.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
The present study’s theoretical approach is based on an extended liberal frame-
work. As outlined in the previous section, its research design holds systemic
factors such as the three countries’ position on the international stage as well
as EU membership constant to a large degree. Following from this, I focus
on explanatory factors emanating from the domestic level, making a liberal
approach the ideal setting as it is centred “on subsystemic determinants of be-
haviour” (Rittberger 2001a: 4). Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework
in greater detail and discusses three types of liberal foreign policy theorising
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that have been conceptualised by researchers and emphasise different inde-
pendent variables (Moravcsik 1997; Freund and Rittberger 2001): structural
or republican liberalism, which focuses on the type of domestic government,
agency-based or commercial liberalism, which highlights the strength of do-
mestic interests, and ideational or constructivist liberalism, which emphasises
the role of domestic norms in influencing foreign policy. However, since all
three countries under study are parliamentary democracies, however, struc-
tural or republican liberalism’s independent variable, the type of domestic re-
gime, can be exogenised by this study. The independent variables considered
in this investigation therefore stem from both agency-based utilitarian liberal
(e.g. Moravcsik 1997) and constructivist liberal (e.g. Wagner 2002, Koenig-
Archbugi 2004) theory, and include political and economic interests as well
as domestic norms about foreign policy-making, based on the premise that
ideational and cultural factors matter in how foreign policy-makers approach
their task (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Katzenstein 1996).
Yet despite holding systemic factors constant, it is unwise to ignore them
entirely. The liberal framework has to be extended for two reasons: on the
one hand, there may still be residual variation in the factors held constant. On
the other hand, they may have a differential impact upon policy-making al-
though they are virtually the same in the three countries under study, because
they may be mediated by domestic factors that account for such different in-
fluences (Beyers 2005; Risse et al. 1999; Moravcsik 1997: 522; 542ff). Con-
sequently, I take into account independent variables stemming from interna-
tional interaction based both on a rationalist and constructivist logic of action:
policy-makers may adhere to international rules because they are interested in
preserving their country’s international reputation, for instance (e.g. Checkel
2005; Slaughter 2004), or because they have been ‘socialised’ into considering
a certain type of foreign policy behaviour appropriate (see e.g. Checkel2005;
Lewis 2003).
However, I conceptualise these variables as mediated by domestic mater-
ial and ideational factors theorised under the liberal framework to account for
their differential impact on systemically similar countries. The study conceptu-
alises the two logics of action – the logic of expected consequences emphasised
by rationalist scholars and the logic of appropriateness highlighted by con-
structivists (March and Olsen 1989; 2004) – as compatible and potentially com-
plementary within the same framework (e.g. Jupille et al. 2003; Fearon and
Wendt 2003; Risse 2003). At the limit, in accordance with utilitarian-liberal
theorising, I expect domestic economic and political preferences to matter the
most (Fearon and Wendt 2003: 58) in determining foreign policy activity to-
wards Latin America. Additionally, congruent with Jupille et al. (2003: 21),
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I assume that high substantive stakes invite rational calculation, although re-
latively low stakes allow for non-calculative decision making. On the whole,
I expect domestic interests to trump the effects of both domestic and interna-
tional socialisation, as well as the rational adaptation to international norms.
Since this study considers two in-depth case studies, one on development
and the other on interaction between national foreign policy towards Latin
America and the EU’s relations with the region, the precise independent vari-
ables are embedded within this general theoretical framework, but are fine-
tuned by recurring to relevant theories on development policy-making (e.g.
Lumsdaine 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007) and on (foreign) policy-
making in the European Union (e.g. Larsen 2009; Moumoutzis 2011). These
middle-range theories will be embedded within the general framework in or-
der to derive more specific theoretical expectations about foreign policy-ma-
king towards Latin America in Europe.
1.3 Methodological Framework
This investigation is based on a small-N case study design. Having outlined
the country-selection process above, this section briefly discusses the selec-
tion of the two cases that will be analysed in depth in the second part of the
study, as well as the methodological considerations underlying the research
design of the case studies. In the first place, I establish cross-country and cross-
dimensional variation in the dependent variable (George and Bennett 2005:
84f) by measuring policy activity towards Latin America on the three dimen-
sions of foreign policy. This is done, as described above, on the basis of an
index constructed using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA;
Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Ragin 2008; 2000). The step-by-step index aggregation
procedure required by the fsQCA method allows me to systematically expose
variation on the economic, governance, and the European dimension of policy
towards Latin America, as well as on their subcomponents. The emerging vari-
ation as well as theoretical considerations are then used to select the two cases
for further study: development policy – a subcomponent of the economic di-
mension – and national-EU-level interaction.
Both cases display high levels of cross-country variation in the dependent
variable (Van Evera 1997) that point to underlying domestic differences. In
addition, however, the two cases are worth investigating from a theoretical
perspective. Regarding development policy, there is a long-standing debate
among researchers regarding the motivating factors of development aid and
whether they respond to a norm of alleviating poverty (e.g. Lumsdaine 1993),
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a utilitarian logic, where aid is used to achieve political or economic goals (e.g.
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007), or both (e.g. Berthelémy 2006), and if
so, how the two logics of action are configured. As regards the interaction
between national foreign policy towards Latin America and the EU level, there
is plenty of theorising on how the two levels interact, and how (foreign) policy
is Europeanised (e.g. Börzel 2002; Larsen 2009; Moumoutzis 2011), and this
study hopes to shed further light on these mechanisms of interaction and what
motivates policy-makers to take national policy stances to the EU level in some
cases, but accept issues emanating from it in others.
In order to address these questions, I draw on process tracing methodology
as “a research procedure intended to explore the processes bywhich initial con-
ditions are translated into outcomes” (Vennesson 2008: 224). Process tracing
can help disentangle different explanatory factors, even if different theories
lead to the same expectations, a phenomenon called equifinality (George and
Bennett 2005: 207). Additionally, it is particularly suitable to uncover the inter-
action of various explanatory factors (Checkel 2006: 366) and thus extremely
useful for the purposes of this investigation.
The main data source employed to distinguish factors explaining the mak-
ing of Latin America policy in Europe is a set of 27 semi-structured elite inter-
views with national policy-makers from Spain, Germany, and Britain. These
interviews were conducted at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Devel-
opment Ministries and Agencies of all three countries. Additionally, they were
triangulated with other sources in order to compensate for potential strategic-
ness (e.g. Berry 2002): an additional 10 interviews were carried out with EU
officials dealing with Latin America, as well as with Latin American diplomats
based in Brussels and responsible for handling European-Latin American rela-
tions. In the case of development policy, aid data are available from the OECD
statistics database and were used to generate descriptive statistics such as aid
concentration curves (Baulch 2003) and Suits Index values (Suits 1977) to obtain
initial insights into the making of development policy towards Latin America.
The elite interviews were then used to further trace the factors impacting upon
policy, and complemented with triangulation interviews. In the EU case study,
a qualitative content analysis of government documents is carried out to gather
first indications of interaction between national and EU foreign policy towards
Latin America, based on a framework by Larsen (2009), which I further adapt
and fine-tune to suit the purposes of this investigation. Again, the elite inter-
views are then used to investigate policy-makers’ motivations for such interac-
tion, and are complemented and cross-checked with triangulation interviews
as well as further evidence from government documents.
For each case study, a separate coding scheme was developed to analyse
1.4. ROADMAP: OUTLINE 35
the interviews using Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software
(CAQDAS), for which the MAXQDA programme was used (VERBI Software
1989-2010). Based on saliency theory (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987) and
interview-specificmethodological considerations (e.g. Gläser and Laudel 2010),
the coding procedure is able to identify the impact of the various independent
variables conceptualised by this study. The procedure and its limitations are
discussed in depth in Chapter 4.
1.4 Roadmap: Outline
This investigation proceeds as follows. In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I situ-
ate the investigation within the fields of research it speaks to and outline its
contribution in these areas. In particular, I focus on extant literature on policy-
making in Europe and foreign policy-making more specifically, and locate the
project within current efforts to analyse European-Latin American relations.
The second half of Chapter 2 establishes this study’s overarching theoretical
framework.
In Chapter 3, I operationalise the dependent variable as foreign policy activ-
ity towards Latin America on three dimensions – economic, governance, and
European – and their subcomponents by developing relevant indicators. I then
outline how to measure policy activity towards Latin America with the use of
an index based on fsQCA methods, with reference to issues of measurement
and index methodology, also showing how fsQCA lends itself to accomplish-
ing the fundamental challenges of comparing context-specific indicators and
combining numerical and qualitative evidence. Finally, Chapter 3 puts these
considerations into practice by constructing the index to expose cross-national
and cross-dimensional variation in foreign policy activity towards Latin Amer-
ica.
The second part of the study begins with an introductory chapter (Chapter
4) explicating the choice of two cases for further study: development policy
and national-EU level interaction. It bases this choice on the variation found
in the previous chapter, as well as the cases’ theoretical relevance. Moreover,
the chapter outlines those methodological considerations relevant to both case
studies, thus dealing with the choice for and evaluation of elite interviews and
data triangulation.
The next two chapters constitute the two in-depth case studies. In Chapter
5, I seek to elucidate the factors impacting upon development policy towards
Latin America to explain various levels of policy activity. I begin with a brief
consideration of the scholarly debate about the motivating factors of develop-
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ment assistance, before moving on to deriving the case study’s specific theoret-
ical expectations embedded within the overarching framework established in
Chapter 2. I then illustrate the concentration of German, British, and Spanish
development assistance in Latin America both within the region and in com-
parison to their aid to other developing regions with the help of so-called aid
concentration curves (Baulch 2003). I innovate upon the methodology of plot-
ting these curves in order to control for population size, and employ the Suits
Index, which indicates whether aid is predominantly poverty-oriented or not
(Suits 1977), to support the evidence from the curves. These measures give
a first indication of whether aid is oriented more towards the poor countries
of Latin America, or towards the richer ones, thus giving a first indication of
whether development policy is driven by normative considerations of help-
ing the poor, or rather by economic or political considerations of boosting new
markets or improving political relations with emerging powers such as Brazil.
Next, I move on to the analysis of the interviews conducted at the national
level, before briefly triangulating them with those interviews carried out with
EU officials and Latin American diplomats, and discussing the results.
Chapter 6 then assesses the interaction of national foreign policies towards
Latin America with the EU level. It begins by conceptualising this interac-
tion as mechanisms of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ of policy elements and
asks what motivates policy-makers to pursue one or the other, and under what
circumstances they do so. I then conduct a content analysis of government
documents from the three countries under study to ascertain how these mech-
anisms play out in practice. Following this analysis, the study goes on to draw
up the specific explanatory framework, again situated within the general the-
oretical model, before proceeding once more to the analysis of national elite
interviews. I then triangulate them with interviews of EU officials and Latin
American diplomats, as well as with a more in-depth analysis of the relevant
policy documents, before discussing the results.
The final chapter (Chapter 7) contextualises the two case studies, binding
them together and situating them within the overall framework, as well as
outlining areas of further research arising from this investigation. It summar-
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In order to analyse the making of policy towards Latin America in Europe, pre-
vious research helps conceptualise the issue. In this chapter, I first introduce
and discuss the relevant literature before building up the study’s overarching
theoretical framework. I thus begin with a discussion of the literature on for-
eign policy-making towards Latin America, which is developed to very differ-
ent degrees for the three cases under study and to date has not been situated in
a unifying comparative framework. I then move on to discussing previous the-
oretical work that may help create an explanatory context for different levels
of policy towards the region on behalf of different EUMember States. In doing
so, the chapter provides a theory-based overview of the general variables that
may influence the different levels of intensity with which policy towards the
region is carried out by the three countries under study. Distinct hypotheses
are then specified in Chapters 5 and 6 for the specific policy areas under study.
2.1 Relevant Research and State of the Art
Given this study’s subject, it is useful to begin with a discussion of the extant
literature on foreign policy-making towards Latin America on behalf of the
three EU Member States under study. The field is hugely disparate, in agree-
ment with the levels of intensity with which policy towards Latin America is
conducted in each country. While this is intuitive, I will show that what is
missing is a coherent comparative framework within which several national
policies towards Latin America are analysed. This investigation purports to
provide such a framework. It thus contributes to a better understanding of
how policy towards one single region is made on behalf of three countries that
are broadly similar but exhibit variation on a range of variables impacting upon
foreign policy.
2.1.1 European-Latin American Relations
Member State Relations with Latin America
Policy-making towards Latin America has received very disparate levels of at-
tention in the three countries under study. In the British case, it appears to be
studiously ignored most of the time. While the UK has a vibrant Latin Amer-
ican studies community – it has produced, for instance, Leslie Bethell’s care-
fully edited seminal Cambridge History of Latin America in 11 volumes (Bethell
1984-2008) –, it does not frequently deal with British-Latin American relations.
There are some exceptions that allow one to trace developments over time, at
least to some extent (Bulmer-Thomas 1989b; Grugel and Kippin 2006; White-
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head forthcoming). However, these contributions tend to be limited to short
papers (Bulmer-Thomas 1989b) or chapters in edited volumes (Miller 2005;
Grugel and Kippin 2006; Whitehead forthcoming 2012). Miller (2005: 34) notes
the long decline of British foreign policy towards Latin America since the be-
ginning of World War I and points out that nowadays, “[f]or most people in
Britain [...] Latin America is a marginal region of unknowns and curiosities
with its stereotypical generals and corrupt politicians, its niggling but skilful
footballers, and increasingly, its salsa music.” (ibid.: 33). In other words, Latin
America is studied by British academics and the British population is inter-
ested in Latin American culture, but few deal with how their own country
relates to the region in current affairs. As a consequence, only a few book-
length analyses of British relations with the region exist, the most recent such
contribution being Victor Bulmer-Thomas’s edited volume on Britain and Latin
America: A Changing Relationship (Bulmer-Thomas 1989a). The sparsely popu-
lated ranks of British-Latin American relations, however, give this investiga-
tion the potential to provide unique and fresh insights.
In the case of Germany, the body of literature is more substantial, and
provides helpful analyses in tracing the development of German policy to-
wards Latin America over time up until the present day (e.g. von Gleich 1968;
Mols 1984; Grabendorff 1993; Mols and Wagner 1994; Maihold 2008, 2010).
There is thus a relatively solid stock of secondary literature to draw on in ana-
lysing German foreign policy towards Latin America. The older studies can
provide a historical background, while the more recent ones will be used to
help assess the results of this investigation. However, similar to the British
literature, the German body of research lacks a unified effort to systematically
analyse the factors that drive policy-making towards Latin America. Often, the
contributions take stock of the state of the relationship very thoroughly. They
usually conclude that Latin America does not receive as much German atten-
tion as it should, or the wrong kind, and make recommendations as to how
things might be improved (e.g. Benecke et al. 1993; Maihold 2008). This is
due to the fact that many of the studies are published as papers at think tanks
or political foundations and are therefore set to have a normative component
centred on how policy towards the region could be improved.
Both the British and the German bodies of literature on relations with Latin
America suffer from the problem that Latin America is not a foreign policy
priority for the respective countries. In the case of Britain, for instance, Gra-
ham (1989: 52) comments that “few reasons have been found in Whitehall to
pay anything other than sporadic attention to Latin America” since 1945. Like
politicians, political scientists tend to be drawn to those policy areas that are
‘interesting’ and fast-moving. Special relationships and crisis regions are ana-
40 CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION AND FRAMEWORK
lysed in depth, while the more day-to-day aspects of foreign relations do not
receive such coverage. This is unfortunate. After all, routine relations con-
stitute a large share of most European countries’ interaction with the rest of
the world. By looking at policy towards Latin America, this study therefore
contributes to the analysis of an important aspect of foreign policy that is all
too often ignored. For both Britain and Germany, literature dealing with these
countries’ foreign policy in general will have to be taken into account in order
to provide starting points and possibilities for cross-validation. That way, I will
be able to provide additional insights into the extent to which policy towards
Latin America might be typical or unique.
For Spanish relations with Latin America, of course, the exact reverse is
true. For Spain, policy towards Latin America is special and generates the cor-
responding amount of researchers’ attention, more than this literature review
could ever hope to analyse. Alongside overarching studies on policy towards
Latin America (e.g. Malamud 2004; del Arenal 2009a; Moltó 2010), there are
also numerous studies on Spanish policy towards Latin America within the
EU framework (e.g. Grugel 2002; del Arenal 2006). Latin America also plays
an important role in the literature analysing Spanish development policy, as
it is a major recipient of Spanish development assistance (e.g. Martínez and
Sanahuja 2010; de la Iglesia-Caruncho 2011). However, with some exceptions
such as Baklanoff (1996) or Youngs (2000), output is often limited to Spanish-
language publications. While more recently, some papers are also published in
English, even if they are published by think tanks based in Spain (e.g. Grugel
2002; Gratius 2010), there is still a language barrier that prevents research on
Spanish foreign policy towards Latin America, but also Spanish foreign policy
more generally, from being received outside Spain.1 Nevertheless, in the case
of Spanish policy towards Latin America, there is ample possibility for this
study to draw on existing literature and compare results with it.
All three bodies of literature have one commonality: they do not speak to
each other. Studies focused strictly on the national background do not attempt
to set the national policy towards Latin America in relation with other coun-
tries’ policies towards the region (in part, this is also due to the aforementioned
language barrier). The existing literature can inform this study with regard to
policy output. To a more limited degree, since literature is scarce especially
for the British case, it can shed light on individual states’ preferences regard-
ing Latin America policy. In general, however, the field suffers from a lack of
systematic comparative analysis of Latin America policy-making in Europe. In
1A similar problem applies to Germany, although in recent years German research has become
much more internationally focused and centred on publishing with English-language journals and
publishing houses, so that its international profile has been raised. Spanish research is moving in
a similar direction but has been slower to adapt.
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most cases, it focuses either only on a particular aspect of Latin America policy,
on one country’s policy, or descriptively on current issues and policy recom-
mendations. In order to understand what drives policy-making towards Latin
America in Europe, a uniform comparative framework is required to facilitate
theory-guided empirical analysis. By presenting such a framework, this study
will add not only to the existing academic debate on European-Latin American
relations, but also to the unification of individual national bodies of literature
that are currently disconnected from one another. This is not just relevant from
an academic vantage point, but also from a more practical perspective: as the
EU seeks to strengthen its biregional partnership with the region, it is import-
ant to obtain a better grasp of what the different EU Member States’ policy
backgrounds are in order to discover potential common areas of interest and
thus move towards a more concerted EU policy towards the region.
EU-Latin American Relations and the Member States
In addition to the country-specific studies there are some volumes looking at
the EU-Latin American relationship which deserve being mentioned at this
point, not only because they can provide insights for the case study on national-
EU-level interaction, but also because they introduce an element of comparison
that the above nuclei of literature on national policy towards Latin America are
lacking. In fact, two of the few texts onUK-Latin American relations come from
just such edited volumes: Kippin and Grugel’s 2006 study forms part of a book
edited by Christian Freres and José A. Sanahuja (2006) on relations between the
EU and Latin America. A more recent study of the Europeanisation of British
national policy towards Latin America by Laurence Whitehead is forthcoming
in a volume edited by Lorena Ruano (forthcoming 2012). Both these volumes
also include chapters dealing with Spain (del Arenal 2006; Sanahuja forthcom-
ing 2012) and Germany (Bodemer 2006; Trueb forthcoming 2012b). Technically,
both are limited to analysing EUMember States’ foreign policies towards Latin
America within the EU context. Nonetheless, they also provide insights into
the bilateral policies that, especially for the case of Britain, cannot be found
elsewhere. Despite this achievement, neither study provides a truly compar-
ative framework of European countries’ policies towards Latin America. This
is, in part, due to their limitation to the EU context as these studies focus on
one specific aspect of foreign policy. It is, however, also due to the nature of
edited volumes, which by virtue of being composed of individual researchers’
contributions tend to struggle with providing what George and Bennett call
“structured, focused comparison” (2005: 67ff, 71). Therefore, although these
studies are broader in scope because they include more country case studies,
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the present investigation is better able to directly relate results from the differ-
ent countries under study with one another.
In addition, there is a body of literature concerned with the biregional re-
lationship between Europe and Latin America more generally, without focus-
ing on specific Member States. This is the case of studies by Grabendorff and
Seidelmann (2005), Sanahuja (2006), Gratius (2007; 2008; 2009), Maihold (2006;
2007) and Freres et al. (2007). Others are concerned with particular policy
areas, such as development (e.g. Freres 2000; 2010). While the biregional rela-
tionship is not the focus of this investigation, these contributions are helpful in-
sofar as they reflect on the importance of theMember States within the relation-
ship, as for instance Westphal’s contribution to Grabendorff and Seidelmann’s
volume does (Westphal 2005a: 354). With respect to this field, the present
study therefore constitutes a more in-depth analysis of the factors emanating
from the Member States that substantially shape the biregional relationship.
By complementing the literature on European-Latin American relations from
the perspective of systematically comparing national foreign policies towards
Latin America, this contribution goes to form part of this research tradition in
a meaningful way.
In the following, I introduce and discuss this study’s dependent variable,
foreign policy towards Latin America conceptualised as policy activity towards
the region. This variable will be subject to further scrutiny in Chapter 3, where
it will be measured for all three countries under study, and contrasted in detail.
I then go on to analyse how various theories of foreign policy can be helpful
in devising an overarching explanatory framework, and provide general hy-
pothetical statements that may be pertinent to an explanation of cross-national
variation.
2.1.2 Foreign Policy towards Latin America in Europe
In order to assess different EUMember States’ policies towards Latin America,
a comparative map of policy towards Latin America in the three countries un-
der study is required as a starting point. That is, the variation in the dependent
variable has to be mapped systematically: before analysing it comparatively,
one must knowwhat foreign policy towards Latin America in Germany, Spain,
and the UK looks like andwhere the differences lie. This begins with a specific-
ation of what is understood by ‘foreign policy’. In this study, I substitute this re-
latively vague termwith ‘foreign policy activity’ in order to reach a more easily
measurable concept. ‘Foreign policy activity’ allows for establishing variation
across the three countries and across policy areas or ‘dimensions’, as I will pro-
ceed to call them. Therefore, the study assesses how active the three countries
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are regarding policy towards Latin America, as well as whether they display
the same level of activity in all areas of their relationship with the region. The
operationalisation of policy activity and its measurement will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 3. In this section, an outline of how the dependent variable
is structured and its theoretical motivation will suffice. To later enable a pre-
cise and comprehensive operationalisation and measurement of policy activity
towards Latin America, a fine-grained structure is provided.
A useful definition of foreign policy is provided by Christopher Hill (2003:
3), who considers it “the sum of official external relations conducted by an
independent actor (usually a state) in international relations”. This defini-
tion’s strength lies in its idea that foreign policy as a whole consists of the
sum of policy in various areas vis-à-vis external actors such as states or re-
gions. Therefore, it is useful to consider a spectrum of different areas of rela-
tions with Latin America when analysing foreign policy towards the region. In
his 2003 volume, Hill is concerned with foreign policy in a globalised world,
leading him to emphasise the importance of considering ‘traditional’ foreign
policy side-by-side with foreign economic policy (Hill 2003: 13f). Given the im-
portance of economic relations in European states’ policy towards Latin Amer-
ica, the idea that foreign economic policy is one component of overall foreign
policy is an important notion. A similar point was, indeed, made earlier by
Czempiel (1981: 16) in dividing the content of policy into security, welfare (in
the sense of economic well-being) and governance – meaning that the three
had to be considered in parallel.2
Czempiel conceptualises ‘welfare’ in the sense of economicwell-being (ibid.)
pursued by a state, or rather its representatives, when making policy – includ-
ing foreign policy. In foreign affairs, according to Czempiel, welfare refers to
external economic relations, trade, and official development assistance (ibid.:
129ff). Governance, on the other hand, refers to a distributive system of power,
freedom, and participation (ibid.: 135). In terms of external relations, the gov-
ernance dimension thus includes issues such as the promotion of democracy
and human rights. The security dimension, finally, understood in its tradi-
tional sense of military security, is less relevant in European-Latin American
relations, as neither region feels militarily threatened by the other.3 However,
2The German original distinguishes between “Sicherheit”, “Wohlfahrt (im Sinne wirtschaft-
lichenWohlstands)”, and “Herrschaft” (Czempiel 1981: 16). Czempiel makes it clear that in foreign
policy, this refers to issues such as external economic relations, trade, and official development as-
sistance (ibid.: 129ff). “Herrschaft” could be translated as ‘authority’, but the meaning Czempiel
attributes to it (a distributive system of power, freedom, and participation, ibid.: 135) makes ‘gov-
ernance’ the better choice.
3An exception, of course, is the Falklands/Malvinas situation between the UK and Argentina.
However, this can be considered a minor enough issue to make it theoretically safe to subsume
security aspects under the governance dimension.
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‘new security issues’ such as drug trafficking, terrorism and migration (Brown
and Ainley 2005: 177) do matter in the relationship. But because of the struc-
ture of the relationship between EUMember States and Latin America, they are
included in the governance dimension, because they are fundamentally dealt
with through mechanisms of political dialogue.
Furthermore, since all three countries under study are Member States of
the European Union, it is reasonable to include a European dimension of for-
eign policy. Indeed, accepting the notion that the EU may have a distinct-
ive impact on how Member States make policy calls for a specific research
agenda on European foreign policies. This point is made by White (1999: 56),
who analyses the case for a European branch of FPA and has been seconded
more recently by Larsen (2009) in his paper on “A Distinct FPA for Europe”.
Member States’ interaction with the European level is ubiquitous nowadays,
even in external relations. The extent to which EU membership significantly
changes Member States’ policy by adding an additional level to the relation-
ship that interacts with national policies has been analysed in depth by stu-
dents of Europeanisation more generally (e.g. Börzel 2005; 2002) as well as
by studies focussing specifically on foreign policy (e.g. Wong and Hill 2011;
Larsen 2009; Manners and Whitman 2000). If we accept these studies’ premise
that there is reason to believe that EU membership substantially changes the
aspect of foreign policy in EUMember States, there is good reason to also intro-
duce a European dimension to the dependent variable measuring how active
the countries under study are at the EU level regarding policy towards Latin
America.
Using these considerations as a point of departure, I thus conceptualise for-
eign policy as consisting of three dimensions: economic policy, governance,
and an EU dimension. The economic and governance dimensions, in turn,
include several subcomponents making up each dimension.4 Together, the
three dimensions constitute the total of foreign policy, that is, Hill’s “sum of
official external relations”. Table 2.1 summarises the three dimensions of for-
eign policy towards Latin America and their respective subcomponents. I now
briefly discuss each dimension in turn.
2.1.2.1 The Economic Dimension
As Table 2.1 shows, the economic dimension includes both trade and invest-
ment relations and development cooperation. In making policy towards Latin
4The issue of variable dimensionality will be discussed in depth in Chapter 3. For now, suffice
it to say that the sub-parts of each dimension are best seen as components of this dimension, rather
than sub-dimensions, because they will yield the basis for the indicators to be combined into a
measure of policy activity on each dimension.
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America, European countries attempt to secure trade and investment possib-
ilities for their domestic industries and firms. Although the negotiation of
trade agreements and, since the Treaty of Lisbon, investment protection treaties
with third countries falls under EU competency, the promotion of economic ex-
change and investment between Member States and Latin American countries
remains very much in the hands of each individual country, and the Member
States have been careful not to give the Commission too much competence in
this respect (Woolcock 2005: 379f, 389). It is important to note here that what
I am concerned with here are not the trade and investment figures that might
be driving economic policy towards Latin America. In the context of economic
policy as a dependent variable, it is the activity on the part of policy-makers to
promote economic exchange and investment between their countries and Latin
America that is of interest.
While the case for including trade and investment promotion on behalf of
policy-makers in the economic dimension is an obvious choice, the case for
including development cooperation here must be made more carefully. Hill
(2003: 134ff) includes both trade and aid as means of “economic statecraft” in
foreign policy, which justifies the inclusion of development cooperation under
this dimension. As pointed out above, Czempiel (1981: 129ff) makes a similar
argument and includes both trade and aid under his “welfare” dimension. In
both cases, this is of course predicated on the idea that states use development
cooperation as a tool to reach their goals. Yet the discussion in the development
literature on why states give aid and whether altruistic, appropriateness-based
or utilitarian, consequences-based factors carry the day has not been satisfact-
orily solved (see Lumsdaine 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007 for two
sides of the debate). At this point, however, we are not yet concerned with
the driving factors of development policy towards Latin America, which will
be the subject of Chapter 5, but with a helpful categorisation of the different
policy areas to facilitate a “structured, focused comparison” (George and Ben-
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nett 2005: 67ff) between the three countries under study. Additionally, even
with a logic of appropriateness in mind when considering development policy,
one could argue that since its aim is to enhance economic development in the
recipient countries, it continues to be well-placed in the economic dimension
even if it is more than just part of the arsenal of tools at foreign policy-makers’
disposal when attempting to advance their country’s economic interests.
2.1.2.2 The Governance Dimension
The governance dimension includes three subcomponents, which are intim-
ately intertwined. The first is political dialogue, a term wide enough to accom-
modate cooperation between politicians and diplomats on almost any issue. In
the case of European countries’ relations with Latin America, political dialogue
as a diplomatic instrument includes exchanges for instance on the promotion
of good governance, migration issues, social cohesion, human rights and the
fight against drugs as well as, increasingly, talks on political cooperation on
the global stage, as Latin America’s weight in the world grows – just to give an
idea of the range of issues covered. It is fairly easy to see why political dialogue
has been included in the governance dimension, as these issues are well within
the concept of Czempiel’s “Herrschaft” (governance) dimension. After all, a
discussion of questions of human rights, democracy, and global governance
in the dialogue between two countries is precisely the foreign policy or inter-
national dimension of Czempiel’s distributive system of power, freedom, and
participation (Czempiel 1981: 135ff).5 Additionally, as indicated above, ‘new
security issues’ are also included in political dialogue.
The second subcomponent of governance is cultural policy. All three coun-
tries under study operate cultural foreign policies designed to extend their
culture and language beyond their own borders, and all three of them have
cultural policy links with Latin America, as I will show in Chapter 3. Cul-
tural policy speaks to the governance dimension by attempting to bring the
European countries’ history, culture, language, and thereby their own gov-
ernance systems and values, closer to Latin America (and occasionally vice
versa). Hill (2003: 134ff) includes cultural diplomacy among the means of car-
rying out foreign policy, thus bringing out the close connection between the
first two subcomponents of ‘governance’.
The third and final subcomponent is civil society involvement. This is re-
lated to the governance dimension in that ‘governance’ may include the in-
volvement of non-state actors in the official policy process. Kohler-Koch and
5Although Czempiel’s work is very much rooted in the Cold War context, his discussion con-
tinues to ring true in its fundamentals.
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Rittberger (2006: 28) note that “Governance [...] denotes the participation of
public and private actors”. Although they deal with governance as applied to
the EU context, this conceptualisation can be extended to the foreign policy-
making process. In all three countries under study, civil society organisations
(CSOs) are actively involved in the relationship with Latin America. They
receive contributions from the governments to work with and in the region.
Their work clearly stretches into the field of ‘governance’: firstly, they work
on issues of good governance, education, human rights, democracy, and so
on. Biekart (2006: 12) lists eight main areas of action in European CSOs’ work
with Latin America, of which the following are relevant for governance as
conceptualised here: political participation, socio-economic rights,6 civil soci-
ety development, conflict, peace construction and reconciliation, and gender.7
Overall, “political participation” was the most populated category with 89%
of the CSOs covered by Biekart’s study stating that they worked in this area.8
What is more, CSOs themselves are a hallmark of the kind of pluralistic gov-
ernance system Europe seeks to promote in Latin America (Westphal 2007:
100ff), thereby establishing a link with those issues discussed under political
dialogue. Therefore, like cultural policy, CSO engagement serves to bring the
European ‘distributive system’ closer to Latin America. In some cases, the
CSOs reinforce what is emphasised by government actors in political dialogue,
in others they challenge it. Precisely by sometimes challenging their home
governments, for example for being soft on human rights abroad, they show
European governance systems at work in foreign policy. Their involvement
in policy towards Latin America is thus well-placed under the governance di-
mension.
2.1.2.3 The European Dimension
The final dimension of foreign policy towards Latin America is the European
dimension. Based on the literature discussed above (e.g. White 1999; Larsen
2009; see alsoWhite 2001), the European dimension is a particular aspect of the
foreign policies of EU Member States, as European action becomes a channel
for them to carry out policy vis-à-vis third countries and regions. In particular,
Wong and Hill’s statement that “[a]ny definition of European foreign policy
[...] has a particular dimension” (2011: 3) demonstrates the importance of this
point: it is now impossible to think about EU Member States’ foreign policies
without considering their EU membership and the relationship between na-
6Biekart joins this with economic development in the same category.
7The remaining working areas are related to development.
8CSOs could indicate several areas of involvement. Note that in other regions, where socio-
economic development is lower than in Latin America and therefore more of a focus for CSOs, it
may be worth grouping CSO involvement in the ‘development’ category.
48 CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION AND FRAMEWORK
tional policies and the EU level. Assessing the involvement of the three coun-
tries under study with the EU’s policy towards Latin America, therefore, is
promising not only because it says something about the countries’ relationship
with Latin America, but also about the way national foreign policy-makers in-
teract with the EU level in foreign policy issues. The European dimension is
conceptualised here as the importance of the EU level in Member States’ policy
towards Latin America.
The European dimension, however, presents a problem of product-process
ambiguity: while here it is conceptualised as part of the dependent variable,
there is considerable theoretical reason to expect and evidence suggesting that
EU membership impacts upon foreign policy-makers in the first place (see e.g.
Manners andWhitman 2000; M.E. Smith 2000). However, as all three countries
under study are by now long-standing members of the EU, the impact of EU
membership is, to a very large extent, held constant. If anything, it would be
domestic or other mediating factors that account for differences in the EU’s
impact on Member States’ foreign policy-making towards Latin America.
Furthermore, the EU is of course relevant in the two other dimensions as
well. In fact, the economic and governance dimensions with their sub-parts
seep into the EU dimension in that these policy areas are also relevant at the EU
level, albeit to varying degrees: development policy is an area of shared com-
petence, external commercial relations are communitarised, and the EU carries
out political dialogue processes with the countries of Latin America through
fora with varying Member State involvement (for a discussion of these mech-
anisms and their content, see Alemany 2007). It is therefore important to make
clear that in the context of the European dimension of the dependent variable,
what is being looked at is the level of policy activity the three EU Member
States under study direct towards Latin America via the EU framework. How-
ever, the EU’s special status as both an influencing factor and a dimension of
the dependent variable must be taken into account by the theoretical frame-
work and is further discussed in Section 2.2.1.1.
Having outlined the theoretical motivations for the conceptualisation and
structure of the dependent variable, it is the task of Chapter 3 to consider the
empirical implications of this conceptualisation. In Chapter 3, I will therefore
outline the operationalisation and measurement of foreign policy activity to-
wards Latin America and then proceed to put them into practise by indexing
foreign policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Germany, Spain, and
the UK using an innovative indexing procedure based on fuzzy-set Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). In the next section, I move on to theorising the
factors that might be able to explain variation in the dependent variable.
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2.2 Explaining Foreign Policy towards Latin Amer-
ica: Theoretical Framework
In the search for explanations of foreign policy activity towards Latin America,
theories of foreign policy offer a wide range of independent variables that may
play a role (Hudson 2007). To narrow down the field of potential explanatory
factors for the case at hand, I now make the case for a liberalism-based frame-
work with the appropriate extensions that can incorporate factors emanating
from the domestic level, as well as from the international and European level –
with the latter factors in turn being mediated by the domestic level. Based on
the selection of the three cases under study, this section begins by making the
case for a liberal focus and then proceeds to outlining the study’s explanatory
factors. Because of the study’s structure, consisting of the above-mentioned in-
dex of policy activity and two in-depth case studies of different policy areas, I
will not formulate in-depth hypotheses in this part of the investigation. Specific
independent variables and hypotheses will instead be specified for each of the
two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, based on the relevant middle-range theor-
ies pertinent to each case. Nevertheless, in this section, I clarify those overarch-
ing independent variables that may influence policy towards Latin America in
Europe and formulate expectations about what such influence might look like
and how it might affect the level of policy activity.
2.2.1 A Liberal Theoretical Approach
2.2.1.1 The Case for a Liberal Focus
What kind of theoretical approach is required to explain the foreign policy
activity of Germany, Spain, and the UK towards Latin America? As discussed
in the previous chapter (see Section 1.1.4), this study is based on aMost Similar
Systems Design (MSSD), trying to hold constant as many factors of the cases
under study as possible (della Porta 2008: 214ff). The factors that are held con-
stant here are mostly systemic: all three countries can, within reason, be con-
sideredmiddle powers, all three are influential EUMember States, in particular
regarding policy towards Latin America, and finally, they have been EU mem-
bers for a relatively long time by now, which should have given them enough
time to adjust to EUmembership.9 Those explanatory factors that may explain
variation in the dependent variable are therefore most likely found in the do-
mestic realm of each country. Therefore, an explanation of variation should be
9However, see fn 12, p. 30 for the particularities of the Spanish case and why this factor should
be taken into account.
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based on a theory that focuses on domestic explanations rather than on the geo-
political position of each country under study within the international system
or the EU, as for instance Realist theory might. The theoretical framework that
best matches this investigation’s requirements is hence a liberal framework,
since it “focuses on subsystemic determinants of behaviour” (Rittberger 2001a:
4).
2.2.1.2 Characteristics of a Liberal Focus
Liberal theories of foreign policy concentrate on the importance of domestic
preferences in explaining foreign policy activity or behaviour. In Hill’s defini-
tion of foreign policy as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an
independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (2003: 3), liberal
foreign policy theory dives into the factors that motivate the state to carry out
its “sum of official external relations” in a certain way as based on the outcome
of a domestic process of preference aggregation (Moravcsik 1998: 20f). The
fundamental idea is that the factors conditioning a state’s preferences are to be
found within the state. This idea appeals to this study’s framework because
if systemic factors are by and large constant, the explanation for differences
in foreign policy activity towards Latin America must be found at the level of
each individual state under study.
The process of preference aggregation itself – that is, the question of how
policy-makers arrive at determining what foreign policy they should pursue
and how actively – is exogenous to my framework, since I am concerned with
which factors impact upon foreign policy towards Latin America rather than
with how these factors are formed. While I am aware that how they are formed
– such as through the interaction of interest groups (see especially Moravcsik
1993, 1998) – is intimately linked to the explanation of which factors matter un-
der which circumstances, the actual preference aggregation process is mostly
outside the scope of this investigation and would require a different method-
ological approach that cannot be covered within the limits of this study, al-
though I do hope to be able to give some indications.10 There are a number
of different types of preference that may determine foreign policy.11 The task
10It might, however, be the subject of future research.
11Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 146f) conceptualises two causal mechanisms for the choice of prefer-
ence: public pressure (emanating, for instance, from interest groups) or elite choice (that is, policy-
makers’ decisions). Which one is at work at a given time may depend for example on the intensity
of the general public’s or interest groups’ preferences on a certain foreign policy issue, but this
question is not particularly relevant for the purposes of this investigation. In fact, it is likely that,
especially in Germany and Britain, elite choice is mostly at work since the general public is not
particularly interested in Latin America, while in Spain, where there is a large Latin American
population and the region is more in the focus of the general public, public pressure may be more
relevant. However, what this study is interested in is which preferences are relevant – that is, what
factors motivate policy towards the region –, not how they are chosen.
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of this study is to uncover which ones are important in foreign policy towards
Latin America on behalf of each country, under which circumstances, and how
they may interact.
Different varieties of liberalism see the origin of preferences in different
areas. Andrew Moravcsik (1997) differentiates three, which he terms commer-
cial, republican, and ideational liberalism. Freund and Rittberger (2001: 71), on
the other hand, differentiate between two variants of what they call ‘utilitarian
liberalism’: structural and agency-based liberalism. Systematising these dif-
ferentiations, they can be said to vary along two dimensions: firstly, the logic
of action, and secondly, the type of ‘preference motivator’, i.e. what determ-
ines policy-makers’ choice of preference. The logic of action corresponds either
to a logic of expected consequences or a logic of appropriateness (March and
Olsen2004; 1989) – that is, whether action is based on rationally trying to real-
ise those preferences determined during preference aggregation, or whether
it is based on what is considered by policy-makers the ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’
course of action. Both variants of Freund and Rittberger’s utilitarian liberalism
and Moravcsik’s commercial and republican liberalism correspond to a ration-
alist, consequentialist logic, while ideational liberalism corresponds to a logic
of appropriateness and has therefore also been termed “liberal constructivism”
(Wagner 2002; Koenig-Archibugi 2004) or “societal constructivism” (Boekle et
al. 2001: 105f). Indeed, Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 145, fn 18) explicitly points out
that “ideational liberalism” and “liberal constructivism” amount to the same
approach.
The ‘preference motivators’ that condition the independent variables are
threefold. Freund and Rittberger provide the more general approach in classi-
fying structural and agency-based motivating factors, with which Moravcsik’s
republican and and commercial liberalism are commensurate. Under struc-
tural – or republican – liberalism, preferences depend on the domestic struc-
ture, that is, a country’s form of government or the strength of a state vis-à-vis
domestic society (Freund and Rittberger 2001: 71f) – as Moravcsik (1997: 530)
calls it, the “mode of domestic representation”. Structural, or republican, liber-
alism is not relevant to the study at hand, as the form of government does not
vary substantially across the three countries in question. All are liberal, and
indeed parliamentary, democracies. The fact that Germany is a federal repub-
lic while Spain and Britain are parliamentary monarchies should not have any
significant impact on their foreign policies towards Latin America.
The second type of preference motivator is agency-based (Freund and Ritt-
berger 2001: 72), and Moravcsik’s commercial liberalism can be subsumed un-
der this: preferences here depend on domestic interests, whereby domestic
groups compete for the realisation of their respective interests (ibid.), and the
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most important, or strongest, interest is incorporated as a policy goal. Moravc-
sik sees commercial liberalism’s preference motivator in “patterns of market
incentives” or “distributional conflicts” (1997: 528f) and considers mostly the
(economic) well-being of the most powerful interest group as the determinant
of preferences and thus of foreign policy. ‘Commercial’ liberalism is, in this
sense, a misnomer: well-being may also allude to political or social well-being
rather than strictly to economic interests – depending on the policy area under
study. Freund and Rittberger’s ‘agency-based liberalism’ terminology is thus
more comprehensive. Therefore, foreign policy towards Latin America based
on preferences according to agency-based liberalism would be motivated by,
for example, economic interests in economic policy, or political interests in
political dialogue.
The third preference motivator is not covered by Freund and Rittberger,
who only deal with utilitarian liberalism, but is comprised by Moravcsik’s
ideational liberalism or constructivist liberalism. While both structural (repub-
lican) and agency-based (commercial) liberalism correspond to a consequen-
tialist logic of action, ideational liberalism populates the above-mentioned cat-
egory based on a logic of appropriateness. Preferences are, here, motivated by
“domestic social identities or values” (Moravcsik 1997: 525) or, as Boekle et
al. (2001: 105f.) put it, “norms shared within the society” – or, indeed, norms
shared among policy-makers, if Koenig Archibugi’s causal mechanism of elite
choice for state preferences holds (Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 146f). Therefore,
what would matter here are considerations over what constitutes the ‘right’
or ‘legitimate’ foreign policy action in general, and in particular towards Latin
America. In Table 2.2, I summarise the typology of liberalisms based on the
above discussion.
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As I have outlined above, structural liberalism will not be considered in
this investigation, leaving utilitarian agency-based liberalism – which I will
proceed to call utilitarian liberalism for the sake of simplicity – and liberal con-
structivism as potential explanatory theories for the framework of this study.
2.2.2 A Note on Logics of Action
At this point it is worth briefly considering the compatibility of the two logics
of action. Establishing this relationship is important in order to be able to make
meaningful predictions about the impact of this study’s independent variables.
Additionally, the issue has been the subject of heated debate in the literature.
This debate over the merits of rationalism and constructivism in Political Sci-
ence and in the wider Social Sciences is highly complex and involves deep on-
tological as well as epistemological discussions and divisions that concern the
very basics of human behaviour. An in-depth discussion of the debate’s intric-
acies is therefore beyond the scope of this study and has been well carried out
elsewhere (e.g. Fearon and Wendt 2003). Due to the work of many research-
ers (e.g. Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003, Risse 2003, among many others)
trying to bridge the rationalist-constructivist divide through a pragmatic ap-
proach, it has become relatively widely accepted that the differences are in-
deed surmountable and both logics of action can be combined within the same
explanatory framework. Researchers advocating the integration of both logics
of action tend to settle on a ‘thin’ or ‘moderate’ (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel
2003; Risse 2003) variant of constructivism that feeds into a positivist epistem-
ology and allows the researcher to look for the influence of independent vari-
ables on a given outcome or dependent variable. Within such a framework,
the two logics can then enter into a fruitful conversation based for instance on
a division of labour, a sequential approach, or the subsumption of one under
the other (Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel 2003). This investigation accepts the
idea that material factors matter at the limit (Fearon and Wendt 2003: 58), and
that high substantive stakes invite rational calculation, although relatively low
stakes allow for non-calculative decision making (Jupille et al. 2003: 21). Simil-
arly, Wagner (2002: 102, 107, 166) prioritises material factors and complements
them with liberal constructivist ones in explaining the preferences of different
EU Member States over EU foreign policy.
What does this mean for explaining policy activity towards Latin America?
I am going to assume that the intensity of material – economic or political –
interests determines, to some degree, the receptiveness of the three countries
under study to the impact of the constructivism-based variables conceived in
this study. Simply put, the idea is that ‘interests trump norms’. Overall, there-
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fore, I expect Spanish policy towards the region to be more interest-driven than
that of Germany and Britain, whose interests in Latin America are lower. This
translates both into higher overall policy activity towards the region on behalf
of Spain, and on the influence of the different independent variables, which
will be hypothesised in detail in the two case study chapters.
Departing from these considerations, therefore, this study will develop a
theoretical framework that incorporates independent variables from both a lo-
gic of appropriateness and one of expected consequences within a positivist
framework. The challenge, as Zürn and Checkel (2005) point out, will be to
show for cases of equifinality whether behaviour is caused by constructivist
or by rationalist explanatory factors. Researchers have noted that operation-
alising constructivist explanatory variables without leaving room for rational-
ist interpretations is difficult (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Zürn and Checkel
2005), and one of this study’s tasks is to overcome this problem as far as pos-
sible.
2.2.3 Liberal Explanatory Factors
From the above discussion, the question arises of which explanatory factors, or
independent variables, the two varieties of liberalism considered by this study
posit. Therefore, in the following I outline which factors might be relevant
and how I expect them to play out in the cases and countries under study. It
is important to bear in mind, however, that I reserve the creation of detailed
hypotheses for each individual case study in order to make more fine-grained
and case-appropriate predictions. Here, instead, I focus on deriving general
theoretical expectations.
Utilitarian Liberalism Within the utilitarian-liberal approach, as discussed
above, material factors are frequently seen as a strong influence (Freund and
Rittberger 2001: 68). In his seminal book The Choice for Europe, Moravcsik finds
overwhelmingly in favour of economic considerations as driving international
cooperation (Moravcsik 1998: 3). Especially in a relationship where issues of
geopolitical “high politics” (Moravcsik 1998: 4) are of little importance, such as
the European-Latin American one, a utilitarian-liberal view expects economic
factors to have great explanatory leverage, as preferences are motivated by the
‘strongest interest’ (see Table 2.2). Therefore, in order to construct hypotheses
relating to utilitarian-liberal explanatory factors, it is important to bear in mind
that according to this framework, “what states want is the primary determin-
ant of what they do” (Moravcsik 1997: 521). The researcher then has to ascer-
tain policy-makers’ preferences over policy towards Latin America to explain
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their policy choice and the intensity with which relations with the region are
conducted.
Economic Interests Liberal accounts of foreign policy often emphasise
material factors, since their economic well-being is what domestic interest
groups and, eventually, voters care the most about (Wagner 2002; Freund and
Rittberger 2001; Moravcsik 1998). Therefore, it is possible to imagine that
policy towards Latin America is conceived primarily with the goal of increas-
ing the economic benefits of those domestic firms who are already active in
Latin America through trade or investment, or those who want to enter the
up-and-coming Latin American markets. In this case, I would expect to see
the country with the largest economic interests in the region (Spain) to operate
the most active policy towards Latin America, followed by Germany and the
UK, whose economic sectors’ involvement with the region is lower (Eurostat
2009). This would affect foreign economic policy towards the region – includ-
ing development policy – in particular, but the governance dimension and the
European dimension might likewise be affected as efforts are concentrated in
those countries where close relations seem to promise the largest economic re-
turns.
How these factors play out in the respective policy areas will be discussed
in more detail within the individual case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, where
case-specific hypotheses are derived. Nevertheless, some general expectations
can be stated here for each of the independent variables, in particular regard-
ing the levels of policy activity to be measured in Chapter 3. As stated above,
it is likely that domestic economic interests go rather a long way in explain-
ing policy activity on the economic dimension, in particular the trade and in-
vestment component thereof. Things look different on the development sub-
component of economic foreign policy towards Latin America, where conflict-
ing motivations on behalf of policy-makers are more likely, as I will discuss in
detail in Chapter 5. As for Spain, it is the country with the highest economic
stakes in Latin America (Eurostat 2009; see also Arahuetes and García 2007;
Heredero and Hernández 2006) and may therefore be expected to be partic-
ularly active on this dimension as it seeks to secure these accomplishments,
particularly in the current crisis where its Latin American investments have
helped keep Spanish enterprises afloat (The Economist 2009). However, if eco-
nomic interests are the main driver behind policy towards Latin America, I
would also expect this to be the dimension where Germany and Britain are
the most active, given the region’s economic growth during the period under
study and the fact that their political interest in Latin America is even lower.
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Political Interests However, whether it is economic or other preferences
determining policy activity may also depend on the policy area. Latin Amer-
ica’s growing importance on the world stage as its economies continue to grow
while those of Europe are struggling warrant additional attention to the “stra-
tegic setting” (Frieden 1999: 48) in considerations of rationalism-based pref-
erence formation. The strategic setting, according to Frieden, is important in
determining actors’ foreign policy preferences in that it constitutes the frame-
work within which they move. Applying this to the context of this study,
one would have to consider the shape of the relationship between the coun-
tries in question and Latin America to determine what each of them ‘wants
from’ the region: is the relationship primarily based on economic factors, or
is there for example a geopolitical component? If so, we would expect foreign
policy towards Latin America to be more active on the governance dimension,
and policy-makers would motivate their policy choices with the importance of
Latin American countries as political partners. Similarly, Wagner (2002: 110)
considers “power” and “plenty” to be the main utilitarianism-based determin-
ants of state preferences. In the Latin American case, in line with a utilitarian-
liberal approach one would expect “plenty” to carry the day as an explanation
for policy towards the region on behalf of EU Member States, but there may
also be an increasingly important “power” component.
Regarding their implications for policy activity, political interests are likely
to matter more on the governance dimension, and again I would expect Spain,
which has been traditionally close to Latin America, to be the most active here.
Spain has been said to use Latin America as a way of projecting itself interna-
tionally (e.g. Grugel and Alegre 1991; Moltó 2010), so that it can be expected
to display high levels of activity. As regards Germany and Britain, it is diffi-
cult to anticipate theoretically where political interests matter more and which
country might display higher levels of policy activity as a result. Both can be
expected to be relatively low, as Latin America is not an important political
partner for both countries: Germany is traditionally more oriented towards
its European partners and the US, as well as more recently towards Eastern
Europe (Anderson 2005; Grabendorff 1993), and the UK – vice versa – often fo-
cuses on the transatlantic relationship first and Europe second, also orienting
itself towards multilateral fora (Williams 2004; Forster 2000). However, polit-
ical interests may also influence the economic dimension and the European
dimension, thus potentially increasing activity in these areas.
However, it is important to test the liberal-utilitarian framework against
competitive explanations, and to check whether other factors that can enhance
the liberal explanations might matter in European countries’ foreign policy-
making towards Latin America. The variation in the dependent variable re-
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vealed in the next chapter may not be entirely explained by liberal utilitarian-
ism, or may even present puzzles for it. For example, in explaining develop-
ment policy towards Latin America, one may want to consider norms over aid
allocation as a potential explanation. In the case of national foreign policies’
interaction with the EU level, it may be worth considering the impact of so-
cialisation at the European level. In placing the competing or complementary
independent variables on the same footing as the liberal utilitarian ‘baseline
model’,12 I begin by contemplating factors from the realm of liberal construct-
ivism.
Liberal Constructivism – National Socialisation into Domestic Norms Ide-
ational factors, however, represent amethodologically challenging concept and
researchers have struggled to operationalise them. Thus, they have frequently
“tended to be pushed aside” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 889).13 As previ-
ously discussed, this investigation seeks to integrate rationalist and construct-
ivist explanatory factors within a positivist framework. The enormous ad-
vantage of such an approach is that it allows the researcher to treat ideational
factors, such as domestic norms giving rise to a national identity, as a vari-
able (Abdelal et al. 2006) alongside and complementing rationalism-inspired
factors. In their edited volume, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) assemble a
range of articles that show what such an approach is capable of. In particular,
taking ideational factors into account, contributions to their work show how
“nations react quite differently to similar material circumstances because of
fundamental differences in normative beliefs about politics” (ibid.: 16). Wag-
ner similarly theorises “reality constructs”, defined as identities, norms and
values (Wagner 2002: 166), as a possibility to move beyond rationalism-based
explanations. These and other works discussed above operate under the ba-
sic assumption that the world is “ideational as well as material” (Ruggie 1998:
879).
From these considerations derives the liberal constructivist idea that policy-
makers may have been socialised into a domestic norm upon which they base
their decisions about policy-making towards Latin America. Normative pre-
scriptions about the ‘right’ or ‘legitimate’ way to carry out foreign policy may
exist and may vary across different countries. Different ideas about the ‘right’
or ‘legitimate’ content and conduct of foreign policy towards Latin America
may therefore result in different foreign policy behaviour on behalf of differ-
12Motivations for using the rationalist framework as a baseline model are discussed in Section
2.2.2; for an in-depth assessment see also Wagner (2002: 102ff).
13Although Finnemore and Sikkink’s piece considers the relevance of international norms,
which are not strictly the focus of this study (unless mediated by domestic factors), this difficulty
applies to ideational factors in all settings.
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ent countries. Ideas can serve as policy makers’ road maps, defining poten-
tial ways of procedure, they can serve as focal points defining solutions to a
problem or ‘glue’ holding a coalition of policy-makers together, and they can
become institutionalised, specifying policy in the absence of innovation (Gold-
stein and Keohane 1993: 13ff). It might even be the case that policy-makers
as such are especially susceptible to such a norm, as they might choose their
career path based on wanting to implement a certain kind of policy. Thus,
Germany, the UK and Spain may, for instance, have different foreign policy
cultures (Boekle et al. 2001: 105f) within which their approaches towards Latin
America are embedded. Policy-makers may be motivated by what they see as
‘appropriate’ given their policy culture, national identity, or domestic norms.
However, in this study, I am not interested in how policy-makers have been
socialised, but whether they have been socialised, so that the socialisation pro-
cess as such remains exogenous to this framework. In considering national
socialisation, I borrow from the literature on the subject that has evolved in EU
studies, where national-level socialisation has been shown to be important in
policy-making (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005).
Observing the effects of socialisation as such is difficult, and many studies
of socialisation have struggled to operationalise it in such a way that it does
not leave room for rationalist interpretations (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1062).
Of course, this study cannot solve all the methodological problems associated
with the concept of socialisation,14 but by providing a clear conceptualisation
of socialisation’s status as an exogenous independent variable for the purposes
of this study, as well as by triangulating different sources, I can provide a plaus-
ible account of the factors at work.
As for their impact on policy activity, domestic norms about what kind of
foreign policy is legitimate or ‘the right thing to do’ may exist in all three coun-
tries and impact upon all the dimensions of policy towards Latin America con-
ceptualised in Section 2.1.2. How they will affect policy activity depends very
much on the national norms themselves and is difficult to state in a general
manner – they may increase, or indeed diminish it. For example, if there is a
domestic norm at play in Britain that development assistance should go to the
poorest countries (Watkins 2010), this may well draw activity away from Latin
America, which is comparatively ‘rich’. On the other hand, if in Germany there
is a domestic norm about directing foreign policy at least partially through the
EU framework, this would likely increase German policy activity on this di-
mension while it might lower it for the UK, where domestic norms regarding
the EU tend to be rather sceptical (Wagner 2002). Therefore, in the case of do-
mestic norms it is instrumental to ascertain not just whether they matter, but
14These issues are discussed in depth by Beyers (2010).
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which ones are at play in a particular policy field, as this impacts upon the
level of activity with which a country is likely to act towards Latin America.
For each case study, therefore, secondary literature will be employed to be able
to incorporate directional statements into the theoretical expectations. In par-
ticular, country-specific studies of foreign policy-making in Britain, Germany,
and Spain will be helpful here. They include, among others, Rittberger (2001a)
andMalici (2006) for the German case, Youngs (2010) andAixalà i Blanch (2005)
for the Spanish case, andWilliams (2004) andWallace (2005) for the British case
– to mention only a few recent studies.
Overall, previous research suggests that German foreign policy has been in-
fluenced by a national perception that the right way to carry out foreign policy
is that of a civilian power embedded both in Europe and the international com-
munity (e.g. Katzenstein 1996; Aggestam 2000; Anderson 2005, among others),
even after reunification: Rittberger (2001b: 7) terms it a “norm-consistent for-
eign policy”, and Malici (2006: 37) argues that many of Germany’s choices
in foreign policy are based on a “foreign policy culture of reticence”.15 Nev-
ertheless, more recently there has been a renewed debate about the extent to
which Germany’s foreign policy is based on domestic norms or whether it is
becoming more interest-driven. (Karp 2009; Bulmer and Paterson 2010, see
also Daehnhardt 2011). I therefore expect German policy activity towards Latin
America to be influenced by domestic norms, although this impact should be
secondary to the realisation of its domestic interests. The specific norms expec-
ted to be at play will be defined in the individual case studies, although they
should be broadly in line with Germany’s foreign policy-making culture as a
peaceful state embedded in both the European Union and the Western interna-
tional community.
As regards Spain, the problem is that its foreign policy has been rapidly
developing since its democratisation after 1975, and that during the course
of these developments, it has been subject to different motivations (Aixalà i
Blanch 2005: 92ff.). However, with regard to policy towards Latin America
there are domestic norms that have been constantly present at least since its
access to the European Community in 1986: the double identity of being both
European and ‘Iberoamerican’ (Barbé 2009, 2011),16 which can sometimes lead
to tensions (del Arenal 2009b: 40). This foreign policy norm of ‘belonging’ to
the Iberoamerican space is thus likely to substantially influence foreign policy
activity towards Latin America and lead to high levels of activity in all areas.
This means that in the case of Spain, both interests and domestic norms should
contribute to the making of its Latin America policy and it is important to dis-
15Emphasis in the original.
16On the “Iberoamerican Community” (Comunidad Iberoamericana), see fn 7, p. 28.
60 CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION AND FRAMEWORK
entangle the two in order to understand the extent to which policy is driven by
both types of factors.
Finally, in the UK, the factors underlying foreign policy-making in general
have been shown to be relatively pragmatic (e.g. White 2001: 120; Forster 2000)
and driven by what Forster terms – in the EU context – “a robust cost-benefit
analysis”. Regarding policy activity towards Latin America, I therefore expect
the impact of domestic norms to be relatively weak, and overall policy activ-
ity to be low (except, as discussed above, in the area of economic policy) and
driven by interest-based factors rather than norms. However, the two case
studies chosen here present some particularities. In the case of development
policy, there has indeed been a strong drive towards poverty alleviation in the
UK that might be driven by a domestic norm (Porteus 2005). In the case of
policy towards Latin America in the European context, it is no secret that the
UK has traditionally been more of an “awkward partner” in Europe (George
1994). Thus, Eurosceptic national norms might also affect how UK policy-
makers carry out foreign policy towards Latin America within the EU frame-
work (Whitehead forthcoming 2012). These issues will be further discussed in
the two case study chapters. For now, let it suffice to say that factors rooted in
domestic norms are expected to be less relevant in the UK than in Spain and
Germany.
In spite of the above evidence for certain national norms arising from pre-
vious literature, it is important that the interviews with policy-makers remain
open enough to be able to uncover norms that may be novel or unexpected
(Gläser and Laudel 2010), an issue that will be discussed in Chapter 4. The im-
pact of norms, however, is also likely to interact with the ‘interest’ variables –
wemight imagine, for example, that economic interestsmay ‘trump’ normative
considerations about foreign policy. Similarly, there are some policy areas that
are more susceptible to the impact of norms than others, making their study
particularly interesting regarding the aforementioned interaction between dif-
ferent motivating factors: it is much more likely that domestic norms impact
upon development policy towards Latin America than, for example, in trade
and investment policy. The impact of domestic norms, therefore, is likely to cre-
ate a more balanced map of foreign policy activity towards Latin America, for
interest-driven foreign policy would mostly increase activity on the economic
dimension and the governance dimension – in the case of the governance di-
mension, especially on the political dialogue component where issues of dip-
lomacy and international politics are covered.
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2.2.4 The Limitations of Liberalism: Extending the Framework
The baseline framework of my study is thus centred on liberalism-based ex-
planations of foreign policy, drawing on both rationalist-liberal and constructi-
vist-liberal factors. However, it is important to address the liberal framework’s
limitations and show how it can be extended to improve upon these shortcom-
ings.
The main issue for this study is the monocausal view of foreign policy a lib-
eral approach takes, focusing exclusively on domestically originated preferences.
The impact of the international level is largely exogenous to the liberal account
of foreign policy. Yet the issue of the systemic level’s influence and its com-
patibility with a liberal framework is important and deserves a more detailed
elaboration. A liberal focus brings with itself the need to discuss this investig-
ation’s particular variant of the agency-structure problem: the reciprocal inter-
play between actors and structure is difficult to conceptualise in social science
in general and in Foreign Policy Analysis in particular (Carlsnaes 1992: 249f).
At the risk of oversimplification, I do not want to pretend that I can even come
close to solving this problem, and much less so within the scope of this study.
Hence, I adopt a pragmatic approach by focusing on the ‘actor’ side of the coin
while trying to hold as much as possible of the ‘structure’ constant through the
application of the most similar systems design discussed previously. This is
not to say, however, that the global systemic and institutional settings of the
states under study do not matter. Although I consider the international system
largely exogenous to my framework, it is unwise to ignore systemic factors en-
tirely. In this section, I first outline which systemic factors this study considers
relevant and how I expect them to be received in the three countries under
study. I then go on to theorise the mechanisms by which they might operate
and how I expect them to play out in the cases under study here.
Indeed, proponents of institutionalism argue that the frameworks within
which policy-makers interact internationally – that is, macro-level factors – af-
fect their preferences and the way they make (foreign) policy. National for-
eign policy-makers may adapt national foreign policy to rules or norms em-
anating from the international level. Because in particular Moravcsik’s theor-
ising on liberalism, and his liberal intergovernmentalist theory more specific-
ally (Moravcsik 1993; 1998), originated within the framework of the European
Union, such criticism is also often located within that framework (e.g. M.E.
Smith 2000; Risse and Börzel 2000; Lewis 1998; Sandholtz 1996). In 2005 an
entire special issue of International Organization was dedicated to the question
of such questions within a framework entitled “International Institutions and
Socialization in Europe” (Checkel 2005). Most recently, Wong and Hill (2011)
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and Moumoutzis (2011) have theorised the impact of the European level on
general Member State foreign policy, and an edited volume by Ruano (forth-
coming 2012) deals with the Europeanisation of foreign policy towards Latin
America in particular. The aforementioned researchers thus focus mainly on
the impact of the EU on Member States’ policy-making both in general and in
foreign affairs in particular. This makes their work particularly pertinent to
the case study on the interaction between national approaches and the EU’s
foreign policy towards Latin America (Chapter 6).
Yet similar arguments might be made about the potential impact of inter-
national interaction more generally, making it relevant also for other aspects of
foreign policy such as development assistance, which will be studied in detail
in Chapter 5. Indeed, the impact of the wider international level on policy
makers and policy-making has also been subject to exhaustive previous re-
search (e.g. Slaughter 2004; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1997). While
the basis of this study’s country selection is, in part, their similar positions in
the international system andwithin Europe, this argument is hardest to uphold
when it comes to the larger global scene, where the UK and Germany occupy
more influential positions than Spain. The UK, for example, is a permanent
member of the UN Security Council. Germany and the UK have considerably
larger economies than Spain, especially since the beginning of the economic
crisis that has beset the country in the latter part of the period covered by this
study.17 On the grand scale of things, it remains plausible to argue that the
countries’ position in the global community is sufficiently similar to justify a
main focus on domestic, that is, liberal explanatory factors. To some extent, all
three are Europeanmiddle powers in the international environment. However,
country-specific factors might account for the potential differential impact of
global-level factors. However, researchers differ about how the impact of the
systemic level, be it the EU or the wider international context, comes about, as
I will further discuss below.
How can the two frameworks be reconciled? As outlined above and in
greater detail in Chapter 1, the country selection in this study is based on the
idea that the countries in question have similar positions in the international
system and at the EU level, and this is why a liberal focus is particularly well-
suited to explain differences in their foreign policies towards Latin America.
What is more, it can be argued that all formal foreign policy is made by officials
in the relevant government ministries and agencies – mainly the ministries of
foreign affairs,18 where they are firmly embedded in a domestic setting. There-
17That said, the effects of the crisis were not fully felt in foreign policy until 2010 (Molina and
Tovar 2011).
18Recall that the definition of foreign policy proposed by Hill (2003) referred to “official external
relations”.
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fore, if there is a differential impact of the international or European level, this
is most likely brought about by domestic differences through which the impact
of systemic factors is ‘filtered’ (Risse et al. 1999).19 As Cortell and Davis (1996)
point out, policy-makers can invoke international rules and norms in making
national policy choices. This, then, is fully compatible with a liberal frame-
work in that the systemic level becomes a factor that influences the preferences
of domestic policy-makers. How this influence is received may then depend
on domestic features, such as the strength of interests or norms on a certain
issue. Additionally, as regards the impact of EU-level factors, a further aspect
needs to be taken into account that justifies the focus on mediation through do-
mestic factors. As indicated previously, all three countries analysed are large
EU Member States. Both Germany and the UK are pivotal states in the Union,
and Spain’s special relationship with Latin America promotes it to such a posi-
tion in policy towards the region. Their position within the EU should hence be
sufficiently similar to assume that if there are differences in the ways in which
EU-level mechanisms play out in the three countries, this should be a result
of their interaction with domestic factors. Nevertheless, in Chapter 6 I will test
hypotheses dealing with EU-level factors in order to ascertain whether they are
influential. However, since among my analysed cases there is no non-Member
State,20 if there is variation in how EU-level factors are received in the three
states under study, they are most likely to result from domestic factors (Mou-
moutzis 2011: 615). Therefore, while the European level may impact upon
national foreign policy, its impact is conceptualised in this study as mediated
by country-specific factors.
Figure 2.1 visualises the study’s overarching theoretical framework.
2.2.5 Systemic independent variables
Having conceptualised how the international and the EU level may impact
upon foreign policy-making, and how this impact might be mediated by do-
mestic factors, I now assess in more detail the possible ways through which
this impact may occur. As with the liberal factors, this study takes a prag-
matic approach to the possibility of interaction and complementarity of the
different independent variables. While I set out to assess which factors best
explain foreign policy activity towards Latin America in Europe, there is no
reason to believe that they should be mutually exclusive or could not be in-
teractive. Nevertheless, it will be crucial to carefully distinguish between the
19For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see also Moravcsik (1997: 522; 542ff).
20Haverland (2006: 139ff) points out the need to include non-EU states within a similar setting if
the goal is to fully determine the impact of Europe. But if EU membership is constant, the impact
of Europe should be similar, unless there is variation in domestic factors.
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Figure 2.1: General Theoretical Framework: Foreign Policy towards Latin
America
different independent variables in order to reach coherent explanations of for-
eign policy-making towards Latin America. In this section I will again form
some general expectations about the impact of the systemic variables, while I
reserve the derivation of specific hypotheses for the case studies in order to be
able to make them more fine-grained.
Rational Adaptation to International and European rules One mechanism
by which systemic, macro-level factors might come to influence foreign policy
is the rational adaptation to international or European standards. The motiv-
ation for policy-makers to conform to such standards is governed by a logic
of expected consequences. Slaughter (2004), for instance, conceptualises in-
ternational governance networks in which policy-makers from different coun-
tries collaborate in solving common challenges and problems. Through inter-
action, the network becomes a “conduit for information” about the members
of the network and “their competence, quality, integrity and professionalism”
(Slaughter 2004: 54), and facilitates the creation of behavioural standards (Ma-
jone 2001: 272; see also Slaughter 2004: 54). Even if there exists an interna-
tional norm about a certain type of behaviour, policy-makers may adhere to it
in order to preserve their status as a ‘good partner’ with their international or
European peers, as well as in order to retain influence and not be left out of
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international decision-making circles. Therefore what Checkel (2005) calls “be-
havioral adaptation” to international rules might be an explanatory factor for
foreign policy towards Latin America. I term this variable ‘rational adaptation’
in order to avoid confusion with other mechanisms, opting for the “behavioral
adaptation” terminology employed by Checkel (2005), or ‘rational adaptation’,
over Slaughter’s use of “socialization”, thus reserving the term for the context
of the logic of appropriateness.
With respect to policy activity itself, as with domestic norms, the impact of
rational adaptation depends on the policy area and international rule in ques-
tion. For development policy, for instance, we may imagine a rule of using
foreign aid to alleviate poverty (Baulch 2006). This would lead countries to
focus their aid on poorer countries, both within Latin America and more gen-
erally, thus potentially leading policy activity away from this relatively rich
region.21 Regarding interaction between national foreign policy towards Latin
America and the EU level, there might be rules about sharing information with
European partners, or accepting policies in which other EUmembers have very
strong interests onto the national foreign policy agenda (Checkel 2005).22
Rational adaptation is, of course, more likely to have an impact in policy
areas where a lot of international interaction occurs – as is the case, for example,
in development policy and, even more so, in the European context. Rational
adaptation to international rules may be particularly important for Spain. As
I have already discussed (see fn 12, p. 30), although membership in the West-
ern international community and the EU is a factor all three countries have in
common and should by now have fully incorporated into their foreign policy-
making process, Spain is still a relative newcomer to the international arena
and might be particularly keen on being seen as a reliable and important in-
ternational partner. Indeed, Spanish adaptation to international and European
patterns has occurred in both foreign aid (e.g. Olivié 2004; Sanahuja 2009) and
foreign policy both towards Latin America and in general (Torreblanca 2001;
Baklanoff 1996; Grugel and Alegre 1991), but these may be the result of both
rational adaptation, international socialisation (see below), or even a change in
domestic norms. Therefore, the interviews will be vital in ascertaining which
motivating factor is behind such patterns. Similarly, Germany has traditionally
been eager to demonstrate its compliance with international or European rules
(e.g. Aggestam 2000), and this study will try to shed futher light on whether
this is due to normative or consequentialist considerations – or both, thus con-
tributing to a current wider debate in the literature about Germany’s foreign
21These dynamics will be discussed in much more detail in Chapter 5.
22Again, a specific hypothesis regarding rational adaptation in the EU context will be derived in
Chapter 6.
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policy motivations (e.g. Bulmer and Paterson 2010; Karp 2009). Britain, on the
other hand, has been traditionally more of an international rule-maker (e.g. in
foreign aid, Watkins 2010), so that the effect of rational adaptation is likely to
be weaker here because there is little need for the UK to adapt to international
rules for whose making it is partially responsible.
Overall, it is important to note that rational adaptation to international rules
is unlikely to be independent of domestic interests. Departing from the idea
that domestic interests should be the main driving factors of foreign policy-
making, as discussed above, we can expect that the stronger domestic interests
are, the more likely policy-makers are to forego their reputation and status in
favour of reaching the national interest should there be a clash between the
two. Thus, especially in the case of Spain interesting interaction between the
two is likely, as interests might drive Spain towards a highly active policy,
while international or European rules might favour the direction of policy
activity away from the region. In Germany and the UK, where interests are
weaker, such a clash should not be present and rational adaptation to interna-
tional rules – if it does make an impact – can affect foreign policy activity more
directly. At the same time, in particular the UK’s position as an international
rule-maker should lower rational adaptation overall. These considerations in-
dicate that complex interrelations between the different independent variables
are to be expected, and Chapters 5 and 6 will shed further light on how they
play out.
Socialisation into International and European Rules On the other hand, it
is also possible that they become socialised into international rules and norms,
coming to accept them as the ‘appropriate’ way to behave in a given setting.
In this case, policy-makers no longer operate within a logic of expected con-
sequences, but one of appropriateness. There are two ways by which actors
could theoretically be socialised, and Checkel terms them “Type I” and “Type
II” socialisation. “Type I” refers to role playing: policy-makers internalise rules
and behave according to them because they consider them appropriate given
the forum. Yet they have not reflexively internalised these rules (Checkel 2005:
810). Such reflexive internalisation is necessary for “Type II” socialisation to
have occurred. In this case, policy-makers have truly come to believe that a cer-
tain way of carrying out policy is the right way to go (ibid.: 812). However,
for the purposes of this study, I exogenise the actual socialisation process. In-
stead, this study is interested in what policy-makers base their decisions on
and whether or not they have been socialised, not how they have been socialised.
Yet if the international context is similar for the three countries discussed, as
I have argued above, the question is how international socialisation can make
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a differential impact in the three countries under study. As previously out-
lined, I conceptualise the independent variables emanating from the interna-
tional level as mediated by the domestic context, in line with Risse et al. (1999).
With international socialisation, I consider such interaction to take place in par-
ticular with domestic norms: if an international or EU-level norm resonates
with a similar domestic norm, then it is more likely to have an effect than if
this is not the case (Acharya 2004; Rittberger 2001b: 5; Boekle et al. 2001: 114).
At least for the EU level, there is evidence that domestic norms are more influ-
ential for policy-making than international ones (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005),
making the idea that domestic norms might mediate a country’s receptiveness
to international norms plausible. Detailed hypotheses regarding these issues
will be established in each of the case study chapters.
As discussed in the previous section, whether a country incorporates inter-
national rules into its foreign policy may be motivated by both rational adapt-
ation or the result of policy-makers having been socialised at the international
level, and finding out which dynamic is at play in Germany’s, Spain’s and Bri-
tain’s policy towards Latin America is one of the tasks of this investigation.
Some country-specific expectations can, however, be given. As I have pointed
out above, Spain is – in comparison to the other two countries – relatively new
to the international community, but its policy-makers have by now had ample
exposure to international and European interaction to potentially have been so-
cialised (Barbé 2011). Nevertheless, given its shorter trajectory, the processmay
not yet be complete. As regards Germany, there is previous evidence for Ger-
man foreign policy being guided by both domestic and international as well as
European norms (Wagner 2002; Rittberger et al. 2001a). Finally, for the UK the
above consideration that it has traditionally been an international pace-setter
also applies here. As a norm-maker, it should therefore be more of a socialiser
than a socialisee (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). For policy activity, making
foreign policy in the light of international norms should, if anything, diver-
sify policy activity across the different policy areas – although different norms
may be at play that can have different effects on policy towards Latin America.
This might apply, for example, to activity on the development component of
the economic dimension, as outlined above, where having been socialised into
an international norm of development policy as poverty-alleviating (as with
rational adaptation or a similar domestic norm) might detract donor countries’
attention from Latin America. Closer attention to these aspects is paid by the
respective case studies.
As with rational adaptation and domestic socialisation, however, I also ex-
pect interaction between domestic interests and the impact of international so-
cialisation. If material factors do indeed matter at the limit (Fearon and Wendt
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2003: 58), given Spain’s economic and political interests in the region its recept-
iveness to international norms might be attenuated when it comes to policy
towards Latin America. Conversely, for the Germany and the UK, whose do-
mestic and political interests in the region are lower, international socialisation
could impact policy more directly if it were at play (see the previous paragraph
for expectations).
2.2.6 Limitations of the Extended Liberal Framework
As all theoretical frameworks, this extended liberal theoretical account has its
limitations and exogenises certain factors that my have an impact on foreign
policy towards Latin America. However, it is impossible to take all factors into
account in one single study. By holding some of them constant, including EU
membership, the policy ‘recipient’ (Latin America), and – at least to some de-
gree – the countries’ position in the international setting, it is therefore possible
to minimise variation in these potential influencing factors.
One account this investigation does not consider in depth is that advanced
in particular by historical institutionalists: it does not especially focus on provid-
ing an historically inspired account of critical junctures, unintended conse-
quences and path dependence shaping foreign policy towards Latin America
in Europe (e.g. Fioretos 2011; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Aspinwall and
Schneider 2000). Of course, the idea that historical factors such as colonial-
ism are at the root of divergent levels of foreign policy activity towards Latin
America is highly intuitive and appealing. This is particularly so given that
with Spain, one of the countries under study was in fact a colonial power in
the region. Moreover, Britain had a vast empire that did not include Latin
America (but did include parts of the Caribbean where the UK still has over-
seas territories), so that its focus may be drawn away from Latin America as a
result of a traditional focus on other regions. This is a perfectly valid consider-
ation. However, there are several aspects that led me away from providing an
historical institutionalist account in the strict sense of the term.
Firstly, the fact that Britain, after the Latin American republics became in-
dependent quickly rose to a position akin to that of a quasi-colonial power
(Fowler 2008: 67ff) somewhat weakens the argument that the UK does not
have a history with Latin America. The question of why it turned away from
the region is for researchers of history to answer, but the present work is con-
cernedwithwhat factors shape the UK’s (and the the other two countries’) rela-
tions with Latin America today. While historical institutionalist accounts have
a great deal of value, they require a different, more evolutionally-oriented re-
search design than the one employed in this study, which essentially presents
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a snapshot of foreign policy-making towards Latin America spanning roughly
the past half-decade (see Chapter 1). Foreign policy and the diplomatic service
in particular is a fast-moving field with high staff turnover, making it difficult
to access previous members of Latin America departments at ministries of for-
eign affairs, for instance. A study with a more in-depth historical focus would
thus have required a very different research methodology and a focus centred
more exclusively on historical factors in order to get a handle on these issues.
More importantly however, this study claims that the factors a more his-
torically based account might emphasise can be comprised within this study’s
framework. For instance, one of the independent variables conceptualised by
my investigation involves domestic norms. There is no reason why, for ex-
ample, in Spain such a norm could not be historically based – Spanish policy-
makers may feel that they have a particular responsibility for a region where
Spanish colonisers committed a range of atrocities, or for a region with which
they have cultural and historical commonalities. Indeed, there is evidence from
previous research in particular for the latter (e.g. Barbé 2009). Although this
is historically based, it may have become a national norm into which policy
makers could potentially be socialised and is therefore commensurate with the
liberal constructivist approach contemplated above. It is rather obvious that
levels of foreign policy activity towards Latin America have historical roots.
However, how these historical roots have transformed into today’s explanat-
ory variables for policy fields such as development policy or the interaction of
national and European policy vis-à-vis the region is something that this study
can explore. While not a historical institutionalist account, therefore, the in-
vestigation is nevertheless historically aware.
At the same time, I do not dive deeper into the group dynamics, bureau-
cratic and organisational processes, or the psychological factors that also form
part of many FPA-based studies (Hudson 2007). Again, this is not to say that
they do not matter – previous theorising and research, most famously by Al-
lison (1971) – on organisational processes and bureaucratic politics – and Janis
(1972) – on the influence of ‘groupthink’ on foreign policy – has shown that
they do. But in the context of this investigation, where the goal is cross-case and
cross-country comparison of foreign policy towards Latin America, a frame-
work allowing for such comparison above the level of the individual or even
small-group dynamics must be established. While it is important to be aware
of the existence of ‘more macro’ and ‘more micro’ influencing factors, a single
study cannot possibly take them all into account, especially if it wants to go
beyond the in-depth study of one single case.
Yet another factor that has to be considered in a study of policy towards
Latin America is the specific relevance of the United States as a potential in-
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fluence on European countries’ policies towards Latin America (Grabendorff
2005). The UK’s transatlanticism has been shown to be particularly strong (For-
ster 2000: 47; Williams 2004: 912), and Bulmer-Thomas (1989b: 200) has also
pointed to the US’s importance in Britain’s relations with Latin America. Sim-
ilarly, previous research has shown that the US plays a rolewhenGermany con-
siders policy towards the region, taking into account US interests (Grabendorff
1993: 45f, 74ff), but at the same time wanting to ensure the US is not the ‘only
game in town’ in Latin America (Bodemer 2006: 265). Finally, in the case of
Spanish policy towards Latin America, the US’s role is very complex. Under
the Conservative Aznar government, Spain tried to move closer to the US on
policy towards Latin America, while the Socialist Zapatero government tried
to recover some of its autonomy (del Arenal 2005: 115). Additionally, it mat-
ters who occupies the Oval Office: while Zapatero’s relations with Bush were
frosty, he tried very hard to get on a better footing with Obama (Powell 2009).
In a long-term perspective, pursuing a strong Latin America policy without
compromising the relationship with the US has always been a balancing act
for the Spanish government (Bodemer 1987: 84; Moltó 2010; Gratius 2010: 4).
However, there are two reasons that can be adduced to justify exogenising
the ‘US factor’ to some degree. One is that US influence in Latin America and
hence, by proxy, its influence on other countries’ policies towards the region is
waning, both because Latin America is becoming more independent (Weisbrot
2011: 70) and because of declining attention from Washington (Gandasegui
2011). Secondly, as discussed above, the US is taken into consideration by all
three countries. US influence as such is therefore constant across the three
countries under study, and the way it plays out in each country is mediated
by domestic factors. Even so, however, it is important not to lose sight of the
US’s presence in European foreign policy-making generally and policy-making
towards Latin America in particular.
2.3 Further Considerations
In this Chapter, I have shown where this investigation’s contribution to the ex-
tant literature on foreign policy-making towards Latin America lies: in provid-
ing a comparative, unified theoretical framework that can be applied across
countries without losing sight of potential national specificities, it goes beyond
the traditional focus on single cases or analyses of policy within the EU frame-
work. While I focus on three countries that have been selected for their simil-
arities and their importance within the international and European system, the
framework could theoretically be applied to any EU Member State, although
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its usefulness is the greatest when applied to countries with an autonomous
national Latin America policy that do not carry out most of their relations with
the region through the EU framework.23 Thus, I contribute to the unification
of a disparate field that is full of unrealised potential, especially given that it
opens up the possibility for the analysis of regular day-to-day foreign policy
that is all too often ignored.
The chapter has also provided a conceptualisation of foreign policy, and
policy activity towards Latin America in particular, which will be the subject of
more in-depth conceptualisation in the next chapter, where it will be measured
using an index constructed on the basis of fsQCA. Foreign policy is conceptu-
alised here as consisting of three dimensions that are relevant for EU Member
States: an economic, a governance, and a European dimension.
Furthermore, I have outlined the explanatory framework of this investig-
ation, which rests on liberal foreign policy theory, thus focusing on domestic
factors that may be able to explain the differences between the foreign policies
towards Latin America of the three countries under study. The framework con-
ceptualises two utilitarian liberal variables – economic and political interests –
as well as a constructivist liberal one focusing on domestic norms about foreign
policy. However, since it is unwise to ignore the wider European and inter-
national systems within which the three countries under study make foreign
policy towards Latin America, I extend the liberal framework to include both
rational adaptation to and socialisation into international (and European) rules
and norms. While in this chapter, I have outlined some general implications
for policy activity towards Latin America, the two case studies on develop-
ment policy and interaction between national and EU-level policies towards
Latin America will draw up more specific hypotheses based on the appropri-
ate middle-range theories. In general, I expect that the more multi-causal the
explanation for a country’s foreign policy towards Latin America, themore bal-
anced its activity across the three dimensions will be, as I expect the utilitarian-
liberal explanations to drive primarily the economic dimension and parts of
the governance one. In addition, Spain will likely display high levels of activity
across all dimensions, with the UK and Germany being considerably less act-
ive overall and concentrating activity especially on the economic dimension.
Let me now turn to empirically analysing these claims by measuring policy
activity towards Latin America on behalf of the three countries.
23This caveat limits the framework’s applicability to the new EU Member States, whose Latin
America policies are, for the most part, only just beginning to develop, and are doing so almost
entirely within the EU framework.
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Chapter 3
British, German, and Spanish
Policy Activity towards Latin
America
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74 CHAPTER 3. POLICY ACTIVITY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA
In the previous chapter, I outlined the theoretical basis for the structure of this
study’s overarching dependent variable: policy activity towards Latin Amer-
ica. ‘Policy activity’ represents a more tangible way of conceptualising foreign
policy, since it facilitates operationalisation. It is, as previously explained, di-
vided into three dimensions: an economic, a governance, and a European di-
mension, which are summarised in Table 2.1 (page 45) alongside their various
sub-dimensions. In this chapter, the operationalisation of ‘policy activity’ and
its measurement will be discussed in more detail. In order to make operation-
alisation and measurement comparable across the three countries under study,
I will develop an index to score their policy activity towards Latin America
using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA; Ragin 2000; 2008;
Rihoux and Ragin 2009) in an innovative fashion.
The use of fsQCA to create an index provides two main advantages: firstly,
it allows for the integration of both qualitative and quantitative data to create a
systematic map of the data. It allows the small to medium-N researcher to dive
deeply into the cases at hand without foregoing the advantages of a highly
structured comparison. Secondly, it enables the researcher to structure data
that are otherwise not easily comparable in an incremental process, exposing
variation at different stages of the index aggregation procedure. The fuzzy-
set scores resulting from indexing will be used to reveal variation that might
lead to further theoretical and empirical insights. This permits the selection
of particularly promising aspects of variation for further scrutiny through in-
depth case studies. Based on the results of indexing, two particular cases will
be subject to further study in the second part of this investigation: develop-
ment policy and the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin
America. Although fsQCA has previously been used for ideal type analysis
(Gran 2003; Kvist 2007), its potential to compile indices for structured compar-
ison still remains under explored. This chapter thus contributes to the inquiry
into the method’s potential for various aspects of scientific investigation, and
to bridging the gap between different types of data.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I will refine the theor-
etical conceptualisation developed in Chapter 37 by developing indicators for
the individual aspects of policy activity. I then go on to make the case for using
an index to measure policy activity and lay out how to do so using fsQCA. The
next step puts the method into practice by setting up the index, before I finally
discuss the variation uncovered and assess its implications for this study.
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3.1 Measuring andOperationalising Policy Activity
towards Latin America
In the previous Chapter, I theorised the three dimensions of policy activity to-
wards Latin America. It is the task of this section to fill this conceptualisation
with life by operationalising the dimensions and their subcomponents with
indicators that can be measured across the three countries under study. First,
recall themotivation for re-conceptualising foreign policy towards Latin Amer-
ica as ‘policy activity’ towards the region. The three countries under study, Bri-
tain, Germany, and Spain, each operate a national foreign policy vis-à-vis Latin
America. This study, based on an extended liberal framework, seeks to explain
the origin of differences in these policies. However, ‘policy’ as such is not easy
to operationalise and measure, so that a more tangible conceptualisation has to
be found. ‘Policy activity’, as I show in this section, fits the bill rather well.
In this context, it is important to clarify the meanings of operationalisation
and measurement. The latter refers to the process of presenting a concept in
such a way that it can serve as part of an empirical statement. Often, the ex-
ample of temperature is used (Brady 2004: 63f). How do we know whether it
is hot, warm, or cold? And how do we know exactly how hot, warm, or cold
it is? Stevens (Stevens 1946: 677) defines measurement as “the assignment
of numerals to objects or events according to rules.” While one may reason-
ably argue that it is possible to measure without assigning a numeral – at lower
levels of measurement, what is assigned is a category or a more general value
(‘more’ or ‘less’) – Stevens’ definition makes sense in that measurement refers
to assigning a classification to a concept. Whether that classification is numer-
ical or qualitative is initially secondary, as is convincingly argued by Collier
and colleagues. In fact, it depends on the subject of study, since “political and
social attributes are not always quantifiable” (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright
forthcoming 2012). But in order to engage in measurement one must have a
measurable, in other words, observable object. Furthermore, as Brady (2004:
63) points out, “Measurement [. . . ] is not the same as quantification, and it
must be guided by theories that emphasize the relationships of one measure
to another.” In the case of this study, the relationships between the individual
concepts to be measured have been theorised in Chapter 2.
Operationalisation, then, refers to the part of the measurement process that
takes the researcher from the concept to be measured to an observable vari-
able (Miller 2007: 85f). The concept one wants to measure is often latent, that
is, not directly observable – just like ‘foreign policy towards Latin America’.
Therefore, the operationalisation step is required in order to find observable
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implications of the concept and thus make it measurable. This is done through
attaching a series of indicators to the concept (ibid.: 86), and it is much easier to
find such indicators for ‘policy activity’ than for ‘policy’, since ‘activity’ implies
that something one should be able to observe is happening.1
I therefore opt for ‘activity’, that is, how much policy towards Latin Amer-
ica is carried out by each country to overcome the difficulty of transforming a
latent concept into an observable variable. Differences in policy activity across
the countries should then become evident from differences in the indicators.
Developing these indicators is the task of the following paragraphs. When
constructing these indicators, it is important to bear in mind that they have to
be both valid (that is, they have to actually capture the concept the researcher
wants to measure) and reliable (that is, the measurement results have to be
reproducible by other researchers). Thus, the criteria for operationalisation
have to be clearly specified and documented (ibid.: 93). In particular, small-N
qualitative research has been criticised for privileging validity over reliability
(King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 152) by engaging in “thick description” that
makes measurement very convincing and plausible (validity), but is difficult
to cross-check by other researchers who do not have the same in-depth know-
ledge of the case (reliability). While reliability can evidently be a difficult issue
in qualitative research, it is important to keep it at a maximum by ensuring
transparency about the sources of data. As I will argue below, fsQCA facilit-
ates this transparency due to its highly systematic approach. What is more,
those sections of measuring policy activity based on qualitative data will be as
well-documented as possible.2
In addition, the issue of cross-national comparability of indicators requires
some attention. Comparative political research tends to struggle with what
van Deth terms the “problem of equivalence” (van Deth 1998; see also Munck
2004: 115; Miller 2007: 92): the difficulty of developing indicators measuring
the same concept across the cases under study. Country-specific idiosyncrasies
often mean that the same indicator measures different things in different con-
cepts, there is no functional equivalent to an indicator in the different cases
under study, or that functionally equivalent indicators still work in different
1Of course, since foreign policy is often subject to diplomatic confidentiality, not all aspects of
foreign policy activity can be directly observed. The task, then, is to find indicators that are not
only suitable, but also available to the researcher.
2All transparency regarding sources can do little to mitigate the issue of information disap-
pearing from the public domain as government websites are updated. Not all countries archive
public web sites when a new version is uploaded, and not all of them do so reliably. In fact, in
the particular countries under study, to my knowledge only the UK archives old versions of gov-
ernmental web sites at the National Archives page (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/).
Unfortunately, there is little that can be done about this except creating one’s own archive of web
site versions that have been used. I have tried to do so as far as possible, and PDF versions of cited
web sites are available upon request.
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ways and therefore have to be measured differently to be compared (Przewor-
ski and Teune 1970; Adcock and Collier 2001: 534ff). As I will show, the indic-
ators developed for measuring policy activity towards Latin America present
several varieties of the problem of equivalence. It is therefore important to
develop what Przeworski and Teune term “system-specific indicators” (Prze-
worski and Teune 1970, Chapter 6) whenever there are no equivalents in the
respective countries.3 Such system-specific indicators will be able to measure
the same concept, for example economic policy activity towards Latin Amer-
ica, by referring to different indicators for each country. Even when indicators
are indeed similar, such as in the case of cultural foreign policy, where cultural
centres are used as an indicator for policy activity, national differences in dis-
tribution and functioning of the centres have to be taken into account. Adcock
and Collier (2001: 536) term this type of indicators “adjusted common indic-
ators”, because while the same indicator is used for all cases under study, it
has to be adjusted to produce a valid measure across cases. Making indicators
comparable is thus an important task not just to achieve measurement validity,
but also to produce workable, meaningful indicators. As I argue below, the
establishment of an index using fsQCA is helpful in this respect.
Finally, the number of indicators employed to measure a concept deserves
some discussion. Introducing multiple indicators for the same concept can in-
crease a measure’s validity (Miller 2007: 94f) and reliability (Ragin 2008: 75)
by increasing the evidence in favour of a pattern. In particular, if qualitative
evidence can be complemented with some numerical indicator, this may also
increase its reliability, because such a numerical indicator tends to be easier to
replicate. However, if the indicators do not co-vary, this might be a reason for
the researcher to become suspicious of either the indicators’ validity or the di-
mensionality of the concept: perhaps it is obscuring variation that points to un-
derlying dimensions driving such patterns. Yet it is also possible that a country,
for whatever reason, focuses more on one aspect of the same dimension than
another and thus scores differently on indicators of the same dimension. The
issue of dimensionality is further discussed in Section 3.2.1, as it has been sub-
ject to – sometimes heated – debate in the literature (Blalock 1982: 109; Jackman
1985: 169; Miller 2007: 95f; Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forthcoming 2012).
3.1.1 Operationalising Policy Activity towards Latin America
In order for operationalisation to proceed, remember the dimensions and sub-
components conceptualised in in the previous chapter (see also 2.1, page 45):
3Alternatively, I will use the terms ‘context-specific’ or ‘country-specific’ to designate system-
specific indicators.
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• the economic dimension (subcomponents: trade and investment, devel-
opment)
• the governance dimension (subcomponents: political dialogue, cultural
policy, civil society involvement)
• the European dimension (EU involvement in national policy towards
Latin America across dimensions)
The dimensions, then, are the concepts for which indicators have to be found.
The subcomponents of these dimensions, such as trade and investment policy
or political dialogue are already much more concrete, thus easing the path to-
wards finding observable implications. I will now briefly recall each dimension
and discuss its operationalisation in turn.
3.1.1.1 Economic Dimension
Trade and investment policy activity Trade and investment policy activity,
in particular, is difficult to operationalise for cross-country comparison, be-
cause it is an especially poignant case of the ‘problem of equivalence’ discussed
above. While this may seem strange at first sight, given that both trade and in-
vestment flows themselves are easily quantifiable, the problem becomes appar-
ent once one notes the difference between trade and investment as such (pur-
sued by private companies) and trade and investment policy (pursued by the
government). Comparing how different national governments deal with pro-
moting their companies’ trade and investment abroad, and how actively they
pursue this policy vis-à-vis a certain region is complex. Each country has quite
specific ways of pursuing such policy. The trade and investment component
will hence require the development of country-specific indicators.
Furthermore, trade and investment policy is among the many phenom-
ena that Collier et al. allude to when stating that many “political and social
attributes” are not easily quantifiable (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forth-
coming 2012). Measuring trade and investment policy activity therefore has to
be carried out qualitatively in the first place. There are no pure, comparable
‘numbers’ available on the activities each national government engages in to
promote trade and investment opportunities for private business. Therefore,
the researcher must dive deeply into the qualitative data on how governments
view their role in trade and investment promotion and how they make trade
and investment policy. To establish measures for policy activity towards Latin
America in this field, I will use comparisons with each country’s policy activ-
ity towards other world regions wherever possible. In particular, Africa and
Asia will serve as helpful yardsticks, since they are the two world regions with
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which EU Member States have relationships approximating that with Latin
America the most. All three are home to both developing and emerging coun-
tries and – aside from the countries of Northern Africa – they are not in the
immediate neighbourhood. While it is important not to overemphasise the
similarities – indeed, I have previously argued that Latin America is a good
case for study precisely because it represents a kind of low-key relationship
that most of Africa and Asia do not – what is required here is some independ-
ent external measure against which to classify policy activity towards Latin
America. Asia and Africa do provide such a yardstick.
As outlined above, with qualitative data the challenge for the researcher is
to explicate concisely, yet exhaustively, the classifications reached in the qualit-
ative evaluation of cases. By doing so and laying open the sources from which
the evidence adduced for measurement is drawn, this study hopes to balance
validity and reliability as much as possible, keeping in mind King et al.’s afore-
mentioned warning against foregoing reliability for validity in qualitative re-
search (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 152).
Bearing the above considerations on multiple indicators in mind, this study
introduces further indicators to strengthen the validity and reliability of the
qualitative evidence. Just like the qualitative data, however, numerical evid-
ence is not always easily comparable across countries. Comparison with ex-
ternal yardsticks, such as an individual country’s policy activity towards other
world regions, enables the researcher to establish measurement.4 The reference
region in this case is Asia, as both regions consist largely of middle-income and
threshold countries. The following indicators were used:
• Britain: The number of Latin American countries classified by the British
government’s trade and investment support agency, UK Trade and In-
vest (UKTI), as ‘emerging markets’ vis-à-vis Asia (UKTI 2010). These are
countries where the British government intends to make special efforts to
secure the UK’s position regarding trade and investment.
• Germany: The number of bilateral mixed economic commissions (Gemisch-
te Wirtschafts- und Kooperationsräte) between Germany and Latin America
vis-à-vis Asia (BMWi 2010). These commissions are made up of govern-
ment officials and business representatives from both countries involved,
and focus on promoting trade and investment cooperation between Ger-
many and the partner country.
• Spain: Number of Planes Integrales de Desarrollo de Mercados (PIDM, Com-
prehensiveMarket Development Plans) with Latin America vis-à-vis Asia
4The use of various types of external yardsticks in fsQCA index creation will be assessed in
greater detail in Section 3.2.2.1.
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(ICEX 2010). Similar to the British ‘emerging markets’, PIDMs cover
countries where the Spanish government is making special efforts to pro-
mote trade and investment relations.
All three country-specific indicators aim at the same concept: the level of activ-
ity with which the three countries under study carry out economic policy activ-
ity vis-à-vis Latin America. Because there are no functional equivalents in each
of the countries, context-specific indicators have been developed here.
Development policy activity While measuring trade and investment policy
activity is a challenge, it is much more straightforward in the case of develop-
ment policy: a readily available indicator that is comparable across countries
exists in the form of the levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows
towards Latin America. Members of the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD)’s Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) regu-
larly report their ODA contributions to the OECD according to a standardised
reporting system, aimed at making the figures as comparable as possible. All
three countries under study are members of the DAC, so that their ODA data
can be obtained from the OECD’s statistics database (OECD 2011). Addition-
ally, the database helps provide yardsticks against which to measure the levels
of policy activity by comparing both Spanish, German and British aid flows
to Latin America with those of the other DAC countries and flows to Latin
America with those to other ODA recipients. I use the following indicators to
represent development policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America (detailed num-
bers are shown in Appendix B):
1. Percentage of total DAC ODA5 to the Americas corresponding to Ger-
many, Britain and Spain, respectively (2007-9 average).6
2. Percentage of ODA to the Americas out of total national ODA (2007-9
average), compared to the other DAC members.
5All figures used are gross ODA disbursements at current US Dollar prices, i.e. the money that
actually went from the donor to the recipient country. This opens up the question of exchange
rates. While Spain and Germany both use the Euro and should therefore have similar exchange
rate fluctuations against the local currencies of the recipient countries and the US Dollar, the British
Pound is detached from the Euro and may be subject to different fluctuation logics. Unfortunately,
there is no easy mechanism to correct for this based on the OECD figures, so this is a risk the
study has to live with. However, the Euro and the British Pound’s fluctuations against the US
Dollar have been moving quite closely together over the 2005-10 period (Bank of England 2011;
European Central Bank 2011a; 2011b). Since aid flows aremeasured inUSDollars, thismitigates the
problem somewhat, although it does not do awaywith issues of fluctuation against Latin American
currencies.
6Aid flows are averaged over several years because ODA disbursements sometimes fluctuate
greatly between two years, for instance because of natural disasters that cause a spike in human-
itarian assistance, such as the 2009 earthquake in Haiti. By considering several years it is easier to
smoothen out such ‘special events’.
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3. Number of Latin American countries/subregions among top-25 ODA re-
cipients (2007-9 average), compared with the other DAC members and
the DAC average.
3.1.1.2 Governance Dimension
The governance dimension reflects policy activity on three subcomponents:
political dialogue, cultural policy, and the integration of Civil Society Organisa-
tions (CSOs) into policy activity. Quite similarly to the trade and investment
subcomponent of the economic dimension, finding cross-nationally compar-
able indicators is difficult. Therefore, I again rely on the external yardstick of
comparing policy activity towards Latin America to other world regions such
as Africa and Asia. The governance dimension is difficult to capture qualitat-
ively; instead I chose a number of indicators for the level of activity in each
country. They are listed in Table 3.1.




Political dialogue Travel diplomacy: bilateral
visits
Cultural relations Cultural centres (% of total),




% of ODA channelled through
CSOs
Political Dialogue With political dialogue, it is important to note that a lot of
contact between countries happens ‘below the radar’ of public documentation
at the working level of civil servants. However, high-level political dialogue
in the form of bilateral visits of Secretaries and Ministers of State, Ministers,
and Heads of State and Government, is usually recorded and made available
on-line. The more frequent the exchange, the higher the level of policy activity.
Because of the different government structures of the three states in question
– Britain and Spain are monarchies, Germany is a federal republic, and their
different representatives have varying functions – the frequency of travel to
Latin America is not directly comparable. However, by comparing travel to
Latin America with Africa and Asia, it is possible to gauge the level of policy
activity towards Latin America. The indicators for each country are as follows:
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• Britain: Travels of the Foreign Secretary, PrimeMinister, Queen, and Prince
of Wales (2006-10); Sources: Clarence House (2011); The Royal House-
hold (2011)
• Germany: Travels of the Federal ForeignMinister, Chancellor, and Federal
President (2006-10); Sources: Bundespräsidialamt (2009, 2011); AA (2009,
2011a); Bundeskanzleramt (2009, 2011)
• Spain: Travels of the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minis-
ter, King, and Prince of Asturias (2006-10);7 Sources: Casa de SuMajestad
el Rey (2009); Presidencia del Gobierno de España (2009); MAEC (2011);
MAEC (2009b)
For each country, the percentage of visits to each of the three regions is calcu-
lated. From these sources, it is possible to gather a relatively complete picture
of travel diplomacy and thus the political dialogue that occurs between the
European countries and their counterparts in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
Cultural Policy In addition to political dialogue, the governance dimension
also comprises cultural promotion on behalf of a country, as theorised in Chap-
ter 2. Part of foreign policy consists in trying to promote a country’s own cul-
ture and language abroad. All three countries under study engage in cultural
promotion through ‘cultural centres’ that teach the language and stage cultural
events such as lectures, film screenings, or exhibitions. In Germany, the task is
performed by a global network of 136 Goethe Institutes (Goethe Institut 2011b),
largely funded by the Federal Foreign Office (Goethe Institut 2011a). The UK’s
British Council has a network of 191 offices around the globe (British Coun-
cil 2010, 2011b), which receive a large amount of government funding – about
30% of its turnover came from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in
2009/10 (British Council 2011a). The task is slightly more complex for the case
of Spain. Generally, Spanish cultural promotion is carried out by the Cervantes
Institutes. However, Spanish is the official language in most of Latin America
except Brazil, and no Cervantes Institutes exist in Spanish America. There are,
however, Cultural Centres which promote cultural relations with the region.
They exist in 13 Latin American countries (and in Equatorial Guinea). Overall,
at the time of writing there were 73 Cervantes Institutes (Instituto Cervantes
2011a) and 17 Cultural Centres (MAEC 2009).
These institutes and centres are taken as an indicator for cultural policy
activity, since they are largely publicly funded and play an important role in
foreign cultural policy (Goethe Institut 2011a; British Council 2011a; Instituto
7In some cases, more than one of the leaders participated in the same visit. In this case, both
were counted.
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Cervantes 2011b). Again, the comparison with Africa and Asia was used as a
yardstick by taking the percentage of total centres in each of the three regions.
In order to adjust for the fact that Africa and Asia might have more centres
because there aremore countries in the region, I weighted the percentage by the
number of countries in one region as indicated by the United Nations Statistics
Division (2009).8
Civil Society Involvement The final component set of the governance di-
mension is the level of policy activity channelled to Latin America through
German, British, and Spanish civil society organisations (CSOs) active in the
region. In all three countries under scrutiny, they receive state funding for
their activities and therefore to some extent form part of the “official external
relations” that constitute foreign policy according to Hill’s definition discussed
in Chapter 2 (Hill 2003: 3). Therefore, CSO activity forms part of policy activ-
ity directed towards Latin America. As an indicator for CSO involvement, the
amount of aid towards a region channelled through CSOs is used. However,
the OECD database only lists overall ODA amounts channelled through CSOs,
but does not break them down by recipient region. Therefore, I had to take re-
course to national data in order to obtain the required figures (DFID/National
Statistics 2009; BMZ 2008; 2009; 2010; MAEC 2009a). Again, the data are not
comparable across countries, but have to be set individually against policy
activity channelled through CSOs towards Africa and Asia. In each case, the
latest available figures were used to calculate a three-year average, thus giving
a more stable indicator than just relying on one-year data.
3.1.1.3 European Dimension
In order to map the EU level’s importance in Member States’ foreign policy
towards Latin America, this study develops an indicator based on the analysis
of national documents dealing with Latin America policy. On the basis of a
coding scheme, the documents can be analysed. Given the small number of
documents, qualitative hand coding is the most viable option, as quantitative
content analysis relies on larger amounts of text. Additionally, the fact that
the texts are in different languages complicates automated analysis (Krippen-
dorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2005). In the case of Britain and Germany, recent doc-
uments on policy towards Latin America are available. Germany published a
new strategy paper for its relations with the region in August 2010 (AA 2010).
In November 2010, British Foreign Secretary William Hague gave a detailed
857 in Africa, 42 in Asia (excluding Western Asia), and 24 in Latin America, excluding the
Caribbean, but including Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.
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speech outlining the UK’s relations with the region (FCO 2010). Finding the
appropriate documents is more of a challenge for Spain, which does not have
a document outlining its strategy towards Latin America because its policy is
extremely broad (Gratius 2010). Therefore, I used the information that is pub-
lished on the Spanish Foreign Ministry (MAEC)’s website on relations with
Latin America (MAEC 2010), as well as an article by then Prime Minister José
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero outlining Spain’s foreign policy (Rodríguez Zapa-
tero, 2004), from which I coded the section concerned with policy towards
Latin America. A more recent speech on relations with Latin America by then
Foreign Minister Trinidad Jiménez (2010) is also included in the analysis. Al-
though these documents are not strictly the same type, all of them are expres-
sions of the official government line. They have undergone a careful govern-
mental writing and editing process and can thus be assumed to be comparable
articulations of policy towards the region.
Based on saliency theory (Budge et al. 1987: 24),9 and adapting a frame-
work by Larsen 2009,10 in order to measure the EU’s involvement the study
considers the relative importance of the EU level vis-à-vis other channels of
action towards the region: bilateral policy, action in conjunction with the US,
and action in conjunction with multilateral actors such as the Organisation of
American States (OAS) or the UN. The coding scheme along with the coding
results are discussed in Section 3.3 of this Chapter.
This section has developed indicators for measuring foreign policy activity
towards Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK. While this has pro-
duced a fine-grained operationalisation of this study’s overarching dependent
variable, these indicators now have to be aggregated into comparable meas-
ures of policy activity. In the next section, I show how the they can be unified
within a coherent framework that enables their comparison across dimensions
and countries by way of constructing an index using fsQCA.
3.2 The Index of Policy Activity
The indicators that have emerged from operationalisation are numerous and,
in their present state, do not yield a comparative measure of policy activity to-
wards Latin America. Some indicators are qualitative, others numerical. Some
are comparable across countries, others are context-specific. Finally, they are
different across the three dimensions and subcomponents of policy activity.
How can such a complex set of indicators be usefully integrated and unified?
9Saliency theory argues that the importance of an issue or actor in a policy area can be gathered
from analysing the frequency – i.e. the saliency – with which it is mentioned in a policy paper.
10This will be further discussed in Section 3.3.3.
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In line withMiller (2007: 94), I argue that an index can help overcome the prob-
lem of indicator complexity and the difficulties it presents for validation.
3.2.1 The Case for Indexing
Indices, according to Miller (2007: 94), are defined as “composite measures
which combine two or more indicators on the basis of predefined rules.” In
other words, if various indicators have been developed to measure the same
variable, an index helps collapse them into one single measure. This is attract-
ive for two reasons. Firstly, as the number of indicators increases, a measure is
more difficult to validate (ibid.). Secondly, it makes the indicators much easier
to understand and handle. The case of policy activity with the complex range
of indicators conceptualised above is therefore a promising candidate for in-
dexing. An index presents numerous advantages over other forms of mapping
a variable. Over a mere description of policy activity on the basis of the above
indicators, it adds manageability of the data. By attaching a score to each com-
ponent, the evidence becomes more tangible and measurement should become
more precise (Ragin 2008: 81). Additionally, if all indicators are placed on an
equal footing by scoring them on the same scale, they become comparable not
only across countries, but also across dimensions. Context-specific indicators
can be homogenised into comparable index scores, while at the same time it
becomes possible to compare, for instance, the indicators for economic policy
activity with those for the governance dimension. An index is thus better able
to systematically expose instances of both within- and cross-case variation.
Moreover, an index offers the opportunity for more fine-grained measure-
ment than, for instance, a classificatory typology sorting the cases analysed into
cells and referring each case to exactly one type (Lehnert 2007: 64; Ragin 2008:
75). As Miller (2007: 95) points out, indices can be based on typologies. If the
researcher so desires, a typology could, likewise, be based – at least in part – on
an index. However, in this study, I want to measure different levels of policy
activity towards Latin America in as fine-grained a fashion as possible in order
to unearth those instances of variation that seem promising regarding further
investigation. Likewise, Babbie (2007: 175) points out that typologies involve
summarising several variables, while an index is constructed to measure one
variable – here, foreign policy activity as this investigation’s overarching de-
pendent variable. A typology, at least of the classificatory type, is therefore not
what is required. Instead, I seek to develop a more gradual measurement of
policy activity than a classificatory typology offers.
This quest correspondsmore to the goals of a continuous typology, in which
cases form part of a type to a greater or lesser degree (Lehnert 2007: 64). In
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fact, the study that served as the inspiration for developing an index for policy
activity using fsQCA (Gran 2003) constitutes such a typology: Gran uses fuzzy-
set analysis to demonstrate the degree to which social services for abused chil-
dren match ideal types. Devising different attributes, he classifies social ser-
vice programmes, evaluating to which degree they conform to the ideal type.
A fine-grained measurement of the degree of ideal-type conformation is per-
mitted by the possibility of partial set-membership in fuzzy-set analysis (ibid.:
94).11 Similarly, Kvist (2007) uses fuzzy sets for what he calls ‘ideal type ana-
lysis’, in this case of different types of welfare state regimes. The index devised
for the purposes of the present investigation, however, differs from Gran’s and
Kvist’s typologies in that it is not used to sort cases into different types, but
rather for mapping and measuring a variable. However, the basic idea of ex-
ploiting the benefits of fine-grained set membership offered by fuzzy-set ana-
lysis is the same. I will further elaborate on the implications of this issue in
Section 3.2.2.2 on indicator aggregation.
Using fuzzy-set analysis for measurement has some tradition in the literat-
ure of development economics, where Schaich and Münnich (1996) have de-
veloped a measure of poverty based on fuzzy sets. According to Schaich and
Münnich, it enables the placement of individuals at different levels of ‘mem-
bership’ in the population of the poor, that is, at different levels of poverty
(ibid.: 444). They also discuss the possibility to include multiple indicators in
the same measure (ibid.: 465f). It is easy to see the connection between their
poverty index and the index of policy activity this study will construct: while
Schaich and Münnich measure levels of poverty, I measure levels of policy
activity towards Latin America. The argument that fuzzy-set analysis enables
fine-grained measurement based on multiple indicators applies equally. The
method of fuzzy-set QCA (Ragin 2000, 2008; Rihoux and Ragin 2009), as I will
discuss below, presents some very convenient possibilities for constructing an
index based on the integration of both qualitative and numerical data using
multiple indicators.
In the context of multiple indicators some attention should be paid to the
question of dimensionality, especially because the word “dimension” has been
used a lot in the previous sections conceptualising policy activity. There is an
extensive body of literature on the question of the dimensionality of variables.
Research methodologists tend to insist that “variables are supposed to be uni-
dimensional” (Jackman 1985: 169), meaning that each variable should only
capture one concept. Similarly, in his seminal book on social measurement,
Duncan (1984: 227ff) deplores social scientists’ reliance on indices because of
11The concept of set membership and its implications for indexing using fuzzy-set analysis will
be discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2.
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the loss of conceptual clarity they entail, although he does accept them as a ne-
cessary evil, “for a merely pragmatic reason, to achieve data reduction.” (ibid.:
228). If multiple dimensions are hidden, these researchers argue, measure-
ment is inadequate and causal inferences are misleading (Collier, LaPorte and
Seawright forthcoming 2012). This insistence on the unidimensionality of vari-
ables is why Miller (2007: 95f) identifies achieving unidimensionality as the
main challenge of indices based on typologies.12
However, other authors such as Collier et al. (forthcoming 2012) take a
more pragmatic view of dimensionality, arguing that “unidimensionality is not
a well-defined ‘end state’ in research”. Each indicator can be further disag-
gregated and may hide further dimensions, potentially leading into an infinite
regress. The real challenge for both qualitative and quantitative researchers,
Collier et al. maintain, is finding “the scope of comparison and level of aggreg-
ation – i.e. the degree to which indicators are broken down into their constitu-
ent elements – best suited to the analytic goals of the study”. It is therefore
important to base the disaggregation of variables into indicators on theoretical
motivations.
This study, while recognising the importance of unidimensionality in prin-
ciple, sides with Collier and colleagues in that it is extremely difficult to guar-
antee, especially when a concept as complex as foreign policy is concerned. The
theoretical motivations for the disaggregation of foreign policy activity into
three dimensions reflecting levels of activity in different policy fields have been
outlined in in Chapter 2. As for their further disaggregation, their subcom-
ponents are sufficiently specific to yield meaningful ways of operationalisation
that can serve as indicators for policy activity. I therefore assume that each di-
mension of policy activity is, in itself, unidimensional and that the indicators
conceptualised in the previous section do not ‘hide’ further sub-dimensions,
but are components of the same concept. The level of disaggregation chosen
for the purposes of this investigation thus reflects both the theoretical issues
discussed in the previous chapter and pragmatic considerations of employing
suitable indicators for comparison.
The aggregation of the various indicators into one index thus entails a num-
ber of specific requirements. Firstly, as mentioned above, a method to assign
scores to data from multiple sources in multiple formats is required in or-
der to enable the combination of various scores into one. In the case of this
study, the integration of qualitative data as well as numerical data in various
formats (percentages, absolute quantities, shares). The unification of qualitat-
ive and quantitative data on the same index is unproblematic. As Brady points
12Typologies can have one or several dimensions (Collier, LaPorte and Seawright forthcoming
2012), while an index is generally unidimensional (Miller 2007: 95f).
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out, “qualitative comparisons are the basic building blocks of any approach to
measurement, thus bridging the ‘quantitative-qualitative’ divide by showing
that the two approaches are intimately related to one another” (Brady 2004:
63, emphasis in the original). This is because alongside theoretical considera-
tions, qualitative empirical knowledge ideally precedes any operationalisation.
There is thus no reason why the two should not be rescaled onto the same in-
dex, and Ragin (2000) emphasises fsQCA’s reliance on both qualitative and
quantitative assessment in assigning scores, thus providing an ideal way of
achieving this integration.
Additionally, foreign policy activity is a matter of continuous, not crisp
levels. It would, of course, be possible to employ an ordinal scale, ranking
policy activity as ‘low’, ‘medium’, or ‘high’, for instance. However, especially
where data points lie closely together, such a scale is not fine-grained enough
to take account of the variation. This may be the case, for example, when sev-
eral countries all display relatively low levels of activity, but do differ never-
theless. Grouping them both into a ‘low’ category would entail a loss of in-
formation. While several authors discuss the idea that more information when
choosing the level of measurement is not always better (e.g. Collier, LaPorte
and Seawright forthcoming 2012; Lehnert 2007: 64, 70), in this case a fairly
fine-grained measure of policy activity is necessary. Of course, the categor-
ies could be refined more by introducing subcategories such as ‘low-medium’,
the assignation of scores in fsQCA permits an intuitive yet sophisticated res-
caling of the different indicators, according to a strict procedure that allows
for highly systematic and replicable measurement. As Miller (2007: 95) points
out, indexing therefore requires the careful specification of aggregation rules,
a requirement fsQCA is able to fulfil by way of its ‘calibration’ methods. The
exact scoring procedure will be outlined in Section 3.2.2 below. Furthermore,
the index will be used as a basis for selecting promising cases for further study.
The step-by-step aggregation procedure of the various indicators can uncover
variation at different steps of the process, so that case selection can be carried
out in a very transparent manner. Finally, the middle-range theoretical frame-
works that will be employed in the case studies will be able to take account of
the different instances of variation exposed by the indexing procedure.
Indexing also requires careful justification of the index components’ com-
bination. The combination of the various subcomponents into dimensions has
already been justified based on theoretical considerations regarding the com-
position of the three dimensions of foreign policy activity towards Latin Amer-
ica. However, the question of how much the different components matter
within the dimensions must be considered and brings up the thorny issue of
weighting the index (Miller 2007: 96). As discussed in the previous section,
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some of the indicators such as cultural centres in Latin America will require
some internal weighting to reach a cross-country comparable measure (such
as weighting by the total number of cultural centres a country operates in the
world). These procedures will be outlined and justified as I set up the meas-
urement of each indicator. However, the question is whether the indicators
themselves have to be weighted against each other: is development more or
less important than trade and investment policy regarding foreign economic
policy activity? In the case of using fsQCA to compile the index, the problem
to some extent resolves itself through the index values. In countries where
development policy activity matters less, they will obviously receive a lower
value on the development policy activity indicator.
But whether the subcomponents of the various dimensions carry the same
weight each has to be justified theoretically. In the case of policy activity to-
wards Latin America, I argue against the weighting of indicators, which is
complex and introduces more questions than it is able to answer. How much
more important than culture is political dialogue? Does the number of Latin
American countries among the top-25 ODA recipient countries matter more or
less than the percentage of total DAC aid to Latin America corresponding to
Germany, Spain, and the UK? In particular with qualitative data it is difficult
to introduce weights, as any attachment of a weight to a qualitative measure is
to some extent decided subjectively by the researcher. Such ad hoc weighting
can be problematic (Slottje 1991: 686; Booysen 2002: 127). There may be theor-
etical reason to believe that one indicator is more important than the other, but
how does one decide whether it is twice or only one and a half times as im-
portant? Additionally, weighting the index makes the aggregation procedure
of calibrating the fsQCA scores more complicated, thereby introducing further
complexity and a potential source of validity loss. Nomatter how sophisticated
the technique, as Booysen (2002: 127) puts it, “no weighting system is above
criticism.” Similarly, Drechsler (1973: 18) points out that all weighting meth-
ods come with different kinds of weaknesses, making it impossible to identify
the ‘best’ one. These difficulties, in fact, give rise to Babbie’s advice that equal
weighting of indicators should be the norm, unless weighting is obviously in-
dispensable (Babbie 2007: 162). This is the strategy employed by this study.
Mainly, the reason is that apart from the additional complexity weighting in-
troduces, a country with a high level of policy activity towards Latin America
should display this activity in all aspects of the relationship, so that all aspects
are important and there is no readily identifiable way in which they should
be weighted. This is also the reason why in creating the final index value, I
demand high scores on all indicators for a high final score.13
13The set-theoretic implications of this will be analysed in the next section.
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To sum up, an index of foreign policy activity towards Latin America will
allow for the transparent aggregation of the indicators previously conceptual-
ised into a fine-grained, intuitive measure that is comparable both across cases
and dimensions. It will systematically expose variation in foreign policy activ-
ity towards Latin America on behalf of Germany, Britain, and Spain. In the
context of this study, the results will serve as the basis for the selection of cases
for further investigation in Part II. That way, the index substantially contrib-
utes to placing the study on a sound methodological footing and facilitates
case selection based on variation in the overarching dependent variable that
may reveal promising insights when disentangled further.
Moreover, by constructing this index, I will introduce an element of com-
parability into foreign policy-making towards Latin America that has previ-
ously been missing from the relevant literature, as I have discussed in Chapter
2. Such an index should also be relatively easy to extend to other instances
of foreign policy activity, be they additional cases of EU Member States’ for-
eign policy towards Latin America, or cases of foreign policy activity towards
other countries or regions (in which case, it may be necessary to make some
conceptual adjustments to capture the specificities of the recipient countries).
In this respect, this study contributes to the literature seeking to systematically
compare foreign policies.
3.2.2 Fuzzy-set QCA for indexing
In this section, I discuss how index construction using fsQCA meets the re-
quirements and challenges in mapping foreign policy activity towards Latin
America discussed above. Interestingly, the applicability of fsQCA to foreign
policy analysis has already been demonstrated by Blatter et al. (2010) in a pa-
per entitled “Preconditions for Foreign Activities of European Regions: Tracing
Causal Configurations of Economic, Cultural, and Political Strategies.” They
take their use of fsQCA one step further than this study by proceeding to a
causal analysis of foreign policy. However, for the purposes of this investiga-
tion, fsQCA shines in its ability to summarise complex data, as I will show in
the following paragraphs, and will not be employed for causal analysis.
In the first instance, however, a few fundamentals of fsQCA must be ex-
plained. Fuzzy-set QCA is a member of the family of Configurational Com-
parative Methods (CCM; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). It is based on Boolean set-
theoretic logic: different conditions maywork together to produce an outcome.
This outcome is conceptualised as the membership (or non-membership) of
the cases under scrutiny in a set as a result of their membership in the condi-
tions (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Therefore, the extent to which cases display the
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conditions must also be conceptualised as set membership. Typically, fsQCA
is associated with uncovering sufficient or necessary causal conditions for an
outcome, but it is also possible to employ it for the simpler purpose of system-
atically summarising data (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 15; see also Schneider and
Wagemann 2010: 3f), which is the use it is put to in this study. Additionally, it
has previously been used for ideal type analyses (Gran 2003; Kvist 2007), some
aspects of which will be exploited for this study. Because I am not proceed-
ing to potential causal analysis, I stop at assigning membership scores in the
‘outcome’: policy activity towards Latin America. Formulated in set-theoretic
terms, I am measuring the extent to which Germany, Spain, and the UK are
members of three target sets that correspond to high activity on the three di-
mensions of policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America. It is also important to note
that fsQCA researchers are wary of the term ‘variable’, preferring ‘condition’
instead of independent variable and ‘outcome’ instead of dependent variable
(Schneider andWagemann 2010: 405). However, because I am not designing an
entire explanatory scheme on the basis of fsQCA as an approach, but rather use
it as a tool for data summary, this study is justified in using fsQCA to map its
overarching ‘dependent variable’. Indeed, Schneider andWagemann point out
that in multi-method designs, it is justified to stick with one kind of termino-
logy to avoid confusion (ibid.). Within Charles Ragin’s four steps of comparat-
ive analysis (2000: 144), this measurement procedure thus corresponds to step
one, during which cases are selected and the property space is drawn up. By
setting up the three dimensions of foreign policy activity towards Latin Amer-
ica and their subcomponents, I have conceptualised a property space which is
now further constructed by compiling an fsQCA index, on the basis of which
cases for further study will be selected.
3.2.2.1 Scoring the Indicators
Fuzzy-set QCA was initially developed as an advance over earlier QCA meth-
ods that were only able to work with crisp sets (Ragin 2000). The crucial ad-
vantage of fsQCA over crisp-set QCA is that, rather than being dichotomised
into either membership or non-membership in a set, membership can vary by
degrees. It may take any value between 0 (fully out of the target set) and 1
(fully in the target set). The potential for the indicator values to vary continu-
ously between 0 and 1 allows for a fine-grained measurement of policy activity
towards Latin America that is considerably more powerful than, for example,
a classificatory typology, or a classification of the cases into high, medium, and
low levels of policy activity. It then becomes possible to combine the various
indicators according to the aggregation procedures specified by fsQCA, com-
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plying with the requisite of “predefined rules” in index compilation (Miller
2007: 94).
However, the scaling process in fsQCA works somewhat differently from
other scaling methods. Usually, values are assigned to indicators on a con-
tinuous scale, varying for example between 0 and 1, or scaled empirically by
taking the highest value found as the maximum and the lowest as the min-
imum (Miller 2007). In fsQCA, while the indicators vary between 0 and 1,
there is an additional step involved that goes beyond the simple rescaling of
data. As Gran explains, “measurement of fuzzy membership seems to require
simply a recoding of quantitative data so that they vary between 0 and 1. [...]
This standardization of variables from 0 to 1 is not the approach of fuzzy sets”
(Gran 2003: 96, emphasis in the original). In fact, the researcher has to query
the cases more deeply in order to assign – in the language of fsQCA, calibrate
– the membership scores. For example, it may be the case that the data are not
uniformly distributed, but ‘bunched together’ in clusters due to the presence,
absence, or the level of certain conditions (for an in-depth discussion of the dif-
ferences between quantitative measurement and measurement calibration, see
Ragin 2008, Chapter 4). By carefully investigating the data and using in-depth
knowledge about the cases acquired during the data collection process, the re-
searcher can spot such ‘natural gaps’ between different outcomes and assign
fsQCA scores accordingly.
Additionally, fsQCA scores are always calibrated against an external ‘yard-
stick’, meaning the set against which the cases are being scored (Rihoux and
Ragin 2009: 90ff). In this study, the yardstick can take three forms: the policy
activity of other countries, policy activity towards other regions such as Africa
or Asia on behalf of the three countries under study, and an ‘ideal type’. I now
briefly discuss each yardstick in turn. Firstly, the yardstick can be constituted
by a universe of other cases the three countries under study are being com-
pared with. This is the case of development policy activity, for example, where
I score the cases against the other members of the OECD Donor Assistance
Committee. Here, there are sufficient data at hand to compare the three states
with other countries. Based on a careful inspection of the available data com-
bined with knowledge of the cases, the fuzzy-set scores can be assigned (Ragin
2008; Schneider andWagemann 2010: 4f). This yardstick type ascertains policy
activity towards Latin America on behalf of the three countries under study by
setting it against the policy activity of other countries not studied. This method
is illustrated in detail in the section on quantitative data, using the example of
one indicator of development policy activity.
Secondly, the yardstick can be constituted by policy activity of the countries
under study towards other regions that are not Latin America but are in a way
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‘similar’. Africa and Asia are chosen in this study, as has been discussed above.
This yardstick type is quite similar to the first in that there are ‘outside’ data
available, although the focus of the comparison is slightly different in that it fo-
cuses on different levels of policy activity towards different regions within the
same country to ascertain the level of policy activity towards Latin America.
This is where the study makes a new contribution to using fsQCA as a tool, as
to my knowledge this type of yardstick has not previously been employed.
Thirdly, if there are no external data available for comparison, or it would
be beyond the scope of a study to obtain such data, it is possible to allocate
membership scores with reference to an ‘ideal type’ (Gran 2003; Kvist 2007).
To this end, it is necessary to consider what would constitute full membership,
full nonmembership, and a maximum point of ambiguity regarding member-
ship in the ideal type target set. Within the context of this study, this yardstick
is used for instance in measuring policy activity towards Latin America on
the European dimension. Based on the question of what would constitute full
membership in the ideal-type set of countries with a highly active policy to-
wards Latin America on the European dimension, I define the relevant points
against which calibration is carried out. These ‘anchor’ or ‘cutoff-points’ are
discussed in more detail below. It is important to note that the overall measure
of foreign policy activity towards Latin America is also based on the notion of
an ideal type (Gran 2003: 94; see also Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 143) – a country
with a very active foreign policy towards the region would score highly on all
three dimensions. However, as I have discussed above, while Gran has used
this property to actually construct a typology, it can also be used to establish an
index. In either case, it is important to be clear about what yardstick is being
used at each step of index construction.
There are essentially two different ways of calibrating fsQCA scores, de-
pending on whether one is dealing with qualitative or quantitative data. Both
will eventually yield fuzzy-set membership scores that can be directly com-
pared and combined. Fuzzy-set QCA’s potential to make qualitative and nu-
merical evidence communicate on an equal footing is what makes the method
so useful for the case at hand, since I do not dispose of numerical data for all the
indicators and thus have to rely on qualitative evidence for part of the index.
In the following, I briefly outline both calibration procedures.
Qualitative Data When dealing with qualitative data, the scores are alloc-
ated based on substantive knowledge about the cases (Ragin 2008; Schneider
and Wagemann 2010). Such knowledge can come from both primary qualit-
ative data such as government documents and secondary literature, as I will
demonstrate in this study. In this context, it is worth clarifying that if the re-
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searcher has to rely on qualitative data, fsQCA is suitable only for indexing a
small to medium number of cases due to the extensive familiarisation with the
cases the method requires. Based on the analysis of the data, the researcher
can then assign fuzzy-set membership scores to the cases at hand. Making the
procedure explicit requires careful description of the data on which the calib-
ration is based in order to make clear that the evidence has not been skewed
or ‘filtered’ in order to suit the researcher’s hypotheses or intuitions – it is im-
portant that the researcher be aware of any bias, even unconscious, she may
be subject to (George and Bennett 2005: 24). This harks back to the previous
discussion regarding the potential trade-off between validity and reliability in
“thick description” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 152). As outlined above,
it is therefore indispensable to be transparent about data sources and as ex-
haustive as possible in their evaluation.14 While this is not an easy task, this
study will do its best to comply with these standards based on both govern-
ment documents and secondary literature, attempting to construct as complete
a picture of policy activity as possible from the information available. Further-
more, as Miller (2007: 88) points out, assigning numbers to qualitative data can
be similarly difficult and problematic because “language does not lend itself
to precise differentiation.” Fuzzy-set QCA, however, provides some helpful
guidelines in assisting with the assignation of fuzzy-set scores: following the
careful investigation of the data, each case receives a score between 0.0 (fully
out of the target set) and 1.0 (fully in the target set), according to the degrees of
set membership shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Degrees of membership for assignation of scores to qualitative
data
fsQCA score Interpretation
1.0 Fully in the target set
0.8 Mostly but not fully in the target set
0.6 More in than out of the target set
0.4 More out than in the target set
0.2 Mostly but not fully out of the target set
0.0 Out of the target set
Source: Ragin 2008: 95f
Data investigation, therefore, has to be deep enough to give the researcher a
14At the same time, it is important not to let the description spiral into an infinite regress and
lengthy discussions of tangential data. Differentiating between relevant and irrelevant aspects of
policy activity remains, unfortunately, a subjective endeavour. While establishing data validity
is a matter of coherent, convincing description, reliability is still a thorny issue, no matter how
convincing the description, since there are no ‘hard’, numerical facts and calculations easy to check
and replicate. The only thing that can be done is to be as transparent as possible about one’s sources
to facilitate cross-checks.
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close enough grasp of the cases under study to be able to assess to what degree
a case is within or outside the target set. In the context of this study, this is rel-
evant mainly for the economic policy dimension’s trade and investment com-
ponent. As laid out above, government material and secondary literature will
be employed to evaluate the level of policy activity, seeking, wherever possible,
the comparison with policy activity vis-à-vis other world regions, principally
Africa and Asia. By using fsQCA to measure qualitative data, it is possible
to mitigate the problem that “measurement in qualitative research is typically
lacking in precision” (Ragin 2008: 81), while at the same time exploiting the
in-depth qualitative knowledge acquired during the study of the cases.
Quantitative Data Fuzzy-set calibration with quantitative data requires the
same initial step of data querying in order to assess the distribution of the data.
In this manner, fsQCA provides an advantage over traditional scaling methods
in that it can take account of qualitative differences in numerical data that are
not accounted for if the data are simply re-scaled, for instance on a continuous
0 to 1 interval. However, calibration is considerably less complex with numer-
ical data, as numbers are more easily inspected for clustering than qualitative
descriptions. Additionally, the calibration of numerical data can be carried
out using the so-called “Direct Method of Calibration” (Ragin 2008: 87ff). It
is implemented in the FSQCA software package (Ragin et al. 2006),15 which
assigns the scores based on a specially developed algorithm. It is explained
in detail by Ragin in his volume on fuzzy sets in social inquiry (2008: 90ff).
In order for the algorithm to work, following the inspection of the numerical
data the researcher must define three important anchor points, the so-called
‘cutoff-points’ (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 90):
• Full set membership (1)
• a crossover point of maximum ambiguity as to whether a case is more in
than out of the target set (0.5)
• non-membership (0).16
These cutoff-points are established on the basis of the aforementioned inspec-
tion of the data. An example is graphically illustrated in Figure 3.1, based on
one of the indicators from the development dimension (see Section 3.1.1): of-
ficial development assistance (ODA) to Latin America on behalf of the OECD
DAC member countries (as percentage of total DAC aid) is plotted and the
15Note that while fuzzy-set QCA is abbreviated as ‘fsQCA’, the corresponding software package
uses all capital letters (‘FSQCA’) for easier differentiation.
16The software assigns a score of 0.95 for full set membership, 0.5 for the crossover point, and
0.05 for non-membership.
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Figure 3.1: Visualisation of fsQCA data inspection and assignation of cutoff-
points
clustering of data points is observed. The resulting cutoff-points are specified
at 15% (any point above is fully in), 7% (crossover point), and 1% (any point
below is fully out), shown as horizontal lines in Figure 3.1.
Based on the cutoff-points, the fsQCA algorithm first transforms the raw
data into log odds, and then uses the log odds to calculatemembership scores.17
The cutoff-points thus act as the parameters against which the software’s al-
gorithm calibrates the relevant data, attaching an fsQCA score to each case.
Again, data from different sources can then be compared, which is highly ad-
vantageous given the problem of context-specific indicators described in the
previous section. Despite the factors speaking in favour of fsQCA for index-
17The formula for converting log odds into membership scores is:
Degree o f membership = exp(log odds)/[1+ exp(log odds)]
(Ragin 2008: 91)
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ing, the researcher must bear in mind that the calibration procedure of assign-
ing fuzzy-set scores to the data adds an additional level of complexity. It is
therefore important to both clearly report and carefully justify the choice for
the cutoff-points forming the basis of the calibration in order to ensure the in-
dex’s reliability and validity.
Fuzzy-set QCA thus allows for the integration of heterogeneous indicators
in two ways. On the one hand, it permits the scaling of qualitative data and
its combination with numerical evidence on the same footing. On the other
hand, context-specific data can be placed on the same scale of set-membership
and thus be made comparable, assisting structured cross-national comparison
(Ragin et al. 1996: 749; Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 13). This greatly facilitates the
use of “system-specific indicators” (Przeworski and Teune 1970) to overcome
the “problem of equivalence” (van Deth 1998) discussed above, hence amelior-
ating one of the difficulties in social science arising from the fact that “perfectly
comparable cases for comparative analysis seldom exist” (George and Bennett
2005: 164). Overall, fsQCA is therefore very well-suited to integrate different
types and sources of data, permitting the creation of indices that would other-
wise be difficult or impossible to compile.
3.2.2.2 Aggregating the indicators
Having established the calibration procedure for fuzzy-set scores, it is equally
important to establish the rules by which the data are aggregated (Miller 2007:
97). I take a step-by-step approach to compiling the index in order to report
as much of the variation as possible. Since fsQCA is based on set-theoretic lo-
gic, the basic concept is that different subsets bring about a case’s degree of
membership in a target set. As previously established, the target sets here are
the three dimensions of policy activity (economic, governance, and European).
A country with a highly active overall foreign policy towards Latin America
would score 1 or close to 1 on all three dimensions. Each case thus receives
membership scores for different component sets that together form the dimen-
sion. In this investigation, cases are scored on indicators that are taken to be
subsets of the target set. A subset relation in fuzzy sets is indicated whenmem-
bership scores in one set are consistently less than or equal to membership
scores in another set – the outcome or target set (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 102).
As for the aggregation of the indicator subsets into a single value for each
dimension, there are two possibilities. Each of them exposes different aspects
of variation in the indicators. Sets can be joined through two operators, logical
AND (set intersection, also symbolised by
￿
) and logical OR (set union, also
symbolised by
￿
). With set intersection (AND), a compound set is formed that
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requires a case’s membership in all relevant subsets of the target set. Logical
AND is therefore reached by taking each case’s minimum membership score
in the sets that are combined (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 96). For example, if a
case reaches a score of 0.4 on the trade and investment component of economic
policy and 0.6 on the development component, the membership score for the
overall economic dimension resulting from set intersectionwould be 0.4. There-
fore, set intersection applies a rather strict yardstick for high membership in
the target set – a country has to score highly on all indicators to receive a high
membership score (Gran 2003: 96). The combination of two sets through lo-
gical AND is visualised in Figure 3.3a.
Conversely, logicalOR achieves the set union by taking themaximumvalue
of each case’s scores on the component sets. This lowers the yardstick for a
high membership score in a target set considerably. In the example above, the
membership score in the economic dimension reached through the union of
the trade and investment with the development component set would be 0.6.
Under set union, it is therefore possible to achieve a high membership score in
the target set even if a case scores highly only on one of the subcomponents.
Set union is visualised in Figure 3.2b.
In most cases, when aggregating the indicator scores, I report both set inter-
section and set union because this uncovers some interesting variation among
the cases that might be lost if only one is reported. A country may score highly
on one component set but low on another, an aspect that is lost if only set union
or intersection are shown. This normallyminor issue is accentuatedwhen there
are differences on the various indicators for the same country. When scores are
more homogeneous, the problem does not present itself. Reporting both values
therefore eases the researcher’s task of finding instances of variation that merit
further investigation. Additionally, it is theoretically reasonable to consider
that even if a country displays high policy activity only on one subcompon-
ent of a dimension, it can still have an overall high level of policy activity on
that dimension due to high levels on said subcomponent. However, there are
instances where there are theoretical reasons why only a high score on all the
indicators should lead to a high overall score. Where this is so, I report only
set intersection. In the present setting, this is the case of the European dimen-
sion, where it is important for a country to have both high levels of activity at
EU level in absolute terms and in comparison to activity channelled through
other external actors (such as non-EU international organisations). Of course,
where there is only one indicator, there is no need to join any sets and simple
calibration is sufficient to reach the fsQCA value of the subcomponent.
Additionally, in the final index, I only report set intersection for the com-
ponent sets of the different policy areas: in order to classify as having an overall
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Figure 3.2: Set intersection and set union
(a) Set intersection (logical AND)
(b) Set union (logical OR)
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Figure 3.3: Index aggregation procedure
highly active policy towards Latin America, a country should achieve a high
score on all the dimensions, thus justifying the use of logical AND.18 Therefore,
the final index values are based on the intersection of intersected subcompon-
ents, applying a particularly strict yardstick for high levels of membership.
Nevertheless, fully reporting the intermediate stages of compiling index val-
ues by joining subsets is important. That way, the step by step aggregation of
the fuzzy-set index allows the researcher to methodically expose variation both
within and across cases. Indeed, the reporting of set union serves the purpose
of somewhat mitigating the problem of a loss of variation through indexing
(Duncan 1984). The final index value will give an overall indication of what
policy activity towards the region looks like in the three cases under study,
thus facilitating comparison between the three countries. The index compila-
tion procedure is visualised in Figure 3.3 for further clarification.
In sum, a fuzzy-set index based on the strict and systematic calibration
and aggregation rules of the fsQCA approach, comprehensively reported and
clearly laid out, has the potential tomake cross-national as well as cross-dimen-
sional comparison both valid and reliable, while at the same time facilitating
the integration of different types of data. In the following section, I proceed to
18Recall that this is also the reason why the index is not weighted – all subcomponents are taken
to be equally important within each dimension.
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compiling the fsQCA index of policy activity towards Latin America in Ger-
many, the UK, and Spain.
3.3 Indexing Policy Activity towards Latin America
In this section, I will put the operationalisation of the various indicators con-
ceptualised in Section 3.1.1 into practice, taking each of the three dimensions
of policy activity towards Latin America in turn. I will discuss each indicator
and assign fsQCA scores in accordance with the calibration techniques laid out
above. The section begins with an analysis of the economic dimension.
3.3.1 Economic dimension
3.3.1.1 Trade and investment policy
As outlined in Section 3.1.1, trade and investment policy activity is difficult
to compare across countries because each country has specific ways of pursu-
ing such policy.19 There are no pure, comparable ‘numbers’ available on the
activities each national government engages in to promote trade and invest-
ment opportunities for private business. Therefore, the researcher must dive
deeply into the qualitative data on how governments view their role in trade
and investment promotion and how they make trade and investment policy.
This involves taking recourse to government documents, websites, and sec-
ondary literature. It is here that fsQCA, with its ability to combine qualitative
and quantitative evidence, shines as a method to establish sound comparis-
ons based on both numerical data and the researcher’s qualitative knowledge
of cases. As for comparability, with its possibility to measure policy activ-
ity towards a certain region against case-specific yardsticks, fsQCA provides
a highly useful approach. In this case, I use policy activity towards Asia to
establish a measure of the level of each country’s policy activity towards Latin
America. The following paragraphs present the data uponwhich I will base the
calibration of fsQCA index scores. I begin by outlining the qualitative evidence
from government documents and the secondary literature.
Britain Generally, the UKpursues a pro-liberalisation foreign economic policy
agenda (Williams 2004). The UK is an extremely open economy highly de-
pendent on both inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (Hirst
and Thompson 2000: 335), and this influences its policy. Latin America does
19Remember the crucial difference between trade and investment as such (pursued by private
companies and easily quantifiable) and trade and investment policy (pursued by the government
and not easily quantifiable), discussed in Section 3.1.1.
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not feature large on the UK’s agenda. The Department for Business, Innova-
tion, and Skills’s latest Trade and Investment White Paper, entitled ‘Trade and
Investment for Growth’, only contains a more detailed section on Brazil and a
minor one on Mexico. While other regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South
Asia, and the Caribbean receive special regional sections, Latin America does
not (BIS 2011). This is noteworthy given that Latin America’s economic growth
in recent years and recovery from the global financial and economic crisis are
acknowledged to have been impressive (BIS 2011: 29). However, the White Pa-
per does not lay out either a deeper analysis of the region or a strategy on how
to proceed. Brazil is treated in the context of the BRIC countries (BIS 2011),20
Mexico receives a paragraph as one of the ’High-Growth Economies’ (BIS 2011:
39). No other Latin American countries are mentioned, thus indicating a low
level of policy activity vis-à-vis the region.
The promotion of foreign economic relations is the remit of UK Trade and
Investment (UKTI), a joint agency of BIS and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO). In Latin America, UKTI focuses on the larger economies such
as Mexico and especially Brazil. In smaller economies such as Bolivia, Ur-
uguay, or Haiti, “lobbying on behalf of British companies may be carried out
by the Head of Mission on a case-by-case basis” (UKTI 2011b). Overall, UKTI
provides full services in 12 countries of Latin America (UKTI 2011a). In total,
52% of countries in the region are covered by full UKTI services, compared to
40% of Asia (17 countries with full services out of 42 countries overall), result-
ing in a relatively good coverage of Latin America. During the course of 2011,
UKTI published a series of analytical papers on its foreign trade and invest-
ment policy (BIS 2011: 76). While Asia and Africa are both subjects of separate
papers, Latin America is not.
Themost intense trade and investment policy activities vis-à-vis Latin Amer-
ica are directed towards Brazil and Mexico. However, most of trade policy
towards Mexico is carried out within Britain’s bilateral relations with NAFTA
(FCO 2007: 17). In South America, Brazil has been designated a “High Growth
Market” by UKTI (2010), and in 2006 a UK-Brazil Joint Economic and Trade
Committee (JETCO) was established. The JETCO is designed to promote trade
relations, develop the strategic economic partnership between the two coun-
tries, and will “examine why UK companies appear to under-perform in terms
of trade and investment with Brazil” (FCO 2007: 17). Within the JETCO, the UK
also works against trade barriers, in line with its global commitment to further
liberalisation. With Mexico and Brazil, Britain focuses on two countries that
are not only likely to attract the interest of UK investors in the near future, but
that, considering their growing economic clout, are likely to also become ma-
20The term “BRIC” refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
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jor sources of investment (FCO 2007: 17). Such a focus is understandable given
the UK’s highly FDI-penetrated economy (BIS 2011: 21; Hirst and Thompson
2000).
It is thus evident that the UK carries out a rather reduced economic and
trade policy vis-à-vis Latin America. It focuses on those two countries that are
likely to not only attract UK investment but also become sources of FDI in the
future – Mexico and Brazil. At the EU level, within the context of the Common
Commercial Policy (CCP), the UK supports the conclusion of further trade and
association agreements between the EU and Latin American countries and re-
gions (BIS 2011: 61). Because of its penchant for further liberalisation and mul-
tilateralism (Williams 2004; Grugel and Kippin 2006: 288), Britain favours the
further elimination of trade barriers between the regions, although this is not
a feature of policy towards Latin America in particular, but rather of the UK’s
general foreign economic policy orientation.
Germany Germany’s strong export orientation is an important factor in its
economic policy towards Latin America (BMWi 2011b). Since Latin America
itself is also export-oriented and, in particular, the population’s purchasing
power is on average still not very high, it previously did not represent a very at-
tractive market for Germany’s high-level manufactured goods. However this
is changing and is indeed recognised by the German government’s strategy
paper for Latin America published in 2010 (AA 2010: 7, 33f). Because of Latin
America’s good economic performance, the German government is becoming
more interested in promoting economic ties with the region. The Ministry of
Economics and Technology’s export website iXPOS (BMWi 2009) has special
country pages informing potential exporters and investors about opportunit-
ies in Latin America maintained by the BMWi’s trade and investment agency
Germany Trade and Invest (GTaI). Such pages exist for seven Latin American
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
They are the most informative for Brazil and Mexico. A trend similar to that
observed in the UK – focusing on those countries that are the most economic-
ally advanced – is apparent.
However, in the case of Germany, much of the information and logistic sup-
port that is provided by GTaI’s British equivalent UKTI, is made available to
German companies through the Chambers of Foreign Commerce (Ausland-
shandelskammern, AHKs) rather than by the government. The AHKs are fin-
anced and supportedmostly by private companies in the relevant countries, al-
though they also receive some state support. There are 21 AHKs in Latin Amer-
ica, three of them in Brazil (German Association of Industry and Commerce
(DIHK) 2011), which have close links with the German diplomatic represent-
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ations. This is indicative of a general tendency: although all embassies in the
region have business departments (AA 2011c), a lot of economic liaison activity
is traditionally carried out by companies themselves. What Grabendorff ob-
served in the early 1990s continues to hold: “German commercial and business
interests [. . . ] are not coordinated by the embassies, but, rather, have their own
representatives and cooperative networks in each of the Latin American coun-
tries” (Grabendorff 1993: 76f). Therefore, while governmental activity might
be rather low, this is not necessarily a sign of loose ties with the region.
One important government actor in facilitating economic relations with
Latin America is the KfW Banking Group and its agencies, the KfW Devel-
opment Bank (Entwicklungsbank) and the German Investment and Develop-
ment Association (Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH;
DEG). The KfW Banking Group has five offices in Latin America: Bolivia,
Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru (KfW Entwicklungsbank 2011). The
KfW Development Bank is mainly concerned with financial development co-
operation, although it does have some funding for export and investment pro-
jects (BMWi 2011a). The DEG, however, finances German long-term invest-
ment in developing countries.21 It has opened three regional offices over the
past decade: Lima, Peru, since 2007, Mexico City since 2003, and São Paolo,
Brazil, since 2002 (DEG 2011). The sequence of opening dates is telling, with
the Southern Cone (especially Brazil) and Mexico being of particular import-
ance. In 2009, the DEG spent 20% of its financing commitments in Latin Amer-
ica, compared to 46% in Asia/Oceania, 8% in Europe and the Caucasus, 25%
in sub-Saharan Africa, and 1% in Northern Africa and the Middle East, thus
making Latin America the third largest receiver of its financing (DEG 2010:
69).
Overall, commercial policy activity towards Latin America thus remains
only at a medium level, even though it is somewhat higher than in the UK.
However, low activity on behalf of the Federal Government does not neces-
sarily mean low-key relations Latin America as a whole, since some of the
activities fulfilled by government agencies in the UK – or, as I will show be-
low, in Spain – are taken over by the Chambers of Foreign Commerce. Within
the EU, Germany supports further commercial agreements with Latin America
(AA 2010: 54f) that will ease its entry into the region’s emerging markets.
Spain Spain has a very active economic policy towards Latin America. Along
with the EU, Latin America is one of Spain’s foreign policy priorities (MAEC
2010; Baklanoff 1996: 113). Spain operates a tight network of Economic and
21However, since the DEG also has a development remit, it invests only in projects that make
sense from a development perspective and are socially and environmentally sustainable.
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Commercial Offices (Ofecomes) around Latin America. They are located in all
Latin American countries except Haiti, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, the small islands
of the Caribbean, and Suriname. The two largest Latin American economies –
Mexico and Brazil – have two Ofecomes each. The Latin American Ofecomes
are located within the Spanish embassies and are well-staffed. As of April
2011, the one in Brasilia had 7 administrative staff members and 11 interns,
and the one in Mexico City had 14 administrative staff members and 6 interns
(Ministry for Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITYC) 2011). Most coun-
try offices provide their own web pages with detailed information for Spanish
firms on how to invest, as well as on Spanish bilateral relations with the host
country. This contrasts especially with UKTI’s rather limited engagement in
most Latin American countries.
For Brazil and Mexico, Spain had special market development plans that
spanned the 2008-2010 period, although they had not been updated as of 2011
(Spanish Institute for External Trade (ICEX) 2010) that will be used as a numer-
ical indicator below. They lay out Spain’s goals in these countries and how the
government purports to achieve them. Like with the UK, there is an emphasis
on those markets that are perceived to present not only opportunities for in-
vestment, but also sources of economic gain for Spain itself, for example as a
source of tourism.
Spain has extensive bilateral programmes that it uses to further its eco-
nomic interests in developing countries. Up until recently, credits from the
Development Aid Fund (FAD) were intended to support Spanish companies
investing in developing countries, in projects using Spanish goods and ser-
vices (MITYC 2008: 8). The FAD’s main problem was that it was supposed
to fulfil a double function as an instrument of development aid and of boost-
ing Spanish exports. Aid conceded under the FAD was tied to Spanish firms
and organisations carrying out the projects. This made separating the com-
mercial from the development dimension difficult, and was harshly criticised
in the OECD’s 2007 peer review of Spanish ODA (OECD 2007: 38). Under
the 2009-2012 Plan Director de Cooperación Española (MAEC 2009c), the FAD
been reformed to create two new instruments. One of them is the Fund for the
Promotion of Development (FONPRODE), which consists of untied aid and is
managed by MAEC. The second, the Fund for the Internationalisation of En-
terprises (FIEM) is more commercially oriented and, accordingly, managed by
MITYC. Its disbursements will only be counted as ODAwhen they correspond
to the principles of cooperation policy.
Within the EU, Spain’s large agricultural sector can become a source of
tension in commercial relations with Latin America, as they are competitors
to some extent. Spain emphasises that future reforms of the Common Agri-
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cultural Policy (CAP) must be market friendly and not lead to market distor-
tions damaging the development prospects of less developed countries (MAEC
2009c: Anexo 3, 56). It wants developing countries to be able to protect their
most vulnerable agricultural sectors (MAEC 2009c: Anexo 3, 57). Neverthe-
less, there is certainly a tension between Spain’s generally pro-CAP outlook
and its seemingly close relations with Latin America, when it comes to the ne-
gotiation of EU Association agreements with Latin American countries and re-
gions (such as Mercosur), where agricultural issues represent a major obstacle
in the negotiation process.
Overall, Latin America remains one of Spain’s priorities in the economic
realm. The political efforts bear fruit: in fact, during the economic and finan-
cial crisis, its Latin American business has kept some Spanish companies, such
as Telefónica, and banks, such as BBVA, afloat and growing despite the dev-
astating domestic effects of the crisis (The Economist 2009). Regarding com-
mercial policy, Spain is very active in Latin America and tries to situate itself
as a competitive trade and investment partner. It does so both on the side of
Latin American ‘customers’ and on the side of Spanish ‘providers’. It is notice-
ably more active bilaterally than the UK and Germany, especially through its
ubiquitous and well-staffed Ofecomes. A similarity to the other two countries,
however, is that Spain also increasingly focuses its commercial policy efforts
on Brazil and Mexico, where it hopes to make a profit.
Assigning fsQCA scores to the qualitative evidence On the basis of the
above analysis, it is now possible to assign fsQCA scores to trade and invest-
ment policy activity. Scores are assigned to the cases at hand using the pro-
cedure specified by Ragin (2008: 95f), according to the degrees of membership
shown in Table 3.2, Section 3.2.2. The yardstick against which the countries are
scored is of the ideal type variety, with the ideal type being a country that fo-
cuses all or most of its foreign trade and investment policy on Latin America.
Such a country would receive a membership score of 1.0. Given the above
analysis, none of the three countries could be assigned full membership. I
therefore assign conservative fuzzy-set scores for the qualitative aspects of this
analysis (thus potentially overestimating activity on behalf of the UK and Ger-
many while underestimating it on behalf of Spain). The resulting scores are
shown in Table 3.3.
Hence, there are different levels in trade and investment policy activity to-
wards Latin America, with Spain being rather active and the UK and Germany
being less so. I now add numerical indicators that should confirm and comple-
ment the results of the qualitative analysis.
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Adding numerical evidence Above, I discussed how the use of multiple in-
dicators can make measurement more valid and reliable. I therefore add some
numerical indicators to the trade and investment component of economic policy
activity. Recall the indicators conceptualised in Section 3.1.1:
• Britain: The number of Latin American countries classified by UKTI as
‘emerging markets’ vis-à-vis Asia (UKTI 2010).
• Germany: The number of bilateral mixed economic commissions (Gemis-
chte Wirtschafts- und Kooperationsräte) between Germany and Latin Amer-
ica vis-à-vis Asia (BMWi 2010).
• Spain: Number of Planes Integrales de Desarrollo de Mercados (PIDM, Integ-
ral Market Development Plans) with Latin America vis-à-vis Asia (ICEX
2010).
Further recall that these are measured against Asia as an external yardstick
of policy activity, and that they are context-specific indicators, as no directly
comparable ones are available. As the data are numerical, the calibration of
scores can be carried out according to the “Direct Method of Calibration” (Ra-
gin 2008: 87ff) using the FSQCA programme (Ragin, Drass and Davey 2006;
cf. Section 3.2.2.1). Therefore, the cutoff-points have to be carefully specified.
Based on the above data, I then calculated the percentage of the total taken by
Latin America and Asia for each indicator. To receive full membership, a coun-
try has to be at least as active towards Latin America as it is towards Asia. I
therefore subtract the percentage for Latin America from that for Asia. What
makes this procedure elegant is that it takes into account that other regions are
also targeted by policy activity (by calculating the percentage of the total), but
only Latin America and Asia are pitted against one another in the comparison
(by subtracting one from the other). Additionally, by using percentages, the
numbers become comparable across countries, although the indicators were
initially context-specific. I therefore set the cutoff-points as follows:
• Fully in: Difference ≤ 0 – a country displays the same level of activity, or
more, towards Latin America as it does towards Asia.
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• Crossover point: Difference = 25 – a country’s activity towards Asia is 25
percentage points higher than towards Latin America.
• Fully out: Difference≥ 40 – The difference between activity towards Latin
America and Asia is higher than 40 percentage points, making policy
activity towards Latin America very low in comparison to Asia.
The results of the calibration process are summarised in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Numerical indicators for trade and investment policy activity to-
wards Latin America
Country Indicator Data fsQCA
score
























a Argentina, Brazil, Mexico
b Brazil
These results show that the tendency obtained from the qualitative analysis
is largely confirmed. Spain displays by far the strongest level of policy activ-
ity with almost full set membership, while activity in Britain and Germany is
relatively low, although it does exist. This is also in accordance with the expect-
ations established in the previous chapter: the Spanish economic sector clearly
has the strongest interests in Latin America out of the three countries under
study. It therefore comes as little surprise to a utilitarian-liberal framework
that its government would also carry out the most active trade and investment
policy towards the region. Next, I move on to completing the economic policy
dimension with evidence from development policy.
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3.3.1.2 Development policy
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the indicators for development policy activity
are based on the levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) going to
Latin America, as reported in the OECD’s statistics database. This makes cross-
country comparison relatively easy. The external yardstick against which activ-
ity is measured is constituted by the other DACmembers (the relevant detailed
ODA figures are shown in Appendix B). Given this data availability, I again
employ the “Direct Method of Calibration”, as with the numerical trade and
investment indicators. The cutoff-points for full set membership, the crossover
point and full nonmembership are based on careful inspection of the data, as
described in Section 3.2.2.1. The indicators and their cutoff-points are specified
as follows:
1. Country percentage of total DAC ODA to the Americas, 2007-9 average.
This indicator represents the level of activity vis-à-vis other donors.
• Cutoff-points: 15% (full membership), 7% (crossover point), and 1%
(full nonmembership). The cutoff-points are based on steps in the
data pointing to qualitative differences; cf. also Figure 3.1 (page 96).
2. Percentage of ODA to Latin America out of total national ODA, 2007-
9 average. The external yardstick is provided by the other DAC mem-
bers. This indicator represents the level of development policy activity
towards Latin America in comparison to other regions.
• Cutoff-points: 20% (full membership), 7.93% (crossover point; per-
centage of total DAC ODA going to the Americas), and 0.1% (full
nonmembership).
3. Number of Latin American countries/regions among top-25 ODA recipi-
ents, 2007-9 average, compared to the other DAC members and the DAC
average. This indicator demonstrates the importance of Latin America
among the top recipients of ODA from the three donor countries under
scrutiny.
• Cutoff-points: 12.5 (full membership; more than half the countries in
the top-25 are in Latin America), 2.47 (crossover point; 2007-9 overall
DAC average), and 0 (full nonmembership).
In order to obtain one value for each country, the membership scores from each
indicator are intersected using the logical AND operator, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2.2.2. This applies strict criteria for full set membership, as a country
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would have to score highly on all three indicators to obtain a high member-
ship score for the set of countries with very high development policy activity
towards Latin America. The results are summarised in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: fsQCA scores for Quantitative Evidence on Development Policy
Activity towards Latin America
Country Indicator fsQCA Score Intersected score
(1) 0.07
Britain (2) 0.08 0.05
(3) 0.05
(1) 0.74
Germany (2) 0.55 0.36
(3) 0.36
(1) 0.98
Spain (2) 0.99 0.9
(3) 0.9
The results in Table 3.5 show that in the field of development policy, Spain
is highly active, achieving full or almost full membership on all three dimen-
sions. It is, in fact, the second largest DAC donor after the US. British devel-
opment policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America, on the other hand, is very low.
It is important to note in this context that the UK has shut down its bilateral
development policy programmewith Latin America. The only Latin American
country DFID currently works with in Latin America is Brazil within the emer-
ging markets context – it has no programme within the country (DFID 2011).
This result is therefore not at all surprising, but the question of why the UK op-
erates such a low-key development policy vis-à-vis Latin America poses some
questions. Is it because the UK does not have substantial economic or political
interests in Latin America? Or because Latin America is relatively rich in com-
parison to other developing regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa, and does
not ‘need’ development assistance any more? While this result may be consist-
ent with the liberal-utilitarian explanation, competing explanations drawing
on the influence of domestic or international norms, as well as rational adapt-
ation to international rules – as outlined in Chapter 2 – might also wield ex-
planatory power. Chapter 5 will thus disaggregate the motivations for giving
aid to Latin America further in order to shed light on these questions. These
issues also feed directly into the observations on Germany: if Latin America
does not ‘need’ development assistance, why does Germany continue with its
programme? Because as Table 3.5 shows, Germany’s policy activity is consid-
erably higher than the UK’s. It remains at the lower end, but Germany scores
rather highly on indicator (1), i.e. policy activity towards Latin America in
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comparison to the other DAC donors. Germany accounts for 11.5% of total
DAC ODA to the Americas region in the 2007-9 average, making it the third
most important DAC donor behind the US (25.8%) and Spain (23.0%). Thus,
Germany is an important donor for Latin America, but Latin America is not a
very important recipient for Germany. This potential loss of fine-grained dif-
ferentiation has been discussed in Section 3.2.2.2. It is important not to lose
sight of such variation in the indexing process. However, since the process is
laid out step by step, the researcher can always go back and identify instances
of interesting variation for further scrutiny. The variation does not simply ‘dis-
appear’ during aggregation, but remains tractable.
Indeed, on the basis of the variation discovered in this step of the index-
ing procedure, I choose development policy as one of this investigation’s case
studies in order to ascertain policy makers’ motivations in carrying out such
widely disparate development policies towards one and the same region. In
the next step, the results so far are integrated in order to generate one single
score per country for the economic dimension.
3.3.1.3 Integrating the evidence
Having obtained scores for both trade and investment as well as development
policy activity, the two component sets can be joined to obtain onemembership
score per country on the economic policy activity dimension. I report both set
intersection and set union scores to lose as little variation as possible. The
results are shown in Table 3.6.














Britain 0.40 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.40
Germany 0.40 0.20 0.36 0.36 0.40
Spain 0.60 0.80 0.90 0.60 0.90
For both set intersection and set union, Spain is far ahead of Britain and
Germany in terms of economic policy activity towards Latin America. It scores
highly on all subsets, both from qualitative and quantitative evidence. Looking
at set intersection only, which applies the stricter criteria for full set member-
ship, the UK’s activity is very low, while Germany is more outside than in the
set, and Spain is more in than out. The tendency, however, is the same both
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in set intersection and set union. Looking at all scores individually allows one
to appreciate the richness of variation in the data. Britain, on the whole, is
more active in the trade and investment area than in development assistance.
Germany scores similarly for both subcomponents, and Spain scores higher on
development assistance than on trade and investment, reflecting the high level
of Spanish activity in development policy towards Latin America. This finding
is interesting from a theoretical point of view, as it points into the direction of
factors beyond liberal utilitarian explanations for foreign policy activity.
3.3.2 Governance dimension
In this section, I measure policy activity on the three subcomponents of the
governance dimension: political dialogue, cultural policy, and the integration
of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) into policy activity. Where required, I
again rely on context-specific or common adjusted indicators and the external
yardstick of comparing policy activity towards Latin America to other world
regions such as Africa and Asia. A number of indicators for the level of activity
in each country have been conceptualised in Section 3.1.1. In the following, I
lay out how the data for each subcomponent was gathered and calibrated to
construct fsQCA membership scores.
3.3.2.1 Political Dialogue
The first subcomponent of the governance dimension is political dialogue. The
chosen indicator for this component is high-level bilateral visits from each
country to Latin America vis-à-vis Africa and Asia. Due to each country’s
specific governmental characteristics, the indicator has to be adjusted for each
context, so that whose visits are counted varies across the cases. The indicators
for each country are thus as follows:
• Britain: Travels of the Foreign Secretary, PrimeMinister, Queen, and Prince
of Wales (2006-10); Sources: Clarence House (2011); The Royal House-
hold (2011)
• Germany: Travels of the Federal ForeignMinister, Chancellor, and Federal
President (2006-10); Sources: Bundespräsidialamt (2009, 2011); AA (2009,
2011a); Bundeskanzleramt (2009, 2011)
• Spain: Travels of the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minis-
ter, King, and Prince of Asturias (2006-10); Sources: Casa de Su Majestad
el Rey (2009); Presidencia del Gobierno de España (2009); MAEC (2011);
MAEC (2009b)
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Although the representatives travelling vary, the indicator is in fact comparable
across countries if one focuses on the percentage of visits to Latin America
vis-à-vis those to the two reference regions. The same cutoff-points are thus
established for all three countries as follows:
• Fully in: 50% of visits are to Latin America (a country dedicates at least
as much activity to Latin America as it does to Asia and Africa together)
• Crossover point: 25% of visits are to Latin America (slightly less than the
same amount of activity is dedicated to Latin America as to each of the
other two regions)22
• Fully out: 15% of visits are to Latin America (countries do send a repres-
entative to each region at some point, so less than 15% appears a reason-
able threshold for full nonmembership)
The results of the calibration process are reported in Table 3.7. British policy
activity is very low, Germany’s reaches a low-medium level, and Spain’s activ-
ity level is very high.
Table 3.7: fsQCA scores for Political Dialogue with Latin America




Latin America: 8 16% 0.06
Britain Africa: 13 26% 0.53
Asia: 29 58% 0.98
Latin America: 17 22% 0.20
Germany Africa: 28 33% 0.74
Asia: 38 45% 0.92
Latin America: 89 51% 0.96
Spain Africa: 58 34% 0.74
Asia: 26 19% 0.05
3.3.2.2 Cultural Policy
The second component of the governance dimension is cultural foreign policy.
As mentioned in the operationalisation section of this chapter, all three coun-
tries under study engage in cultural promotion through ‘cultural centres’ that
teach the language and stage cultural events such as lectures, film screenings,
or exhibitions. Again, some national idiosyncrasies have to be taken into ac-
count and have been discussed in section 3.1.1, such as the fact that Spain does
22In order to provide a conservative figure, 25% rather than 33% (which would mean an exactly
equal distribution of activity across the regions) was chosen.
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not have Cervantes Institutes in Latin America except Brazil, but does oper-
ate Cultural Centres (centros culturales) that can be used as an indicator. The
adjusted indicators are thus as follows:
• Germany: number of Goethe Institutes in Latin America vis-à-vis Africa
and Asia (Goethe Institut 2011a).
• Britain: number of British Council offices in Latin America vis-à-vis Africa
and Asia (British Council 2010, 2011b).
• Spain: number of Cervantes Institutes/Cultural Centres in Latin Amer-
ica vis-à-vis Cervantes Institutes and Cultural Centres in Africa and Asia
(Instituto Cervantes 2011a; MAEC 2009).
Again, the comparison with Africa and Asia was used as a yardstick by tak-
ing the percentage of total centres in each of the three regions. In order to
adjust for the fact that Africa and Asia might have more centres because there
are more countries in the region, I weighted the percentage by the number of
countries in one region as indicated by the United Nations Statistics Division
(2009).23 However, the networks are not comparable across the three countries
under study due to their different distribution of cultural centres across Latin
America, Africa and Asia: Spain and the UK have a greater regional focus than
Germany, which distributes its Goethe Institutes more evenly on the whole.
Such differences translate into different cutoff-points for full set membership,
the crossover point and non-membership:
• Britain: fully in: 0.8; crossover point: 0.4; fully out: 0.1.
• Germany: fully in: 0.6; crossover point: 0.3; fully out: 0.1.
• Spain: fully in: 1.5; crossover point: 0.3; fully out: 0.1.
The results of calibration are shown in Table 3.8.
While Spain in particular, but also Germany, operate quite an active cul-
tural policy towards Latin America, this is not the case for the UK. Britain
scores quite a low membership score for the set of countries with a highly act-
ive policy towards Latin America, although the cutoff-points were adjusted by
country to better fit its distribution of cultural centres.
3.3.2.3 Civil Society engagement in policy towards Latin America
The final component set of the governance dimension is policy activity chan-
nelled throughCSOs. Therefore, the three-year average (2007-9; 2006/7-2008/9
23See footnote 8, p. 83 for the exact numbers.
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Table 3.8: fsQCA scores for Cultural Policy Activity












Latin America: 11 5.8% 0.24 0.17
Britain Africa: 35 17.8% 0.31 0.29
Asia: 46 24.6% 0.59 0.8
Latin America: 16 11.8% 0.49 0.84
Germany Africa: 17 12.5% 0.22 0.23
Asia: 25 18.4% 0.44 0.8
Latin America: 24 30.0% 1.25 0.91
Spain Africa: 13 16.3% 0.29 0.44
Asia: 7 8.8% 0.21 0.2
in the case of Britain) of funding on behalf of the government to CSOs for pro-
jects in Latin America was conceptualised as an indicator. This is compared to
funds channelled towards Africa andAsia. Table 3.9 summarises the indicators
and aid figures.
Table 3.9: Percentage of aid funding towards Latin America channelled
through Civil Society
Country Indicator Region Percentage
Latin America 19.54
Britain % of total DFID
bilateral aid to regiona
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.09
Asia excl. Middle East 9.76
Latin America 19.91
Germany % of gross bilateral
ODA to regionb
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.3
Asia excl. Middle East 7.34
Latin America 27.48
Spain % of gross bilateral
ODA to regionc
Sub-Saharan Africa 28.78
Asia excl. Middle East 12.46
a % of total DFID bilateral aid to region channelled through NGOs; 2006/7-
2008/9 average. Source: DFID/National Statistics (2009).
b % of gross BMZ aid to region channelled through Churches, Political Found-
ations, and other NGOs; 2007-9 average. Source: BMZ (2008; 2009; 2010).
c % of gross bilateral ODA to region channelled through Development NGOs;
2006-8 average. Source: MAEC (2009a).
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National cutoff-points are chosen because the data are not cross-nationally
comparable and there seem to be different base lines for involving CSOs in
policy activity. While Spain shows rather high overall levels of CSO activity,
this is much less the case for Germany and the UK, where levels are rather
similar. The cutoff-points are set as follows:
• Britain: fully in: 20%; crossover: 10%; fully out: 7%.
• Germany: fully in: 20%; crossover: 10%; fully out: 6%.
• Spain: fully in: 30%; crossover: 25%; fully out: 10%.
Table 3.10 shows the fsQCA scores for the three countries under scrutiny.
Table 3.10: fsQCA scores for policy activity channelled through Civil Society










Overall, policy activity towards Latin America channelled through civil so-
ciety is relatively high. Even the UK, which scores low on all other indicators,
achieves a high score here.24 Germany also directs a surprisingly high level of
policy activity towards the region via CSOs.25 Spain, finally, displays a some-
what surprising distribution. Its level of policy activity directed at Latin Amer-
ica through CSOs is lower than for Africa (although not by a huge amount), a
departure from Spain’s overall pattern. What is interesting for the purposes of
this study is that across all three countries, policy activity in terms of funding
channelled through CSOs is very high. Latin America therefore appears to be
a ‘good region’ for CSO involvement across the board.
24However, it is important to note that the UK abandoned a programme by which it channelled
funding to Latin America through CSOs, the so-called Programme Partnership Agreement (PPA),
in 2010. The scores with newer data should therefore be considerably lower.
25This is in line with the high level of governance activity deployed by its political foundations,
who are important actors in the German CSO landscape (Werz 2005: 378f).
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3.3.2.4 Integrating the evidence
In the next step, the above evidence is combined to obtain a single score for
the governance dimension. As with the economic dimension, set intersection
as well as set union are applied and reported. Table 3.11 shows the results.













Britain 0.06 0.15 0.95 0.15 0.95
Germany 0.27 0.74 0.95 0.27 0.95
Spain 0.9 0.9 0.82 0.82 0.9
For set intersection, which applies a harsher yardstick for full set member-
ship, Spain scores the highest, Britain scores very low, and Germany scores
low but higher than the UK. Set union scores, however, reflect the UK’s and
Germany’s high scores on Civil Society involvement, pushing both countries’
membership scores to full set-membership. This demonstrates the value of re-
porting both intersection and union scores, as it allows the researcher to lay
open the variation contained in the data.
3.3.3 European Dimension
Finally, when assessing the foreign policy of a European Union Member State,
it is important to consider the role of the EU level, as theorised in Chapter 2.
In order to map the EU level’s importance, the following national documents
dealing with Latin America policy were hand coded:
• Germany: “Germany, Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategy Paper
by the German Government” (AA 2010).
• Britain: “Britain and Latin America: Historic Friends, Future Partners”
(2010 Canning Lecture given by Foreign Secretary William Hague, 9 No-
vember 2010; FCO 2010).
• Spain: “Política exterior de España en Iberoamérica” (Spanish foreign
policy in Iberoamerica; MAEC 2010), “La nueva política exterior para Es-
paña” – section on relations with Latin America (“The new foreign policy
for Spain”; Rodríguez Zapatero 2004), “Comparecencia ante la Comisión
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deAsuntos Iberoamericanos del Senado” (“Appearance before the Senate
Commission for Iberoamerican Affairs”, Speech by then ForeignMinister
Trinidad Jiménez; MAEC 2010).26
To ascertain the EU’s importance, I considered the relative importance of the
EU level vis-à-vis other channels of action towards the region: bilateral policy,
action in conjunction with the US, and action in conjunction with multilateral
actors such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the UN. A cod-
ing scheme was devised on the basis of a framework by Larsen (2009) and
adapted for the purposes of this investigation to take account of the relevant
channels of policy throughwhich EUMember States may carry out their policy
towards Latin America. Larsen discusses the various ways in which EU Mem-
ber States consider the EU’s agency when making foreign policy, pointing out
that the “degree of national intertwining with EU foreign policy” must be as-
certained (ibid.: 544). In his study, he is therefore primarily concerned with
whether states carry out foreign policy primarily through, partly through, or
not through the EU (ibid.: 547). While these mechanisms of interaction will
again be useful in Chapter 6, at this point I am interested in the overall import-
ance of the EU level in Member States’ relations with Latin America as well
as the importance of the EU level vis-à-vis other potential channels of the rela-
tionship. Therefore, I have devised a coding scheme that uncovers the extent
of the involvement of different policy channels when a Member State carries
out its policy towards Latin America. The channels considered are:
• bilateral
• European
• with the US
• multilateral.
Recalling the discussion in the previous chapter (see Section 2.2.6) of the inter-
national setting within which national policy towards Latin America is made
in EU Member States, these are the channels within which Germany, Spain,
and Britain might conceivably carry out foreign policy towards the region. The
coding scheme resulting from these considerations can be found in Appendix
B, along with some coding examples from the policy documents. The results
of the hand coding are shown in Table 3.12.
The EU level plays a different role in each Member State. In absolute terms,
it is the strongest in Spain, the second strongest in Germany, and the least
strong in Britain. For Germany and Britain, the results are not surprising
26The suitability of these documents for analysis has been theorised in Section 3.1.1.
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Table 3.12: Importance of the EU level in policy towards Latin America for
Britain, Germany and Spain (% of total sentences coded)
Channel Britain Germany Spain
Bilateral 86.05 66.50 44.55
EU 06.98 18.45 28.18
US 02.32 00.00 03.64
Multilateral 04.65 15.05 23.64
given the existing literature on Germany as rather Europeanist and the UK as
rather Eurosceptic and having strong transatlantic ties (Katzenstein 1996; Wal-
lace 2005: 55). Much more puzzling at first sight is the strength of the EU in
the Spanish case. Given Spain’s emphasis on Latin America as a foreign policy
priority (Jiménez 2010: 106), one might expect a much higher importance of the
bilateral level. A possible explanation for this pattern could be that Spain con-
ducts a highly active policy in all forums precisely because of Latin America’s
importance. This explanation finds potential support in the fact that Spain also
scores quite highly on the ‘multilateral’ dimension and the highest out of the
three countries on US involvement. The heavy emphasis on the multilateral
framework stems from Spain’s involvement in the Iberoamerican Community,
which involves cooperation in many policy areas and regular meetings at all
levels, including an annual Summit of Heads of State and Government.27
Given these considerations, it is worth ascertaining the importance of the
EU vis-à-vis potential outside alternatives. This can be done by taking the dif-
ference between activity carried out within the European framework and the
sum of the other two channels (US and multilateral), shown in Columns 2 and
4 of Table 3.13. Germany is the country where the EU matters comparatively
more than in the other two, Spain reaches a medium level and in Britain, the
picture is the most balanced with the EU being just as important as the multi-
lateral framework and the US combined. This makes sense given the second-
ary literature, which tends to classify Germany as very Europeanist, Spain as
Europeanist but torn between a European and Iberoamerican identity, and the
UK as heavily oriented towards the US and the multilateral framework (Wag-
ner 2002; Wallace 2005; del Arenal 2004: 3; Grugel and Kippin 2006: 288).
In order to define the cutoff-points for fuzzy-set calibration, a target set
must be defined. I take this to be the set of countries where most of policy
activity is carried out within the EU framework vis-à-vis other channels, both
in absolute terms (Table 3.13, column 2) and comparing the EU with outside
27Member states of the Iberoamerican Community are Spain, Portugal and Andorra on the
European side, and 19 Latin American countries.
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alternatives (Table 3.13, column 4). Therefore, the intersection of both sets is
needed to reach the overall fsQCA score for the European dimension.
For membership in the set of countries who carry out most of their policy
within the EU context in absolute terms, I set the cutoff-points as follows:
• Fully in: 50% (a majority of policy activity in absolute terms is carried out
within the EU framework)
• Crossover point: 20% (less than a quarter of policy activity is carried out
within the EU framework)28
• Fully out: 5% (all countries have to carry out at least some of their policy
within the EU framework, namely where the EU holds competences,
such as in commercial policy)
The resulting fsQCA scores are reported in column 3 of Table 3.13.
For membership in the set of countries who carry out most of their policy
within the EU context compared to other non-bilateral channels, the cutoff-
points are specified as follows. Remember that the scores are based on the
difference between activity within the EU context and activity within other
contexts: EU − (US+ Multilateral). A country carrying out as much policy in
the EU context as in other contexts would receive a score of 0, which is the point
at which it is fully out of the set of countries conducting most of their policy
within the EU rather than other contexts. In theory, the difference between the




EU − (US+ Multilateral)
￿
= (100− Bilateral)
Given the strength of bilateral action in all three countries, a result of 5 for
EU− (US+Multilateral) is reasonable for full set membership. The following
cutoff-points are thus set:
• Fully in: 5
• Crossover point: 2
• Fully out: 0
The results of the calibration are reported in column 5 of Table 3.13.
Finally, the resulting set intersection scores for the overall EU dimension are
reported in column 6 of Table 3.13. Note that no country achieves a very high
membership score, because none scores highly on both absolute policy activity
28In order to provide a conservative figure, 20% rather than 25% (which would mean an exactly
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within the EU context and policy activity within the EU context compared to
other non-bilateral channels. The UK scores low on both counts. Germany
scores high on the importance of the EU among non-bilateral channels, but
receives only a medium score on the overall importance of the EU. Spain scores
high on the overall importance of the EU, but low on the importance of the EU
vis-à-vis other non-bilateral channels, because of the Iberoamerican Summit
Process.
3.4 Results and emerging puzzles
Having obtained scores for all three dimensions, an overall picture of variation
across Britain, Germany and Spain emerges. Table 3.14 displays the final index
results. Here, I report the scores for set intersection only, given that they apply
the stricter requirements for a high final score. In order to be counted as having
a very high level of policy activity towards Latin America on a dimension, the
countries under study have to reach a high score on all subcomponents of the
three dimensions. Following the same logic, I base the final set intersection
on those scores that have resulted from the intersection of subsets in the cases
where I have reported both scores, thus reaching overall conservative index
values for each country on each dimension.








Britain 0.05 0.15 0.05
Germany 0.36 0.27 0.42
Spain 0.6 0.82 0.16
Table 3.14 shows some interesting variation in policy activity towards Latin
America that can lead to future research questions on the reasons for such dif-
ferences. Britain receives low scores for all three dimensions, indicating that it
conducts a rather low-key policy towards Latin America. Germany fares better
than the UK, but still receives scores indicating that its level of activity in policy
towards Latin America is rather low, with the partial exception of the EU di-
mension. Although still more in than out of the set of countries with a high
level of policy activity within the European, it is the most active country out of
the three countries studied in this chapter. Spain, finally, scores the highest on
all counts except the EU dimension. What, then, can be made of this evidence?
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Fuzzy-set QCA’s step-by-step approach allows for exposing variation with-
in and among the cases as the index is being constructed. Although some vari-
ation may not show in the final index, it remains tractable and easily iden-
tifiable throughout the index creation procedure. Especially with qualitative
data, a less strictly structured way of aggregating evidence and making it com-
parable can make it more difficult to identify such variation. This convenient
property of fsQCA allows the researcher to systematically query the cases un-
der study and choose especially significant or puzzling instances of variation
for further investigation.
One example is development policy. Germany scores very highly on one
of the indicators, namely the percentage of total DAC ODA to Latin America,
meaning that it is one of the most important DAC donors to Latin America.
Meanwhile, the UK scores very low on all development policy activity indicat-
ors, and Spain receives very high scores. What accounts for such differences?
How is it that the same region receives such vastly different amounts of ODA
from different European donors? A second example of variation that merits
further attention is the EU dimension. Evidently, the interaction between the
national policy towards Latin America and the EU’s policy towards the region
differs in the three countries. For example, Spain is very active within the EU
overall, but is almost as active in the multilateral context. How can the two-
level interaction be conceptualised and how can the differences be explained?
It is these two cases – development policy and interactionwith the European
level – that will be the subject of deeper investigation in the second part of this
study. In-depth comparative case studies will attempt to further disentangle
and explain the variation uncovered through the indexing procedure. In that
sense, indexing with fsQCA provides a highly tractable and systematic tool
for summarising and mapping complex data in small to medium-N analyses.
Both the final index values and the intermediate scores resulting from calib-
rating various indicators can serve as a basis for further case selection. What
is more, the method permits the integration of very different types of data,
both qualitative and numerical, placing them on the same footing. This al-
lows for structured comparison even when numerical data is available only
for some but not all aspects of the cases under scrutiny, thus facilitating both
cross- and within-case comparison. It provides for the better comparability of
qualitative data and is able to exploit the in-depth knowledge of cases the small
to medium-N researcher acquires during the data collection process, taking it
into account during the calibration procedure. By doing so, it allows the re-
searcher to create a systematically comparative map of the data, in this case
the overarching independent variable of the study. This is in itself a contribu-
tion to both the application of fsQCA as a research tool in general, as well as to
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the comparative study of foreign policy, in this case towards Latin America, in
particular. As discussed in Chapter 2, systematic comparison is something the
body of literature on Latin America policy-making in Europe is presently lack-
ing. By providing a framework that can be adapted to not only other countries’
Latin America policy, but also to policy towards other regions, this study con-
tributes to the quest for improving systematic comparative foreign policy ana-
lysis. More specifically, while it was previously clear that policy towards Latin
America differs among Germany, Spain, and the UK, we now know where ex-
actly the variation lies, because it has been systematically exposed. As a result,
it is now possible to construct adequate middle-range theoretical frameworks
within the overarching theoretical model conceived in Chapter 2 in order to
explain the variation uncovered here.
3.5 Conclusions and Outlook
In this chapter, I have operationalised andmapped this study’s overarching de-
pendent variable by conceptualising it as policy activity towards Latin America
and finding appropriate multiple indicators for its three dimensions, economic
policy, governance, and the European dimension of policy towards Latin Amer-
ica. The chapter has then laid out how to summarise the indicators using an
index based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Fuzzy-set QCA
permits the integration and systematic comparison of various types of data,
thus facilitating both within- and cross-case comparison in small to medium-N
analysis.
In systematically exposing the variation among German, Spanish, and Brit-
ish policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America in a step-by-step fashion, I have
shown that overall, Spain’s policy towards Latin America is the most active,
while Germany’s reaches a medium to low level, and the UK operates a rather
low-key policy towards the region. However, by providing a very fine-grained
map of the empirical panorama, I have uncovered much more deeply rooted
and less crude variation among and within the three cases. By doing so, this
chapter has laid the basis for the selection of particular aspects for further
study. In particular, development policy and the interaction of national policy
towards Latin America and the EU’s policy towards the region will be the
subject of two in-depth case studies. Explaining such variation will require
more fine-grained middle range theoretical frameworks that nevertheless situ-
ate themselves within the general theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2.
It is the discussion of the selection and further introduction of these two cases
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The first part of this investigation has introduced, theorised, and conceptual-
ised foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe. Chapter 2 has
outlined the state of the literature as well as the general theoretical founda-
tions of this study, which seek to explain foreign policy-making towards Latin
America within an extended liberal framework (see Figure 2.1, page 64 for a
graphical overview of the framework). In Chapter 3 I have drawn up a system-
atic map of foreign policy activity vis-à-vis the region on behalf of Germany,
Spain, and the UK, using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to con-
struct an index. The index serves two purposes. Firstly, it exposes variation
on the investigation’s overarching dependent variable, foreign policy activity
towards Latin America, in a comparable way. In so doing it contributes to the
study of comparative foreign policy more generally, as well as to the analysis
of Latin America policy more specifically by introducing a systematic com-
parative element that has hitherto not been a strong point of the literature on
policy-making towards Latin America in Europe. Secondly, as indicated in the
previous chapter, the variation revealed by the indexing procedure is used to
select two aspects of foreign policy towards Latin America for more intensive
study: development policy on the one hand, and the interaction of national
policy with the EU level on the other.
In this short introduction to the second part of the study, I further discuss
the motivations for selecting development and interaction with the EU level
for in-depth case study analysis. I then go on to discuss the methods used for
analysing the two cases, their advantages as well as their limitations and how
I purport to mitigate them. The remainder of Part II is then dedicated to the
case studies.
4.1 Case Selection: Development and EU-level In-
teraction
In Chapter 3, I carefully operationalised andmeasured variation in policy activ-
ity towards Latin America on behalf of Britain, Germany, and Spain with the
use of fsQCA to create a systematic index. As opposed to other indexing
methods, fsQCA clearly uncovers differences not only in the final index val-
ues, but also in the stages leading up to the compilation of the eventual index.
This step-by-step process of index aggregation has revealed some particularly
noteworthy instances of variation that merit further attention. In order to fur-
ther disentangle and explain foreign policy-making towards Latin America in
Europe, I therefore select two cases that will be subject to in-depth case studies
in this part of the investigation. The two chosen aspects, as indicated in the pre-
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vious chapter, are development policy and interaction between national policy
and the EU’s policy towards Latin America. This section reviews and further
motivates the selection of these two cases by putting it into a methodological
perspective.
4.1.1 Case Selection: Methodological Remarks
As I have outlined in Chapter 1, the selection of cases for study has two com-
ponents in the context of this investigation. The first, country selection – that is,
the selection of Germany, Spain, and the UK for study – has been motivated in
the first chapter. The second concerns the selection of aspects of foreign policy-
making towards Latin America and is discussed in this section. In order to refer
to these aspects, I will use the term “cases” because they are conceptualised as
two in-depth case studies that make up the second part of the research project.
Of course, the country selection carried out in Chapter 1 to some extent con-
ditions how the cases for further study are selected. As previously explained,
the countries have been chosen in part because the selection of Germany, Bri-
tain, and Spain allows me to keep some aspects constant: all three countries
are Member States of the European Union, all three – for the purposes of this
study – can be considered ‘great powers’ within the EU and ‘middle powers’
within the global context, and finally, all three operate an autonomous Latin
America policy. I am, therefore, working with what has commonly come to
be termed a ‘most similar systems’ design (MSSD) emerging from the country
selection: a design where some systemic variables are held as constant as pos-
sible,1 while those whose effect one is interested in are allowed to vary (della
Porta 2008: 214). In the context of this study, as explained in Chapter 2, the
factors that vary are mostly domestic factors, which hence become the inde-
pendent variables of this study. However, the liberal framework was extended
to accomodate the impact of systen-level variables such as EU membership,
which are conceptualised as mediated by the national context.
For this reason, in order to make the most of the study’s explanatory po-
tential with regards to policy-making towards Latin America in Europe, the
cases analysed should be carefully selected. I am interested in the impact of
domestic-level factors, as well as certain systemic factors, potentially mediated
by domestic variables, on foreign policy-making towards Latin America, as
well as the mechanism through which they work. In that sense, I am mov-
ing within the ‘causes-of-effects’ framework of many qualitative researchers
(Mahoney and Goertz 2006: 230) who seek to identify the causes of certain
1Della Porta (2008: 215) discusses the limitations of the most similar systems design and points
out that it is usually not possible to hold the desired factors completely constant, so that one always
has to reckon with some residual influence of variation in these factors.
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outcomes and their interaction.
In order to analyse and disentangle these factors within the complex pro-
cess of foreign policy-making, I will employ process-tracing, which will be
further discussed in Section 4.2. Vennesson defines process tracing as “a re-
search procedure intended to explore the processes by which initial conditions
are translated into outcomes” (Vennesson 2008: 224). Since process-tracing in-
volves the deep investigation of cases, the number of case studies this study
can accommodate is limited to two for practical reasons. Gerring (2004) dis-
cusses the tradeoffs involved when settling on case study research and choos-
ing cases (see also della Porta 2008: 213). By incorporating two cases and com-
paring three countries, this study is able to mitigate at least some of these lim-
itations. Including several countries is able to overcome, at least to some ex-
tent, the problem of ‘boundedness’ involved in case study research: because
of their narrow focus, case studies, according to Gerring, “often produce infer-
ences with poorly defined boundaries”, while cross-unit (here, cross-country)
analyses are less likely to do so because the research design allows the invest-
igator “to test the limits of an inference in an explicit fashion” (Gerring 2004:
347). Similarly, choosing to study two areas of policy-making towards Latin
America can help identify common or diverging factors in determining the
making of Latin America policy in Europe. Of course, it is important that one
be aware of the limitations of the study of two cases. It is difficult to carry
generalisations over into other areas of foreign policy-making and into foreign
policy-making in other countries and towards regions other than Latin Amer-
ica. Gerring (ibid.: 348) refers to this as the problem of representativeness.
Studying elements of one case – policy towards Latin America – ensures that
they are comparable among each other (homogeneous), but limits the extent
to which findings can be carried over to other areas. Being aware of these lim-
itations is important in order not to overstate the significance of the findings
(George and Bennett 2005: 84). While the study of development policy-making
and the interaction between national and EU policy towards Latin America can
give some indications of the factors that are at work in foreign-policy making
more generally, it is vital to be aware that the results are circumscribed in the
following ways.
Firstly, the independent variables conceptualised in Chapter 2 may play out
differently in different countries, and are indeed likely to do so.. This does not
only apply to the three countries under study here, but evidently also to coun-
tries that are not considered by this project. Therefore, while some basic gener-
alisations about foreign policy making in general and towards Latin America
in particular can be made, it is important to bear in mind that other countries’
policies towards the region are made within specific national contexts that may
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alter the impact of the different independent variables.
Moreover, because of the research design that considers EU Member States
only, the findings are also limited to such states. While the MSSD employed
allows me to reduce variation in the independent variables to a manageable
degree, it also limits the generisability of the findings to states that correspond
systematically to those under study. Similar dynamics might thus, for instance,
be at work in countries such as France or Italy, but may play out differently in
non-EU states, or even in smaller or new EU Member States. One of the pre-
conditions for case selection in this study was that the countries under consid-
eration should bring an autonomous national policy towards Latin America
to the table, which is the case only to a very limited degree in the new East-
ern European Member States. Small states are similarly limited in carrying out
autonomous foreign policies comparable to those of relatively large states such
as Germany, Britain, and Spain.2
In addition, because of the methodological choice for process tracing that
is conditioned by the nature of the research project as a comparative small-N
design with a potentially equifinal impact of the independent variables, the
number of policy areas studied is limited to two: development policy and in-
teraction between national and EU policy towards Latin America. As with the
country selection, this case selection means that while the same independent
variables are likely to be at play in other policy areas, there might be addi-
tional factors influencing these issues, or the independent variables might play
out differently from the ways I find in this study. Therefore, I can give general
indications as to what impacts upon policy-making towards the region and
how these factors interact, but there is always a possibility that this works out
in different ways depending on the policy area in question.
My investigation thus contributes, firstly, to the study of foreign policy-
making towards Latin America – it can give indications as to foreign policy-
making more generally, but it is likely that in particular the ways in which
the various independent variables interact with one another depends also on
the ‘recipient region’ of foreign policy. Secondly, as indicated above, the study
makes a valuable contribution to the analysis of foreign policy-making in (large)
EU Member States. Although the generalisability of its results is limited by the
factors outlined above, the study’s framework may very well be extended not
only to the analysis of other countries’ policies towards Latin America, but also
to other regions. One interesting point of departure for further research might
thus be the comparison between policy towards Latin America and policy to-
2For the motivations behind the selection of Germany, Britain, and Spain, see Chapter 1, Section
??.
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wards Africa and Asia, for example.3 Furthermore, the study is situated in the
more general contexts of development policy-making on the one hand, and the
interaction between policy-making at the national level and the European level
– particularly in foreign policy – on the other. Both these contributions will be
discussed in more detail in the case study chapters following this introduction.
Based on these considerations, the two cases have been selected for reasons
of both empirical variation and theoretical relevance, as I will show in the next
two sections. As George and Bennett (2005: 83) point out, when selecting the
cases, the primary criterion should be relevance to the research objective. Since
I am concerned with Latin America policy in Europe, and I am selecting the
cases based on the conceptualisation of foreign policy towards the region that
preceded mapping the dependent variable, the relevance of the chosen cases is
given. Additionally, I will further motivate their theoretical relevance below.
Moreover, George and Bennett (ibid.) call for cases to be selected in order to
provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem.
Firstly, in order to identify the varying effects of the explanatory variables
that will be conceptualised for each case studymore specifically but have broad-
ly been outlined in Chapter 2, variation in the dependent variable is required
(George and Bennett 2005: 81). As Van Evera (1997) points out, selecting cases
with extreme values (high and low) for study, that is, maximising variation
in the dependent variable, makes omitted variable bias less likely because it
“lowers the likelihood that any third variables have enough impact to produce
this result and also ensures that these variables’ necessarily extreme values
will call attention to themselves if they do produce this result” (ibid.: 61; see
also p. 80f). By combining MSSD in selecting the countries under study and
maximising variation in the dependent variable, I hope to be able to control
for the impact of third, not theorised factors sufficiently to discover them if
they do have an impact. I therefore choose cases that differ considerably in the
levels of foreign policy activity vis-à-vis Latin America. Secondly, as discussed
above, control for external factors is provided by the country selection carried
out prior to mapping foreign policy activity.
4.1.2 Empirical Variation
As laid out in the previous chapter, both development policy activity vis-à-vis
Latin America and the interaction of national policy with the EU level present
not just a high level of variation, but also vary in interesting ways. An analysis
of this variation can help disentangle the drivers of foreign policy towards the
3While such an extension would potentially require the introduction of further independent
variables and some reconceptualisations, the general MSSD set-up could be kept by looking at the
policies of the same EU Member States.
4.1. CASE SELECTION 133
region in the cases under study and can potentially give indications regarding
foreign policy-making in Europe more generally. As mentioned above, since
the country selection is based on maintaining certain factors constant, it is vital
to have variation in the dependent variable in order to tackle the identification
of explanatory variables and the mechanisms through which they drive Latin
America policy (Van Evera 1997). Table 4.1 recapitulates this variation, which
is useful to bear in mind for the following paragraphs. Recall that the scores
correspond to each country’s membership in the set of countries with a high
activity towards Latin America in development policy and involvement with
the EU level, respectively.4
Table 4.1: Foreign Policy Activity towards Latin America – Development
policy and EU Involvement




See Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.1.2 and 3.3.3 for details on the measurement and
assignation of scores.
Regarding development policy activity, the question of how it is possible
for the very same region to receive such vastly different levels of attention on
behalf of three EU Member States arises directly from the disparate member-
ship scores. The UK’s very low involvement is the most noticeable. Home not
only to a very influential development ministry, the Department for Interna-
tional Development (DFID) but also to various influential development NGOs,
such as Oxfam, and research institutes, such as the Overseas Development In-
stitute (ODI), the UK holds an international status as an important donor with
in-depth expertise in development policy (Porteus 2005: 283; Watkins 2010: 2).
Yet, as its index score on development policy activity shows, the UK seems to
ignore Latin America almost completely. Indeed, as I showed in Chapter 3,
the UK’s activity in development policy towards the region is low across all
indicators (see Table 3.5, page 108): it neither accounts for a large share of total
OECD DAC aid to the Americas, nor does it dedicate a significant share of its
national aid to the region or include a Latin American country among its top-
25 ODA recipients. Spain, on the other hand, veers towards the other extreme,
scoring nearly full membership on all indicators. Finally, Germany lies in the
middle, albeit towards the lower end. However, it does score quite highly in
terms of its share of DAC aid to Latin America, and is slightly above the DAC
4The higher the number, the greater set membership. For an in-depth discussion, see 3.2.2.
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average in terms of the national aid share it dedicates to the region. Therefore,
if aid were mainly poverty-oriented, one might expect a more homogeneous
distribution of development policy activity among the three countries. Like-
wise, if aid were mainly economically oriented, the distribution would make
some more sense, but the UK’s disregard for the region is still quite puzzling
given that it does have some trade and investment interests in the region (Gru-
gel and Kippin 2006), and Latin America’s economies have been growing. Sim-
ilarly, in that sense, one might expect somemore engagement from the German
side. It is therefore worth investigating what drives the very different levels of
activity on this subcomponent of economic foreign policy.
As for the European dimension, activity levels are also disparate, even
though the differences are not quite as large as those found in development
policy activity. Here, the puzzles lie more with the German and Spanish case
than with the UK. While Britain is traditionally viewed as rather Eurosceptic
(e.g. Wagner 2002;Wallace 2005) and its low level of involvement with the EU’s
policy towards Latin America is therefore not that surprising, Germany has tra-
ditionally been seen as rather Europeanist (e.g. Rittberger 2001a; Wagner 2002),
and Spain’s approach to European integration has often been to see Spain as the
problem and Europe as the solution, to paraphrase Spanish philosopher Ortega
y Gasset. Indeed, Baklanoff describes Europeanisation as Spain’s main for-
eign policy objective since the late Franco period (Baklanoff 1996: 112; see also
Kennedy 2000: 106). Additionally, it has been seen as a ‘bridge’ between the EU
and Latin America and, in particular, sees itself this way. In fact, the Spanish
(and Portuguese) Accession Treaties to the European Communities included
a joint declaration on how their entry to the EC could strengthen Europe’s
relations with Latin America (Member States of the European Communities
1985). However, recently Spain’s success of providing the EU’s connection
to Latin America has been critically scrutinised by researchers, who consider
that Spain has not managed to fulfil expectations regarding European-Latin
American relations (Kennedy 2000: 12f; Moltó 2010). Spain’s low score on the
European dimension of policy activity stems from the low importance of the
EU among other non-bilateral channels, chiefly driven by the high importance
of the Iberoamerican framework (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3). Overall Spanish
involvement with the EU is higher, but with a score of 0.69 still not as close to
full membership as one might expect of a country that constitutes the ‘bridge’
between the EU and Latin America. Again, therefore, the variation both within
and across cases on the European dimension deserves some further attention.
In line with the methodological considerations discussed above, these two
cases thus respond to several aspects of case selection. On the one hand, by vir-
tue of their being aspects of the dependent variable conceptualised in the pre-
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vious chapter, they are representative of policy towards Latin America more
generally – of course, bearing in mind the above limitations. Secondly, I have
shown how they expose instances of variation that can be fruitfully explored
through process tracing. In the next section, I discuss their theoretical relev-
ance.
4.1.3 Theoretical Relevance
In addition to themethodological and empirical considerations outlined above,
development policy as well as interaction between national foreign policy and
the EU’s Latin America policy are relevant to this study’s theoretical frame-
work. When selecting cases for further study, as della Porta points out, some-
times “good cases are not the most typical, but the most telling, because they
help to clarify theoretical problems” (della Porta 2008: 216). It is therefore
worth considering, in the context of this study, what constitutes a ‘telling’ case.
Whether it is also ‘typical’ or not is secondary; in fact, what might make a
case telling could be precisely the fact that it is typical. In this investigation, I
have conceptualised a theoretical framework whose goal is to contribute to ex-
plaining foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe (Chapter 2).
I have also laid out how the more in-depth study of cases will require the use
of middle-range theories dealing with the particular issue at hand. Therefore, I
require cases that are both able to contribute to the explanatory effort and have
middle-range theories available that allow for such an endeavour. As Ven-
nesson notes, both case-study research and process tracing require the prior ex-
istence of theoretical frameworks for fruitful research to take place (Vennesson
2008: 236). This is given in both the literature on development policy, and the
literature on the interaction between national (foreign) policy and the EU level.
The theoretical building blocks have been galvanised into a general framework
in Chapter 2. It is the task of the case studies to enrich this framework with
concrete theoretical expectations in order to test them empirically.
In the development realm, there have been heated discussions on whether
development policy and the allocation of aid are primarily the results of util-
itarian considerations (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007) or of norms
(e.g. Lumsdaine 1993). So far, there has been no final adjudication on the
issue. If anything, the most widespread yet disputed consensus is that both
aspects matter. However, as I will outline in Chapter 5, the debate over the
circumstances under which they matter is far from closed. While this invest-
igation does not pretend to provide an adjudication between utilitarian and
normative independent variables, it can hope to contribute to bringing the two
camps closer together by elucidating to what extent they are complementary
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and how variables theorised by both approaches impact development policy-
making towards Latin America in Europe. Likewise, in the literature on the
interaction of Member States’ national policy with the EU level, there is a vivid
debate in the literature on the extent to which Member State foreign policies
have been Europeanised (e.g. Wong and Hill 2011; Ruano forthcoming 2012),
what mechanisms are at play in the interaction between national and European
(foreign) policy (e.g. Radaelli 2004; Moumoutzis 2011; M.E. Smith 2000; 2004),
and the attitude different Member States take towards EU foreign policy – and
why they take it (e.g. Wagner 2002; Bulmer and Paterson 2010; Torreblanca
2001). This study seeks to contribute to the field by determining how differ-
ent independent variables impact foreign policy-making and how they might
combine to explain country-specific foreign policy activity and characteristics
by assessing the impact of the variables conceptualised in Chapter 2. In partic-
ular, where several variables predict the same or similar outcomes, case studies
can help disentangle the mechanisms at work (George and Bennett 2005: 207).
Additionally, both foreign policy-making in the EU and development policy
are vividly discussed in the political science literature at this point in time and
are the subject of recent publications (e.g. Moumoutzis 2011; Wong and Hill
2011 for foreign policy and the EU; Milner and Tingley Submitted 2010; Feeny
and McGillivray 2008 for development policy). In that sense, therefore, this in-
vestigation is able to contribute to ongoing debates in the academic literature.
4.2 How do we know? Methods for analysing for-
eign policy-making in EUMember States
Having motivated the selection of two cases for further study, the next section
discusses how to go about analysing them. The question is how the some-
times equifinal impact of different independent variables can be disentangled,
while at the same time accounting for the potentially complex interaction of
mechanisms that eventually give Latin America policy in the respective coun-
tries its shape. As I demonstrate in the following paragraphs, process tracing
provides a way of doing so. The analysis will be based mainly on interview
data, although other publicly available government documents and secondary
literature will also be employed. The strengths and limitations of the approach
are the subject of the following paragraphs.
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4.2.1 Process tracing
As Fearon andWendt (2003: 62) point out, it may be difficult to empirically dis-
tinguish different motivations for the behaviour of policy-makers, especially if
only behavioural data are available. It may be that several theories predict the
same or a similar outcome, a phenomenon called equifinality. Equifinality is,
indeed, one of the issues of social scientific research that in-depth case studies
are considered particularly apt for dealing with (George and Bennett 2005: 76),
alongside the study of causal mechanisms, meaning the interaction of different
factors in order to produce an outcome (Checkel 2006: 366).
One method often employed by case-study researchers is process-tracing,
which is considered especially well-suited for uncovering social mechanisms
and their functioning, as well as for dealing with equifinality (George and Ben-
nett 2005: 207). Process tracing as a term was coined by Jack Goldstone (1991;
see also George and Bennett 2005: 159) in a study on “Revolution and Rebel-
lion in the Early Modern World”, although the practice is in fact older than
that. One famous example is Theda Skocpol’s seminal volume “States and So-
cial Revolutions” (1979). Most approaches to process tracing “emphasize the
identification of a causal mechanism connecting independent and dependent
variables” (Vennesson 2008: 232), although it is often likely that more than
one mechanism is at play (Checkel 2006: 368). In addition to its benefits for
uncovering social mechanisms, Checkel also considers process tracing to be
especially suitable for both differentiating different independent variables and
analysing their connections and interactions: “it is extremely useful for teas-
ing out the more fine-grained distinctions and connections between alternative
theoretical schools” (ibid.: 366).
Frequently, process tracing is associated with the tracing of historical pro-
cesses (e.g. Bennett and Elman 2006b: 459; George and Bennett 2005: Chapter
10). However, George and Bennett (2005: 208f) point to a fundamental dif-
ference between process tracing and historical analysis in that process tracing
places a strong emphasis on theory development and theory testing, as the
present study does. Therefore, I argue that process tracing is suitable not only
to trace historical developments but to trace all sorts of social processes, even
if they develop within a short period of time that is difficult to classify as ‘his-
torical’ stricto sensu. ‘Historical’, then, refers merely to the fact that a process
is unfolding over a certain period, no matter how short. This understanding
is confirmed by Vennesson’s description of process tracing as “a research pro-
cedure intended to explore the processes by which initial conditions are trans-
lated into outcomes” (2008: 224). Clarifying this is important for the context
of this investigation, which after all deals with a ‘snapshot’ of policy towards
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Latin America as made at the time of investigation and a few years prior. As
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2 (p. 68), it does not dive deeper into
an historical analysis of its sources, even though in the case of the interaction
between national and European policies towards Latin America a historical
overview is provided to give a sense of developments since the beginning of
European integration.
Process tracing has been used in various manners (Vennesson 2008: 231).
In the context of this study, I will use it to uncover the influence of different,
potentially complementary or competing, independent variables on policy to-
wards Latin America by looking at how it is made in Germany, Spain, and
the UK. Process tracing comes in a variety of types. It is therefore important
to classify my own research within the variants of process tracing in order to
demarcate its domain of application more clearly. George and Bennett (2005)
suggest the following variants:
• Detailed narrative: a “story presented in the form of a chronicle that pur-
ports to throw light on how an event came about” (ibid.: 210)
• Analytic explanation: “an analytical causal explanation couched in expli-
cit theoretical forms” (ibid.: 211)
• More general explanation: “a general explanation rather than a detailed
tracing of a causal process [...] consistent with the familiar practice in
political science research of moving up the ladder of abstraction” (ibid.)
Given the conceptualisation of this investigation and the evidence provided
so far, I aim to use it in the sense of an analytic explanation strategy. Embed-
ded within a theoretical framework, I search for the drivers of Latin America
policy in the three countries under study, using the examples of development
policy and interaction with the EU level. As Gerring (2007: 173) points out,
“the hallmark of process tracing [...] is that multiple types of evidence are em-
ployed for the verification of a single inference.” In the next section, I assess
how this study performs such triangulation by the analysis of interviews at the
national level, the European level and with Latin American diplomats, as well
as the analysis of government documents and the supplementary use of sec-
ondary literature. Before proceeding, however, it is important to consider the
challenges and pitfalls of process tracing.
As anymethod, process tracing comeswith its own set of issues a researcher
has to bear in mind. The challenges of process tracing are particularly well
summarised by Checkel (2006: 367ff) and Vennesson (2008: 237f). In the follow-
ing, I briefly consider those that matter the most for this study. Firstly, accord-
ing to Checkel, process tracing encourages non-parsimonious theories, connec-
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ted with a danger to lose sight of the ‘bigger picture’ and becoming drawn into
a regress of ever more ‘micro’ analyses of the mechanisms at work. (Checkel
2006: 367). This is because the social mechanisms considered in process tracing
may be so complex that they turn into “everything matters” explanations. It
is therefore important to consider alternative explanations as alternatives and
not ignore negative evidence (Vennesson 2008: 238). When considering dif-
ferent explanatory variables, I thus have to ensure that negative evidence –
or a lack of evidence – is not ignored or unduly dismissed. This study thus
intends to follow Checkel’s call to “take equifinality seriously” (Checkel 2006:
370) by consideringwhether influencing factors are complementary or compet-
itive. Additionally, the researcher’s desire to provide as complete explanations
as possible may lead to an ever-deeper analysis of causal mechanisms. It is
therefore important to draw a line at which to stop. Since this study is based
on interviews with policy-makers, this is to some extent determined by the em-
pirical data. In theory, I could go down to the personal level in determining the
drivers of policy towards Latin America, as well as small-group dynamics in-
volved at the relevant institutions. However, in order to ensure comparability
across the case studies and countries, I focus on explanatory factors provided
by the extended liberal framework conceptualised in Chapter 2 and thus on
factors emanating mainly from the meso-level without losing sight of the im-
pact of macro-level variables, but exogenising more ‘micro’ factors.
Another challenge is that some variables remain unobservable even in pro-
cess tracing (Checkel 2006: 367). What is more, as Vennesson (2008: 237) points
out, the empirical sources employed in process tracing and their treatment re-
quire a high level of accuracy to ensure reliability. The reliability of qualitative
data has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter (see Section 3.1.1). The
approach taken in the remainder of the investigation is similar: I will ensure
transparency about sources and data treatment as much as possible in order to
keep reliability at the highest possible level. Again, this is an issue that is partic-
ularly relevant to foreign policy, where policy-makers’ motivations cannot be
directly observed and are, moreover, often clouded in diplomatic confidential-
ity. Below, I outline the triangulation strategies adopted by this investigation
to mitigate the problem, even though it cannot be completely solved. In the
following paragraphs, I discuss the data analysis methods employed by this
study and how they are used to ensure that both validity and reliability are
kept at a maximum. Note that in this introductory chapter, I discuss chiefly
those aspects applying both case studies, since case study-specific issues will
be discussed in the respective chapters.
140 CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY FRAMEWORK
4.2.2 Interviews
I have indicated above that the empirical evidence for this study is basedmainly
on elite interviewswith officials at the relevant national ministries of foreign af-
fairs and the development ministries or agencies. The institutions were chosen
because the foreign ministries represent the institutions with the most com-
prehensive overview of policy towards Latin America, while the development
ministries and agencies are experts regarding the particular case study of Chap-
ter 5.5 There are several reasons for the choice of elite interviews; in the follow-
ing, I outline the use to which the interviews will be put and discuss why elite
interviews are an appropriate method to obtain the required evidence.
Why Elite Interviews? In order to explain the choice for elite interviews as
the main data source, it is important to understand how they will be used.
In this study, I wish to elucidate the factors that drive policy-making towards
Latin America in Germany, Spain, and the UK. In order to do so, I choose two
promising case studies that can give further insight into the issue at hand, the
first one focussing on development policy, and the second one focussing on
the interaction between national and EU policies towards the region. In both
cases, only a limited amount of publicly available data exists. In the case of
development policy, aid statistics collected by the OECD can be used. These
data are reported by donor countries to the OECD according to a cross-country
reporting system, making them as comparable as possible. They are readily
available at the OECD’s Statistics Database. However, while these data can tell
us something about how development aid to Latin America is given on behalf
of the three countries under study, the statistics themselves can only give rise to
some ideas about why aid is given in a certain way. They cannot give a precise
account of the motivations behind aid allocation, especially when various the-
oretical currents predict similar behaviour, that is, in cases of equifinality. As
outlined in Chapter 2, it is often difficult to distinguish between outcomes res-
ulting from different independent variables. Equifinality therefore represents
an obstacle to be overcome by this study.
Similarly, in the case of national-EU level interaction in Latin America policy-
making, government documents will be used to ascertain some of the inter-
action mechanisms, as well as providing some indications about motivations
for such interaction. However, they are less than plentiful and, on their own,
would provide too thin a base of evidence. Additionally, the publicly available
government documents are generally quite good to assess what a country is
5It is, of course, important to be aware that officials from other institutions are also involved in
policy-making towards Latin America, such as the ministries of the economy. Nevertheless, given
limited time and resources, a choice for the most relevant institutions had to be made.
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doing with regard to Latin America policy, which is why they were used in
the fsQCA indexing procedure. However, they are somewhat less good at lay-
ing out the motivations for a particular cause of action. Overall, government
documents are a very useful source of information, but are better used as sup-
plementary evidence.
Even more importantly, when it comes to foreign policy making, informa-
tion is often not publicly available at all for reasons of confidentiality. There-
fore, a way must be found to test equifinal theoretical predictions and comple-
ment publicly available data with more precise information about the motiv-
ations behind policy-making towards Latin America. In order to do so, inter-
views with policy-makers represent an adequate option to obtain the required
information about the factors that motivate foreign policy-making. While they
might not be able or willing to tell all, it is often possible to get vital information
from officials, particularly if the confidentiality of the interviews is granted.6
From a theoretical perspective, it is worth recalling the definition of foreign
policy as a country’s “official external relations” (Hill 2003: 3). Since I am try-
ing to ascertain the factors that drive foreign policy towards Latin America in
Germany, Spain, and the UK, it seems more than reasonable to obtain inform-
ation about these factors from those who are involved in policy-making on a
day-to-day basis. Although, as will be discussed below, interviewees may give
strategic answers, interviews provide an opportunity to remedy the problem
of equifinality at least in part by permitting the researcher to query policy-
makers directly about their motivations. The choice for elite interviews as such
is therefore fairly trivial. As Richards (1996: 199) puts it, elites “hold, or have
held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as a political scient-
ist is concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes
than general members of the public.” This makes them highly useful sources
of information for a study of foreign policy-making.
Semi-Structured Interviews In terms of form, I chose semi-structured inter-
views, because they allow for both detail and depth, give an insider’s perspect-
ive, and can be used for hypothesis testing (Leech 2002: 665). Semi-structured
interviews involve a relatively detailed interview guide designed to specific-
ally probe the causal relationships the researcher has theorised. They can con-
tain both open and closed questions and can, in some circumstances, also serve
to obtain additional factual information, although Leech advises against ask-
ing for information that could be obtained through other sources (ibid.: 666).
Through open questions, it is possible not to condition the interviewee when
asking about her motivating factors. In that sense, open-ended questions max-
6Confidentiality and its implications are discussed below.
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imise response validity, as respondents can organise their answers within their
own frameworks. Interviewees tend to prefer open questions, because they
can explain why they think what they think (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:
674), especially if they are experts on the subject and are involved in shaping
it, as policy-makers are with foreign policy. Additionally, open-ended ques-
tions allow for the possibility of capturing issues not covered by the theoretical
framework, thus helping to avoid omitted variable bias, as well as the prob-
lem that the mechanisms theorised work differently than anticipated. To this
end, it was important to structure questions in such a way to prompt answers
regarding the relevance of certain processes, as well as questions eliciting an
explanation of these processes (Gläser and Laudel, 2010, 125f). One relevance-
question and its follow-up explanatory process question, for example, was the
following (taken from the EU case study, Chapter 7):
Relevance question: Are there aspects of policy towards Latin
America that should remain at the bilateral level rather than being
dealt with at the EU level? If so, which ones?
Process question: How does your country try to make sure the
policy remains bilateral?
By asking questions this way, the interviewer can first probe whether the issue
is important at all. If an interviewee does not think any policy area should
remain exclusively bilateral, then there is no need to question them about the
process of achieving this.
However, open-ended questions make some aspects of interviewing more
difficult, as it takes longer to conduct the interviews, transcribe the answers,
and prepare the transcripts for evaluation (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674).
It is thus important not to formulate the questions too openly, since this might
give rise to irrelevant responses. Furthermore, the evaluation, in this case the
coding of the interviews, has to be carefully designed to ensure the neces-
sary analytic rigour, maintaining the richness of individual responses but suf-
ficiently structured that the interviews can be subjected to analytic techniques
(ibid.: 675). For an in-depth discussion of the appropriate degree of openness
of questions, see Gläser and Laudel (2010: 131ff).
Sampling While the choice for elite interviewees as such is relatively easy,
‘getting in the door’ and speaking to the appropriate policy-makers is harder.
In principle, random sampling is often the ideal in social scientific research, a
practice that stretches to elite interviewing in many cases (Tansey 2007). How-
ever, Tansey points out that in elite interviewing for process tracing, completely
random sampling is often less-than-ideal, because the research interest is in
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Table 4.2: National-level Interviews – Overview
Study Total* Germany Spain UK
Development 21 8 9 4
EU
interaction
26 12 10 4
* Not all development interview partners could be asked about the EU and vice
versa, normally for reasons of time constraints. Therefore, the total number
of interviews relevant for each case study is not equal to the total number of
interviews carried out in the study.
very specific events and processes (ibid.: 768), so that it is important to ask
the people who will actually be able to say something about it. In the case of
this study, the situation is relatively plain. There is a very limited number of
officials involved in foreign policy-making towards Latin America, and it is
therefore quite easy to achieve a good coverage of the ‘total population’, once
one gets the relevant appointments. Because of the small size of the policy-
making community, snowball sampling was used. Snowball sampling, also
called chain referral sampling, refers to the use of one point of contact in or-
der to get in touch with others (Goldstein 2002; Tansey 2007). It is particularly
useful in the case of a sometimes secretive elite such as foreign policy-makers
and diplomats, where knowing one person can be the entry ticket to the entire
institution. In the case of interviews in Spain, for example, one former deputy
head of unit set up interviews within the entire State Secretariat for Iberoamer-
ica.7 In the case of such a small population, essentially, concerns of sampling
tend to be secondary – the researcher will try to conduct as many interviews
as possible. In total, for the purposes of this study, 27 interviews with national
officials were carried out. Table 4.2 shows an overview of the relevant national-
level interviews for each study.
In this context it is important to be aware of the limitations introduced by
not getting interviews with certain people (Goldstein 2002: 669), as well as by
the small population size itself. If one cannot interview people from all geo-
graphical units of a ministry concerned with Latin America, for example, it is
possible that some issues that are of importance only with regard to certain
Latin American subregions or countries remain unobserved. Additionally, if
the population is very small, even if all relevant partners can be interviewed,
distortions may result from the population size. In the case of the German
development ministry, for example, the relevant population was nearly ex-
7As previously mentioned, this state secretariat was later incorporated into one State Secretariat
for External Affairs and Iberoamerica.
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hausted with three interviewees.8 Even though the coverage may be excellent
in such cases, if an interviewee forgets to mention an issue or does not want
to talk about it, with such a small population it is less likely that somebody
else will. It is therefore important to be aware of such issues and take them
into account when evaluating the interviews. While they can tell us a lot about
the factors that matter in foreign policy-making towards Latin America, there
may be influencing factors that remain in the dark by omission – intentional or
unintentional – on behalf of the interviewees. This is a problem that is particu-
larly pertinent in the case of the UK. The FCO team working on Latin America
is tiny, and there is currently no team within DFID, since the Latin America
programme has been dismantled. It was therefore extremely difficult to track
down the relevant former DFID officials. Other ways of obtaining and back-
ing up the information received therefore had to be found and are discussed
below. Nonetheless, there is no way around admitting that evidence for the
British case is the least valid and reliable.
Strategic rhetoric, unwillingness, and unawareness George and Bennett
state that in order to assess the evidentiary value of sources, one has to con-
sider “who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances”
(George and Bennett 2005: 99f; emphasis in the original). Contemplating these
issues for interviews with foreign policy-makers, one invariably comes to the
conclusion that interviewees might give strategic answers, awareness of which
is important in assessing the interviews. Interview partners may be strategic
in several ways. Firstly, interviewees are members of the policy-making elite
and have an incentive to overstate their own or their organisation’s involve-
ment in the process (Berry 2002: 680; Tansey 2007: 767). While exaggerations
of personal or organisational involvement are somewhat less relevant for this
study, whose primary focus is not on inter-agency and group dynamics or per-
sonal factors, such overstatements of course stretch into both the importance
of Latin America within a country’s foreign policy (nobody likes to admit that
their area of expertise is not very relevant), and the importance of their country
in the wider international setting – this is particularly relevant for the EU case
study, where policy-makers have a strong incentive to overstate their country’s
involvement in and influence on the EU’s policy towards Latin America. Inter-
views thus have to be carefully cross-checked in order to gain an impression of
the potential magnitude of the exaggeration problem (Berry 2002: 681).
8The size of the population is an issue in all three countries when it comes to development
policy. However, fortunately all development interviews could be supplemented with interviews
at the foreign ministries, where officials also have some development policy experience. Similarly,
the development interviews could be used in the EU case study as well, where development policy
is an area of interaction between the national level and the EU level.
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Moreover, the problem of strategic rhetoric may influence the way in which
policy-makers represent their motivations in an interview. For example, ad-
mitting that development aid might be commercially oriented may not be a
statement an official is willing to make in an interview, neither on nor off the
record. While officials may intentionally misrepresent their motivations, but
on the other hand they are sometimes the only source of further information,
making them inevitable interview partners in certain studies (Davies 2001: 74).
However, they might simply ‘parrot’ the official government line, taking re-
course to confidentiality and refusing to reveal any information beyond what
is stated in publicly available official documents (Gläser and Laudel 2010: 181).
In such a case, there is little one can do. It is therefore important to probe the
interviewees, try to get them to “critique their own case” (Berry 2002: 681) us-
ing questions such as ‘In the literature, academics are saying that..., yet you
are telling me... – why are the scholars not buying your argument?’, and,
obviously, cross-checking motivations across different interviews. Gläser and
Laudel (2010: 178ff) give a series of very useful tips for developing strategies to
deal with different types of interviewees (such as the particularly distrustful,
secretive, chatty, etc.). Repeating them here is beyond the scope of this chapter,
but it is important to be aware of such potential pitfalls to be able to anticipate
them and deal with them appropriately.
Unawareness of the influence of certain factors is another difficult issue. In-
terviewees are not always able to identify subtle influences of certain variables,
a difficulty especially of mechanisms like socialisation, which are important
for example in the EU context. Policy-makers may not actually be consciously
aware that they have been socialised, since this is the result of a slow, often
unconscious process. This problem refers back to the issue of latent, unob-
servable variables discussed in the previous section (Checkel 2006: 367). The
interviewer therefore has to carefully consider how the influence of such vari-
ables can be recognised, and design the evaluation of the interviews accord-
ingly. For example, when looking for the effects of socialisation, one has to
query the interview transcript or protocol for explicit or implicit references to
norms or ideas that have been acquired by the interviewee through a process of
interacting with his or her policy-making context both at the national and the
European level. These issues will be further elaborated upon in the individual
case study chapters when discussing the coding schemes for the interviews.
Timing and Staff Turnover The national-level interviews were carried out
between the spring of 2010 and the summer of 2011. This brings with it several
factors of timing. Firstly, governments changed. For example, interviews in
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were carried out a few months after
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the British general elections of May 2010, so that officials were sometimes not
yet sure how things would work under the new government. Additionally,
the EU level context is changing. Interviews at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MAEC)were conducted during the Spanish EU Presidency of 2010 and
shortly thereafter. This was a period of important changes within the EU, as
the Treaty of Lisbon was being implemented with all its consequences for EU
external relations, such as the creation of the European External Action Service
(EEAS), the recent designation of the newHigh Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, and so on. This state of
affairs was very much on interviewees’ minds and sometimes translated itself
into statements of insecurity about policy-making motivations. Such issues
are unfortunately entirely beyond the researcher’s control, and they have to be
borne in mind when evaluating the interviews.
Additionally, staff turnover in foreign policy-making is high due to the rota-
tional systems implemented particularly in theministries of foreign affairs. Oc-
casionally, the foreign policy researcher is confronted with interview partners
who have been on the job for only a few months and do not have any, or very
little, prior experience of Latin America. Institutional memory, unfortunately,
is not the forte of foreign policy-making institutions. Again, these problems can
only be remedied by asking as many people as possible and trying to get in-
terviews with officials at different levels of seniority. Often, heads of unit and
higher-level civil servants in charge of a region have long-standing experience
in that area, and make excellent sources of information about continuity and
change in foreign policy-making towards Latin America. Additionally, there is
theoretical reason to assume that foreign policy is a relatively stable issue area,
where nuances may change across governments, but the fundamental motiva-
tions remain the same: evidence for foreign policy continuity has been found
for all three countries under study (Aggestam 2000: 65; Kennedy 2000: 106;
Williams 2004: 912).
However, some scholars consider the impact of the time policy-makers are
exposed international networks crucial for the impact these networks might
have on their behaviour (see e.g. Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005), especially when
considering the EU level. In this study, as previously discussed, I do not
consider the impact of time. Most national-level interviewees were heads or
deputy heads of unit, in some cases Director Generals, who have been in the
diplomatic service and potentially in the geographic department for a fairly
long time, although some desk officers were also interviewed. It is therefore
fairly safe to assume that on average, they have had significant exposure to
both their national and the international or European level during the course of
their career. Moreover, research suggests that such impact may occur quite fast,
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although it is not ‘sticky’ once policy-makers are taken out of interaction with
the higher-level environment (Beyers 2010: 915f). Therefore, despite some is-
sues that must be considered, it is safe to assume that at least in part, the factors
influencing policy-making towards Latin America remain the same across gov-
ernments and officials in charge.
Confidentiality All interviews carried out for the purposes of this studywere
confidential, meaning that statements from the interviews may not be attrib-
uted to the person who made them. Overall, confidentiality is one of the main
concerns in carrying out interviews with foreign policy-makers. Especially
since the advent of WikiLeaks, they are very concerned about interview ma-
terial appearing in the public sphere. Additionally, the small size of the policy-
making community means that certain statements could easily be traced back
to the individuals who made them – just mentioning their nationality might
be enough in some cases. In the analysis of a sensitive ‘moving target’ such as
foreign policy, a lot depends directly on the relationship between the policy-
makers concerned. Furthermore, many interviewees are still in their posts at
the time of the results’ publication, so that it is indispensable to respond to
policy-makers’ concerns about anonymity in order to not disturb the on-going
policy process. For a discussion of the various dimensions of anonymity and
their legal implications, see Gläser and Laudel (2010: 55f), as well as Goldstein
(Goldstein 2002: 671).
In this context, it is worth briefly discussing the issue of interview record-
ings and transcripts. Taping the interview is often regarded as indispens-
able by interview methodologists (Gläser and Laudel 2010: 157f; Aberbach
and Rockman 2002: 675). If interviews are not recorded, the time that passes
between the interview and the moment of writing up a protocol, along with
re-interpretations and cognitive biases on the side of the researcher may dis-
tort the results. What is more, protocolling the interview puts an additional
strain on the researcher, who has to ask questions, write, and think about the
interviewee’s response all at the same time (Gläser and Laudel 2010: 157f). On
the other hand, interviewees may be less forthcoming with information when
they are being recorded than otherwise (Richards 1996: 202; see also Gläser
and Laudel 2010: 157). However, Gläser and Laudel (2010: 158) claim that the
distortion arising from protocolling interviews frommemory is worse than the
potential bias produced by the presence of a tape recorder. In the case of for-
eign policy elite interviewing, I disagree. Due to foreign policy-makers’ strong
concerns with confidentiality, some of them outright refused to be taped. Oth-
ers, in turn, openly stated that they would give different information based on
whether or not the interview was recorded. Finally, two interviews were car-
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ried out by telephone and thus could not be taped.9 In these cases, I opted for
the additional information over taping the interview. Because I was interested
in information beyond the official record, it was vital to obtain as much of it
as interviewees were willing to provide. In total, 15 of the 37 interviews con-
ducted for this investigation could not be taped (including the two telephone
interviews). When interviews were not recorded, interview protocols based on
the notes taking during the interview were written up as soon as possible after
the interview, and in all cases on the very same day the interview was conduc-
ted, in order to minimise the loss of information (Richards 1996: 203). In the
context of this study, I exclusively cite directly from interview transcripts. Pro-
tocols are coded but never cited directly to support an argument. Where direct
citations are reported, linguistic imprecisions such as the repetition of words,
or the use of fillers (such as ‘uh’) are removed. Such a removal is indicated by
ellipses within square brackets ‘[...]’, and relevant content is not removed. An-
onymised transcripts and protocols in the original language can be provided
upon request. Interviews were conducted in Spanish, German, and English; all
translations from the Spanish or German are by the author.
4.2.3 Interview Evaluation
Based on the above considerations and the theoretical goals of this investiga-
tion, the method for evaluating the interview transcripts and protocols must
be chosen. Due to the issues of confidentiality discussed above, a method of
evaluation guaranteeing interviewees’ anonymity had to be employed. Addi-
tionally, the amount of material collected required a method that would facil-
itate keeping track of the evidence. Given these parameters, I opted for eval-
uating the interviews using the MAXQDA software package (VERBI Software
1989-2010). ‘QDA’ stands for ‘qualitative data analysis’. With MAXQDA, as
with most Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS)
packages, it is possible to code interviews for evidence of the postulated hypo-
theses.10 It allows for assessing competing hypotheses and multiple codings
of the same passage. Additionally, transcripts and protocols can be queried
for new issues that might not be covered by the original hypotheses. Coding
schemes for each of the two case studies were therefore developed making use
9Gläser and Laudel (2010: 153f) also debate the utility of telephone interviewing, as control of
the interview is not as good and the amount of information obtained is lower than in a face-to-face
setting. Again, I advocate a pragmatic approach. Conducting an interview by phone is better than
not conducting the interview at all, given the small size of the population relevant to this study.
10CAQDAS packages are often associated with grounded theory (MacMillan and Koenig 2004:
182ff; Bong 2007: 260ff), however, it is not strictly necessary to use them in this fashion. Instead,
they can just as well be used for their practical benefits such as facilitating the handling of lar-
ger amounts of data and extracting coded passages more easily, as well as for hypothesis-guided
analysis.
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of the colour-coding and structuring possibilities of MAXQDA. They can be
found in Appendix D for the development case study, and in Appendix E for
the EU case study, respectively. Moreover, a comment can be attached to each
coding, and these comments can be exported so that in the case of codings in
“Other” categories, more specific observations could be attached to the codings
through the comment function.
In the case study on development, I designed a coding scheme for the
interviewees connecting the postulated independent variables with motivat-
ing their development policy decisions regarding Latin America. Because of
equifinal predictions arising from the theory, it was important to ensure the
explicitness of the connection between independent variable and policy. For ex-
ample, code 2a National Norm Poverty Alleviationwas only assigned if a national
norm of poverty alleviation was cited as themotivating factor for allocating aid
to Latin America as a whole or a specific country. Additionally, a code entitled
Other Concentration and were introduced to be able to code for motivations
that did not correspond exactly with the explanatory variables postulated for
the concentration of development aid towards Latin America. That way, it is
possible to uncover other motivating factors that make an impact upon devel-
opment policy towards the region.
In the EU case study, codes were assigned for the postulated explanatory
variables (variable codes) as well as for the mechanisms through which the
variables were theorised to be at work (mechanism codes; Gläser and Laudel
(2010: 208f) call these ‘causal dimensions’,11 but I prefer to maintain the term
mechanism to be consistent with the process tracing terminology). For ex-
ample, one such postulated variable was domestic interests, while the mechan-
isms for interaction of the national level with the European level were strong
and weak uploading as well as downloading. Therefore, code 1a was con-
structed to designate issues identified by the interviewee as being of particular
interest to her country. Codes Uw and Us were designate strong and weak
uploading, respectively, whileD designates downloading. The mechanism hy-
pothesised was that strong interest would lead to strong uploading, that is,
trying to take one’s national stance to the EU level and push for its implement-
ation there. The combined code for this mechanism is 1aUs. The presence of
statements coded 1aUs indicates support for the hypothesis.
However, the existence of individual codes for the independent variables
and mechanisms also allows the researcher to spot the emergence of new pat-
terns that were not originally theorised. For example, if – hypothetically speak-
ing – strong domestic interest caused downloading, the investigator would
find instances of 1a combined with D. If many such instances occur, there may
11‘Kausaldimensionen’, translation by the author
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be evidence for a causal path not postulated by the theoretical considerations.
MAXQDA’s possibility to inspect code co-occurrences allows such patterns to
be spotted relatively easily. Additionally, a code called Other was devised to
be able to code sections that did not fit any of the hypothesised variables or
mechanisms. MAXQDA allows all codes to be automatically extracted. They
can then be inspected in a table, making it easier to spot patterns within the
other category than if they had to be extracted manually, so that new variables
or mechanisms can be identified.12
The very same property also allows for an analysis of the codings based on
saliency theory, attributing greater importance to those codes that occur with
greater frequency (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987). However, saliency the-
ory has to be taken with some caution. As I have outlined above, interviewees
may overstate certain mechanisms at the expense of others to appear in a more
favourable light or because they are unaware of some issues. Therefore, while
the frequency of codings can give important pointers regarding their import-
ance, it is unwise to take such frequency analysis entirely at face value without
discussing its implications and limitations.
As for the practical procedure of coding the interviews, Gläser and Laudel
(2010: 210) recommend using paragraphs as the unit of analysis, because sen-
tences or parts thereof tend to be too short to be interpreted meaningfully.
However, in my experience this varies considerably depending on the inter-
viewee. Germans and Spaniards tend to formulate longer sentences than Brit-
ish interviewees, for instance, so that here it is sometimes possible to code one
sentence or even part of a sentence. Additionally, the length of sentences varies
depending on the individual. For these reasons, I handle the unit of analysis
more flexibly. Neuendorf (2005: 71) defines a unit in content analysis as “an
identifiable message or message component”. Such a unit can be used in sev-
eral ways, one of which is measuring a variable, which is what I am doing
here. Based on the definition of a unit as an identifiable message or message
component, I fix the units to be coded in the analysis of interviews as a ‘mean-
ing unit’, that is, a unit to which an identifiable message or message compon-
ent can be attached. This comes closest to the unit Neuendorf discusses as a
“verbal clause” (ibid.: 72). The problem is that since the content analysis of the
interviews is based on transcripts and protocols, that is, on natural language,
clauses are often incomplete, or the same clause may contain several messages
(Gottschalk and Bechtel 1995: 126). For the variable codes, sometimes a few
words are enough, while for the mechanism codes normally at least part of a
12In the identification of such variables and mechanisms, the researcher has to be careful to
ensure that they are indeed new rather than different manifestations of already postulated rela-
tionships in order to avoid over-specifying the explanations.
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sentence and up to several sentences is required. By proceeding this way, I can
keep the length of the coding segment variable.
What, then, can this analysis tell us about the hypotheses postulated in the
case studies? The presence of statements indicative of support for a certain hy-
pothesis can very well be taken as evidence for the influence of a factor. Nev-
ertheless, their absence does not necessarily mean that a certain factor is not
influential. It might be that other factors are simply more important or, in the
worst case, that interviewees – despite conducting as many interviews as pos-
sible – have given only part of the answer. Additionally, the strength of the in-
fluencing factors can be gauged. It is rather unlikely that only one factor drives
the interaction mechanisms, and much more likely that evidence for more than
one hypothesis will be unearthed. If several interviewees repeatedly mention
the same factor, it is very likely to have a stronger influence than if only one in-
terviewee mentions it. Again, however, given the small size of the population
and thus of the sample, this possibility must be considered with the appropri-
ate caution. Therefore, while the method is not able to confidently disconfirm
the influence of factors, it can very well confirm their presence, as well as the
strength of their influence to a certain degree.13 However, the evidence has to
be validated using other sources, to whose discussion I now turn.
4.2.4 Triangulation
The various virtues and limitations of elite interviews have been laid out above.
Due to the method’s limitations, it is wise to supplement the evidence collected
from the interviews at national level with other sources in order to minimise
the problems arising from the small population size and sampling issues, as
well as potentially strategic rhetoric, forgetfulness, or concerns about confid-
entiality on behalf of interviewees, for instance. Triangulation promises to do
just that. According to della Porta and Keating, triangulation “is about us-
ing different research methods to complement one another” (della Porta and
Keating 2008: 34). However, it is also possible to triangulate sources rather than
methods, which is what interviewmethodologists recommend in order to back
up the validity of the results from interviews (Richards 1996: 204; Davies 2001:
78; Berry 2002: 680). Davies, for example, recommends a “triangulation triad”
of primary sources such as interviews and documentary sources, along with
secondary literature (Davies 2001: 78). In this study, I triangulate the data ob-
tained from national-level interviews with further interviews with EU officials
and Latin American diplomats, as well as with with evidence from policy doc-
13Gläser and Laudel (2010, 247ff) provide an in-depth discussion of causal analysis using inter-
view data.
152 CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY FRAMEWORK
uments. Finally, the evidence will be considered within the context of already
existing secondary literature, which can help situate the present study within
the context of policy-making towards Latin America and, more generally, for-
eign policy-making in Europe. In the following, the use of triangulation inter-
views and policy documents is further discussed.
4.2.4.1 Triangulation interviews
In order to increase the validity and reliability of the results from the national
level interviews, I triangulate themwith further interviews from different sour-
ces, which I will discuss individually in the following paragraphs. However,
some general remarks can be made. All further elite interviews were evalu-
ated using the same qualitative content analysis method as in the case of the
primary interviews (i.e. usingMAXQDA). The coding schemes used for the tri-
angulation interviews were the same as those of the national-level interviews,
except that country codes were introduced to indicate whether a statement was
tied specifically to Germany, Spain, the UK, or any combination of the three.
By using MAXQDA’s code correlations tool, it was then possible to extract the
importance of each explanatory variable for each individual country. By intro-
ducing new sources of information, the triangulation interviews can therefore
give greater validity to the evidence based on the national-level interviews.
However, they suffer from their own varieties of the pitfalls discussed above,
which have to be taken into account when it comes to their evaluation.
A total number of six additional interviews was carried out with EU offi-
cials at the Council, the Commission, and the EEAS involved with Latin Amer-
ica policy at EU level. Interviewing EU officials was, of course, particularly
helpful for the EU case study. However, because the officials deal on a regular
basis with their counterparts from all three countries under study as well as
officials from other EU Member States, they bring to the table a comparative
perspective that is highly useful for the entire investigation. Since the EU is also
involved in development policy towards Latin America, they were also able to
make some contributions to the development case study. Of course, EU offi-
cials suffer from their own ‘versions’ of the biases reported in the above section.
They may have incentives to overstate the impact of the EU on national foreign
policies and the importance of the European policy towards Latin America.
Furthermore, by virtue of their role in bringing together the different Member
States, they have an obligation to be ‘diplomatic’ and might be reluctant to cri-
ticise individual Member States. Finally, just like Member State officials, they
may be unaware of certain processes, or unwilling to admit the influence of
certain factors. Just like in the national-level interviews, these limitations must
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be considered in interpreting the evidence from the EU-level interviews. How-
ever, the triangulation of national- with EU-level interviews has a number of
advantages. Firstly, they may corroborate the evidence for the causal mechan-
isms discovered in the national-level interviews. What is more, by bringing in
a comparative angle because of officials’ regular dealings with all 27 Member
States, they can aid this study’s task of putting the different national policies
into perspective. By the same virtue, they offer the possibility for at least some
generalisation beyond the three countries under study. Last but not least, be-
cause EU officials are not subject to the same strategic incentives as national
officials, they may put the distortion of evidence resulting from the national
level into perspective, at least to some degree.
Similarly, four triangulation interviews were carried out with Latin Amer-
ican diplomats based in Brussels,14 bringing up the total number of triangu-
lation interviews to ten. As with the national-level and the EU officials, Latin
American diplomats have their own set of restrictions when granting inter-
views. These include concerns about confidentiality – after all, the diplomats
still have to work with their European counterparts and are thus legitimately
concerned about not offending anybody –, the problem of strategic rhetoric,
and so on. The problem of unawareness is particularly pertinent to interviews
with Latin American diplomats, who have even less possibility than EU offi-
cials to ‘peer into’ the policy-making process within the Member States under
study. However, they are indeed able to offer valuable additional information.
They bring in a valuable outside perspective providing noteworthy insights
into a number of factors: firstly, on the perception of the motivating factors
in Member States’ foreign policy towards their region. Secondly, from their
vantage point of closely observing proceedings without actively participating,
they have a valuable perspective on the interaction between the national level
and the EU level. Thirdly, by virtue of their experience as observant repres-
entatives of their respective home countries, they are able to provide insight
into the perception of EU Member States’ development policy towards Latin
America from the recipient countries’ point of view. Fourth and finally, al-
though they are constrained by other parameters (such as, in the true sense of
the term, being diplomatic), Latin American officials, similar to EU officials,
offer a comparative perspective the national-level interviews cannot provide.
Therefore, while they cannot make the investigation perfect, the triangu-
lation interviews can at least mitigate some of the problems contained in the
national-level data, thereby increasing its validity.
14Due to limited time and resources, unfortunately, no Latin American diplomats based in the
European capitals could be interviewed, although this would have enhanced validity even further.
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4.2.4.2 Policy documents
As I have discussed above, official documents on policy towards Latin Amer-
ica are too scarce to be the main source of evidence regarding the motivations
for policy towards Latin America. However, they can offer valuable initial and
supplementary information that can be used to cross-check the evidence ob-
tained in the interviews. They will be used for this purpose in the EU case
study. For this part of the investigation, national policy documents were first
coded to reveal the mechanisms by which national and EU-level policy to-
wards Latin America interact in the three countries under study. Although
they are most certainly strategic and, as I have outlined above, may sometimes
not give very clear indications of motivations for a certain policy, it is possible
to tease out some information from them, for example through coding. They
are potentially the outcome of a long negotiation process within the govern-
ment (van der Mast and Janssen 2001; Janssen and van der Mast 2001), and
thus reflect the consensus that determines a country’s foreign policy, just like a
party manifesto determines a party’s line on different issues (Budge et al. 2001:
6) – often, they are statements of intent. Additionally, as Larsen (2005; 2009)
demonstrates, it is possible to develop coding schemes that take account of the
mechanisms involved in foreign policy-making. The EU case study exploits
this potential in order to determine the aforementioned mechanisms of inter-
action. Policy documents can therefore be used in a fruitful manner to both
inspire interview-based research – through uncovering mechanisms that will
then be further investigated in the interviews – and to cross-check the evid-
ence from the national-level and the triangulation interviews. In the EU case
study, they are also used for this latter purpose to further corroborate the evid-
ence from the interviews. In that sense, by introducing publicly available in-
formation into the analysis, the use of policy documents not only contributes
to further validating the evidence, but also to increasing reliability by working
with documents that can be easily cross-checked.
4.3 Outlook
In this introductory chapter, I havemotivated the choice for development policy
and the interaction of national and EU-level policy towards Latin America as
cases for in-depth study within this investigation’s framework. Both devel-
opment policy and national-EU level interaction are of particular theoretical
relevance and have displayed cross-country variation in the previous chapter.
Their further study is thus particularly promising.
Moreover, I have shown how this study will employ process tracing based
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on OECD data (for the development case study), government documents (for
the EU case study), and elite interviewswith national policy-makers in order to
determine the factors that influence policy towards Latin America in Germany,
Spain, and the UK. These data will be triangulated with interviews conducted
at the EU institutions and with Latin American diplomats. This chapter has
also discussed some of the pitfalls of the methods employed by this study, out-
lining its scope and limitations, and has clarified how I purport to deal with
them. It is now time to put these methods into practice by turning to the study
of development policy-making towards Latin America in Spain, Germany, and
Britain.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a first case study to shed light on how foreign policy
towards Latin America is made in Europe. It focuses on German, Spanish,
and British development policy towards Latin America. As I have shown in
Chapter 3 and discussed in the previous chapter, this is an area where the
three EU Member States under study display wide variation in their policy
activity that merits further attention. Given that the Latin American countries
have reached a certain level of development, one would expect donors to be-
have similarly towards them if all donors are taken to behave more or less in
the same way, as has been suggested by some (Feeny and McGillivray 2008).1
However, while Spain dedicates a very large share of its overall aid budget to-
wards Latin America, the UK has shut down its bilateral aid programme with
the region as of 2008 (DFID 2009). A programme remains with Brazil to take
account of its “important role in global development”, and another residual aid
programme with Nicaragua “as it becomes a middle income country”, switch-
ing delivery from bilateral delivery to the Nicaraguan government to other
channels such as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and multilateral donors
(ibid.), has now also closed down. Germany, meanwhile, might be expected to
harbour similar intentions as the UK, given that its country recipient list is in a
continuous process of consolidation. Additionally, while its economic interests
in Latin America are somewhat larger than the UK’s, they are definitely not as
large as Spain’s. Nonetheless, Germany continues to run an autonomous bi-
lateral programme with Latin American countries and there do not seem to be
intentions of shutting it down, although aid in absolute numbers has decreased
over the years.2
In Chapter 3, I have mapped out variation in development policy activity
towards Latin America on behalf of Germany, Spain, and the UK. The variance
found is once again displayed in Table 5.1. The first section of this chapter
Table 5.1: fsQCA index values Development Policy Activity towards Latin
America
Britain Germany Spain
fsQCA value 0.05 0.36 0.90
will conceptualise a theoretical framework and hypotheses specific to this case
1Of course, the same region may ‘mean’ different things to different donors. For example, Latin
America is economically more important to Spain than the the UK or Germany, a factor that has to
be taken into account.
2This is in part the case because some Latin American countries ‘graduate’ from the OECD’s
list of countries eligible for ODA, as their levels of development rise.
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study, situated within the overarching theoretical framework conceptualised
in Chapter 2. Based on the framework, I then proceed to further flesh out how
aid is delivered to Latin America by Britain, Germany, and Spain. In order to
obtain first indications of how aid is allocated, I map allocation patterns and
lay out the preliminary conclusions regarding the way in which the three coun-
tries allocate aid to Latin America: is it more oriented towards poor countries
or towards emerging markets, or both? Is Latin America an exception in this
respect, or does it reflect the patterns also found in overall aid delivery? To
this end, I plot so-called aid concentration curves to visualise the amounts of
aid received by Latin American countries relative to their poverty levels. By
complementing the evidence from OECD data with evidence from interviews,
I then proceed to analysing these patterns in more depth and to finding explan-
ations for why Germany, Spain, and the UK give aid to Latin America the way
they do.
The chapter presents both substantial and methodological innovations. In
the methodological realm, I introduce a more intuitive way of plotting aid con-
centration curves, mitigating some problems the curves have hitherto struggled
with. This is discussed in depth in Section 5.4. In the area of development re-
search, I innovate upon previous research in trying to explain the concentration
of aid by looking at three important donor countries’ behaviour in one region
in detail. Earlier, mostly quantitative studies, have produced a wealth of res-
ults and explanations that are often contradictory. As I will show in the first
part of this chapter, development policy is a very complex endeavour varying
on so many levels that with large-scale studies it is difficult to trace the reas-
ons for why countries out such policy in a certain way. Although a small-N
in-depth study makes generalisations more difficult, it seems worth looking at
a smaller section of development policy behaviour in order to gain a deeper in-
sight into what motivates policy-makers in their development policy decisions.
The argument for taking a small-N approach, essentially, is the idea that aid al-
location is so complex that in large-N studies looking at all (or most) donors
and all (or most) aid recipients in the world, potentially even across time,3 pro-
duce explanations that are either extremely specific because of the framework
conditions introduced, or extremely broad. The result tends to be that many
factors matter, or that ‘it depends’. By taking a closer look at a few donors with
some common characteristics and holding the recipient region constant, I hope
to shed more light on some aspects of donor behaviour by placing them under
the magnifying glass of a small-N study. Additionally, by relying on interview
data, it is possible to trace the processes of development policy-making beyond
3Faust and Ziaja (2011: 6) also point out that looking at different time periods may account for
the disparate findings in these studies.
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publicly available ODA data. That way, this studymay be able to overcome the
problem of equifinality in development policy research at least to some extent,
thus complementing large-N studies on the issue.
On the other hand, the study further complements existing studies on de-
velopment aid in the three countries under study, both more general ones and
those focusing explicitly on the study of development policy towards Latin
America (Manuel de la Iglesia-Caruncho 2011; Faust and Ziaja 2011; Sanahuja
2009; Rocha Menocal et al. 2008) by introducing a comparative element. To
what extent are motivations similar or different, and how does such variation
come about? Additionally, extant research comparing the behaviour of vari-
ous donors (e.g. Lancaster 2007) and studies on the development policies of
other EU Member States (e.g. Carbone 2007) will be complemented by this
study. By situating itself on the middle ground between single-country case
studies (both quantitative and qualitative) and large-N comparative studies,
this investigation contributes to a deeper understanding of the factors impact-
ing upon development policy and their interaction.
I find that indeed, factors based on utilitarian liberalism and constructiv-
ist liberalism, but also the international environment do matter. However, do-
mestic political and economic interests are found to be themain driving factors.
Yet I also show that depending on the national context, the independent vari-
ables theorised in the analysis of development policy combine in unique ways
to bring about different outcomes. This is why an in-depth analysis of the de-
velopment policies of a limited number of countries towards Latin America can
provide interesting insights and uncover potential areas for future research,
thus complementing earlier large-N studies with novel evidence.
5.2 Aid to Latin America – but how?
All three countries involved in this study give ODA to Latin America, but they
do so in different ways. This chapter pays particular attention to the concen-
tration of aid in different countries and in the region as a whole vis-à-vis aid
to the rest of the world. This should give an indication of what aid to Latin
America is supposed to ‘do’. Is it directed largely at countries with a large pop-
ulation share below the poverty line? Then we can assume that aid is poverty-
oriented, thus targeting the poorest, as prescribed by the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs; Baulch 2003: 13).4 Is it directed largely to big countries
that are doing relatively well, such as Brazil or Mexico? In this case, we might
suspect that aid serves other purposes, such as helping potentially interest-
4Whether the aid actually reaches the poor within the poorest countries is a different matter,
however.
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ing markets develop faster, or geopolitical considerations (Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2007). This area has been approached mostly through quantitat-
ive studies, but researchers disagree about the motivations for development
aid to a surprisingly large degree. As Berthelémy (2006: 179) states, “the con-
sensus now is that, whenever these variables are relevant for the explanation
of aid allocation, one needs to introduce them all together in so-called ‘hybrid’
models”. However, such hybrid models like the one employed by Berthelémy
himself tend to find that everything somehow matters and that this also de-
pends on how the allocation model is specified (Berthelémy 2006: 187f). In
other words, the explanatory power of such models is high, but their broad-
ness leaves the curious researcher with a plethora of open questions. By look-
ing more closely at the behaviour of three important donor countries towards
one single region, this study can help shed some light on differing donor mo-
tivations, holding the recipient region constant. This section begins by showing
the differences in aid allocation to Latin America among Germany, Spain and
the UK.
5.2.1 Aid to Latin America
The amount of aid each country gives to Latin America varies substantially
across Germany, the UK and Spain. Table 5.2 summarises developments in
ODA disbursements over recent years. Note that with aid data, there is always
a time lag of at least one year, often more, for the latest available data. The
descriptive statistics here are based on data obtained from the OECD statistics
database, whose reporting rules make the figures as comparable as possible.
Table 5.2 illustrates in more detail the findings from Chapter 3 that Spain
gives extraordinary amounts of ODA to Latin America in comparison to the
other two countries and to both the DAC total and DAC-EU. Germany lies
more or less within the DAC/DAC-EU average, and the UK gives very small
amounts. (see also Appendix B for an overview of development aid figures
within the DAC). Departing from this overview and from the map of devel-
opment policy activity that has emerged in Chapter 3, the question of how to
explain this scenario arises. Why does aid to Latin America look the way it
does?
5.3 Theoretical framework and Expectations
The overarching theoretical framework based on Foreign Policy Analysis for
the entire study was conceptualised in Chapter 2 for the analysis of foreign
policy-making within an extended liberal theoretical setting incorporating mo-
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tivating factors from both liberal utilitarianism and liberal constructivism. Ad-
ditionally, I pointed out that it was important to be able to account for the
mediation of influencing factors at the global level, such as rational adaptation
to international rules or socialisation into international norms, by the afore-
mentioned liberal factors. In this section, the task is to adapt the overarching
framework to the case of development policy. In addition to shedding light
on the motivations of foreign policy towards Latin America in the three cases
under study, the seemingly eternal scholarly battle over whether aid is ego-
istic or altruistic (or both) makes a perfect case for ‘bridge building’ between
a logic of expected consequences and one of appropriateness. Do Germany,
Britain, and Spain give aid to Latin America because they ‘want something’, or
because they adhere to norms stipulating that foreign aid is ‘the right thing to
do’? This study tackles the question in the following way: the three countries’
overall development policy activity towards the region, as mapped in Chapter
3, sets the overarching question of why it is so varied. Looking at the vari-
ation in more detail, the concentration of Germany, Spanish and British aid to
Latin American countries as compared to their poverty levels can give us an
indication of whether aid is poverty-oriented or not (Baulch 2003).
Motivating factors for development policy have been the subject of intense
debates in the academic community ever since the beginnings of foreign aid
after World War II, and they roughly correspond to the independent variables
discussed in Chapter 2. Some have found that donors give aid in order to buy
concessions from developing countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007).
Others have found evidence for aid allocation corresponding to strategic de-
velopment goals (Bermeo 2010). This means that donor countries allocate aid
in order to further development, but they strategically do so in countries with
which they already have ties. Others, in turn, have argued from a constructivist
perspective that giving reflects a shared norm of helping the poor (Lumsdaine
1993). Why do the findings exhibit such variation? There are several reasons
for this, but the most comprehensive answer to this question is that aid alloca-
tion is much more complex than it seems at first sight and than many studies
allow. Allocation can vary along several dimensions, and the reason for the
literature’s disparate findings is that it probably does. Indeed, a paper by Ber-
thelémy (2006: 187f) is an impressive demonstration of how nigh on everything
can become statistically significant as amotivating factor for aid allocation, and
of how this also depends on the indicators chosen to represent the independent
variables.
On the other hand, some researchers have recognised that the “diversity
of domestic constellation across donor countries creates a need to comple-
ment broad cross-country studies with specific case studies focussing on single
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donors” (Faust and Ziaja 2011: 2). Of course, such an approach in turn has the
drawback of making it difficult to generalise beyond the findings on one single
country. Similarly to large cross-country studies, even country-specific studies
relying on statistical analyses find that much depends on the model specific-
ation (ibid.: 15f), and they are unable to account for outcomes that could be
explained either by norm-based or interest-based behaviour (ibid.: 14f). By
taking a small-N comparative approach, I hope to be able to better isolate the
influence of domestic-level factors by holding external factors constant, while
at the same time introducing an element of comparability that should allow
at least for some generalisation. Additionally, by conducting interviews with
officials responsible for making development-policy, it is possible to at least
encroach upon equifinality’s territory, although it is impossible to conquer it
completely. The rationale behind these considerations has been outlined in
depth in Chapter 2.
Development policy involves several dimensions. On the one hand, for
the donor government it involves answers to the two-step question of whether
to give aid to a country and if so, how much (Berthelémy 2006: 179; Carey
2007: 453). Secondly, for answering both parts of this question, criteria must
be applied on behalf of the donor. As outlined above, the development studies
literature is replete with investigations into what motivates these decisions.
Essentially, the drivers considered belong to three camps:
1. Donor interests. This encompasses a wide variety of strategic, economic,
and political interests considered by the donor when deciding whether
and how much to give (Morgenthau 1962; Maizels and Nissanke 1984;
Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Younas
2008).
2. Recipient need. If the needs of the recipient are the main motivating factor
of a donor government, then policy activity and, by extension, aid should
be primarily concentrated in the poorest countries (Baulch 2003; 2006).
3. Recipient capacity and governance. This is motivated by efficiency con-
siderations. ‘Efficiency’, or ‘effectiveness’ as it is also called,5 refers to
the capacity of aid to reduce “poverty, malnutrition, disease, and death”
(Easterly and Pfutze 2008: 29). Aid is supposed to be more efficient in
countries who have the institutional capacity to administer it correctly, as
well as in democratic countries with a good human rights record, or gov-
ernance record more generally (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Carey 2007).
Recipient capacity and governance can be both a goal of aid (aid goes to
5I will be using these terms interchangeably, as appears to be custom in the literature.
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projects of institution-building, for example) and an instrument of con-
ditionality (aid as a reward for good governance), making it problematic
to identify which direction its effect is ‘supposed to’ go in: should aid
be given to those countries who already show a good institutional and
governance track record (and, by extension, be withheld from those who
do not), or to those who are most in need of building such institutions?
Similarly, an argument can be made that stopping aid to recipients with a
poor capacity or track record would result in a complete loss of potential
influence (Luard 1992: 304; Carey 2007: 457).
While the two former schools of development aidmotivations are already senior
(Morgenthau 1962; White 1974), the issue of recipient capacity and record is
newer and has become an issue of greater concern since the introduction of
aid conditionality into the equation of development assistance, more or less
since the late 1980s (Carey 2007: 450f). Note that donor interests as motivat-
ing factors in aid allocation correspond to a utilitarian-liberal view – the donor
country gives aid in order to obtain political or economic benefits from it. Re-
cipient need, as well as recipient capacity and governance, in turn, follow a
logic that may respond either to domestic or international norms, as well as
rational adaptation to international rules. On the one hand, if a donor country
gives aid to the needy, or its goal is to allocate aid where it can make a differ-
ence in terms of aid’s proclaimed goal, poverty reduction,6 one may assume
that the basic motivation is one of goodwill, or “idealism” (Carey 2007: 452)
rather than interests – at least in the first instance.
There may, however, be three sources of norms stipulating that aid should
be poverty-oriented. Firstly, norms about the poverty orientation of aid may
emanate from the domestic level, in accordance with liberal constructivism.
Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007), for example, show that rising ODA levels in
South Korea were due to the emergence of domestic norms about the poverty
orientation of aid. Therefore, policy-makers may have been socialised in a
policy-making environment where the poverty alleviating goal of aid is taken
for granted.
Secondly, norms may emanate from the international level. All three coun-
tries under study here are members of the OECD’s Donor Assistance Com-
mittee, and are also involved in the work of various multilateral donors, in-
cluding the World Bank, the European Union, and international development
6For the purposes of this study, poverty reduction or poverty alleviation is taken in the broadest
sense of the term, referring not only the most ‘obvious’ forms of poverty such as starvation, which
is not necessarily a problem in large parts of Latin America. I also include the goal of alleviating
other impediments to socio-economic development such as poor political and fiscal governance,
discrimination and the curtailing of human and civil rights, as well as unfavourable environmental
factors, among others. The idea behind this is that these factors go hand in hand with full devel-
opment, which is unattainable without their realisation.
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banks. Additionally, Feeny and Mc Gillivray’s finding that donors’ aid alloc-
ations have responded to changes in developmental criteria following the set-
ting up of the Millennium Development Goals (Feeny and McGillivray 2008:
526) speaks for the influence of international norms on donor policy. As Carol
Lancaster (2007: 5) puts it, the history of foreign aid “reflects the development
of an international norm that the governments of rich countries should provide
public, concessional resources to improve the human condition in poor coun-
tries.”
Finally, there is a theoretical current emphasising the rational adaptation
of states and their policy makers to international rules as a result of seeking
to maintain their reputation and status as a full and worthy member of the
international community (Slaughter 2004; Checkel 2005), in this case the com-
munity of donors. For the case of development policy, Lumsdaine and Schopf
(2007: 223) consider this idea when discussing that aid giving may be motiv-
ated by “social participation or social roles and obligations”, as different from
“doing right or doing one’s duty”. As I laid out in Chapter 2, however, it is
important to be aware of the domestic mediation of international factors, be
they rational adaptation or the internalisation of international norms about de-
velopment policy. Poverty orientation of aid may thus be the result of several
causes, and this study attempts to determine which ones hold for aid concen-
tration in Latin America on behalf of Spain, Germany, and Britain. Summing
up, donor interests, as well as recipient need, capacity and governance, there-
fore, reflect basic ideas about what purpose it is aid should serve. However,
in the case of need, capacity and governance, it is nevertheless possible for the
donor’s eventual behaviour to conform to rationalism when it comes to decid-
ing about development policy, despite the underlying idealist motivation.
These driving factors, then, should be visible in the way donor govern-
ments concentrate aid in certain developing countries (or not), that is, what
Latin American countries receive how much aid.7 The rationale behind focus-
sing on the concentration of aid is that depending on the motivation behind
development policy, aid should be concentrated differently in different coun-
tries and regions depending on their characteristics. Assuming as a baseline
that aid is primarily geared towards alleviating poverty, it should be concen-
trated in the poorest world regions, or in the poorest countries within a region
(Baulch 2003), which is the case I am dealing with here. If aid concentration
7Note that I am not primarily concerned with the decision to include or exclude certain coun-
tries from the recipients’ list in this study, but rather with how the concentration within Latin
America is carried out. However, the British decision to close its bilateral Latin America pro-
gramme amounts to a choice for the exclusion of all Latin American countries except Brazil and
Guyana from the list. In addition, I will compare aid concentration in Latin America with data for
the rest of the world, so that Latin America as a whole remains the main focus of the study.
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deviates from this pattern, that is, countries receive a much lesser (or greater)
share of aid than would correspond to their poverty levels, the researcher must
assume that something other than poverty alleviation is at the heart of the dis-
tribution decision.
Following from the above considerations and the framework outlined in
Chapter 2, I hypothesise several relationships of motivating factors and de-
velopment policy activity in Latin America, based both on a logic of expected
consequences and of appropriateness.
5.3.1 Independent Variables
In the following, I outline how I expect the different independent variables
arising from the previous paragraphs to influence development policy towards
Latin America in Germany, Spain, and Britain. I assume that the factors motiv-
ating development policy affect the concentration of development assistance
in Latin America as a whole, as well as across different Latin American coun-
tries. Aid concentration is taken as an indicator for development policy motiv-
ations. The basic assumption underlying the choice is that if aid is concentrated
primarily in poor countries, aid allocation is based on the needs of the recipi-
ents rather than the interests of the donors, and is thus indicative of a logic of
appropriateness motivating the donor country. However, these basic expect-
ations must be refined and alternative explanations considered. In line with
the overarching framework, I consider motivating factors emanating from the
domestic level, and conceive international-level factors as mediated by the do-
mestic – the policy-makers’ – level, as outlined both in the previous section and
in Chapter 2. I now proceed to drawing up theoretical expectations about the
factors determining development policy towards Latin America in Germany,
Spain, and the UK.
Both the concentration of aid to Latin America as compared to other world
regions or overall aid, and the concentration of aid within Latin America are
of interest. I define the following independent variables and observations that
should be made if the theoretical relationships postulated hold.
Economic Interests The idea that development aid might be used to further
the economic interests of the donor country has been widely considered by
the development literature. Indeed, economic variables have become a staple
in large-N studies on development aid allocation (e.g. McKinlay and Little
1977; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthelémy 2006,
etc.). Recently, Younas (2008) has found that aid is used by donor countries
to influence aid recipients to buy their manufactured goods – aid may there-
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fore be commercially oriented. It does make intuitive sense that by furthering
development in potential markets, donor countries might try to expand oppor-
tunities for their businesses in terms of both trade and investment. In partic-
ular, one may expect aid to middle-income countries to be more commercially
oriented (Milner and Tingley Submitted 2010: 14), because evidently these
countries make more promising markets than low-income countries. There-
fore, it would be logical to see development aid towards Latin America to be
especially driven by economic considerations: the region consists almost ex-
clusively of middle-income countries, and economic growth has been quite
stable in recent years. Concerning the concentration of aid, we should then ob-
serve aid to Latin America as a whole not to be poverty-oriented. Within Latin
America, it should be disproportionately concentrated in those countries that
represent large potential markets for the three donor countries under study,
principally the richer countries including, for instance, Brazil, Mexico, and Ar-
gentina, but also Chile and Peru, which has seen particularly fast growth (GDP
grew by more than 7% each year since 2006, except in 2009, and GNI grew by
similar figures, according to the World Bank World Development Indicators
2011). Regarding the three donor countries, as discussed in Chapter 2, Spain
is the one with the most important economic stakes in the region and is thus
most likely to use its development assistance to the region to further such in-
terests. Germany has lower, but still above-EU average trade, while the UK has
below-EU average trade with Latin America (Eurostat 2009). As I have shown
in Chapter 3 and summarised again in Table 5.1 (p. 158) the corresponding
levels of policy activity match the expectations discussed in Chapter 2 at least
in principle: Spain is the most active, Germany takes a middle position, and
the UK’s development policy towards the region is practically non-existent. I
therefore hypothesise:
H1a: The stronger a donor’s economic interests in Latin America, the
more development policy activity should be focused on those countries
representing potentially interesting trade and investment partners. This
tendency should thus be particularly strong in Spain, less strong in Ger-
many, and the least in the UK, in order of descending economic stakes in
Latin America.
As laid out above, economic interests driving development policy should trans-
late into aid concentration that is unrelated to Latin America’s overall poverty
levels. Richer countries should receive disproportionate amounts of aid. In ad-
dition, in the interviews carried out for the purposes of this study, I would ex-
pect policy-makers to motivate development policy with their respective coun-
try’s economic and trade relations with the region as a whole and particular
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countries. This is one area where one has to be particularly aware of strategic
rhetoric, as discussed in the previous chapter, because it is quite likely that
policy-makers are not ready to admit to the commercial orientation of their
country’s aid. Interviews therefore have to be carefully coded to find poten-
tially elusive evidence for the commercial orientation of development policy.8
The codebook according to which the evidence was scrutinised can be found
in Appendix D.
Political Interests Strategic political interests are another motivating factor
to be considered among the potential drivers of development policy. Devel-
opment assistance as a tool of foreign policy has been analysed by researchers
since very early on, especially in the context of the Cold War (Morgenthau
1962; McKinlay and Little 1977). Again, political interests are by now a staple
independent variable in large-N studies on aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Ber-
thelémy 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, etc.). In particular, aid may
serve to buy votes in the United Nations as considered by Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2007: 254), although Alesina and Dollar (2000: 37f, 46) earlier poin-
ted out the difficulties in disentangling whether aid causes UN votes, or UN
votes are indicative of alliance patterns that condition aid (they advocate for
the latter). In the case of Latin America, the use of aid for political-strategic
goals is particularly interesting because there is a growing awareness that Latin
American countries’ importance on the world stage is growing, as discussed in
detail for example in Germany’s strategy paper for Latin America published
in 2010 (Auswärtiges Amt 2010: 6ff). Three Latin American countries are now
members of the Group of 20 (G-20), Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Likewise,
Mexico hosted the COP-16 climate change conference in 2010. Donor countries
therefore might have good reason to provide development assistance ‘goodies’
to such potentially important political partners. Additionally, security con-
cerns in the sense of ‘new security’ considerations may play a role, as much of
the world’s cocaine as well as other drugs continue to come out of Latin Amer-
ica (Brombacher andMaihold 2009). Political interests may therefore form part
of policy-makers’ preferences when considering development policy towards
Latin America. As with economic considerations, one would then expect aid
to be overall not poverty-oriented in Latin America, and policy activity should
rather be focused on those countries that are politically important, like the ones
mentioned above.
In the case of Spain, its status as a former colonial power in Latin Amer-
ica must be considered. Spain has colonial ties with nearly all Latin Amer-
ican countries except Brazil, Suriname, and Guyana (where, in turn, the UK
8In practice, it was found that officials spoke more frankly than expected.
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is a former colonial power). Colonialism has been shown to heavily influence
whether a donor allocates a lot of aid to a recipient country or region (see, for
example, Alesina and Dollar 2000; Carey 2007). Therefore, it is a factor to be
considered in the context of political reasons for aid allocation. While, how-
ever, colonial ties might explain the large amounts of aid Spain allocates to
Latin America overall, with the exception of the aforementioned three coun-
tries that are not former colonies, they should not impact differently upon the
concentration of Spanish aid within Latin America, which is a nice feature of
singling out one recipient region. Nevertheless, the Spanish interviews should
be scrutinised particularly carefully for colonialism as an impacting factor. It
will, however, be treated as part of the political interest variable, because co-
lonialism is indicative of a particularly close bilateral political relationship. In
the case of Spain, therefore, I expect rather high scores on this factor.
In the cases of Germany and the UK, on the other hand, an impact of
political interests should indeed lead to a concentration of development policy
activity in the political ‘heavyweights’ of the region, in particular Brazil, Mex-
ico, and to some extent Argentina. Additionally, countries that are the source
of insecurity in terms of drugs trade, such as Colombia or Central American
countries, might also receive a special share of development policy activity on
account of such issues.
I hypothesise:
H1b: The greater a donor’s strategic-political interests in Latin Amer-
ica, the more development policy activity should be focused on countries
that are important political partners for the donor under study, and aid
is overall not poverty oriented. Political interests should be especially im-
portant for Spain across the entire region on account of its colonial ties
with the region, while they should be lower for Germany and the UK,
which are expected to focus their development policy activity more select-
ively on countries that are considered important political partners.
Overall, in a similar fashion to economic factors driving aid, if political interests
are a factor, aid to Latin America should overall not be poverty-oriented and
go disproportionately to important political partners such as Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico. Unfortunately, these coincide also with those countries that are
economically interesting. Interviews should help to shed some light on this
instance of equifinality.
Overall, in the interviews, I look for explicit connections on the part of the
interviewees between development aid and political considerations. What was
said in the previous paragraph about strategic rhetoric, however, applies sim-
ilarly.
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Domestic Norms As outlined above, however, there is also the possibility
that norms about aid giving influence development policy towards Latin Amer-
ica. The idea that aid is motivated by recipient need is essentially as old as de-
velopment assistance itself and has been discussed early on (e.g. White 1974;
McKinlay and Little 1977). More recently, Lumsdaine (1993) made a sophist-
icated case for the impact of humanitarian concern in the donor countries in-
fluencing development assistance throughout the Cold War. Similarly, Lums-
daine and Schopf (2007) show how the development of domestic values over
helping the poor have impacted South Korean ODA levels in recent years. The
idea that policy-makers have been socialised into such a norm prior to or upon
entering the development policy-making world in their home country thus
seems plausible, and it might even be the case that they are especially suscept-
ible to such a norm, as they might choose their career path based on wanting
to make a difference to the poor.9 However, in this study, I am not interested in
how policy-makers have been socialised, but whether they have been socialised,
so that the socialisation process as such is considered to be exogenous to this
framework. In considering national socialisation, I borrow from the literature
on the subject that has evolved in EU studies, as discussed in Chapter 2. In
the EU, national-level socialisation has been shown to be important in national
policy-making (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005). If national socialisation is at work
with respect to norms regarding the EU, there is no reason why it should not
be at work with respect to norms regarding development policy.
As discussed in Chapter 2, observing socialisation is difficult. Many studies
of socialisation have struggled to operationalise it in a way that does not leave
room for rationalist interpretations (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1062). Of course,
this study cannot solve all the methodological problems associated with the
concept of socialisation,10 but by providing a clear conceptualisation of so-
cialisation’s status as an exogenous independent variable for the purposes of
this study, as well as by triangulating different sources, this investigation can
provide a plausible account of the factors at work.
I therefore test for the impact of a national norm stipulating that develop-
ment assistance should be granted to alleviate poverty, in the widest sense of
the word, in developing countries. If this is the case, poorer countries should
receive more aid (Baulch 2003). What forms exactly such domestic norms
might take in the individual countries is, in the case of development assist-
ance, unlikely to vary largely between the three countries under study. All
three are donor countries where there might be a domestic norm that it is right
9This, indeed, is one of the reasons why it makes sense to interview policy-makers rather than
rely on public opinion data, like Milner and Tingley (Submitted 2010) have done.
10These issues are discussed in depth by Beyers (2010).
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to help the poor. Aid should therefore, if anything, be focused on the poorer
countries of Latin America rather than those that are promising emerging mar-
kets or political partners. Why, then, does the level of development policy
activity still differ so widely between the three of them? In terms of over-
all levels, if development policy activity is motivated by a national norm of
poverty alleviation, it would be plausible that a donor withdraw some of its
aid from the region because it is by now relatively ‘rich’. This may explain the
UK’s, but also Germany’s relatively low levels of policy activity on the devel-
opment dimension. But to explain cross-country variation in activity it must
be considered national norms about poverty alleviation might interact with
other factors to produce the outcomes on the dependent variable observed in
Chapter 3. If, as the utilitarian-liberal approach discussed in Chapter 2 would
propose, the key goals of foreign policy-makers are economic (and potentially
political) well-being (Moravcsik 1998), although ideational factors might also
be at play (Moravcsik 1997; Wagner 2002; Koenig-Archibugi 2004), well-being
might trump norms. In this case, we would expect domestic norms about
poverty alleviation to play a greater role in Britain and Germany, where ma-
terial interests are lower and leave more ‘wiggle room’ for normative factors,
than in Spain with its substantive economic interests in Latin America. I thus
would expect that:
H2a: The stronger a domestic norm about poverty alleviation in a
donor country, the more development policy activity should be concen-
trated in the poorest countries of the region and overall aid to Latin Amer-
ica should be poverty-oriented. This is expected to be more likely in Ger-
many and Britain, where material interests are lower, than in Spain.
The countries receiving the bulk of aid from donors motivated by domestic
norms should therefore be the poorest countries of Latin America, while the
richer ones should receive less. It is, however, important to note that from the
concentration of aid alone, it is not entirely clear whether development policy
results from a domestic norm of poverty alleviation. This is because donors
may decide to allocate aid to countries where it is most efficient, that is, in coun-
tries that are well-governed and have the administrative capacity to handle the
inflow of large amounts of assistance (Baulch 2003; Berthelémy 2006; Bermeo
2010), a property often referred to as absorptive capacity. Therefore, if aid is not
strictly poverty-oriented, this does not mean that a national norm stipulating
poverty alleviation through aid does not exist. We might see aid concentrated
in the middle band of recipients, favouring neither the poorest nor the richest,
and the interviewees have to be queried for considerations regarding absorpt-
ive capacity. Regarding aid to Latin America as a whole, it is possible that
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interviewees adduce the poverty orientation of aid for reducing overall devel-
opment policy activity towards the region, as it is relatively rich and does not
strictly correspond to the ‘neediness’ required to receive aid. Overall, in the in-
terviews, I look for specific evidence linking development policy to a domestic
norm about aid giving and aid being ‘the morally right thing to do as country
X’.
International Norms However, as indicated above, the norm of using aid for
poverty alleviation does not necessarily have to be a domestic one. Because
policy-makers are in frequent interaction with their international counterparts
and officials of international donor agencies, an international norm of poverty
alleviation might be responsible for the poverty orientation of aid (Lancaster
2007: 6). In fact, Faust and Ziaja (2011) note a recent trend in studies to find
more development-friendly aid allocation than previously, which might be an
indicator of the maturation of such an international norm. Actors, therefore,
might have been socialised internationally rather than domestically. This is
another reason for focussing on policy-makers rather than public opinion (see
above), because the general public is not subject to such socialisation processes.
Again, the question of how policy-makers become internationally socialised is
beyond the scope of this study. I want to see whether international norms
about giving to the poor impact development policy towards Latin America,
and therefore do not differentiate between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ socialisation, or
what Checkel calls “Type I” and “Type II” socialisation (Checkel 2005: 804).
While ‘thick’ socialisation involves the complete internalisation and taken-for-
grantedness of international norms, ‘thin’ socialisation means that actors con-
form to a norm because it is ‘appropriate’ in a given social setting (such as the
OECD DAC), that is, they play a role. Note that this is still different from ra-
tional adaptation, which will be discussed below and involves a purpose-driven
adaptation to rules.
However, as I have outlined in detail in Chapter 2, international factors
are likely to be mediated by a country’s domestic context. Since Spain, the
UK, and Germany largely participate the same international fora that might be
responsible for their policy-makers’ international socialisation, including the
DAC and the EU, the differential impact of international socialisation ought to
be explainedwith reference to domestic factors at play in each individual coun-
try. I therefore hypothesise in addition that international norms about poverty
alleviation have a greater impact in countries where there exists a similar na-
tional norm that reinforces the international one (Rittberger 2001b: 5; see also
Boekle et al.2001: 114). The coincidence of international with national norms
is therefore important. Again, as with national norms a country with higher
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economic or political stakes in the region may also be less responsive to an
international norm about poverty alleviation. This makes the impact of inter-
national norms on development policy activity towards Latin America more
likely in Germany and Britain than in Spain. Yet at the same time, Britain is
seen as more of a ‘norm maker’ than a ‘norm taker’ in the international de-
velopment policy community (Watkins 2010). Therefore, it can be expected to
be more of a ‘socialiser’ than being socialised internationally. As Finnemore
and Sikkink (1998: 897) put it, “[n]orms do not appear out of thin air; they are
actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable
behavior in their community.” I thus expect the effect of international norms
to be lower in the UK than in Germany.
Yet the domestic context influences not only the receptiveness to an interna-
tional norm, but also its interpretation. An international norm about poverty
alleviation can impact the concentration of aid, leading it to be focused on the
poorer countries of the region. On the other hand, it can also be interpreted
in a way that leads to the reduction of overall development policy activity to-
wards Latin America by reorienting it towards the poorest countries of the
world, especially those of Sub-Saharan Africa. This could explain the lower
overall levels of policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Britain and
Germany than of Spain.
H2b: The stronger international norms about poverty orientation im-
pact a donor’s development policy activity towards Latin America, the
more it should be concentrated in the poorest Latin American countries
and overall policy activity towards the region should be lower. The effect
should be stronger if H2a also holds. The impact of international norms
is expected to be the strongest in Germany, whose material stakes in the
region are lower than those of Spain. Impact in the UK is expected to be
lower because of its role as a ‘norm maker’. As for Spain, I expect its polit-
ical and economic interest to mitigate the impact of international norms.
Clearly, the observable implications regarding the concentration of aid are the
same for hypotheses 2a and 2b, namely that the poorer countries of Latin Amer-
ica should be receiving the most aid, and that this tendency is potentially toned
down by considerations of efficiency. This is a case of perfect equifinality of
theoretical predictions. Therefore, in this context the evidence from the in-
terviews is vital. If policy-makers have been internationally socialised, they
should make explicit references to such international norms. Contributing to
the international effort of realising the MDGs as ‘the right thing to do’ or ‘ap-
propriate’, for instance, points to the impact of international socialisation. As
indicated above, I expect such tendencies to be stronger in countries where
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policy-makers are also socialised into national norms about poverty allevi-
ation. The evaluation of the interviews will also have to pay attention to the
kind of interpretation national policy-makers give to international norms.
Rational Adaptation As I have indicated previously, there is one further po-
tential alternative explanation for the concentration of development assistance
in Latin America that lies outside the framework of a logic of appropriateness:
the rational adaptation to international standards. Note that there may still be
an international rule or norm stipulating that development policy should be
oriented towards the neediest countries, but the motivation for policy-makers
to conform to this rule is governed by a logic of expected consequences. Slaugh-
ter (2004), for instance, conceptualises international governance networks in
which policy-makers from different countries collaborate in solving common
challenges and problems – such as, for example, underdevelopment and pover-
ty and their unpleasant consequences for the donor countries, such as global
migration. Through interaction, the network becomes a “conduit for inform-
ation” about the members of the network and “their competence, quality, in-
tegrity and professionalism” (Slaughter 2004: 54, and facilitates the creation of
behavioural standards (Majone 2001: 272; see also Slaughter 2004: 54). Even
if there exists an international norm about poverty alleviation, the individual
donor country’s policy-makers might not necessarily be socialised into it, but
rather adhere to it in order to preserve their international status as a ‘good part-
ner’, as well as in order to retain influence and not be left out of international
decision-making circles like the DAC.
Therefore, in adherence to international rules about development policy,
what Checkel (2005) calls ‘behavioral adaptation’ might be another explanat-
ory factor. I term this variable ‘rational adaptation’ in order to avoid confu-
sion with other mechanisms.11 Lumsdaine and Schopf (2007: 232) consider
such concerns about status as a motivating factor for South Korea to substan-
tially increase its ODA levels: “a desire to be counted with the more developed
nations as a part of the OECD.” In a sense, South Korea displays some par-
allels to the Spanish case, since both were recipients of ODA until relatively
recently. One might thus expect Spain to be particularly enthusiastic about in-
ternational development policy rules due to a desire to enter the prestigious
club of donors as a fully-fledged member with a good reputation. Its policy
activity towards Latin America should then be quite strongly poverty-oriented,
although it will be interesting to see how Spanish policy-makers square this
11As mentioned in Chapter 2, in order to avoid confusion between the different variables I opt
for the ‘behavioural adaptation’ terminology employed by Checkel (2005), or ‘rational adaptation’,
over Slaughter’s use of ‘socialisation’, thus reserving ‘socialisation’ for the context of the logic of
appropriateness.
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with potential demands to re-orient policy activity away from Latin America
towards the world’s poorest countries. Again, its substantial economic and
political interests in the region may play a role in explaining its continued high
policy activity there. In a similar vein, Germany and the UK, two long-standing
donors, have incentives to maintain their influence rather than being left out.
This could explain their lower policy activity towards Latin America in the de-
velopment realm. Germany has been argued to be keen on being accepted as a
‘good’ member of the international community (Karp 2009), so that rational ad-
aptation can be expected to be at least partially responsible for its development
policy activity towards Latin America. This should lead to a concentration of
aid in poorer countries. But the UK, who has been recognised as an interna-
tional rule-maker, especially in the realm of development policy (e.g. Watkins
2010), actually has rather less need to adapt rationally to rules for which it
is itself partially responsible. Therefore, the impact of rational adaptation is
expected to be relatively low for the UK. The corresponding hypothesis is as
follows:
H2c: Stronger rational adaptation to rules of the international donor
community should lead to development policy activity being concentrated
in the poorest Latin American countries and an overall poverty orientation
of aid to the region. Rational adaptation to international rules is expected
to be important both in Spain and Germany, while in the UK, it is expected
to be less relevant.
Again, because the observable implications of this potential driving factor of
development policy are indistinguishable from those of the hypotheses based
on a logic of appropriateness, the interviews must be taken into particular con-
sideration here. I thus look for the interviewees explicitly connecting poverty-
oriented aid towards Latin America as a result of adhering to international
standards as a result of rationalist considerations with reference to maintain-
ing or obtaining a good reputation with or influence in the international donor
community.
Figure 5.1 shows a graphic representation of the explanatory framework for
aid concentration in development policy towards Latin America based on the
general theoretical framework conceptualised in Chapter 2 (cf. Figure 2.1, p.
64).
5.3.2 Further Considerations
Having drawn up the theoretical expectations regarding the concentration of
aid to Latin America, a number of additional factors must be considered. One
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Figure 5.1: Explanatory Framework Aid Concentration in Latin America
is the impact of domestic politics on development policy. Tingley (2010: 47;
see also Fleck and Kilby 2006) finds that “as governments become more con-
servative, the share of GDP committed to foreign aid effort declines.” There
might thus be an influence of domestic politics and government change on
development policy. In the period covered by this study and during which
interviews were carried out, the government changed both in Germany and
in the UK. In Spain, the same Socialist government was in power through-
out the relevant period. In Germany, the current development minister even
proposed abolishing the development ministry during the election campaign
(Frankfurter Rundschau 2009), so it is possible that some factors may have
changed since the government change. Similarly, the change from a Labour
to a Conservative government after 13 years may have left its mark on Bri-
tain’s aid policy. However, at the same time, economic and political-strategic
interests do not normally change with the government. Thus, while it is im-
portant to inquire about the potential effect of a government change, this is
more likely to affect normative considerations than interest-based ones. Ad-
ditionally, development aid is highly ‘sticky’, as Carey (2007) demonstrates.
Because economic and strategic interests are slow to change, because bureau-
cracies do not adapt immediately to the new government, and because aid is
often spent as part of programmes running over the course of several years,
changes resulting from a new government coming into office will take time to
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manifest themselves. Moreover, the available figures consider the period prior
to the government change. Nonetheless, it is important to take this issue into
account, and interview partners were constantly probed to consider changes
between the previous government and the new one. Indeed, more often than
not, they volunteered their own considerations on the issue.
While the UK and Germany have had a government change that may have
impacted development policy in general and policy towards Latin America
in particular, Spain has been under the firm grip of an economic crisis since
late 2008. Similarly to the government changes in the other two countries, the
figures considered in this study come from before the onset of the crisis. Ad-
ditionally, it took a while for the economic pressures to manifest themselves in
development policy funding, but aid has indeed been cut as part of the general
efforts to reduce the government budget since 2010 (AECID 2011). Again, it
is important to take Spain’s economic situation into account when discussing
the findings, and interview partners were asked to evaluate the issue. Most re-
cently, the government change in Spain has fused the Foreign Ministry’s State
Secretariat for International Cooperation with the State Secretariat for External
Affairs, indicating that development policy might be put on the back burner as
Spain seeks to consolidate its exit from the debt crisis.
Overall, with the present research design, I hope to shed a closer light on
the equifinal predictions the theoretical framework entails. In the first instance,
I use data available from the OECD to obtain a first picture of what aid concen-
tration looks like in the three countries under study. From these data, it should
be possible to glean first insights into the factors potentially at play in German,
British, and Spanish development policy towards Latin America. However,
due to the aforementioned equifinality problematic, I rely on interviews with
policy-makers in order to further disentangle the different motivating factors.
Taken together, concentration in connection with the interview results should
enable conclusions about the motivating factors of development policy vis-à-
vis Latin America in the three countries under study.
5.4 Helping the Poor or Fulfilling Own Interests?
The Concentration of Aid in Latin America
As I have theorised above, aid can vary with the recipient – donors might give
predominantly to poorer countries or predominantly to countries they consider
strategically important (whether for economic or political reasons). Addition-
ally, aid can vary with the recipient region. In one region, donors might prefer
giving aid to the poorest countries, while in another, they may focus on prom-
5.4. HELPING THE POOR OR FULFILLING OWN INTERESTS? 179
ising emerging markets or states that are pivotal to the security of a region.
Furthermore, aid can vary with the donor. Some donors might give accord-
ing to development considerations, others according to strategic development
considerations, and others according to entirely different considerations, such
as historical or colonial ties. At the same time, it is of course possible for aid to
vary according to donor and region. Spain, given its strong economic interests
in Latin America, for example, might target emerging markets there to further
these interests, while in Africa it might target its aid at the poorest countries
for development reasons. Finally, aid can vary within donors over time, for
example as a result of a government change. Given the heterogeneous evid-
ence in the literature, it is highly likely that such complex variation is precisely
what happens. It is easy to see why different patterns might emerge depending
on the chosen model, the variables held constant, or the time periods investig-
ated. It is thus worth looking more closely at aid allocation by different donors
to the same region during a very short time period in order to reach a deeper
understanding of whether – and how – such complex variation occurs.
5.4.1 Visualising the Concentration ofDevelopment Aid to Latin
America
The concentration of development aid in certain countries can be visualised
with so-called aid concentration curves. Such curves plot a measure of aid –
such as aid commitments, disbursements, or loans – from one or several donor
countries or organisations against a population measure, such as the popula-
tion living below a certain poverty line, the populationwith a certain education
level, and so on. By plotting these curves, one can therefore ascertain the ex-
tent to which aid is oriented towards the poorest countries in a sample (Baulch
2003). However, the traditional way of plotting aid concentration curves comes
with some disadvantages, which is why I introduce a novel methodology of
normalising the curves.
ConstructingAidConcentration Curves The traditionalmethodology of con-
structing aid concentration curves is well explained in Baulch (2003: 3ff). How-
ever, I introduce a newmethodology of normalising the curves that merits fur-
ther discussion. Aid concentration curves plot the cumulative share of aid re-
ceived by the countries included in the curve on the y-axis, a procedure which I
maintain. “Cumulative share” means that the percentage share of each country
is added to the sum of percentage shares of the previous countries, until with
the last country, 100% is reached. To illustrate this, if four countries A, B, C,
and D have percentage shares of A=20%, B=50%, C=20%, and D=10% respect-
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ively, the cumulative shares would be: A=20%; B=70%, C=90%, and D=100%.
The x-axis traditionally plots each recipient country’s cumulative share of some
deprivation measure, such as the share of the total population living below the
globally accepted poverty line of 1.25 US-Dollars per day.12 A segment of the
aid concentration curve thus corresponds to each recipient country. For the
case of Latin America, this would mean the following: on the x-axis, 100% is
the total number of Latin Americans living below the poverty line. Each coun-
try’s percentage share of the total Latin American poor is calculated, and the
cumulative shares are based on these figures. A country with a large popu-
lation will thus have a longer line than a very small country. This procedure
presents some difficulties and trade-offs, which I will discuss below.
Aid concentration curves have also been called ‘aid Lorenz curves’ (White
andMcGillivray 1995), but they display a crucial difference to traditional Lorenz
curves. In addition to the two variables – poverty and aid – plotted against
each other, a further ranking variable is introduced to place the recipient coun-
tries in the right order before plotting the curve. The countries are normally
ranked by per capita income, so that the curve begins with the lowest-income
country at the bottom left and ends with the highest-income country at the
top right. Introducing this ranking variable enables the concentration curve
to cross the diagonal, thus allowing the researcher to draw conclusions about
whether aid is predominantly targeted at countries with a large population
share of $1.25/day poor (the curve lies to the left of the diagonal), or to richer
countries (the curve lies to the right of the diagonal; Baulch 2003).
The difference I introduce is in the values represented on the x-axis. Tradi-
tionally, as discussed above, the x-axis shows the recipient countries’ cumulat-
ive shares of a deprivation measure, such as the $1.25/day poor. For example,
if I were to plot the concentration of German aid to Latin America, the x-axis
would show each country’s cumulative share of the total Latin American popu-
lation living below the poverty line. Basing the x-axis on a poverty headcount
figure means that each country’s share depends on the size of its population.
A big country like Brazil would have a very long line, simply because it has a
large population and is therefore home to a large share of Latin America’s poor.
It will therefore easily seem as if Brazil is not receiving ‘enough’ aid in compar-
ison to its poor. This is counter-intuitive, as Brazil is overall a relatively rich
country. To visualise the problem, the concentration of German aid to Latin
America according to the traditional methodology is shown in Figure 5.2 as an
example. The issue is evident: Brazil has a relatively long line that is also com-
12This threshold has been criticised by some (Deaton 2001, 2010; Reddy and Pogge 2010). Never-
theless, it provides the closest thing to an ‘objective’ measure of poverty one can get, and is widely
used. For the rationale behind the poverty threshold – which used to be placed at 1 US-$, but was
raised to 1.25 – see Ravallion et al. (1991).
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Figure 5.2: Example Aid Concentration Curve, Traditional Method
paratively flat. It is hardly intuitive to claim from this curve that Brazil receives
a very large amount of German aid. However, this is indeed the case, as Brazil
accounts for an average of 13.20% of total German gross ODA disbursements
to Latin America in the 2004-8 period, more than any other country except
Nicaragua with 14.66% (calculation based on OECD 2011).
In order to mitigate this issue, it makes sense to normalise the concentration
curves to the percentage of each country’s population living below the poverty line.
Note that the basis for calculating the percentage shares is no longer the total
Latin American population, but each country’s poverty share. To stick with the
previous example, Brazil has a large number of poor, but only has a poverty
share of about 8.00%, compared with 15.81% in Nicaragua, the other major
recipient of German aid (World Bank 2011). The procedure for calculating the
cumulative percentages is thus as follows.
• Step 1: obtain each country’s poverty share figures directly from theWorld
Bank’s World Development Indicators database, i.e. the percentage of a
country’s population living below the poverty line. Convert these into
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decimal shares (e.g. 54.9% becomes 0.549).
• Step 2: sum the figures obtained in step 1 across all Latin American coun-
tries to obtain the basis for the calculation of cumulative shares.
• Step 3: calculate each country’s cumulative percentage share of the figure
obtained in step 2.
Following step 3, the length of each country’s curve segment now no longer de-
pends on the size of the country’s population, but rather on its poverty share.
This does away with the problem of long, flat lines for relatively rich countries,
and is a more intuitive representation of the concentration of aid. The slope
of each line segment still varies with the cumulative percentage of total aid a
country receives. The steeper the slope, the more aid the country receives in
relation to its $1.25/day poor. If aid is poverty-oriented, the line segments cor-
responding to each country should be getting flatter as the curve reaches the
segments of the richer countries. If the curve rises steeply, a country receives a
disproportionately large amount of aid in comparison to the share of its pop-
ulation living below the poverty line. If the curve is relatively flat, a country
receives little aid in comparison to its poor.
Figure 5.3 shows the aid concentration curve for ODA to Latin America
from the member states of the OECD’s Donor Assistance Committee (DAC),
alongside some explanations.
Data The population figures (total population and percentage living beyond
the 1.25 $/day threshold) were obtained from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators (WDI) database, available on-line (World Bank 2011). The
data used to calculate the cumulative percentage share of aid going to each
Latin American country was obtained from the OECD’s Statistics Database,
also available on-line (OECD 2011). In this case, I adhered to the standard set
by Baulch (2003: 3) of using total aid disbursements, since this represents a
good measure of the money that was actually spent by the donor rather than,
for example, committed.
As for ranking the countries along the curve, gross national income per
capita (GNI/capita, Atlas method) figures from the World Bank’s WDI data-
base are normally used (see e.g. Baulch 2006). They provide some advantages
such as smoothing the impact of exchange rate and price fluctuations. Unfor-
tunately data availability is problematic in this case, as no GNI/capita data are
available for Haiti. Haiti is by far the poorest country in Latin America and
hence important for the purposes of this exercise. I therefore used GDP/capita
figures from the WDI database to rank the countries instead. Since using GDP,
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Figure 5.3: Reading Aid Concentration Curves - an Example
Haiti: low-income country (at the bottom left of the curve); a large share of the
Haitian population is poor (long curve segment), but Haiti receives relatively
little aid in comparison to its poor population (flat slope).
Nicaragua: country characteristics similar to Haiti, but Nicaragua receives dis-
proportionately more aid in comparison to its share of the population below
the poverty line (the slope is steeper than the diagonal).
Colombia: still has a relatively large share of poor people (its line segment
covers a relatively large share of the x-axis), but receives enough aid to push
the curve slightly across the diagonal.
Brazil and Mexico: relatively high-income countries (at the top right of the
curve) with a relatively small population share below the poverty line (short
curve segments). Nevertheless, they receive a lot of aid (steep slope).
General remarks: The DAC countries’ aid to Latin America is overall regress-
ive, as it only crosses the diagonal once and very briefly. This pattern is driven
by the fact that Haiti, with its huge population share of $1.25/day poor receives
disproportionately little aid. Additionally, it is remarkable that some richer
countries towards the top of the curve, with a low share of the population be-
low $1.25/day, such as Brazil and Mexico, receive a lot of aid in comparison to
their populations’ poverty share.
184 CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY: THE COMPLEXITY OF AID
a productivity measure, as an indicator for income is not ideal, I checked the ef-
fect of this on the ranking of countries (data availability permitting). While the
replacement did lead to minor changes in the ranking of the countries under
scrutiny, the general picture did not change significantly: In some cases, coun-
tries switched places depending on whether they were ordered by GNI/capita
or GDP/capita, but the difference was never more than two spots up or down.
For greater convenience, Table 5.3 shows a summary of measures, the in-
dicators used to construct them, and their sources.
In some cases, aid can fluctuate considerably between one year and the
other, for example if a natural disaster has caused a spike in humanitarian aid
to one certain country. Therefore, I take a five-year average for 2004-8 in order
to smooth out such irregularities. Similarly, the figures in particular for the 1.25
$/day poor fluctuate considerably between years, and a considerable amount
of data points is missing. Such fluctuations were also encountered by Baulch
(2003), who rightly pointed out that they are rather implausible, as poverty
rates are relatively slow to change over time. He opted to replace implausible
data from the year 2003 with the corresponding 2002 data. Since I am work-
ing with a five-year average, this problem is somewhat mitigated in my case,
however. As opposed to the OECD aid figures and the World Bank popula-
tion figures, no data is available for this indicator for 2009 yet, thus inspiring
the overall 2008 cutoff point. Due to the fluctuations and the missing values, I
summed up the data points available for the 2004-8 period and divided them
by the number of points available. For example, in the case of Peru, data is
available for 2005, 2006, and 2007, so I took these three figures, added them to-
gether and divided them by three to obtain the average used in the analysis.13
In some cases, there is no poverty share data available for the time period in
question. This is the case, for example, for Haiti, where the latest available
data are from 2001. I have, however, already pointed out the importance of
Haiti in the aid context as the poorest Latin American country. In the graphs
showing aid to Latin America below, I thus plotted the curve twice, once ex-
cluding Haiti and once including it. In this particular case, this procedure is
justifiable on the above-mentioned grounds that the poverty share is a relat-
ively slow-moving indicator, and that data from 2001 may still be reasonably
proximate to the 2004-8 average. It is important to note that for some countries
there are no estimators in the WDI data at all, for example Cuba. While this is
rather unfortunate, it means that these countries have to be excluded from the
plot (Baulch 2003: 8). Figure 5.4 plots the aid given by Germany, Spain, and
the UK to Latin America in the 2004-8 period. A list of country abbreviations
13The same thing was done for GDP/capita, where in some cases the 2008 data was still missing
and the 2004-7 average was used.
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is provided in Appendix A.
The Suits Index Aid Concentration Curves can be complemented by a meas-
ure called the Suits Index to ascertain whether an aid concentration curve is
overall progressive or regressive. The Suits Index S was developed by Amer-
ican economist Daniel B. Suits, originally in order to measure tax progressivity
(Suits 1977). The index is similar to the Gini Coefficient,14 but while the Gini
Coefficient varies between 0 and 1, the Suits Index can vary between -1 and 1.
A Suits Index of -1 for an aid concentration curve would correspond to a case
where a donor gave all its aid to the poorest country included in the curve. A
Suits Index of 1, on the other hand, would mean that a donor gives all its aid
to the highest income country included in the curve. Finally, a Suits Index of
0 stands for a completely equal distribution of aid, that is, an aid concentra-
tion curve along the diagonal of the graph (Baulch 2003: 4f). The method for
calculating the Suits Index is found in Appendix C. The Suits Index for the con-
centration curve pictured in Figure 5.3 is 0.19, meaning that overall aid from
the DAC countries to Latin America is moderately regressive. In the following,
I will report the Suits Index value for each concentration curve plotted.
Limitations of Aid Concentration Curves and the Suits Index The limita-
tions of the aid concentration curve methodology and the accompanying Suits
Index are discussed in detail by Baulch (2003: 5). Their main drawback for the
purposes of this study is that they are descriptive, not explanatory. From the
concentration curves and the Suits Index, we can only gather whether or not
aid is poverty oriented, but they do not give indications for why this is so. This
is particularly important where hypotheses make equifinal predictions. The
concentration curves and Suits Index values must therefore be complemented
with interview data in order to achieve insights into which factors motivate the
particular concentration patterns. A by-product of this issue is that the concen-
tration curves as well as the Suits Index reflect the poverty orientation of aid,
but do not take account of the fact that perhaps poverty is not the only criterion
for aid allocation. Especially if donor countries apply conditionality criteria for
good governance or give predominantly to countries with the institutional and
administrative capacity to ‘handle’ the aid, this might lead to a concentration
curve that is not poverty-oriented. Therefore, it is dangerous to conclude that
a certain donor’s aid is interest-driven simply because its concentration curve
is not poverty-oriented. The investigation must go beyond Suits Index values
14The Gini Coefficient is used to measure the distribution of income within a society – it is 0
for complete income equality and 1 for complete income inequality, i.e. the extreme case that all
income is concentrated in one unit of analysis, such as a household or person (Suits 1977: 748).
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and concentration curves to ascertain the motivating factors of aid.
5.4.2 Aid Concentration in Latin America in Comparative Per-
spective
Figure 5.4 shows the aid concentration curves for 2004-8 average gross dis-
bursements to Latin America in current US-Dollars for Germany, Spain, and
the UK. Both the curves and the Suits Index values indicate that aid to Latin
America from all three countries is moderately regressive, that is, on average
not poverty-oriented. Spain, with a Suits Index value of 0.14, distributes its aid
most equally among the Latin American countries, while Germany displays
the most regressive behaviour with a Suits Index value of 0.29, and the UK lies
roughly in the middle. Only the Spanish curve ever crosses the leading diag-
onal for a prolonged stretch of the curve. The UK crosses it, but quickly reverts
back to below the diagonal. Spain crosses the line in the top half of the curve,
meaning that it allocates substantial amounts of aid to countries which are not
necessarily the poorest. Nevertheless, given Spain’s status as a former colonial
power in Latin America and the fact that in terms of volume it allocates consid-
erablymore ODA to Latin America than the other two countries, it is important
to note that the shape of its concentration curve as such is not hugely different
from the other two countries’ curves. It appears that while colonialism may
drive Spain’s overall allocation of aid to Latin America, allocation within Latin
America, where nearly all countries were previously Spanish colonies, may
well be driven by considerations similar to those taking place in the other two
countries. What is remarkable about the comparison is that all three countries
allocate very little aid to the country with the lowest GDP/capita in the region
– at the very bottom of the curve – Haiti. The dismal Haitian record essentially
drives all three concentration curves into being regressive – if it were not for
Haiti, the picture would look rather different. I now proceed to discussing each
concentration curve in more detail.
Germany German aid to Latin America, shown in Figure 5.5, is the most re-
gressive out of the three (Suits Index: 0.29). The most remarkable aspect of
the German curve is that it rises in steps, meaning that it is predominantly
driven by a small number of countries. The recipients to be singled out here
are Nicaragua, Peru, and Brazil, as well as, to a much lesser extent, Bolivia,
Honduras, and Colombia. What is interesting is that the three most extreme
cases do not reveal much of a pattern in terms of orientation towards countries
which are poor both in terms of income and population share of $1.25/day
poor: Nicaragua is the country with the second lowest GDP/capita on the
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curve, Peru is at the top end of the curve’s middle section, and finally Brazil
is located towards the top. It seems that Germany focuses not only on very
poor countries, but also on countries with concentrated pockets of poverty. On
the other hand, it is also the case that Brazil and Peru happen to be relatively
high-growth economies. Combined with the fact that Germany’s aid concen-
tration curve also rises very steeply for the two highest-income countries, Mex-
ico and Chile, economic factors such as the search for potential markets may
also be driving the allocation of German aid. This distribution may correspond
more closely to a logic of strategic aid allocation, as Brazil and Mexico are stra-
tegically important emerging economies that harbour not just market, but also
global political potential. There is some evidence of such thinking on behalf
of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
who published a strategy paper on such countries, termed ‘anchor countries’
(“Ankerländer”) in 2004 (BMZ 2004). These included Brazil and Mexico, but
also Argentina, which is not currently a ‘partner country’ of German devel-
opment cooperation as such (BMZ 2011). In the case of Germany, therefore,
we find some indication that aid may be poverty-oriented as well as interest-
oriented. Therefore, it is the task of this investigation to further disentangle
this pattern through interviews.
Spain Spanish aid to Latin America is less country-focused than German
aid, and it is also more poverty-oriented. The Spanish curve has the low-
est Suits Index value (0.14) out of the three countries under study, and if it
were not for Haiti, the curve would actually overall be progressive. If any
countries stand out as disproportionate recipients of Spanish aid, these would
be Nicaragua and Guatemala. However, most of the middle section of the
curve from Nicaragua to Peru receives amounts of Spanish aid that are dis-
proportional to the share of poor within their populations, with the exception
of Paraguay (which receives less) and Bolivia (whose curve segment is nearly
parallel to the leading diagonal). This allocation pattern drives Spanish aid
to cross the diagonal with aid to Ecuador. In comparison with the German
curve, it is remarkable that not only is Spanish aid more evenly distributed,
but the high-income countries receive considerably smaller shares of Spanish
ODA than is the case with German ODA. This is interesting considering that
Spain has substantial economic interests in Latin America that had led me to
hypothesise Spanish aid to be mostly interest-driven, including substantial al-
locations to potential markets, i.e. the high-growth, high-income countries of
the region. Of the ‘richer’ countries, only Peru and Colombia receive consider-
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Figure 5.5: German Aid to Latin America
Suits Index: 0.29
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Figure 5.6: Spanish Aid to Latin America
Suits Index: 0.14
able shares of Spanish ODA, while Brazil and Mexico receive relatively little.
Therefore, in the Spanish case there is compelling first-sight evidence for the
poverty-orientation of aid leading to the suspicion that Spanish development
policy as manifested in aid allocation within Latin America may actually be
overall norm-driven. Nevertheless, recalling the hypotheses theorised in the
previous section it may well be the case that poverty orientation is the result
of rational adaptation, which was theorised to be a strong factor for Spain. It
will therefore be interesting to trace the equifinality that might cause the shape
of Spain’s aid concentration curve. To what extent is the allocation of Spanish
ODA motivated by norms? Or is it the fact that all countries except Brazil are
former colonies of Spain that overrides the economic motivations in the case of
allocating aid to the whole of Latin America? Interviews should shed further
light on these questions.
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Britain The British aid concentration curve displays certain similarities to the
‘steps’-pattern already observed in the German curve, meaning that there are
some countries driving the curve’s rise, while others receive relatively little aid.
The drivers here are Nicaragua, Bolivia, Peru, Panama, and Brazil. Especially
Bolivia, but also Peru and Brazil receive particularly large shares of British aid
relative to their poverty share. With a Suits Index value of 0.17, the curve is
mildly regressive, rather similar to the Spanish one. However, this example
demonstrates the advantage of plotting aid concentration curves over merely
reporting a Suits Index score, as different aid concentration patterns may lead
to similar scores: while the Spanish slope increases constantly during the mid-
segment of the curve and slows down towards the end, the British curve slows
down in the middle and picks up again towards the end. Aside from Peru,
the countries in the mid-section of the curve receive relatively low shares of
ODA from the UK. In contrast to the pattern seen from Spain and Germany,
Colombia also receives relatively little. Moreover, unlike the Spanish curve, the
British one does not cross the diagonal for an extended segment. Only Brazil
very briefly pushes it across the 45 degree line. Panama is the real surprise
here – why does this tiny country with a relatively high GDP/capita and low
share of the population below the poverty line receive so much British aid?
The overall pattern points to a potentially two-fold motivation for British aid
to Latin America. At the bottom, with the exception of Haiti, aid appears to
be largely poverty-oriented, as the poorest countries receive large aid shares.
At the top, however, countries also receive relatively large shares, pointing to
economic or political motives. Interviews, therefore, must dive more deeply
into the roots of British poverty orientation regarding the bottom end of the
curve and the potential interest orientation towards the top end.
5.4.3 Is Latin America Special? A Comparison with the Rest of
the World
In addition to the concentration curves for Latin America, I also constructed
aid concentration curves for overall German, Spanish, and British ODA in or-
der to check to what extent Latin America stands out from overall aid alloca-
tion patterns. In order to visualise the comparison, both the ‘global’ curve and
the Latin American curve are plotted in the same graph. The curves are shown
in Figures 5.8 to 5.10. In order to plot the curves reflecting the overall concen-
tration of aid, the same methodology was used as for the Latin American ones,
generating a consolidated list of 98 recipient countries for which the required
data were available.
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Figure 5.7: British Aid to Latin America
Suits Index: 0.17
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Figure 5.8: German Aid Concentration in Latin America and the World
Suits Index aid to Latin America: 0.29
Suits Index total aid excl. Latin America: 0.49
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Figure 5.9: Spanish Aid Concentration in Latin America and the World
Suits Index aid to Latin America: 0.14
Suits Index total aid excl. Latin America: 0.47
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Figure 5.10: UK Aid Concentration in Latin America and the World
Suits Index aid to Latin America: 0.17
Suits Index total aid excl. Latin America: 0.22
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In Figures 5.8 to 5.10, the solid lines represent the aid concentration curves
for Latin America and the dashed curves represent aid to the rest of the world
(excluding Latin America). Both the curves and the Suits Index values show
that for all three countries under study, aid to Latin America is more progress-
ive than aid to the rest of the world. This pattern is particularly striking in the
case of Spain, less so in the case of Germany, and the weakest in the case of
the UK, meaning that the UK is overall more poverty-oriented than the other
two countries. Latin America is therefore ‘special’ to the extent that Germany,
Spain, and the UK allocate aid towards the region in a way that is more com-
mensurate with the share of each country’s poor than is the case for aid to the
rest of the world.
The question is then to what extent Latin America matters in the concen-
tration of total ODA. The concentration curves in Figures 5.11 to 5.13 plot two
curves, one showing concentration of the country’s total aid, while the second
one shows total aid excluding aid to Latin America. The curves thus demon-
strate the extent to which aid towards Latin America matches the country’s
overall aid concentration pattern. The closer the curves, the more similar the
fashion in which aid is concentrated in Latin America and the rest of the world.
Similarly, the Suits Index values show this pattern. The larger the difference
between the Suits Indices for the two curves, the greater the difference between
the poverty orientation of total aid and aid to Latin America. It is important
to note that since the curves are normalised for each donor country, the abso-
lute values of the Suits Index and the differences between them are difficult
to compare across countries, so that comparison is limited to within-country
values.
The curves show that the match between aid to Latin America and the over-
all concentration of aid is the closest in Germany. The curves look very sim-
ilar and only begin to split up roughly half-way along the curve, when over-
all aid becomes less regressive than aid excluding Latin America. The Suits
Index changes only slightly from 0.45 for total aid to 0.49 for aid excluding
Latin America. This means that for Germany, the overall concentration of aid
is slightly more evenly distributed when we include Latin America. This is
surprising given the picture in Figure 5.5, which shows that German allocates
disproportionate amounts of aid to some relatively rich Latin American coun-
tries, such as Brazil, Mexico and Chile. For Spain, the difference between the
two curves is by far the largest, showing a relatively large mismatch between
theway inwhich aid is concentrated in Latin America and the rest of the world.
Since Latin American countries are on the average relatively rich, and the other
major recipient of Spanish ODA is Africa, which is comparatively poor, this
finding is not surprising. It is supported by the Suits Index values of 0.57 for
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Figure 5.11: The Impact of Aid to Latin America on Overall Aid Concentra-
tion in Germany
Suits Index German total aid: 0.45
Suits Index German total aid excl. Latin America 0.49
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Figure 5.12: The Impact of Aid to Latin America on Overall Aid Concentra-
tion in Spain
Suits Index Spanish total aid: 0.57
Suits Index Spanish total aid excluding Latin America: 0.48
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Figure 5.13: The Impact of Aid to Latin America on Overall Aid Concentra-
tion in Britain
Suits Index UK total aid: 0.14
Suits Index UK total aid excluding Latin America: 0.22
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total Spanish ODA and 0.48 for ODA excluding Latin America, showing that
the poverty orientation of Spanish ODA increases if Latin America is excluded
(although the Suits Index remains rather regressive). Interestingly, however,
SpanishODA ismuchmore poverty-orientedwithin Latin America, as has been
shown in Figure 5.6, with an only mildly regressive Suits Index of 0.14. Finally,
the UK shows a picture similar to the German one in terms of the pattern of aid
concentration. Excluding aid to Latin America makes the overall concentration
curvemore regressive, i.e. less poverty-oriented. The larger difference between
the two curves and between the Suits Index values (0.13 for total ODA and 0.22
for ODA excluding Latin America) shows that the mismatch between the UK’s
overall aid allocation pattern and the allocation of aid in Latin America is lar-
ger than in Germany, however – similar to the pattern for Spain. Overall, UK
aid concentration in Latin America appears to be more evenly distributed than
aid concentration in the rest of the world.
Overall, therefore, it becomes clear that aid allocation is a very complex
process not just among recipient countries, but also within recipient regions
and among donors. For example, evidence from Germany and the UK may
support the findings of Tingley (2010) that aid to low-income countries is more
development-oriented, while aid to middle-income countries – such as those of
Latin America and the Caribbean – is more commercially oriented if we look
at how the aid is concentrated within Latin America. Yet at the same time,
both countries seem to distribute their aid towards Latin America more evenly
than their overall aid. Spain, on the other hand, contradicts Tingley’s findings
the other way around – the concentration of its aid within Latin America does
not seem to be commercially oriented, while the weight of Latin America in
Spain’s overall aid allocation may point in the direction of economic interests
or colonial history playing a role.
Overall, therefore, the concentration curves have given first indications of
what aid to Latin America looks like and what its drivers might be. How-
ever, the evaluation of the interview data must provide further indications as
to what motivates development policy to Latin America in order to disentangle
the explanatory factors.
5.5 Corroborating the Evidence – Analysis of Inter-
views
It has become evident that choices for aid concentration are highly complex
and vary with donors, recipient countries, and recipient regions. Tracing these
processes in depth for the case of aid to Latin America from Germany, Spain,
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and the UK offers a unique opportunity to elucidate the reasons behind some
contradicting findings in the previous literature. The case study therefore con-
tributes to a more complex, in-depth understanding of the rationales behind
foreign aid, especially in EU Member States. I have shown that aid allocation
to Latin America is generally more poverty-oriented than the overall alloca-
tion of ODA by the three countries under study. This is at odds with previous
findings that have shown a tendency for aid to middle-income countries to be
more commercially oriented than aid to low-income countries (Tingley 2010).
At the same time, there are some interesting particularities in each coun-
try’s aid concentration within Latin America that merit further attention. What
is, for example, the reason behind Spain’s low level of aid allocated to Brazil?
What drives the large amounts of German aid to both Nicaragua and Brazil?
The answers to such questions can help to better understand the overall ra-
tionale behind the aid allocation process in countries with different levels of
commercial interests, historical ties and cultural similarities with the recipient
region.
In the second part of this chapter, therefore, I evaluate the interviews car-
ried out for this study with regard to supplementing the patterns found in the
above data. Based on the study’s explanatory framework, I build up coding
schemes for both the national-level interviews and for the triangulation inter-
views. As I have outlined in the previous chapter, in the context of this study,
the interviews provide a possibility to query those who are actually responsible
for making development policy towards Latin America about the factors driv-
ing the country’s aid policy towards Latin America. I complement previous
quantitative studies by asking policy-makers about their motivations, which
provides an opportunity to further open the black box of aid motivations (it
is, however, important to bear in mind the limitations of interviews discussed
in the previous chapter).15 I begin with a discussion of the results from the
national-level interviews. They were coded according to the coding scheme
conceptualised in Section 5.3, which can be found in Appendix D. The results
for the various hypotheses conceptualised in the theoretical framework section
are summarised in Table 5.4.
In the following paragraphs, I discuss the results and their implications.
Regarding the hypotheses on the concentration of development aid in Latin
America, I find the strongest support for interest-based hypotheses in Germany
and the UK, while in Spain, support for the hypotheses supporting poverty
orientation considerations is stronger. As I pointed out at the beginning of this
15One option to connect the evidence obtained in my interviews with policy-makers to quant-
itative studies would be to expand beyond policy towards Latin America by carrying out a rep-
resentative survey among policy-makers, which would represent an interesting point of departure
for future research.
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Table 5.4: Development Case Study: Results of national-level interview ana-
lysis (% of total evidence for hypotheses)





















chapter, multiple motivating factors for allocating certain amounts of aid to
different Latin American countries and to Latin America as a whole are at play.
Below I analyse their relationships among each other and assess the differences
across the three cases under study.
5.5.1 Germany
Economic Interests Germany shows the greatest evidence for the influence
of economic interests on policy activity out of the three countries under study.
This somewhat contradictory to what the hypothesis on the impact of eco-
nomic interests (H1a) postulated. While Germany does have economic interests
in the region, the expectation had been that this would be relatively more im-
portant for Spain. German interviewees are between open and reluctant to
admit the influence of economic interests on development allocation. While
the mutual benefit of companies and aid recipients was as far as some would
go in admitting that economic considerations played a role, others openly ad-
mitted that Mexico, Brazil and Peru were at an advantage over other Latin
American countries in the compilation of the list of countries to receive devel-
opment aid, because trade flows mattered in the selection. This confirms the
picture of the development aid curve that poverty orientation does not seem to
be the only consideration in German development policy towards Latin Amer-
ica (and even more generally, since the selection rules matter for all potential
recipient countries).
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In general, interviewees point out that roping economic actors into public-
private partnerships (so-called PPPs) is nowadays not necessarily seen as a bad
thing, but rather as a way to augment otherwise limited aid funding. However,
they tie this recent development to the change of government in 2009. As one
German interviewee stated:
“All this support for private economic actors is a new aspect, a
new feature of the new leadership. I mean, the strengthening of
cooperation with the private economy, and thereby at the end also
a strengthening of the German industry’s competitive position in
Latin America.”
The strengthening of PPPs as a result of the government change is actually
mentioned in the government’s coalition treaty as an initiative setting the new
government apart from the old one (CDU, CSU and FDP 2009) – although since
the German ODA figures come from before the government change, it is per-
haps not as new a feature as the coalition treaty would have one believe. In-
deed, as one German interviewee put it, such structures are also more frequent
in Latin America “due to the increased ability of local partners there to pay
for services” – that is, due to their relatively high levels of economic and in-
stitutional development. This idea was expressed in all three donor countries
under study: by having private enterprise participate in development policy,
it is possible to mobilise additional funding and have both sides – the recipient
country and domestic enterprises – benefit at the same time.
Hence, in Germany there appears to be a political-ideological component
to the involvement of private actors in development aid, supporting the pat-
tern found by Tingley (2010; see also Fleck and Kilby 2006) that government
ideology influences the motivations behind aid giving. However, the fact that
patterns consistent with pro-economic aid policy could be found even before
the government change is also coherent with the idea that domestic preferences
remain constant over time, and that perhaps changes in ideology matter more
for poorer recipients than for richer ones, where aid tends to be more econom-
ically oriented irrespective of the government’s ideology (Tingley 2010: 47).
There seems to have been a coincidence between political change in Germany
and a realisation that Latin America is a region of important economic poten-
tial. While not the most fundamental part, the involvement of private eco-
nomic actors in development policy activity could help further German eco-
nomic interests in the region and reap the benefits of said economic potential.
Therefore, Germany is staying involved in development policy towards the re-
gion, putting an emphasis not just on the poorest countries, but also on those
that promise economic gains.
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Political Interests Despite the somewhat surprising importance of economic
interests, political interests in the region matter even more for the allocation
of German development policy activity towards Latin America, in accordance
with Hypothesis 1b. The relatively strong focus on Mexico and Brazil is ex-
plained with the countries’ rising global importance, not just economically, but
also in international politics. This focus corresponds directly to the relation-
ship between political interests and development policy activity postulated in
Hypothesis 1b. As one interviewee put it, Brazil and Mexico as “global part-
ners” play a special role: development aid is not important for their budgets,
but instead serves to facilitate and enhance the bilateral relationship. It is not
the defining factor of policy towards these countries, but a “support pillar” of
the general foreign policy relationship. Such statements are in line with the
idea of a German strategy paper on “anchor countries” published in 2004, of
which Brazil and Mexico formed part (BMZ 2004). These “anchor countries”
were not only emerging countries, but also politically pivotal partners in their
respective regions. Although the strategy is currently being revised, interviews
revealed that the role of the two countries would remain similar. German in-
terviewees were keen to point to the donor capacities Brazil and Mexico are
currently building up, an involvement in which is seen as an opportunity for
the “transfer of interests”. Additionally, the new government appears to be
keen to strengthen development policy with Colombia, which is seen as a re-
liable political partner. “This was a political decision to strongly intensify co-
operation over the last year. We practically tripled it,” one official claimed, a
statement that was confirmed by other interviewees. Germany has, overall, a
relatively wide approach to the countries it considers politically important in
the region and also includesMexico and to some extent Colombia in this group,
with Colombia’s rising importance being a recent political decision. This broad
understanding is, at least partially, at the root of Germany’s overall medium-
level development policy activity discovered in Chapter 3.
Domestic Norms Domestic norms of poverty alleviation, as postulated in
Hypothesis 2a, also play a role in German development policy towards Latin
America, although in Germany they seem to be the least relevant out of the
three countries concerned. This low level of impact on development policy
activity is somewhat unexpected, as I hypothesised national norms to be a
stronger influence in Germany than in Spain (although the British case is, as
I will discuss below, consistent with the hypothesis). Despite the relatively
low level of importance, German interviewees do emphasise that Latin Amer-
ica consists mainly of middle-income countries, so that poverty alleviation in
the traditional sense matters most in only a few countries, such as Guatemala,
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Honduras, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. Interestingly, one interviewee noted in the
context of these countries that they are not economically important for Ger-
many, making the competition between the interest-orientation and poverty-
orientation of aid palpable. In the richer countries of Latin America, at the
same time, poverty alleviation does play a role in the widest sense of the term.
German development policy in these countries focuses on, as one official lis-
ted, “strengthening democracy to create a social balance, strengthening gov-
ernance, and then also environmental, climate, and biodiversity protection”.
The crucial point is thus that for Germany, a domestic norm of poverty orient-
ation is not enough reason to pull out of Latin America completely, although
interviewees domention that more andmore Latin American countries ‘gradu-
ate’ from the list of recipient countries. Nonetheless, German policy-makers
are not as decisive in exiting from the region as their British counterparts. As
with political interest, the issue is one of Germany defining ‘poverty allevi-
ation’ very widely, especially for the richer countries. Under the new govern-
ment, however, several interviewees pointed out that interests are beginning
to trump poverty alleviation, as expected by Hypothesis 2a, and as the overall
distribution of evidence for Germany shows. As one interviewee stated, the
fight against poverty is not the only criterion for the new government, which
takes into account global politics and economic interests as well. However,
the aid concentration curve with earlier data indicates that this is not a new
phenomenon, and indeed, the multiple drivers of German aid have also been
found by previous studies (e.g. Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Berthelémy 2006).
However, the national norm of poverty alleviation is also intertwined with
recipient countries’ capacity to handle the aid. As one German interviewee
put it, the development-orientation of the partner countries is “a precondi-
tion”: the question is not only whether a country is poor, but also whether it
can and will administer aid appropriately, a problem especially in the Central
American countries, where governance is particularlyweak. As a consequence,
one official worried that these countries “might fall off the edge” and cease to
receive aid if things continue to deteriorate further. Colombia, Peru, Brazil,
and Mexico, on the other hand, are perceived by German policy-makers to be
development-oriented, so that the fact that they continue to receive aid is the
result not only of interest-based considerations, but also of efficiency concerns.
International Norms Turning toHypothesis 2b, while German policy-makers
sense that there is indeed an international norm of poverty reduction which it
is appropriate to follow, this is considerably weaker than the corresponding na-
tional norm. Indeed, one interviewee was keen to point to the extent to which
the national norm about poverty alleviation preceded the international focus
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on this issue:
“they [the MDGs] play a prominently important role in political
discourse. But I do not think that they caused a major shift in ac-
cent, because I think that German development cooperation was,
already without the MDG’s existence, already strongly oriented to-
wards it [poverty]. [...] [O]ne might say the MDGs... afterwards
German aid somehow reoriented itself completely, but that is not
how it was. Because that was already an integral part of our own
development cooperation.”
What is important to note, however, is that the international norm evidently
serves to reinforce the national norm in this case, as postulated in Hypothesis
2b. The MDGs, as this particular official pointed out, are important in German
development policy discourse, but they did not reorient aid – whereas, as I
will discuss below, this was very much the case in Spain. However, in reply to
the question of whether there were elements of German development policy in
Latin America that responded to a global agenda, another official stated “when
we say global development cooperation strategy, that would be the pursuit of
the MDGs [...] Environmental and climate protection are of course part of the
MDGs, and they are embedded there.” Thus, German policy-makers do accept
the influence of international norms on their development agenda with the
region and seek to embed their policy within such international goals.
International Rules: Rational Adaptation While there is some evidence for
the impact of international socialisation, I do not find evidence in Germany for
rational adaptation to international rules, even though Hypothesis 2c expected
it to matter in Germany because of its wish to be recognised as a fully-fledged
‘good’ international partner. The reasons for this absence of evidence are thus
not entirely clear from a theoretical point of view, although there is some evid-
ence pointing to the idea that Germany might no longer be in a position of
‘courting’ the international community for recognition (e.g. Karp 2009; see
also Bulmer and Paterson 2010).
Recall, furthermore, that the absence of evidence for a hypothesis does not
necessarily mean that there is no influence of a particular explanatory variable,
just that no indications for it have been found. It may thus well be the case
that Germany does adapt to international rules out of a desire to maintain its
status as a ‘cooperative member’ of the international donor community. Fur-
ther investigation beyond the scope of this study is required, however, to truly
ascertain the reasons for the absence of evidence for rational adaptation in Ger-
many and Britain when it comes to motivations for the concentration of aid to
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Latin America and in certain Latin American countries. There is, indeed, a
grey zone between following international rules motivated by a ‘logic of ap-
propriateness’ (Hypothesis 2b) and a ‘logic of consequences’ (Hypothesis 2c).
Even the most careful coding of interviews can sometimes not disentangle the
two logics, a problem that applies also to all three cases under study and may
contribute to the lack of evidence for rational adaptation. Sometimes officials
make statements about the impact of the international level on their national
policy-making without explicitly linking them to a logic of appropriateness or
expected consequences, and then it is not possible to code these statements into
one or the other category. Therefore, the lack of evidence in the German case
must be taken with the appropriate caution.
Summary: Germany The overall medium level of development policy activ-
ity towards Latin America on behalf of Germany is accounted for by several
factors. Firstly, economic factors play a surprisingly important role despite the
– in comparison to Spain – relatively low economic stakes of German economic
actors in the region. This is reflected in the focus of German aid concentra-
tion on economically important countries of the region, as well as in the in-
terviews. Although economic factors were present even before 2009, the com-
ing to power of a liberal-conservative coalition government in 2009 combined
with a realisation of Latin America’s economic growth potential and has led
to a greater involvement of the business community in development policy
towards the region.16
Political factors, however, play an even more important role. Germany’s
relatively broad definition of what makes for a politically important partner –
from the up-and-coming global actors Brazil andMexico to politically ‘likeable’
Colombia – accounts, at least in part, for a relatively wide spread of German
development policy activity towards the region and overall medium levels of
activity. Interestingly, such a broad definition also applies to the interpretation
of ‘poverty alleviation’ in Latin America. Although utilitarian-liberal factors
clearly trump the impact of this factor arising from domestic considerations
about what distribution of development policy activity is appropriate, it is
nevertheless an important concern. While it leads to a focus on some Latin
American countries at the poorer end of the spectrum, German policy-makers
consider that even in the richer countries poverty alleviation and thus devel-
opment policy activity has its justification in the broad sense of eradicating
barriers to full economic development.
16It must be noted that under the guidance of a minister from the Free Democratic Party (FDP),
the greater involvement of economic actors in development policy is visible also in other regions.
Yet the coincidence of this change in mentality with the realisation that Latin America is an im-
portant growth region does make policy towards the region unique.
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This liberal constructivist variable interacts with the impact of socialisation
at the international level to some degree. While policy-makers consider the
national norm prior to the formation of international norms about focusing
development policy activity in poorer countries, especially in the context of
the MDGs, this international norm does reinforce domestic concerns about the
goal of development policy being poverty alleviation. Even so, because of the
domestic definition’s breadth, this does not translate into a wholesale exit from
Latin America.
Finally, it is interesting to observe within the context of the academic dis-
cussion about Germany’s place in international society that I do not find evid-
ence for rational adaptation to international development policy rules as might
have been expected. It lends support to the idea that Germany’s actions on the
world stage are gradually less affected by its necessity to gain others’ recog-
nition than they were after the Second World War and throughout the Cold
War. On the other hand, it might also be that there is a temporal component
at work: during this period of over sixty years, what began as rational adapt-
ation might have become more deeply embedded and German actors might
have become truly ‘socialised’ into considering obedience to international de-
velopment policy rules appropriate. This idea might be an interesting point of
departure for future, more historically oriented research on the impact of time
on actor socialisation. Nonetheless, it should not detract from the finding that,
as theorised by my extended liberal framework, domestic interests do indeed
seem to be the key driving factors behind German policy activity towards the
region.
5.5.2 Britain
Economic Interests In the UK, consistent with theoretical expectations given
its relatively weak economic interests in the region, economic factors (H1a) mat-
ter much less in determining policy activity towards Latin America than they
do in Germany. According to one interviewee, British firms are reluctant to
engage in the region due to – in part prejudiced – ideas about how doing busi-
ness in Latin America is a difficult affair. Nonetheless and similarly to the
German case, a British official commented that under the new Conservative-
Liberal government there has been “definitely a push towards the private sec-
tor, to get more private sector funding”. This reinforces the notion of a political-
ideological aspect to private actor involvement in development aid, specifically
within the context of PPPs, as discussed in the case of Germany. Indeed, in the
UK, this is the only context within which economic issues were discussed at all
by the interviewees.
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Political Interests There is, on the other hand, strong evidence in the case
of the UK that political interests are important in determining development
policy activity towards Latin America (H1b). Indeed, such evidence is consid-
erably stronger for the British than for the German case. The balance between
the two types of domestic interest in the case of Britain is in line with liberal-
utilitarian expectations that the strength of interests influences their import-
ance in policy-making, as the UK’s economic interests in Latin America are
even lower than Germany’s.
Indeed, political reasons are among those that account for Latin America’s
overall low weight in British development policy activity. Security concerns in
Afghanistan and Iraq have swallowed up large shares of the UK aid budget
according to one interviewee, but the same interviewee also pointed out that
this was not a recent phenomenon. Rather, the fact that Latin America never
had a large programme within British development policy is partially due to
historical-political – that is, colonial – reasons that have caused Africa and Asia
to predominate. This also helps explain why Guyana still receives British bi-
lateral aid: it is part of the aid effort towards the Caribbean. While this is not
within the scope of this study, in the Anglophone Caribbean there appears to be
strong support for political considerations in aid allocation. As I have outlined
in Chapter 2 (see p. 68), this study does not provide an explicitly historical-
institutionalist account. The case of the Latin America programme within UK
development assistance is, however, a case in point of how this investigation
needs to be historically aware. Latin America was never hugely important to
Britain, but at the same time this has made it easier for political arguments
about its low place in development policy activity to take hold.
The importance of political interests in British development policy activ-
ity becomes even clearer when considering the evidence provided by inter-
viewees that within Latin America, political considerations condition where
policy activity is directed, that is, the concentration of UK aid among the coun-
tries of the region. The fact that after closing down nearly all bilateral pro-
grammes with Latin America, only Guyana and Brazil continue to receive aid
speaks volumes. The case of Guyana has already been discussed. In the case
of Brazil, the importance of political considerations in maintaining the pro-
gramme is clearly spelled out by interviewees. The programme, according to
them, was maintained in order to take account of Brazil’s global role as an
emerging power. Indeed, the DFID officials working on the programme are
based within the British embassy rather than a DFID office and liaise explicitly
with the Brazilian government on issues including the rise of Brazil itself as
a donor country. The close relationship between DFID and the local embassy
is exceptional considering that development and foreign policy as handled by
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the FCO tend to be quite separated in Britain, according to the interviewees.
Given that Brazil is the only Latin American country with whomDFID still car-
ries out development work, the political motivation of this cooperation weighs
heavily on the overall motivations of UK development policy activity towards
Latin America. Additionally, although this has been discontinued, the FCO
did at one point have an aid programme in Colombia arising out of security
concerns. Overall, therefore, political motivations far outweigh other factors in
driving what is left of the UK’s development relationship with Latin America.
Latin America is not politically important enough for the UK to be highly act-
ive, but those countries that are important – in particular Brazil – concentrate
nearly all the policy activity that is directed at the region.17
Domestic Norms Lending support to Hypothesis 2a, the influence of a do-
mestic norm about poverty alleviation is strongest in the UK, which arguably
has the lowest ‘utilitarian’ interests in the region, especially in economic terms.
In addition, this national norm plays out in a particularly interesting fashion,
for it is this norm that is in part responsible for the closure of the bilateral aid
programmeswith Latin America and the UK’s low level of development policy
activity towards the region. When questioned about DFID’s decision to pull
out of the region almost completely, interviewees agree that it corresponds to a
decision in the late 1990s, that is, at the beginning of the Labour Government’s
first legislature. It appears that the decision had two roots, on the one hand,
the desire to decrease DFID’s footprint by getting rid of small programmes
that were not perceived to be making a big impact. Indeed, (former) DFID
officials previously involved with Latin America unanimously stated that the
programme had been so small even before its cancellation that it was almost
impossible to make a noteworthy impact through allocation decisions or con-
ditionality. The second cause of the Latin America programme’s closure, how-
ever, was the strong perception that aid had to be focussed on the poorest coun-
tries. As one interviewee stated,
“there was a big rethink about [...]18 aid to middle income coun-
17It is important to note that under the new government there have been efforts to step up Brit-
ish policy activity towards the region that point into the direction of the UK taking note of Latin
America’s growing political importance, although these have not taken place in the realm of de-
velopment policy. These include the reopening of a diplomatic post in Central America and the
scaling up of other Latin American posts: “We are embarking on a large-scale shift in network
resources announced by the Foreign Secretary to shape a future network that reflects the shifting
power dynamics in today’s world. [...] [W]e will open new posts in Kyrgyzstan, South Sudan, El Sal-
vador and, when local circumstances permit, in Madagascar and Somalia. We will also strengthen
our small and medium size posts across the Asia-Pacific region, in Latin America and in parts of Africa,
the Middle East and Central and South Asia. (FCO 2011: 2; emphasis added).
18Please note that, as discussed in Chapter 4, when there are ellipses in citations from the inter-
views, this is normally due to the fact that they are based on interview transcripts. As interviewees
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tries. And Latin America, although we know there are large num-
bers of very poor people in Latin America, and pockets of genu-
ine poverty in the region, on the whole, [...] most of the countries
slipped into the middle-income bracket. And there was [...] a de-
cision within DFID under the then New Labour government to fo-
cus aid very much on the very poorest countries. So there was a
general decision to start closing down some of the traditional bilat-
eral aid programmes also in Latin America.”
As a result, the Latin America programme was gradually dismantled. There
was, initially, one low-income country left in the region, Nicaragua, where a re-
sidual programme remained “as it becomes a middle-income country” (DFID
2009). Indeed, the decision was not uncontroversial within the policy-making
community, as there appeared to be the potential for parliamentary resistance
from a group of pro-Latin American MPs. The decision was thus taken to
re-channel aid through what was called a Programme Partnership Agreement
(PPA) with a number of British NGOs (DFID 2008). Initially designed to run
over three years, no decision was taken to prolong the programme’s life at the
change of government in 2010, so that even the PPA has now run out. In the
case of the UK, therefore, the normative decision to focus aid on the poorest
countries combined with domestic political dynamics and led to the dismant-
ling of British bilateral aid to Latin America.19
The UK was able to codify the norm of poverty alleviation in the Interna-
tional Development Act of 2002, which states that development assistance may
be provided whenever “the provision of the assistance is likely to contribute to
a reduction in poverty” (UK Parliament 2002, Part I, 1(1)). The norm has thus
been enshrined in legislation and subsequently impacted British development
policy as a whole. As a result, UK development policy is now focused mainly
on Africa and, to a lesser extent, on Asia (DFID/National Statistics 2009). One
interviewee pointed out that there was indeed a deliberate effort on the part of
the government to detach aid from interest-based considerations, at least un-
der the Labour government: “Aid is there to do something that’s morally right,
not strategic.”
As in the German case, however, poverty orientation does not automatic-
ally mean that the poorest countries receive the most aid. Incidentally, Latin
speak freely, there tend to be repetitions of words, syllables, and interruptions that have been re-
moved in order to make the transcript ‘citable’. No relevant content has been left out. Anonymised
transcripts can be made available upon request.
19It is important to note that Latin America was not the only region affected by the reorientation
of British aid towards the poorest countries. Interviewees were very clear that this was not an
issue that was specific to Latin America, but that offices were also closed in other middle-income
countries, for example in Eastern Europe.
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America provides an excellent example of how this impacts upon aid alloca-
tion both on behalf of Britain and Germany: the case of Haiti. Recall from the
aid concentration curves that Haiti is the main reason for why the curves of
all countries under study are regressive: it is Latin America’s poorest country,
yet it receives disproportionately little aid. Britain and Germany have both
taken conscious decisions not to work with Haiti bilaterally. One main reason
is Haiti’s lack of absorptive capacity: as one former British official pointed out,
many other donors such as Canada are highly active in Haiti, and its capacity
to absorb aid is very low. Thus, poverty orientation may also lead to countries
with more administrative and absorptive capacity getting more funds.
It will be interesting to see how the strong domestic norm of poverty al-
leviation develops under the new Conservative-Liberal government, although
interviewees do not anticipate substantial changes. However, the strength of
the British national poverty-alleviation norm has had repercussions beyond
British policy towards Latin America, as will be further discussed below. Be-
cause of Britain’s strong influence on the international donor community, it
was able to take its national poverty reduction norm to the international level
and act as a norm-maker there. While of course interviewees’ claims about the
extent of the UK’s influence on the international arena must be viewed with
the appropriate caution, it is noticeable that the UK’s impact – along that of
other countries such as the Nordic states – is also recognised by interviewees
from the other countries under study and the triangulation interviewees, as I
show further on. The UK’s domestic norm of poverty alleviation has therefore
had an impact beyond the UK, as well as on all aspects of British develop-
ment policy, including towards Latin America, although it does compete with
– mainly political – interest-based factors that have, for example, enabled the
duration of DFID’s work in Brazil.
International Norms Support for the impact of an international norm of pov-
erty alleviation, however, is fairly low in the UK. This lends support to the
theorising of Hypothesis 2b, which stated that the UK as a norm-maker at the
international level could be expected to be more of a ‘socialiser’ than a ‘so-
cialisee’. Given the strength of the pre-existing domestic norm, the fact that an
international norm to the same effect has a weaker impact is not at all surpris-
ing. One interviewee stated that in the context of reorienting resources towards
the poorest countries, the international context did matter, but that it was ac-
tually the UK and the Nordic countries who led the way on this issue. This
finding is theoretically interesting, as the interaction between national and in-
ternational norms has also been theorised to the effect that international norms
are more likely to resonate in countries where there is a similar domestic norm
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(e.g. Checkel 1999: 81; Rittberger 2001b; Boekle et al. 2001). This idea does
make sense, although the role of the respective country at the international
level must be carefully taken into account. A country which is a norm-maker at
the international level is more likely to implant its domestic norm there than to
be socialised by others, whereas the relationship between national and interna-
tional norms postulated above applies better to countries that are norm-takers.
How a country’s position as a maker or taker of international norms comes
about has been the subject of a comprehensive body of research (e.g. Börzel
2002; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
International Rules: Rational Adaptation While in Germany, I did expect
rational adaptation to international rules, this was less the case for the UK (Hy-
pothesis 2c), so that the fact that I do not find evidence for it is not surprising
and lends support to the theoretical expectations postulated. Again, given Bri-
tain’s substantial influence on the making of this rule, there was no theoretical
reason to expect it to adapt to an international rule in whose crafting the UK
itself was instrumental. Another potential explanation lies in the fact that by
now, British policy activity towards the region is so low (Latin America ac-
counts for a mere 2% of total UK development assistance; see Table 5.2) that
Britain does not see the need to signal ‘good behaviour’ in a region where it
will not be noticed. Even so, however, it is important to consider the caveats
discussed in the section on Germany: a lack of evidence for the impact of a
variable does not necessarily mean that it is not at work at all.
Summary: Britain The most remarkable thing about the UK’s development
policy towards Latin America is its virtual nonexistence, which this section
has sought to explain. As expected, economic interests do not play much of a
role for British development policy towards Latin America, as they are rather
low. Political factors, on the other hand, are relatively much more important
than in the other two countries under study. In some aspects, their impact ex-
hibits similarities to the German case in that they lead to policy activity being
focused on recipients that are considered politically important. However, the
British definition of ‘politically important’ is much sharper than the German
one and entails a strong focus almost exclusively on Brazil. This ‘Brazilian-
isation’ of British policy towards Latin America has entailed a move away
from other countries, although it is not solely responsible for the low level of
policy activity towards the region. In the realm of domestic political interests,
political-historical factors also play a role in that they have made it easier to de-
tract policy activity from Latin America and towards other regions, such as the
Caribbean or Africa. The issue of definitions, however, also applies to the so-
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cialisation of British policy-makers into a very strong domestic norm of poverty
alleviation. While German policy-makers operate within a rather broad defini-
tion of poverty alleviation that allows them to include ‘more developed’ coun-
tries, the British norm is much more geared towards focusing development
policy activity on the world’s poorest countries and is, in conjunction with the
other factors discussed, responsible for the low level of policy activity towards
Latin America. Indeed, Britain has become a norm-maker at the international
level, so that I do find little evidence for international socialisation and rational
adaptation to international norms and rules to whose establishment the UK
itself has contributed considerably.
5.5.3 Spain
Economic Interests The fairly low importance of economic factors in determ-
ining Spanish development policy activity towards Latin America comes as a
surprise to utilitarian-liberal theory given the substantial economic interests
Spain has in the region (cf Hypothesis 1a). There is some reason to believe that
in this case, the interview results must be taken with a pinch of salt due to the
possibility that interviewees are being strategic. Spain has, in fact, been harshly
criticised by its last DAC Peer Review (OECD 2007) for its large amounts of tied
aid, that is, aid attached to the condition that the recipient country make a pur-
chase in the donor country or carry out projects in conjunction with companies
from the donor country. While several interviewees confirm that this has been
an issue in the past, however, they are adamant to point out that Spain has
been working to reduce its tied aid. The source of the problem, as confirmed
by the DAC Peer Review, was a fund called Fondo de Ayuda al Desarrollo (FAD;
Fund for Development Aid), which was counted as ODA, but was in fact a
fund “to aid exports”, as one interviewee explained, and to help Spanish com-
panies enter Latin American markets, which had “nothing to do with the rest
of cooperation”. Indeed, the FAD has recently been dismantled to become the
Fondo para la Promoción del Desarrollo (FONPRODE), administered by the Span-
ish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID), and the
Fondo para la Internacionalización de la Empresa (FIEM), administered by theMin-
istry for Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITYC). FONPRODE will consist
strictly of development-oriented untied aid, while FIEM fundswill be ODA eli-
gible only if they comply with DAC rules (Gobierno de España 2011; 2010; Sa-
nahuja 2009). Therefore, while in earlier years, there was a use of FAD funding
to help Spanish enterprises along in Latin America, interviewees concur that
the government has in recent years made a conscious effort to untie aid from
economic interests. Indeed, these findings chime with the pattern found in
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the Spanish aid concentration curve that the richer and more rapidly-growing
countries of Latin America do indeed receive proportionally little development
assistance.
One interviewee, however, points to the issue of including private actors in
development policy that also appeared in interviews with British and German
policy makers. Roping economic actors into PPPs is now seen as a way to aug-
ment otherwise limited aid funding. But while in Britain and Germany there
was a political component to the involvement of private actors in development
policy through PPPs, in Spain it is seen by policy-makers as the result of the
maturation of Spanish development assistance rather than of domestic polit-
ical ideas.20 This indicates that Spain continues to see itself as a ‘young donor’,
which, as I will discuss below, impacts quite strongly upon its motivations
for development policy in other respects as well. Spanish interviewees agreed
with their British and German counterparts, however, in that Latin America
with its relatively high levels of development and its relatively well-developed
public institutions is particularly suited for the application of PPPs.
Political Interests In Spain, political interests (Hypothesis 1b) matter to a sim-
ilar degree as economic interests. Unsurprisingly, Spanish officials point to the
historical connection between Spain and its former Latin American colonies.
This relationship is in part political, as I have previously discussed and inter-
views have confirmed, as Spain uses Latin America to project itself interna-
tionally and increase its global clout. This is clearly reflected in the level of
development policy activity towards Latin America, even though Spain’s co-
lonial past with the region also has a normative dimension that will be further
discussed below. “There are historical and cultural ties with Latin America we
cannot deny”, one official stated, “so Latin America remains very important to
us.” However, there are also some more recent political factors that have im-
pacted upon Spain’s development policy towards the region, one of them be-
ing migration. One interviewee admitted that while the demographic pressure
emanating from Latin America was not as strong on Spain as on the United
States, it has nevertheless had an impact on development policy towards the
region. This has taken the form of co-development programmes to try and in-
volve migrants themselves in development cooperation and put, for example,
their remittances to developmental use. However, the official stated, these pro-
grammes had not been graced with a great deal of success so far.
The relatively low importance of economic and political interests comes as
20The fact that this development came about largely during the Socialist government of 2004-11
supports the idea that there is a difference between the political roots of such changes in Britain
and Germany on the one hand and the Spanish case on the other.
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a bit of a surprise for the Spanish case, where liberal-utilitarian theorising pos-
tulated that given Spain’s strong interests in the region should be a, if not the
key motivating factor. Even though taken together, the ‘domestic interest’ vari-
ables still account for about 30% of the evidence, it is surprising that overall,
normative factors account for more. Let me thus turn to the discussion of the
impact of norms on development policy activity towards Latin America.
Domestic Norms Regarding Hypothesis 2a, the domestically-rooted poverty
alleviation norm matters nearly to the same degree in Spain as it does in Ger-
many. This is interesting, as I had hypothesised it to matter less due to Spain’s
greater economic and political interests in the region. However, in so far as a
domestic norm over poverty alleviation might impact upon the overall level
of development policy activity towards the Latin America, it does enter into
conflict with Spain’s close historical relationship with the region. This relation-
ship is so deeply ingrained in both the public’s and the policy-makers’ thinking
about Latin America that policy-makers repeatedly referred to Latin American
countries as “brothers” or having a “brotherly relationship” with them. As one
interviewee put it,
“as much as we, the Spanish society, should support the world’s
poorest countries, if you ask someone the one-hundred Euro ques-
tion, to divide it between Africa and Latin America, I am convinced
that in the majority of cases they would put quite a lot more in Latin
America than in Africa. Although at a more general level, they will
say that more aid has to be given to Africa.”
However, the poverty-orientation of Spanish aid is slowly increasing, although,
as I discuss below, this is probably more the result of international-level dy-
namics. Nonetheless, diverting aid from Latin America appears to be morally
very difficult for Spain. While Chile is theoretically on the road to graduating
from Spanish development aid, one interviewee pointed out that to the date,
policy-makers have not been able to close AECID’s Technical Cooperation Of-
fice (OTC) in Santiago. “It was traumatic. [...] The decision was included in the
current Development Plan from 2009. Until today, though, they do not know
how to do it”, the interviewee explained.
However, poverty alleviation has been a priority within Latin America, in
line with the picture emerging from Spain’s aid concentration curve in the re-
gion. This, indeed, appears how Spain has been trying to resolve the cognitive
dissonance between the norm of orienting aid towards the poorest countries
and its Latin American vocation. In fact, the Socialist government has made
strong efforts to untie aid from other objectives, despite domestic pressures to
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make it conditional. In Bolivia, for example, where Spanish companies were
negatively affected by nationalisations, business interests and parts of the me-
dia were trying to push the government to condition its aid, one interview
partner reports. Nonetheless, the government maintained “a clear position
that the two things could not be connected, that [...] [development] cooper-
ation has its logic and we want to maintain this, beyond [...] commercial or
economic conflicts”, as one interviewee explained. But, as will become clear in
the following, this poverty orientation is much more the result of international
influences than of domestic norms in Spain.
International Norms Spain is the country where an international norm has
had the most relative impact by far out of the three countries under study. In
contrast to the UK’s role as a ‘norm-maker’ of development policy at the in-
ternational level, Spain very much appears to be a norm-taker in this respect.
Evidence shows that an international norm of ‘aid to the poorest’ appears to
havemade considerable impact on policy-makers. One Spanish interview part-
ner who has been involved in development policy-making for a long time ac-
tually described a fundamental change in this respect since the coming into
power of the Socialist government in 2004: “Spain had a model one academic
called ‘typically Spanish’,21 [...] ‘our [development] cooperation is different,
and that in itself is good’. [...] This has changed.”
This reorientation of Spanish development aid caused Africa to surpass
Latin America for the first time in 2007 in terms of total Spanish aid funds with
1,180.1 million Euros vis-à-vis 1,070.8 million Euros (MAEC 2008: 50).22 The
Millennium Development goals, according to interviewees, have made a par-
ticular impact on Spanish development policy-makers: “Spain completely sup-
ports the MDGs.” However, as with the national norm of poverty alleviation,
any international norm has to compete with Spain’s special relationship with
Latin America. One official admits that international decisions regarding the
goals of development such as the Paris Declaration or the Accra Agenda have
not been fully incorporated in Spain, because of its historical ties with Latin
America. Therefore, as another interviewee stated, while the MDGs were “a
central element” for the Socialist government’s development policy – one that
is accepted by policy-makers without questioning it – they did cause “some
dilemmas in the Latin American case [...] They are written for low-income
countries... the poorest countries in the world.” The tension between the ac-
ceptance of an international norm on the one hand and domestic traditions on
21The original word used was “castizo”, which refers to something that is typically or tradition-
ally Spanish.
22However, Africa was the main recipient of Spanish multilateral aid, while Latin America con-
tinued to receive the largest share of bilateral funds.
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the other thus had to be resolved.
This was achieved by giving Spanish development policy a particular twist,
which came to be known as “ODMPlus” in Spanish development circles (ODM
being the Spanish abbreviation for the MDGs). “We wanted to be within the
MDG framework”, an interviewee explained, “but adapt it to the Latin Amer-
ican reality. [...] [A]nd we saw that this involved working in three areas:
democratic governance, social cohesion [...] and thirdly, economic develop-
ment.” Similarly, the MDGs were incorporated into the Spanish development
agenda vis-à-vis Latin America by adjusting the concentration of aid among
the various countries and moving towards the poorer ones: “the MDGs were
incorporated by the concentration of lower middle-income countries within
the region [...] the compromise was [...] we’re not going to treat Brazil the
same as Bolivia [...] Brazil does not need aid.” Thus, Spanish development
policy-makers readily incorporated the international norm of giving aid to the
poorest, but such socialisation occurred only within limits as it partially con-
flicted with domestic preconceptions about aid, with which it had to be recon-
ciled. Therefore, it would be wrong to speak of an unreflective internalisation
of international norms in this case. While the norm was indeed internalised,
the way in which it was turned into development policy practice was very
much premeditated and rational, although the underlying adaptation was to
some extent motivated by considering the Millennium Development Goals an
appropriate course of action.
Spain’s role as a norm-taker at the international level can be explained with
its relatively recent appearance as a donor (García-Calvo Rosell 2003); up un-
til the early 1980s it was actually a recipient of development assistance, and it
was not until the early 2000s that its aid seriously took off. However, in Spain,
the acceptance of poverty reduction as a goal of development assistance is as
much a question of appropriateness as it is of rational adaptation, as I will
show in the next section. In terms of normative development, however, Spain
is the only one out of the three where the international norm is more influ-
ential than the national one – to some extent, therefore, Spain’s membership
in the international community has socialised policy-makers into considering
poverty alleviation as a fundamental goal of development aid, which shows in
the poverty-oriented distribution of aid within Latin America.
International Rules: Rational Adaptation There is, however, also consider-
able evidence for the impact of rational adaptation to international rules on
Spanish development policy activity (Hypothesis 2c). It matters, according to
the evidence, just as much as the international norm about poverty reduction,
and only slightly less than the idea that adhering to international norms is mor-
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ally right.23 Therefore, while the norm of poverty orientation has been inter-
nalised to some degree, it is also a rational response to international demands
that has caused Spanish aid to the least developed countries to rise consider-
ably over the past years. Spanish interviewees are happy to admit that Spain
wants to be recognised by the international community of donors, including
its EU partners, as a worthy member. Initially, in fact, “the only area where it
could demonstrate some capacity for cooperation was Latin America”, as one
interviewee put it. Later on, as development cooperation funding rose, more
money has been going to Africa in response, it seems, both to the diffusion and
acceptance of the norm that aid should go to the poorest, and a desire to be
more like the other donor countries: “the new [Socialist] government wanted
us to be [...] much closer to the orthodoxy [...], which said that we had to
increase [development] cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, and, to a lesser
extent, with Asia.” Similarly, this adaptation is clearly a response to the in-
ternational demand: “at all international development agendas, they were de-
manding of us to direct our increase in resources to least developed countries”.
However, as with the internalisation of poverty orientation as a norm, rational
adaptation has been bounded by domestic preconceptions about where Span-
ish aid should go. The importance of Latin America may have diminished in
terms of its share of aid, where Africa now receives a similar proportion, but
in absolute numbers, Spain remains committed to the region. Nevertheless,
the adaptation to international rules has left its mark on Spanish development
policy activity towards Latin America. Along with the partial internalisation
of poverty orientation as a norm, the desire to be accepted as a fully-fledged
member of the international donor community contributed to a very specific
‘Spanish way’ of orienting aid towards the poorest Latin American countries.
Summary: Spain Aside from displaying the highest level of development
policy activity towards Latin America, Spain also displays the most varied
evidence regarding itsmotivations. Interestingly, its strong economic and polit-
ical interests in the region matter less than expected according to evidence
from the interviews. There appears to be a an element of evolution in Span-
ish assistance to Latin America that has been strongly influenced by the inter-
national level through processes of both rational adaptation and socialisation
into norms emanating from the international level. Indeed, it seems to be the
case that Spanish development activity towards the region was more interest-
driven earlier and has become more poverty-oriented in recent years as Spain
became an ever more active donor.
23Some caution is appropriate with reference to the differences between evidence for hypotheses
2b and 2c.
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In comparison to Germany and Britain, Spain’s current development policy
activities within Latin America are, indeed, more poverty-oriented in terms of
aid concentration, which is corroborated by the strong evidence for normative
factors and rational adaptation to the prevailing international rules from the
interviews. With this distribution of policy activity within the region, Spain at-
tempts to resolve the tension between the increasing perception that aid needs
to be poverty orientated and the both utilitarian and normative pressures to
maintain the strong focus on Latin America. While in the past, Spain’s strongly
expandingODAbudget has allowed it to increase aid to Africa at the same time
as keeping up its activity in Latin America, the country’s deep economic crisis
will force it to prioritise and it will be interesting to see how the new Spanish
government will handle this task.
Overall, current political and economic factors matter only marginally.
Political considerations in the shape of historical colonial ties, however, do
matter for the disproportionate amount of aid allocated to the whole of Latin
America. Within the region, differences in the political importance of the coun-
tries appear to be less relevant. Economic considerations have been a more de-
cisive factor in the past, particularly during the 1990s, than they are now. The
Socialist government has made efforts to untie aid from economic drivers by
abolishing the FAD funding line and replacing it with two new funds, only the
development-oriented of which is entirely ODA eligible (FONPRODE). How
this will affect aid to Latin America in practice, however, remains to be seen,
since FONPRODE’s rulebook was only approved in summer 2011.
Summary Overall, it has become clear that development policy activity is
driven both by domestic political and economic interests and the understand-
ing that giving aid to underdeveloped countries is morally appropriate. While
the former applies particularly to Germany and the UK’s aid to the richer Latin
American countries – Mexico, Brazil, and to some extent Peru and Colombia
–, aid to the poorer Latin American countries is more motivated by poverty
alleviation norms, arising from both the domestic and the international con-
text. This lends support to the findings of Tingley (2010), who finds that aid
to richer countries is often more interest-driven, while aid to poorer countries
responds more strongly to a logic of appropriateness. Especially in the UK,
however, the national poverty-orientation norm is so strong that it has indeed
led to the dismantling of almost all aid to Latin America, except for a chiefly
interest-motivated programme with Brazil that takes account of the country’s
growing global importance and its emerging role as an international donor.
In the case of Germany, there is a similar tendency to dismantle aid towards
the richer Latin American countries, while Germany does not leave the poorer
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ones. The reason for this most probably lies in the fact that Germany’s na-
tional norm about poverty alleviation is less strongly developed than the Brit-
ish one, and in particular under the new government, considerations regard-
ing the absorptive capacity of aid recipients and interest-based considerations
are gaining traction. Britain has, in addition, emerged as a norm-maker at the
international level, so that both international socialisation and rational adapta-
tion have had little impact on British development policy towards Latin Amer-
ica. In Spain, however, while economic and political – notably ex-colonial –
factors do matter, the international level is very important in determining the
concentration of Spain within Latin America. While the large amounts of aid
channelled to the region can only be explained with its historical and cultural
relations that have turned into a national norm of Latin America as a ‘brother’
whom one cannot cut off aid, the distribution of this aid within Latin Amer-
ica corresponds to poverty orientation arising from three sources: a national
norm that aid should go to the poorest countries, the acceptance of an inter-
national poverty-orientation norm – which is likely to be partially responsible
for the creation of the domestic norm to the same effect, given Spain’s recent
emergence as a donor –, and its rational adaptation to international rules in
order to become accepted as a fully-fledged member of the international donor
community.
For all three countries, the evidence from the interviews nicely corresponds
to and complements the data shown in the aid concentration curves and the
Suits Index values. Thus, this study has shown so far how the variables concep-
tualised by the extended liberal theoretical framework combine, mediated by
each country’s domestic context, to produce specific patterns of development
aid concentration in Latin America. In the following, I assess complementary
evidence from the triangulation interviews.
5.5.4 Additional evidence from triangulation interviews
The triangulation interviews, because they were carried out with EU officials
and Latin American diplomats based in Brussels, carry considerably less weight
for this case study than for Chapter 6. This is because neither EU officials nor
Latin American diplomats in Brussels have much insight into what is happen-
ing at the domestic level regarding development policy-making. Interviews
carried out at the EU’s DG Development/EEAS proved most useful in this re-
gard, as they can be taken as interviewees with representatives of a multilateral
donor organisation to some degree.24 Therefore, rather than providing a fully-
24The EU’s hybrid situation between a multilateral donor organisation and an international or-
ganisation due to the distribution of competences between the Union and its Member States in
development policy has already been outlined and must of course be considered.
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fledged coding analysis of the interviews here, I will briefly analyse them.
In general, interviewees emphasise economic motivations, with this being
the strongest for Spain. This contrasts with the findings from the national-
level interviews, although is not surprising given Spain’s substantial economic
interests in the region and is more consistent with Hypothesis 1a than the in-
terviews with Spanish development policy-makers, indicating that there may
indeed be an element of strategic rhetoric at the national level. Spain is continu-
ously pushing for more aid to Latin America, one interviewee stated, “because
they know that then 60, if not more percent of that money have the chance to
benefit the Spanish economy.” However, the interviewee also admitted that
this was not limited to Spain: “Of course everyone tries to get as much as pos-
sible out of the Community [development aid] budget [...] raised by the 27 for
their own industry.” However, while the impact of economic considerations
could be pinpointed for Spain and Germany in the interviews, this is not the
case for the UK, which may be because its economic interests in the region are
the smallest out of the three countries under study. Additionally, another in-
terviewee explained that Member States try and influence the EU in favour of
their own development policy, especially when priorities change, which was,
for example the case after the German change of government. Interviewees
also confirmed the notion that Britain is particularly influential regarding de-
velopment policy, not just towards Latin America, thus reinforcing the state-
ments of British officials themselves and adding to the theoretical notion of the
UK as a ‘norm-maker’ at the international level (Hypothesis 2b).25 Germany,
however, was also mentioned among the generally influential states, while the
Spaniards do have special clout with regard to Latin America. Yet one inter-
vieweementioned that the influence on EU development policy is also “a ques-
tion of capacity”, so that Germany and Britain were better off in this respect
than Spain, whose institutional capacity was seen as more limited.
Finally, it is worthmentioning that themotivation behind the EU’s develop-
ment policy – in addition to regionally specific factors – is fundamentally seen
as poverty alleviation. This points to two issues. Firstly, it is a further indica-
tion that normative considerations at least partially drive development policy
in the EU. Secondly, there exists a norm at the EU (i.e. the international level)
into which policy-makers could potentially be socialised, thus ex post facto jus-
tifying the theoretical considerations behind Hypothesis 2b. Overall, however,
the triangulation interviews give further support to the evidence produced in
the previous section: the drivers behind development policy towards Latin
25In fact, national officials from other countries also reinforced this notion by stating that because
of British expertise in certain sectors, they were listened to more and had greater legitimacy than
other donor countries.
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America are fundamentally complex and involve the interaction of normative
and rationalist considerations, although rationalist considerations regarding
the realisation of domestic interests tend to carry the day.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have adapted the study’s general explanatory framework
to development policy-making towards Latin America by conceptualising ex-
planatory variables within the framework developed in Chapter 2 in order to
explain development policy activity towards Latin America on behalf of Ger-
many, Britain, and Spain. In order to do so, I analysed the concentration of aid
within the region, as well as Latin America’s general standing vis-à-vis other
areas of the world. I then complemented the results with an analysis of elite
interviews. As suspected in the introduction, the picture is highly complex.
Nonetheless, some general tendencies can be observed.
As was to be expected given the results of previous research, both norm-
ative factors based on a logic of appropriateness and factors driven by a logic
of expected consequences matter. Aid concentration, as expected, is chiefly
driven by domestic political and economic interests, but I also found consider-
able evidence for the impact of domestic as well as international norms. How-
ever, with regard to international rules, it is important to recognise that the
impact of socialisation processes policy-makers have been subject to interacts
with rational adaptation to international rules in order to maintain or achieve
the status of fully-fledged membership in the international donor community.
This is particularly important in the case of Spain, whose aid concentration
within Latin America is the most poverty-oriented out of the three countries
studied. Spain is still a relatively ‘recent’ donor and its policy-makers remain
rather preoccupiedwith being accepted as ‘good’ donors internationally. Over-
all, the impact of the international level depends on domestic factors as well as
on the position of the country under study within the international setting. In
the case of Britain, for instance, a strong national norm has contributed to mak-
ing it influential in the international donor community, a ‘norm-maker’. The
impact of the international level on Britain, in turn, is therefore lower.
In Germany and the UK, there is evidence that poverty orientation matters
more in poorer countries, while interest-based considerations dominate when
allocating aid to the richer countries of Latin America, in line with previous
findings by Tingley (2010). This explains why both countries give some sub-
stantial shares of their aid to some very poor, but also to some of the region’s
rich countries. Indeed, in the UK a strong national norm about the poverty
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orientation of aid has strongly contributed to dismantling the bilateral aid pro-
gramme with Latin America. Interest-based considerations, however, motiv-
ate the UK to continue running a programmewith Brazil as an emerging global
power. Germany on the other hand, due to its somewhat greater interests in the
region, as well as broader conceptions of both the political importance of Latin
American partner countries and the notion of ‘poverty alleviation’, maintains
a broader profile, but the essential pattern is similar to the British one.
Interestingly, I find that the lower policy activity towards Latin America,
as laid out in Chapter 3, the less relevant Latin America-specific considera-
tions are in accounting for policy activity towards the region. This is a factor
that has not, as far as I am aware, been specifically theorised in the literature,
since ‘special relationships’ have traditionally been approached through a ‘co-
lonialism’ variable, which fails to capture the full implications of this finding.
Indeed, such a special relationship seems to make the drivers of development
policy activity more complex and varied, since the specificities of the recipi-
ent region are given greater importance. The driving factors in Germany and
particularly in the UK are thus more reflective of general development policy
considerations than in Spain. Evidently, Spain is a special case with regard to
Latin America. As a formal colonial power, its close ties to the region on all
levels – cultural, historical, economic and political – impact upon its develop-
ment policy towards the region. In particular, Spanish policy-makers find it
very difficult, bordering on impossible, to reduce or withdraw aid from Latin
American countries even if they, like Chile, have reached substantial levels of
economic development that make justifying aid to these countries increasingly
hard. However, within Spain, aid to the region is very much poverty-oriented
as a result of both normative considerations and rational adaptation to interna-
tional rules, in particular to those established in the MDG context. This shows
how the impact of international-level factors is indeed mediated by the do-
mestic context of each individual donor country.
Overall, different motivating factors matter in all three countries under
study, but the ways in which they matter and, in particular, interact among
each other are conditioned by domestic preference constellations – both norm-
ative and rational – that are unique to each country. Therefore, a closer look at
these country-specific interactions through the lens of a small-N case study is
very fruitful in order to go beyond previous quantitative studies’ finding that
different factors matter, by looking at how and why they matter differently in
various contexts.
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6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I discussed the importance of EU membership in the foreign
policy-making of EU countries (see p. 61), and conceptualised a European di-
mension of foreign policy activity towards Latin America (see Section 2.1.2.3, p.
47). Because of the level that integration has reached in the EU, foreign policy-
making is nowadays practically unthinkable without taking into account the
European level and its interaction with national foreign policy. Nevertheless,
as I have shown in Chapter 3, levels of policy activity, that is, the extent to
which the three countries carry out their Latin America policy within the EU
framework vis-à-vis other channels, vary considerably. Table 6.1 recapitulates
this variation.
Table 6.1: fsQCA Index Values European Dimension of Policy Activity to-
wards Latin America
Britain Germany Spain
fsQCA value 0.05 0.42 0.16
This chapter thus focuses on the policies towards Latin America of Ger-
many, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the European context in order to ex-
plain the variation found. Since EU membership is a constant among the three
countries under scrutiny, domestic factors ought to be at its root, so that the lib-
eral framework conceptualised in Chapter 2 should be suitable for analysing
this phenomenon. However, because of the constant bidirectional interaction
between the EU level and the domestic context, the framework has to be adap-
ted in order to explain such variation by focussing on the mechanisms of such
interaction. In this chapter, therefore, I conceptualise an explanatory model for
the interaction between national Latin America policies and the EU’s policy
towards the region that situates itself within the context of this study’s over-
arching theoretical framework. In order to be able to conceptualise the analysis
and derive hypothetical expectations about what interaction should look like, I
employ a framework based on Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993;
1997; 1998). However, I extend this framework through a liberal constructiv-
ist perspective, which allows for the incorporation of ideational aspects into
state behaviour.1 Additionally, I draw on literature that is able to incorporate
the ramifications of actor socialisation and rational adaptation at the European
level, as well as the potential impact of the EU’s institutional framework. In
this sense, the framework takes into account similar explanatory variables as
1As previously mentioned, Koenig-Archibugi (2004: 145, fn 18) points out that liberal construct-
ivism and what Moravcsik calls ideational liberalism (1997: 515) amounts to the same approach.
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those employed in the previous chapter regarding development policy, but ad-
apts them to the EU-domestic interaction context. I then go on to assess this
framework empirically.
Regarding the countries under study, both Germany and the UK should be
particularly instructive, as they are pivotal Member States of the EU with a
great deal of influence on the Union’s policies. Nonetheless, both countries ex-
hibit foreign policy traditions that set set them apart from one another and from
other large EU members such as France. Studies have shown that Germany
has generally been more willing to Europeanise its policies than other Member
States (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005; Wagner 2002; Manners andWhitman 2000).
In the UK, on the other hand, there is a strong tradition of Euroscepticism that
impacts upon all aspects of its interaction with the EU level (Wallace 2005: 55).
At the same time, Spain’s special relationship with Latin America allows it to
punch above its usual weight in the Union when it comes to the EU’s action
towards Latin America, thus promoting it to ‘great power status’ in this par-
ticular area of EU external action. The chapter conceptualising the dependent
variable has resulted in a relatively low fsQCA score for Spain on the European
dimension, as the EU has relatively little importance in Spain’s Latin American
policy compared to a very strong bilateral component, and runs side by side
with Spain’s own Ibero-American Summit process. In this chapter, I seek to
uncover the mechanisms through which the three Member States under study
take their relationship with Latin America to the EU level. Two principal ques-
tions guide the analysis. How doMember States carry out their policy towards
Latin America within the EU framework? Andwhat explains the way in which
national and EU policy towards the region interact?
Again, as expected by the study’s theoretical framework, I find that inter-
action is driven predominantly by domestic interests. Where they are strong,
the three countries under study try to ‘upload’ them to the EU level by at-
tempting to influence the EU’s stance on an issue. Differences in the intensity
of preferences lead to variation in the intensity with which they are pursued,
and the breadth of issues covered by such attempts to ‘upload’. When interests
are weak and it does not cause disadvantages, Member States are prepared to
accept issues defined at the EU level onto their national policy agenda. Addi-
tionally, the institutional distribution of competences between the national and
the EU level also impacts upon the way in which Member States pursue their
Latin America policies. Finally, there is also evidence for the impact of both
national and EU-level norm. However, the various influencing factors interact
differently in the three countries under study, as I will show in the following.
While this study is not able to account for all aspects of the interaction pro-
cesses at work, the depth with which it is able to compare and contrast the
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policies of these three important Member States is able to uncover novel as-
pects of EU-national level interaction in foreign policy-making towards Latin
America that may carry implications for other Member States as well as policy
towards other third regions.
The chapter is structured as follows: I first give a brief historical overview
of how each country’s relationship with Latin America has developed in the
European context. In the next step, I provide a theoretical conceptualisation
of the interaction between national and European Latin America policy and
derive expectations about what interaction should look like. I then move on
to an empirical test of the framework and a detailed discussion of the results.
The final section concludes and embeds the results within this study’s wider
framework.
6.2 National Latin America policies in the EU con-
text
Why should we study foreign policy-making in EU Member States and its in-
teraction with the EU level? Despite several decades of European-level cooper-
ation and institutional reform, Member States still retain very strong national
foreign policies as well as an important influence on EU action in foreign af-
fairs. This applies both to foreign policy in general and policy towards Latin
America in particular. European cooperation in Latin American affairs took
off in the early 1980s when the Member States began working together in or-
der to help resolve the Central American crises (Bodemer 1987: 75). It was
further strengthened by general institutional reforms, such as the Maastricht
Treaty, which turned European Political Cooperation (EPC) in foreign affairs
into the CFSP, and by specific changes such as the founding of a biregional
strategic partnership and the institutionalisation of biannual EU-Latin America
and Caribbean (EU-LAC) summits in 1999. Therefore, there is now a distinct
European dimension to policy-making towards Latin America. Yet national
policies continue to exist and interact with the EU level in different ways and
intensities.
Institutionally, Latin America policy within the EU context is mostly car-
ried out through two advisory bodies of the Council, AMLAT and COLAT, al-
though commercial issues fall within the realm of the Trade Policy Committee
(prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, known as the Article 133 Committee). AMLAT
and the Trade Policy Committee are Working Groups of the Council, involving
national officials based in Brussels. COLAT is a format in which national offi-
cials from the capitals meet once per month in Brussels to coordinate aspects
6.3. UPLOADING AND DOWNLOADING 231
of policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean.
In order to assess interaction between national Latin America policy and the
EU’s policy towards the region, I first conceptualise different interaction mech-
anisms before moving on to generating expectations about how they might be
explained. In this context, the literature on Europeanisation (e.g. Moumoutzis
2011; Radaelli 2004; Börzel 2002) is helpful, although there has been a vivid dis-
cussion within this literature regarding the nature of Europeanisation and the
ways in which it affects national policy. In this study, I take Europeanisation as
such to be an exogenous process.2 Foreign policy has been ‘Europeanised’ to
some extent because the European level plays a role in national foreign policy-
making. This study is interested in themechanisms throughwhich the national
and the European level interact as a result of Europeanisation, not the process
of Europeanisation as such. This approach corresponds more to the way FPA
literature on EU Member States (Manners 2002; Larsen 2005, 2009) takes the
European level into account, framing it in terms of mechanisms through which
national foreign policies interact with the EU level. Finally, literature on EU for-
eign policy is helpful whenever it deals with the interaction between foreign
policy at the EU level and national policy (e.g. Smith 2000). In order to capture
this interaction, I make use of two concepts, the ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’
of policy to and from the EU level. By explaining why uploading and down-
loading occur the way they do in the three Member States under study, I hope
to be able to shed light on the reasons for the varying levels of policy activity
on the European dimension unearthed in Chapter 3. In the following section, I
conceptualise uploading and downloading, show how they can be empirically
observed, and how relevant they are in German, Spanish and British policy
towards Latin America.
6.3 Conceptualising Uploading and Downloading
Assuming that states have an interest in taking their national policy to the
European level, they might try to ‘upload’ national policy to the EU, as Börzel
argues (2005; 2002). However, Börzel’s argument about uploading is linked
to the idea that uploading a national model or policy to the EU level reduces
the cost of national adaptation to the ‘new’ EU model or policy.3 Moumoutzis,
however, discards the adaptational pressure argument for foreign policy as the
EU does not have legal instruments to pressure the states into national adapta-
2While technically, as the EU’s competences in foreign policy evolve, Europeanisation remains
on-going, policy-makers operate under a given level of Europeanisation at a given point in time.
3The idea is that in countries who successfully upload, there is then a better fit between the EU’s
policy and the extant national policy, necessitating little adaptation and thus keeping adaptational
costs low.
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tion. But there are other instrumental reasons for trying to upload one’s foreign
policy and use the EU strategically, such as privileged access to information
about others’ policy, or being able to ‘punch above the weight’ of one’s na-
tional foreign policy (Moumoutzis 2011: 614ff). In order to avoid the confusion
that has been associated with the term ‘uploading’ (Radaelli 2004; Moumoutzis
2011), I define it as a country’s attempt to take its policy and approach to the
EU level. It is important that uploading does not necessarily have to mean
that a country tries to get the other Member States to adopt the same stance
(‘strong uploading’). For ’uploading’ to be present it is enough that a coun-
try present its national policy or a policy initiative to the other Member States
(‘weak uploading’). Even more importantly, under this definition, uploading
does not entail the passing of competences to the EU level, nor does it need
to. Analogous to the Europeanisation process, the distribution of competences
between the national and European level that results from Europeanisation is
exogenous to my framework. The question is what, given a certain level of
Europeanisation and distribution of competences, motivates state representat-
ives to try and upload national policy.4
The reverse mechanism is ‘downloading’ (Börzel 2002). Again, in order to
avoid confusion about what ‘downloading’ entails, I move away from defin-
itions that might include structural or institutional adaptation to EU rules or
norms, as included in the ‘goodness of fit’ argument (Risse, Cowles and Ca-
poraso 2001: 2f), where adaptation is the result of pressure emanating from the
EU level, and new institutional features are incorporated particularly well by
states who have an institutional set-up similar to the one defined by the EU.
As with ‘uploading’, such adaptation is assumed as given through the process
of Europeanisation. Downloading thus refers to accepting a policy issue on the
national agenda as it emanates from the EU level.
It is important to clarify these issues, because ‘Europeanisation’ has been
defined and approached in different ways. Although my strict definitions of
up- and downloading limit the overall scope of the explanandum, it seems
more fruitful to work with well-defined, albeit narrower concepts, than with
broader concepts that blur “the boundaries between cause and effect, between
dependent and independent variables” (Wong and Hill 2011: 11). Even Wong
and Hill’s own conceptualisation of Europeanisation includes, aside from up-
loading and downloading, a third dimension that incorporates the gradual
convergence of identities and interests (ibid.: 6). Yet the question of whether
this is a driver or an outcome of Europeanisation remains. By exogenising the
4Note that the institutional distribution of competences can still have an impact on whether
states try to upload their policy on a certain issue or not, which is further discussed below. How-
ever, in this study I do not deal with changes in the distribution of competences.
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process of identity change and considering the mechanisms of interaction as a
potential result of this process, a more clear-cut assessment of drivers of such
interaction is possible – while, of course, all this is not to say that studies fo-
cusing on said process are without merit. In this study, however, I opt to treat
uploading and downloading as mechanisms of interaction between national
policy and the EU level that can potentially be explained with reference to the
outcome of policy-makers having been influenced by the EU level as an inde-
pendent variable. I outline this framework below.
One aspect of up- and downloading that is beyond the scope of this study is
the issue of non-geographically specific policy areas, such as migration or hu-
man rights policy in general. It has been suggested, for example, that Spain has
downloaded migration policy from the EU level as a whole (Cornelius 1994:
362). However, downloading a policy as such does not mean that a country
cannot try to influence the way such policy is applied in its relation with a cer-
tain region, which is the case I am concerned with in this study. For example,
to continue with the example of migration policy, the adoption of the so-called
Returns Directive in 2008 and Spanish support for it evoked harsh criticism
from Latin America of both the EU and the Spanish government in particular.5
However, Spain then took a leading role in explaining the implications of the
Directive to its Latin American counterparts (Acosta 2009), thus taking the lead
in EU relations with the region.
6.3.1 Uploading and Downloading: Observable Implications
In order to explain these interaction mechanisms, it is vital to know what up-
loading and downloading look like. Ideally, one would take a look at EU and
national priorities in policy towards Latin America to see to what extent they
are congruent. In practice, observing uploading and downloading is not that
easy, because congruence says nothing about the direction in which the inter-
action went, or whether there was interaction at all – after all, the EU might
come up with similar priorities for other reasons, such as influence from other
Member States or demands from Latin American countries. The challenge is
thus to find a way of including directionality in the interaction.
Regarding uploading, the above definitionmeans that evidence for attempts
to actively influence EU policy towards Latin America by bringing one’s own
policy stance to the EU level and potentially – in the case of strong uploading –
seeking for it to be adopted must be identified. Downloading is more difficult
to observe. It is more passive in orientation, and the direction of the mechan-
5The Directive’s full title is “Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals” (Council of the European
Union/European Parliament 2008).
234 CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY: INTERACTINGWITH THE EU LEVEL
ism is reversed: downloading will be noticed on the national agenda rather
than on the EU level. Downloaded aspects of policy are those that would not
be on the national agenda were it not for the fact that the EU is dealing with
the issue. The ‘requirement’ for downloading to be observed is thus not only
that the EU deal with an issue, but that this issue appear on the national Latin
America policy agenda in a certain fashion (or even at all) because of EU in-
teraction. Unfortunately, unlike in the case of development policy, no readily
comparable numerical data are available to glean an insight into patterns of
uploading and downloading. Therefore, in order to give an indication of up-
loading and downloading in Germany, Spain and the UK, I hand-coded policy
documents from the three countries to assess the strength of the mechanisms.6
Note that these are the same texts that have already been assessed in Chapter 3
to determine the level of Latin America policy activity in the EU context. Using
the same texts and applying a different coding scheme to them ensures coher-
ence of the material used. In the case of Germany, I used the strategy paper for
its relations with the region published in August 2010 (AA 2010). As for UK
policy, Foreign SecretaryWilliamHague’s November 2010 speech outlining the
UK’s relations with Latin America is used (FCO 2010). Finally, for Spain I used
the information that is published on the Spanish Foreign Ministry’s website
on relations with Latin America (MAEC 2010), the section on Latin America
of an article by then Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero outlining
Spain’s foreign policy (Rodríguez Zapatero 2004), and then Foreign Minister
Trinidad Jiménez’s speech before the Senate Committee for Iberoamerican Af-
fairs (Jiménez 2010).7 Of course, like the development aid data used in the pre-
vious chapter, the evidence drawn from the policy documents must be further
investigated and corroborated, which I do through interviews, as well as an
additional in-depth analysis of the policy papers in the light of the theoretical
expectations outlined below.
In order to distinguish processes of uploading and downloading, I further
fine-grained a framework conceptualised by Larsen (2009) for the analysis of
EU Member States’ foreign policy, which I already used to determine the over-
all level of policy activity on the European dimension in Chapter 3. Larsen uses
government documents to asses whether a state conducts its foreign policy
within, partly within, or without the EU (see alsoManners andWhitman 2000),
and whether it is more of a maker or a receiver of EU foreign policy. For the
present analysis, I further adjusted this framework to be able to take account
6See the discussion on hand-coding as the most appropriate option in Chapter 4.
7Recall that although these documents are not strictly the same type, all of them are expressions
of the official government line on policy towards Latin America, having undergone a careful gov-
ernmental writing and editing process. They can therefore be considered comparable articulations
of the motivations of policy towards the region.
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of the mechanisms of interest. I assess the way in which the countries’ policy
towards Latin America interacts with the EU level by coding relevant sen-
tences of the document into “the EU as the only or main actor” (downloading),
“Country and the EU acting together” (two-way process), and “Country acting
through the EU” (uploading). Based on saliency theory (Budge, Robertson and
Hearl 1987: 24),8 I then calculated the percentage of sentences coded into each
category in order to assess the importance of each mechanism. The results of
the document analysis are shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Content analysis of government documents (% of total number of
sentences coded)
Code Britain Germany Spain
EU as main actor 00.00 13.16 31.25




Documents coded: AA 2010; FCO 2010; Rodríguez Zapatero 2004; MAEC 2010;
Jiménez 2010.
In all three countries, there is ample evidence of trying to act ‘through’ the
EU, i.e. of uploading one’s own national policy, as the strongest mechanism of
interaction. Interestingly, however, this is actually the strongest in Germany,
which has a traditionally Europeanist reputation. Furthermore, uploading is
the weakest in Spain. Instead, the Spanish documents are those that provide
the clearest evidence of the EU having its own ‘actorness’, even more so than
Spain and the EU acting in parallel or jointly. It therefore appears that at least
for Spain, Europeanist rhetoric trumps rhetoric on achieving the national in-
terest, while in Germany and the UK, appearing to push the national interest
seems more important. A potential explanation for this phenomenon is sig-
nalling. While Spain has to make an effort to appear particularly ‘Europeanist’
because it is often suspected of ‘using’ the EU to further its national interest.
Germany and Britain, on the other hand, which could be accused of not seeing
their interests through on Latin America and leaving EU-LAC policy to Spain,
have an incentive to portray themselves as particularly assertive.9
8As discussed in Chapter 4, saliency theory argues that the importance of an issue or actor in
a policy area can be gathered from analysing the frequency – i.e. the saliency – with which it is
mentioned in a policy paper.
9Assertiveness and high percentage points in the document analysis must not be confused with
an overall high level of activity in EU policy towards Latin America. A country which is overall
not very active might still be assertive and try hard to upload when it does act.
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6.4 Theoretical Framework and Expectations
In order to explain the pattern uncovered above, I adapt the overarching liberal
theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2 to the EU-national interaction
context by basing this case study’s explanatory framework on Liberal Intergov-
ernmentalism (LI; Moravcsik 1993; 1997; 1998). LI’s two-level perspective of a
liberal domestic policy-making process and ensuing intergovernmental nego-
tiations is particularly helpful for this analysis (Moravcsik 1993: 480). I there-
fore depart from a liberal-utilitarian base line in which state representatives act
based on cost-benefit calculations when trying to up- or download. However,
as laid out in Chapter 2, the framework has to be extended in order to fully cap-
ture the complex interaction process. LI-based independent variables have to
be tested against alternative explanations based on a liberal-constructivist ac-
count in which policy-makers base their decisions to up- or download on con-
siderations of the ‘appropriate thing to do’, predicated upon national norms
of behaviour (Wagner 2002; Checkel 2005). Therefore, this chapter includes
ideational factors as a possible explanation. Furthermore, factors emanating
from the EU level that might influence the interaction between national and
European Latin America policies. Firstly, up- and downloading may not only
depend on cost-benefit calculations, but also on the institutional framework
in which policy-makers operate (Jupille and Caporaso 1999). Secondly, norms
may – potentially in addition to the domestic level – also emanate from the
EU level, where foreign policy-makers continuously interact. This may lead
them to consider up- and downloading in terms of European norms they have
been socialised into (Hooghe 2005; Smith 2000). Of course, however, this has
to be tested against an alternative explanation, according to which adapting
interaction to European rules might be based on cost-benefit calculations –
conforming might bear benefits, or not conforming might impose costs that
lead policy-makers to rationally adapt the interaction between national and
EU policy towards Latin America (Checkel 2005; Slaughter 2004). This leads
to a framework which considers explanatory variables emanating both from
the domestic and the European level, as well as interaction resulting both from
a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness. It is the task of this
chapter to find out whether and when the various factors are at play.
6.4.1 Independent Variables
In the following, I conceptualise the explanatory variables, as well as laying
out their empirical implications. The study is based on confidential semi-
structured interviews with national officials and a set of triangulation inter-
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views with EU officials and Latin American diplomats based in Brussels, as
discussed in Chapter 4. I therefore also give some indications of what evid-
ence for these variables might look like in the interviews carried out for this
study. The complete coding scheme for both national-level and triangulation
interviews can be found in Appendix E.
Domestic interests Within a liberal-utilitarian framework, policy towards La-
tin America is determined at the national level by aggregating the interests of
both state and non-state actors (Moravcsik 1997).10 Depending on the policy
area, national positions are then taken to the EU level intergovernmentally
through the Council, in the case of Latin America policy most frequently the
AMLAT Council Working Group and the COLAT coordination meetings. Even
in trade policy, where the negotiation of agreements is entrusted to the Com-
mission, the negotiation mandate for such agreements is determined through
intergovernmental negotiation. Westphal observes the importance of national
interests in the EU’s foreign policy process towards Latin America, confirm-
ing the utility of a liberal-intergovernmental framework (Westphal 2005b: 354).
Hence, it is reasonable to expect that state representatives may push their na-
tional interests vis-à-vis Latin America to be incorporated in the EU’s policy
through ‘strong uploading’: the stronger national interest in Latin America,
the stronger involvement with the EU should be. One reason for this is that
policy-makers can use the EU to ‘punch above their national weight’ in external
relations, in this case with Latin America (Manners 2002; Larsen 2005). What
they might not be able to achieve on their own could potentially be achieved
by using the collective bargaining power of the EU. This component is partic-
ularly strong in economic affairs, but might also apply to areas like external
democracy promotion in which the EU has a history (Jünemann and Knodt
2007).
Downloading ismore difficult to conceptualise in this context. Whenwould
policy-makers be willing to have their country’s Latin America policy be ‘dic-
tated’ by the EU level? Only policy-makers in states with weaker interests in
some areas might be willing to ‘download’ issues from the European agenda,
and only if they either hope to reap benefits from downloading, such as the
ability to strike a package deal or link the issue to support from the other coun-
try on another issue area (Putnam 1988). Alternatively, downloading might
occur if there are no costs attached to it or they are low enough to make it ac-
ceptable. As in Chapter 5, I would therefore expect domestic interests to be
the most influential in the country with the strongest economic and political
10However, this aggregation is beyond the scope of this study, which looks at the two-level
interaction between these aggregated national policies and the EU level.
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interests in the region, Spain. They should matter less in Germany, and even
less so in Britain. I thus expect the following behaviour:
H1: The stronger a Member State’s interest in an issue vis-à-vis Latin
America, the harder its representatives try to ‘upload’ its policy to the
European level, and the more likely ‘strong uploading’ becomes. As a co-
rollary, only where interest in an issue area is weak might they be willing
to ‘download’ issues from the EU agenda, if this brings other benefits or
costs are very low. ‘Strong uploading’ should matter the most in Spain,
less in Germany and the least in Britain. Britain and Germany should be
more willing to ‘download’ policy.
In order to observe uploading as a consequence of interest in an issue, in the in-
terviews I thus look for references to issues in which the Member State in ques-
tion has a particularly strong interest in connection to references at attempts
to upload the national stance on this issue due to cost-benefit calculations. But
what would the willingness to download an issue in the case of weaker interest
look like from a utility maximising perspective? Here, I look for evidence for
linking different issues or trying to strike package deals.
In this realm, it is particularly important to triangulate the data, as national-
level interviewees have strong incentives to misrepresent their action in vari-
ous directions: to appear more active than they actually are, or to appear less
interest-driven than they actually are. Triangulation interviewees, therefore,
were asked whether any country was particularly keen to take its national
stance to the EU level and what they thought motivated this activity.
Institutional framework It is important to note that interaction between the
national and the EU level in external relations not issue independent. This is
due to the distribution of competences between the EU and theMember States,
that is, on the institutional context within which the state representatives are
moving. The specific institutional properties of the EU that give it suprana-
tional competence over certain policy areas set it apart from other international
contexts and warrant the introduction of the institutional framework as a sep-
arate independent variable. Jupille and Caporaso (1999: 432) point to the ways
in which “institutions structure incentives.” In our case, incentives are struc-
tured by whether an issue area is EU competence or not. In intergovernmental
issue areas, such as foreign policy per se, Member States can still pursue their
own policy and therefore circumvent the EU if they do not achieve their in-
terest. However, in communitarised issues such as commercial policy, national
options are nonexistent or highly limited. States have to accept whatever is de-
cided at the EU level. Therefore, I also expect that uploading is stronger in issue
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areas where competences lie with the EU. State representatives have a greater
incentive to try and see their national interest realised at the EU level, because
it is the only way to achieve it. In relations with Latin America, this is primar-
ily the case in commercial policy. In that sense, the institutional framework – a
factor emanating from the EU level – acts as an intervening variable between
trying to achieve one’s interest and attempting to ‘upload’ one’s policy to the
EU level. Being aware of these institutional constraints is important in order
not to overestimate the importance of uploading in areas such as commercial
relations between the EU and Latin America, where states might try hard to
upload even if interests are relatively weak. Without awareness of the insti-
tutional context, policy activity in the commercial realm, for example, might
otherwise be mistaken as evidence for H1, thus leading to an overestimation
of evidence for the liberal-utilitarian hypothesis. In terms of country specific
expectations, Britain in particular but also Germany should concentrate their
uploading efforts in areas of EU competence – notably trade –, while Span-
ish uploading efforts should be more balanced across policy areas due to the
country’s more pronounced and varied interests in Latin America. In terms of
downloading, on the other hand, areas of EU competence should be where one
might see instances of Spanish downloading when it is unable to upload its
own policy. The second hypothesis is thus as follows:
H2: State representatives try particularly hard to ‘upload’ their na-
tional policy to the EU level in areas that are of EU competence, because
they do not have national means at their disposal to reach their national
interest. Countries with lower material interests (Britain and Germany)
are expected to focus their uploading efforts in these areas, while Spain’s
uploading activity should be more balanced across issues. Downloading
is more likely in these areas than in others for countries with stronger
interests, since they must accept EU decisions.
In the national interviews, I thus look for evidence of uploading that is expli-
citly connected by the interviewees to the EU holding supranational compet-
ences in an area. If there is evidence for H2, interviewees might state that they
try to influence EU commercial negotiations with Latin American countries or
regions through the negotiation mandate, because otherwise they could not
achieve their trade interests vis-à-vis the region. The difference to evidence for
the first hypothesis is that interviewees are expected to make reference to up-
loading because there is no other way to achieve their interest. If they are not
successful, they must accept whatever the EU does on their behalf – they are
‘forced’ to download.
240 CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY: INTERACTINGWITH THE EU LEVEL
In the triangulation interviews, I take evidence for H2 to be present if inter-
view partners connect a country’s uploading attempts to the EU’s institutional
framework, or downloading to there being no other way.
Rational adaptation Although the liberal-utilitarian framework provides a
compelling potential explanation for the interaction between national and EU-
level Latin America policy, it has to be extended in order to provide room for
other possible explanations. For instance, interaction may be affected by stra-
tegic adaptation to EU rules, that is, by factors emanating from the EU level
(Checkel 2005). This is akin to the impact of rational adaptation to interna-
tional rules about development policy conceptualised in Chapter 5. Anne-
Marie Slaughter proposes the notion of governance networks where policy-
makers from different countries – and potentially their supranational coun-
terparts – work together to respond to common global challenges and prob-
lems (Slaughter 2004). Cooperation at the EU-level may therefore lead to the
adherence to certain norms and rules that ease cooperation. It is important
to note that in this framework, policy-makers still respond to a logic of con-
sequences: rule-adherence involves establishing and maintaining a good repu-
tation as a reliable partner in repeated interactions (ibid.: 54f). Thus, in making
Latin America policy, cooperation at the European level may be due to com-
mon interests vis-à-vis Latin America, for example in trade policy. Through
interaction, the network becomes a “conduit for information” about the mem-
bers of the network and “their competence, quality, integrity and professional-
ism” (ibid.: 54), and facilitates the creation of behavioural standards (Majone
2001: 272; see also Slaughter 2004: 54), such as sharing national initiatives at
the EU level (weak uploading) and cooperating with fellow Member States
on issues they have brought forward (downloading). The danger of losing a
good reputation makes it costly for the network members to defect from co-
operation. Similarly, Checkel postulates that strategic calculation that can lead
Member States and their representatives to adapt their behaviour to “the norms
and rules favoured by the international [in this case, European] community”
(Checkel 2005: 809).11
Based on careful calculation and the strategic maximisation of interests,
agents may hence decide that the best option is to adhere to EU-level rules and
norms. Otherwise, the result might be a bad reputation or the loss of a good
one, including being ‘shamed’ by EU partners (Slaughter 2004; Checkel 2005:
808). Given that in foreign policy cooperation there are few material incentives
to reward cooperative partners, social rewards and punishments are those that
matter. Therefore, it could be expected that instead of socialisation mechan-
11See Chapter 2, p. 64, for the use of ‘rational/behavioural adaptation’ versus ‘socialisation’.
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isms based on a constructivist logic, rational behavioural adaptation may be
at work. But how, then, could one explain national variation in support for
EU-level policy-making vis-à-vis Latin America? Essentially, for a state not to
care enough about its reputation to adhere to the aforementioned behavioural
standard of cooperating with fellow Member States, it must have a more at-
tractive alternative bearing benefits that outweigh the costs of not adhering
to EU-level rules and norms. This would occur if the country can achieve its
interest vis-à-vis Latin America on its own, rather than by cooperating with
its European partners, if its interests in Latin America are much stronger than
those of the other Member States and therefore they are unwilling to take ac-
tion at all – these two might hold for Spain –, or if it already has a reputation
as a ‘bad European’ and therefore there are no costs attached to losing a good
one – this might hold for the UK with its traditional reputation as an “awk-
ward partner”, to use a phrase coined by Stephen George (1994). Germany,
on the other hand, has traditionally had a reputation for being keen to keep a
reputation as a ‘good European’, although this has recently become subject to
debate (e.g. Bulmer and Paterson 2010). For the purposes of this study, I am
going to assume as a point of departure that rational adaptation is relatively
‘sticky’ and continues to be a goal of German policy-makers, but this investig-
ation will contribute to elucidating whether this is really the case. Therefore, I
hypothesise that:
H3: The stronger aMember State’s desire to maintain a reputation and
status as a ‘good partner’ with fellow representatives in the EU network,
the more it adapts rationally to EU rules. This can lead to a willingness to
download policy towards Latin America that is important to other Mem-
ber States. It may also lead to (weak) uploading to be seen as cooperative.
Such rational adaptation is expected to be the strongest for Germany, less
strong for Spain, and the least strong for the UK.
Observable implications of strategic adaptation are explanations of uploading
and downloading advanced by the interviewees motivated with a desire to be
seen as ‘good partners’ by their counterparts from the other Member States.
Similarly, in the triangulation interviews, evidence for reputation-seeking and
status-maintaining behaviour as motivating factors for downloading and
(weak) uploading is sought. Especially in the interviews with EU officials, the
question of reputation and status should become evident if it is a relevant mo-
tivating factor: statements to the effect of ‘if a representative is unwilling to
deal with an issue back home, country will get a bad reputation with the oth-
ers’ are indicative of support for H3.
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Domestic socialisation However, the interaction between national foreign
policy towards Latin America and the EU level may also be influenced by
policy-makers having been been socialised into certain norms at the national
level, in line with liberal constructivist thinking. I therefore also test hypo-
theses emphasising a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989; 2004). It
is possible to conceptualise both uploading and downloading as resulting from
the socialisation of national policy-makers. Checkel (2005: 804) defines social-
isation as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given
community.” As Beyers (2010: 911) points out, the term ’socialisation’ suffers
from product-process ambiguity in that it refers to a process of socialising act-
ors as well as an outcome of actors having been socialised. In the context of
this study, I am concerned with socialisation as an independent variable: the
question is whether policy-makers have been socialised and whether this im-
pacts up- and downloading. Based on this framework, state representatives
might take their national policy initiatives to the European level or download
policies onto the national agenda because it is what they consider ‘appropriate’
behaviour.
Indeed, Koenig-Archibugi (2004) finds that willingness to go the European
route is variable across Member States. Domestic socialisation may thus play a
role. Therefore, I test the potential impact of domestic socialisation, which em-
anates from the domestic level just as liberal utilitarian factors do, and has been
shown to be important in previous socialisation research (e.g. Hooghe 2005;
Beyers 2005). In the context of this study, what matters is the foreign policy-
making culture into which domestic actors are potentially socialised (Rittber-
ger 2001a: 112f; Katzenstein 1996: 20f), and the “reality constructs” within a
state that determine its representatives’ behaviour (Wagner 2002: 178). In a lib-
eral constructivist framework where norms emanate from the domestic level,
the ‘given community’ into whose norms policy-makers are socialised is the
domestic network of foreign policy-makers, specifically those concerned with
Latin America policy-making. Therefore, I term this variable ‘domestic social-
isation’, in line with Hooghe (2005).
Aswith preferences as conceptualisedwithin the utilitymaximisation frame-
work, there is room for cross-national variation in domestic socialisation. Pre-
vious research by Beyers (2005) on policy-making in Council Working Groups
(CWGs) is particularly relevant for this study. Firstly, EU policy towards Latin
America is also largely made in a CWG setting. Secondly, Beyers shows vari-
ation among the Member States regarding what they consider appropriate for
EU-level policy-making (Beyers 2005: 931f). It is important to note that he
deals with ‘supranationalist’ versus ‘intergovernmentalist’ attitudes in Mem-
ber States, a dichotomy somewhat less relevant for the case of Latin Amer-
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ica policy. External relations remain intergovernmental to a relatively large
degree. However, it is not too far-fetched to assume that more ’supranation-
alist’ states are generally more favourable of EU-level approaches, while ’in-
tergovernmentalist’ states are less so. Based on the 1996 Elite Eurobarometer
Survey, Beyers finds that policy-makers in the founding members of the EU
– including Germany – are more favourably inclined towards supranational
policy-making. Policy-makers from countries belonging to the 1986 enlarge-
ment round – including Spain – are still more in favour of supranational than
intergovernmental approaches. Finally, the first enlargement batch – including
the UK – is more intergovernmentalist than supranationalist in orientation.12
Of course, the relevant Elite Eurobarometer is now 15 years old and things may
have changed, given for example the recent ‘Eurosceptic turn’ in German gov-
ernmental rhetoric (see e.g. Bulmer and Paterson 2010). What are the implica-
tions of these findings for up- and downloading? Policy-makers socialised in
a pro-European domestic culture may, firstly, be more willing to download is-
sues from the European level because they assume this to be appropriate action
– even if no benefits accrue to their country from downloading. Secondly, they
may upload for different reasons than policy-makers deciding based on utility
maximisation or socialised into a Eurosceptic way of policy-making: upload-
ing by nationally socialised pro-EU actors would be motivated by a domestic
norm of sharing national initiatives with the EU level. A policy-maker social-
ised in a Eurosceptic national environment, on the other hand, would be more
reticent regarding both up- and downloading, as well as seeing policy-making
towards Latin America as primarily bilateral. Of course, the outcome of social-
isation depends on the kind of norm policy-makers are socialised into. With
German and Spanish policy-makers, it is likely that the norm in question is a
pro-European one, as both countries have been shown to have a rather pro-
EU outlook (e.g. Wagner 2002; Barbé 2011). However, in Spain it is possible
that pro-EU norms coincide with the strong interests the country has in Latin
America, making their pertinence somewhat less likely. Moreover, there has
been shown to be a tension between pro-European norms and belonging to
the Iberoamerican Community (del Arenal 2009b: 32). In the UK, on the other
hand, such socialisation is much less likely due to the country’s scepticism over
Europe (Whitehead forthcoming 2012; Wagner 2002). In fact, there might even
be potential for ‘negative socialisation’ here, although research has shown that
UK foreign policy is more ‘Europeanised’ than policy-makers are willing to
admit (Bulmer and Burch 2009; Forster 2000), so that assuming such ‘negative
12For further discussions of national attitudes towards the EU supporting these findings, see e.g.
Baklanoff (1996); Katzenstein (1996); Manners andWhitman (2000); Wagner (2002); Wallace (2005).
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socialisation’ may be a step too far.13 Therefore, I hypothesise:
H4: The more ‘Europeanist’ the norms into which state representat-
ives have been socialised at the domestic level, the more they are willing to
download issues onto the national agenda although they might not accrue
benefits from this action or even incur costs. Similarly, the more likely
uploading is to be motivated with a domestic norm of sharing national
initiatives, even if it brings no additional benefits. Such behaviour is ex-
pected to be stronger in Germany and Spain than in the UK.
Note that the previous considerations on the operationalisation of socialisa-
tion (see p. 58) apply also to domestic socialisation in the European context,
which is difficult to observe (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1062). As in Chapter 5,
by providing a clear conceptualisation of socialisation’s status as an exogenous
independent variable for the purposes of this study, as well as by triangulating
interviews from different sources, I provide a plausible account of the factors at
work. One of socialisation’s main issues is that it is not easy to discern from em-
pirical evidencewhether an actor is socialised or strategic (Flockhart 2004: 377),
because the resulting behaviour might be the same. Especially across coun-
tries, it is hard to compare data because policy-makers’ training and careers
differ, so their socialisation processes may be different (Beyers 2010: 918). By
considering the process per se exogenous to my study, this problem is slightly
mitigated: what matters is not how, but whether policy-makers are nation-
ally socialised and whether this has an impact on how they interact with the
EU-level when making policy towards Latin America. However, recognising a
‘nationally socialised’ policy-maker is also not trivial. In the interviews, I look
for evidence indicating that uploading or downloading was indeed motivated
by a nationally-based norm and a logic of appropriateness. It therefore is im-
portant that there be no reference to rational calculation of costs and benefits.
The key difference between uploading motivated by liberal utilitarian factors
and uploading motivated by liberal constructivist factors is that ‘constructivist
uploading’ does not happen with the goal of achieving something, but simply
because it is considered the ‘right thing to do’ in one’s country.
Even so, it is still difficult to ascertain whether such interaction is really
due to a nationally accepted norm or because actors are being strategic. There-
fore, EU-level interviewees were asked whether there were countries they per-
ceived as bona fide Europeanists or Eurosceptics – because they were generally
particularly willing to share national initiatives or accept EU-level initiatives
or because they were generally reticent about EU-level action vis-à-vis Latin
13What is more, the UK has traditionally been in favour of EU foreign policy cooperation, as
long as it remained intergovernmental (e.g. Whitehead forthcoming 2012; Forster 2000)
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America.
European Socialisation Scholars have, however, also argued that state rep-
resentatives can be socialised through processes at the EU level through a
change in beliefs about how foreign policy should be conducted, and as a res-
ult change their practices of foreign policy-making. They thus consider so-
cialisation through repeated interaction (Checkel 2005: 806), meaning that con-
stant cooperation at the EU level changes the way national policy-makers work
together and conceptualise foreign policy-making (e.g. Hooghe 2005; Beyers
2005; Smith 2000). In this case, the ’given community’ into which actors are so-
cialised is the EU-level network of policy-makers involved in external relations
with Latin America. Sociological institutionalism thus endows institutions and
their norms, rules and practices with the ability to socialise national actors into
a certain type of behaviour (Lewis 2003: 99). In line with Beyers (2010), I term
this variable ‘European socialisation’. Since all three countries under study
are by now long-standing members of the EU, their representatives are more
or less equally exposed to such stimuli, for example through constant interac-
tion in the AMLAT and COLAT groups,14 as well as communication, such as
through the COREU communication system.15 A ‘European reflex’ might thus
have become established.
The implications of such socialisation for the interaction between national
and EU policies towards Latin America, conceptualised in terms of up- and
downloading, are as follows. Actors who have been socialised at the EU level
may download issues onto their national agenda motivated by a European
norm that stipulates the appropriateness of dealing with issues at the EU level,
although they might not derive benefits from this, or incur costs from hand-
ling an issue they might not otherwise deal with. Similarly, they may upload
policy initiatives by communicating their national initiatives,16 thus opening
them up to comments (positive and negative) or participation from their EU
partners – even if this is not advantageous from a utilitarian perspective. There
is no ulterior interest behind such action, it is simply thought ‘the right thing
to do’. National foreign policy-makers are socialised at the European level if
they have a sense of belonging to a European-level community, (Checkel 2005:
14See Chapter 127, p. 146 for considerations on the impact of the length of time policy-makers
have spent in such fora. I assume that as long as policy-makers are exposed to EU-level policy-
making towards Latin America – which the interviewees were – there is good reason to believe
that European socialisation may have an impact, since according to Beyers (2010: 915f), it occurs
relatively fast.
15COREU (Correspondence Européenne) is a network for EU Member States and the Commission
to communicate on foreign policy matters. “COREUs” are similar to faxes, but are confidential and
encrypted.
16See Smith (2004: 745) on the ‘communication reflex’.
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802) in which there is an atmosphere of cooperation and trust. As discussed
in Chapter 5, state representatives may reach this logic of action via "Type II"
or ‘thick’, as well as "Type I" or ‘thin’ socialisation (Checkel 2005: 804).17 As
previously discussed in Chapter 5 regarding the effects of international social-
isation, for the purposes of this investigation it does not matter through which
route actors have arrived at socialisation. What matters is that they arrive there
and can be considered ‘socialised’.
As in the previous chapter, I assume that international – here, EU – level
norms interact with potentially pre-existing national norms. It is not unreas-
onable to conceptualise the relationship as mutually reinforcing or sequential,
with one influencing the other. Previous work on socialisation (e.g. Hooghe
2005; Beyers 2005) has indeed shown national factors to have a strong impact,
with European socialisation exerting only limited effects. As was the case for
domestic socialisation regarding domestic norms of development policy in the
previous chapter, I therefore hypothesise that domestic socialisation may in
fact mediate the effect of European socialisation: the stronger national norms
about the positive aspects of EU foreign policy, the more receptive to European
socialisation national policy-makers are likely to be. In line with the expecta-
tions of H4, I thus expect EU-level socialisation to fall on more fruitful ground
in Germany and Spain than in the UK. Again, however, in Spain there is a
potential clash between socialisation dynamics and material interests in Latin
America that might reduce the impact of European socialisation.
H5: State representatives who have been socialised at the European
level are more willing to download issues onto the national agenda al-
though they might not accrue benefits from this action or even incur costs,
motivated by European norms. State representatives who have been social-
ised into a pro-European domestic policy-making culture at the national
level are more likely to also be subject to European socialisation. I expect
European socialisation to exert a stronger influence in Germany and Spain
than in the UK.
In the interviews with national foreign policy-makers, I take support for H5
as given if interviewees refer to European norms or belonging to an EU-level
community as the motivation for interaction between the national and the EU
level, only if it comes without any reference to cost-benefit calculations. Any
such reference would immediately lead to the rejection of the socialisation hy-
pothesis (Moumoutzis 2011: 622). Again, however, evidence from national-
level interviews has to be cross-validated, which is why in the triangulation
17Note that Type I socialisation is different from rational adaptation (see above; Checkel 2005:
804). With rational adaptation, there is an incentive to adhere to EU-level rules, although theymight
be social rather than material. Type I socialisation occurs absent such an incentive.
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interviews, especially with EU officials, I asked how cooperation among the
Member States worked and what it was based on. Answers referring to a sense
of community and mutual trust, as well as working together on the basis of
common norms can be taken as evidence for European socialisation, while a
connection with ‘achieving a common interest’ or other types of cost-benefit
calculations invalidates the European socialisation hypothesis.
6.4.2 Further considerations and overview
In Figure 6.1 I give a visual overview of the framework conceptualised above.
It is situated within the overall FPA framework and the theoretical conceptu-
alisation discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1, p. 64). It is important
to note that the independent variables conceptualised here point at the policy-
makers rather than the up- and downloading mechanisms directly, because the
policy-maker level is where decisions are taken.
For the sake of completeness, note that other channels of action than policy-
making in the EU context and bilateral action must be borne in mind, since
Member States may also take their policy to fora outside the EU. For example,
they may chose to work with the Organisation of American States (OAS), the
United Nations, or with other, non-EU states such as the US. Spain even has
its own multilateral forum for interaction with Latin America, the Iberoamer-
ican Process. The researcher must be aware of this in order not to fall into
the trap of overestimating Europe’s importance. However, for the purposes of
this study, only the mechanisms of interaction with the European level are of
interest. They are shown in Figure 6.1.
In Table 6.3, I summarise the independent variables and their hypothesised
effects on up- and downloading.
In addition to the independent variables, an interaction between H4 and
H5 is expected, in that the representatives of a country that have been nation-
ally socialised into a pro-EU culture are also more likely to adhere to EU-level
norms as a result of European socialisation.
6.5 Policy towards Latin America in the European
Context – Historical Developments
In this section, I assess the historical evolution of policy towards Latin Amer-
ica in a European context. To this end, developments since the beginning of
membership in the European integration process for each country are briefly
analysed. I discuss howmembership in the European project influenced policy
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Figure 6.1: Explanatory Framework of Interaction between National and EU
Policy towards Latin America
towards Latin America increasingly as integration progressed. Additionally,
the entry of Spain (and Portugal) into the European Community in 1986 gave
the relationship a new quality. Finally, it reached its current form with the cre-
ation of a “Strategic Partnership” between the two regions in 1999.
6.5.1 Germany: From advocate to bystander?18
Immediately after World War II, the task was to re-build relations with Latin
America. Economic ties were quickly re-established, and when the young Fed-
eral Republic gained full sovereignty in foreign affairs, political and diplomatic
relations were equally quick to return (von Gleich 1968: 27, 30). However,
Germany’s policy towards the region remained cautious as Latin America was
seen as a domain of the United States (Mols and Wagner 1994: 58), and for-
eign policy focused on relations with its Western neighbours and the security
relationship with the US (Grabendorff 1993: 43). In this sense, Germany’s West
European focus can be seen as an early, indirect impact of the European con-
text upon its policy towards Latin America: it kept the Federal Republic busy
with other issues, such as the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Com-
18Amore detailed analysis of the historical development Germany’s role within EU-Latin Amer-
ican relations can be found in Trueb (forthcoming 2012b).
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The first direct impact came through the foundation of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) in 1957 and the ensuing efforts to create a common
market, including a common external tariff and a common commercial policy.
Additionally, Latin American products became subject to competition from the
former colonies of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands for which a special
preference system was established under the Treaty of Rome.19 The estab-
19To date, Central and South America remain excluded from the European Partnership Agree-
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lishment of the ACP system was particularly important for German relations
with Latin America since Germany was the region’s biggest commercial part-
ner within the EEC (von Gleich 1968: 50). Germany tried to establish con-
ditions more favourable to Latin America, but did not succeed (von Gleich
1968: 51). Similarly, the introduction of the CAP and its protectionist effects
have strained European-Latin American relations ever since the 1960s (Krum-
wiede and Nolte 1994: 7). Germany has sought to reduce this strain but has
not entirely managed. The banana regime is a particularly clear example of
Germany’s difficulties in ‘uploading’ its preferences in this regard. The Treaty
of Rome included the so-called ‘banana protocol’, which granted Germany a
special right to import bananas duty-free (for an overview of the initial situ-
ation, see Sutton 1997: 9). But this was an exception to the preference system
rather than making German practice the rule for the entire EEC. Therefore, the
establishment of the common market has limited Germany’s policy towards
Latin America by reducing its autonomy in trade affairs (Grabendorff 1993: 75;
Bürvenich 1995: 7; Hofmeister 1999: 11). Germany’s inability to break up the
preference system in favour of its own interests – which even coincided in this
case with those of Latin America – shows that even a large Member State such
as Germany may be unable to ‘upload’ its preferences when they clash with
others’ strong interests. The fact that Germany tries, however, is indicative of
evidence for Hypothesis 1.
Germany’s political relations with Latin America came to be affected by the
European context with the establishment of EPC in 1970. However, already
in 1963 (and again in 1967), the Federal Government called for the intensi-
fication of political dialogue, the recognition of Latin America and Europe as
a ‘community of fate’ with a common Western heritage, as well as the de-
sire to create greater European solidarity with Latin America and increased
coordination and intensification of Latin America policy within the Western
European Union (WEU), the EC, the OECD, and NATO (Kullack-Ublick 1987:
48). It is important to note that this happened even before EPC came into being.
European thinking was therefore a feature of German policy-making towards
Latin America very early on. This supports Hypothesis 4, that is, a willingness
to Europeanise policy based on a domestic political culture or norm facilitating
such Europeanisation. Yet the EC and the WEU were not the only organisa-
tions deemed important in this context. NATO and the OECD also played
a role. Germany had European priorities, but its pursuit of Latin American
policy beyond bilateral relations was not limited to Europe.
Although Latin America was not a policy priority for Germany, it played
ments (EPAs) that have been concludedwith the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states under
the Cotonou Agreement.
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the role of advocate for Latin America at the European level, particularly re-
garding economic issues (von Gleich 1968: v; 51). If even for its advocate,
Latin America was not a priority, then how could it be a priority at the EEC
itself? What is more, since EPC was not designed specifically as an instru-
ment geared towards Latin America, this early Europeanisation of policy is
again best seen as a side effect. Within the EPC framework, there was little
concern with Latin America during the 1970s. Only in the case of Nicaragua
could positions be galvanised into a common position in 1979 (Bodemer 1987:
75). Indeed, the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s were prob-
ably the finest hour of Germany’s advocacy for Latin America within Europe.
During the Central American crisis, Germany was instrumental in shaping the
EC’s approach. In particular, the conference of foreign ministers at San José in
1984, involving the EC and Commission representatives, Spain and Portugal,
the Central American states and the Contadora countries, was pushed within
Europe by Germany’s Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Henze 1991:
20). There were several reasons for this commitment. On the one hand, ac-
cording to Krumwiede and Nolte (1994: 3), it was motivated by the desire to
maintain US strategic attention and resources in Europe and to prevent Ger-
many’s most important ally from making a costly mistake. In this case, the EC
offered Germany a possibility to be present in Central America without risking
a head-to-head disagreement with the US (Karthaus 1994: 86). Member States
can thus use the European level to ‘hide behind’ when this is convenient, in-
dicative of the strategic use of the European level where it furthers a country’s
interest.
German policy-makers, on the other hand, were keen to point out their
normative motivations: offering assistance to Central America in overcoming
its problems through democracy and regional cooperation (Genscher 1987a:
61f). Genscher (ibid.: 62) saw developments as follows: “I am convinced that
with this initiative a new page has been opened in the history of Europe and
Latin America. [. . . ] Germany has taken on a special role in this.” While this
might be an overstatement, the San José Conference did initiate biregional co-
operation, which still marks EU-Latin American relations today – a success-
ful example of ‘uploading’ a German initiative to the EC. Biregional cooper-
ation, in turn, was supported by German policy-makers who believed that
Europe could serve as an example of the positive effects of regional integra-
tion (Kullack-Ublick 1987; Genscher 1987a).
Increased attention was drawn to Latin America not only by the Central
American crisis, however, but also by the Falklands/Malvinas conflict between
the UK and Argentina, and by the debt crisis that shook the region during
the 1980s. The case of the Falklands is a demonstration of the extent to which
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Germany was convinced by the early 1980s that “any demonstration of interest
in Latin America should be European, rather than purely German, in nature”
(Grabendorff 1993: 75).20 Although supporting the British position bore costs
for Germany, given its ties with Argentina and its conviction that all diplomatic
means should be exhausted before taking recourse to military power, it did
support trying to find a common European position on the issue (Benecke et al.
1993; Grabendorff 1993).
The accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 introduced a new element
into the equation. Since the beginning of integration, Germany had seen its
role within Europe as that of an advocate – low-key, but advocate nonethe-
less – of Latin America within the EC (von Gleich 1968; Meyer-Landrut 1987;
AA 1987). However, this began to change in the 1980s, when German policy-
makers placed great expectations for EC-Latin American relations in the acces-
sion of Spain and Portugal to the Community. Their presence, it was hoped,
would give Latin American issues a greater weight in the foreign policy pro-
cess of the Community (Genscher 1987a; 1987b; Möllemann 1987). A further
element in this equation was the end of the Cold War and the ensuing reunific-
ation of Germany. Its costs and consequences, it was feared, would cause Ger-
many to ‘turn East’, leaving it with fewer resources to expend in Latin Amer-
ica (Grabendorff 1993). Similarly, Mols and Wagner (1994: 72) note that in the
1990s, overall European presence in Latin America stagnated as the EU became
increasingly inward-focused. Internal change, manifested in the Maastricht
Treaty, seemed to absorb its energy. However, as the restructuring of the EU
deepened integration, the potential for joint external action also increased
through the creation of the CFSP and its instruments. To some extent, the ac-
cession of Spain and Portugal, reunification, and further European integration
created a new understanding of the European dimension in German policy to-
wards Latin America. Turning away from Germany as a ‘creator’ of EC policy
towards the region, the new understanding was that perhaps some aspects
were better dealt with at the European level where Spain and Portugal were
the chief protagonists.
This overview shows the growing importance of the European level in Ger-
man policy towards Latin America as integration proceeded. As new policy
areas were affected, the European level also became more relevant to Ger-
man Latin America policy in those areas. Overall, this brief historical analysis
shows some support for both the rationalism-based and the constructivism-
based hypotheses. Generally, Germany has been both willing and able to up-
load its preferences to the EU level regarding Latin America. Nevertheless,
where these preferences have clashed with the strong interests of other Mem-
20The Falklands conflict will be further discussed in the section dealing with the UK.
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ber States, as is the case with the banana regime, uploading has not succeeded
to the same degree.
6.5.2 The United Kingdom – The “Indirect Uploader”21
The UK joined the EC in 1973, coinciding with the establishment of EPC (Ak-
tipis and Oliver 2011). Although it had previously had a very active policy
towards Latin America, even becoming a sort of ‘informal imperial power’
after the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the 19th century (Miller 2005: 33),
the importance of Latin America in British foreign policy had been steadily de-
clining for decades. Thus, by the time the UK joined the EC, Latin America
held very little importance for it, except for its former colonies and remaining
overseas territories in the Caribbean. Rather than actively influencing Europe’s
emerging policy towards Latin America, Britain thus became an “indirect up-
loader” (Whitehead forthcoming 2012). It successfully managed to include its
former imperial possessions in the ACP countries under the preference system
previously created at the insistence of the Netherlands, France, and Belgium.
This affected the Community’s relations with Latin America negatively – the
region remained outside the system, while the addition of further countries
after British accession increased the number of developing countries that had
better access to the EC market than Latin America.
Additionally, closer ties with Europe further reduced the UK’s available re-
sources for relations with the non-European and non-Commonwealth world.
British foreign policywas largely focused on relationswith the Commonwealth,
the US, and increasingly Europe (Bulmer-Thomas 1989b; Fawcett and Posada-
Carbó 1996, 198). In particular, the ‘special relationship’ with the US condi-
tioned the UK’s approach to Latin America in the Cold War period. As Hart
puts the UK’s position on Latin America during the 1970s: “where Washing-
ton led, London followed” (Hart 1988: 11). Bodemer (1987: 86) goes as far
as calling the UK a ‘brakeman’ for establishing a distinct Western European
role in the Central American conflict due to its regard for the US, stating that
within the EC, the British government was perhaps most firmly opposed to
a clearly defined EC opinion on Central America. Nevertheless, however,
the Thatcher government eventually participated – albeit grudgingly – in the
San José process, and opposed the US naval blockade of Nicaragua’s harbours
(O’Shaughnessy 1988: 8; Whitehead forthcoming 2012). The case of the UK’s
participation in the San José process as a reluctant follower rather than a ini-
tiator places it in the position of a ‘downloader’ on this issue and has several
implications for our hypotheses. On the one hand, it is supportive ofHypothesis
21This term is introduced by Whitehead (forthcoming 2012).
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1: on issues where Britain does not have a strong interest, it may ‘download’
policy from the European level. At the same time, if it considers a different
forum or state – in this case, the US – more adequate as a partner for dealing
with an issue, it will try to forego the European level. In this particular case,
the UK even tried to hamper a distinct EC role in the Central American conflict
because of its consideration that this should be better dealt with by the US.
However, themost remarkable episode about the UK’s Latin America policy
acquiring a European dimension ismost certainly the Falklands/Malvinas Con-
flict. After the Argentinean military had invaded the islands, which are a UK
overseas territory, the EC quickly condemned the invasion. The UK then asked
its fellow EC members to ban Argentinean imports. Within two weeks of the
invasion, the import ban was put into place, an unusually speedy move on the
part of the Community (Edwards 1984: 295). In this sense, the episode sup-
ports Hypothesis 1 in that the UK tried – and managed – to ‘upload’ a position
to the European level on an issue in which it had a very strong interest. Nev-
ertheless, Geoffrey Edwards also points out that the UK used its connections
to the US, which had good relations with the Argentine military government,
and the UN, in order to see its position through. In fact, he points to the im-
portance of the UN in first rallying the other EC Member States around the
UK’s position. Later, however, the EC was relegated to an almost secondary
position, which may have contributed to the embargo falling apart as Italy
and Ireland withdrew their support. Nevertheless, eight of the ten Member
States remained faithful to the embargo, causing Edwards to state that “the
continued imposition of sanctions in the middle of an armed conflict by even
eight member states cannot, in Community terms, be considered unsuccess-
ful” (ibid.: 296). Thus, in the event, the UK’s action is indicative of its strong
interest in the issue. At the same time, it used the EU to ‘punch above its own
weight’: while a unilateral embargo on Argentina would not have hurt much
given the UK’s low trade volumewith the country, an embargo imposed by the
EC Ten had amuch stronger impact (ibid.: 300). LisaMartin argues that the UK
managed to ‘upload’ its position through skilfully linking Community support
for the UK position in the Falklands Conflict to other issues such as an ongoing
dispute over the EEC budget and the CAP. Through this move, the UK could
garner the support of Member States who were reluctant to impose sanctions
on Argentina (Martin 1992: 153). The Falklands issue can still unexpectedly
erupt onto the European agenda today, as evidenced at the 2010 EU-LAC Sum-
mit in Madrid (Reuters 2010), where Argentine President Cristina Fernández
de Kirchner called for opening negotiations on the Falklands. What is import-
ant to note here is that the Falklands are listed as a UK overseas territory in
the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on
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the Functioning of the European Union, so that the entire EU recognises them
as a UK possession (Council of the European Union 2010: 334). However, as
the Falklands Conflict subsided, so did the UK’s peak in involvement with the
European-Latin American relationship. As such, this episode illustrates that
Britain can take a strong and active role in shaping the relationship when it
wants to do so. Yet, most of the time, the UK chose to remain aloof, using the EU
to advance its interests when these were strong and it was convenient.
In general, however, its Euroscepticism and its low interest in the Latin
American region has prevented the UK from playing a very strong role in the
European-Latin American relationship. It has managed to influence European
Latin America policy mainly as an ‘indirect uploader’ of its foreign policy pri-
orities which lie clearly outside Latin America – with the notable exception of
the Falklands Conflict. Since the UK’s direct involvement in European Latin
America policy-making is quite low, it therefore makes sense to take into ac-
count more strongly the indirect impact on European-Latin American relations
of UK action within the Union. The most important example is that of in-
corporating its own former colonies into the ACP preference system, which
deteriorated the terms of trade between the Community and Latin America
by increasing the number of countries with advantageous access to the Com-
mon Market that Latin America did not enjoy. This pattern is a familiar one:
as I showed in the previous chapter, the UK’s lack of a bilateral development
policy towards Latin America means that what influences its relationship with
the region is mostly the indirect impact of more general attitudes.
6.5.3 Spain – Driver or Brakeman?
Spain was the last of the three countries under study to access the European
Communities in 1986. Along with Portugal, the accession of Latin America’s
former colonial powers to the EC, it was expected by many – not least other EC
member states, as we have seen above –, would mark a new era for European-
Latin American relations. In fact, Spain’s accession treaty contained a declar-
ation by Spain articulating its particular interest in Latin America and a de-
claration by the Member States on the need to intensify European-Latin Amer-
ican relations (European Communities 1985; Member States of the European
Communities 1985). The declaration stated the need to avoid disturbances to
Spain’s imports from Latin America and the intent to find “permanent solu-
tions in the context of the generalized system preferences, when next revised,
or of othermechanisms existingwithin the Community” (European Communit-
ies 1985). From the beginning, Spain thus tried to ‘upload’ its preferences to
the European level and use the Communities as a means to achieve its Latin
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American interests. Ideally, of course, Spain would have liked to extend the
preferences given to the other countries’ former colonies under the ACP system
to Latin America. However, to date, Spain has failed in this intent (Kennedy
2000: 119), similar to Germany, who had tried the same prior to Spanish ac-
cession (see above). Only in the case of Haiti (a former French colony) and the
Dominican Republic (which had changed hands between Spain and France in
terms of colonial rule) did it succeed in achieving their inclusion into the Lomé
Convention in 1987 (Baklanoff 1996: 115). Why?
According to Hypothesis 1, Spain with its strong, especially economic, in-
terests in facilitating trade with Latin America, should have tried hard to ‘up-
load’ its preferences in this respect. Like Germany, however, Spain came across
very strong interests of the other EC Member States whose former colonies
were under the ACP system, and who had an interest in maintaining the status
quo. The Spanish case thus supports the finding of the German case that when
countering the strong interests of other Member States, it is difficult for a coun-
try to ‘upload’ its own interests, even if it is a large Member State or has par-
ticular interests in one area. Additionally, Spain, as a late accessor to the Com-
munities and recently democratised state, was placed in the position of rule-
taker rather than rule-maker (Baklanoff 1996: 112). The then Socialist govern-
ment saw Europeanisation and modernisation in tandem (Kennedy 2000: 106),
so that Spain, at least initially, was concerned to bring Spanish policy in line
with European norms, similar to the ‘rule taker role’ it takes in international
development policy (cf. Chapter 5). One sectoral area of foreign policy that re-
flects this is development policy, which, since Spain’s accession, began orient-
ing itself along the European model (Varela Parache and Varela Parache 2003).
This may be indicative of support forHypotheses 3, 4, or 5, which predict adapt-
ation through socialisation or rational adaptation mechanisms. There are most
likely elements of all three, and it will be interesting to see how this plays out in
today’s policy-making. On the one hand, Spanish Socialist policy-makers op-
erated in a national policy culture of seeing Europeanisation as a good thing.
On the other hand, their socialisation through interaction at the European level
may indeed have been enhanced by this belief, thus supporting the idea that
national norms can provide fruitful ground for European-level norms to fall
on. However, it may also have been spurred on by the desire to establish a
good reputation and ‘serious member’ status with fellow EU partners. This
contrasts sharply with the case of the UK, which joined the ECwith amuch less
receptive attitude. In the case of trade preferences for Latin America, however,
the positive Spanish attitude did not help it establish its preferences against the
strong interests of others.
However, the first time Spain actively came in touch with the European
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policy towards Latin America actually preceded its accession. Spain and Por-
tugal as accession candidates with strong Latin American ties, it was decided,
should participate in the first ministerial summit at San José to help solve the
Central American crisis (Torreblanca 2001). In the words of Bodemer (1987:
81), the Socialist government of Spain was the the one displaying the greatest
commitment to solving the crisis. Along with Willy Brandt from Germany and
Bruno Kreisky from Austria, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González was one
of the most active members of the Socialist International promoting a stronger
role of Europe in foreign policy in general and in Central America in particular
(ibid.: 94).
Spain took the Council Presidency twice during the period between acces-
sion and the mid-1990s: in 1989 and in 1995. Both Presidency terms were char-
acterised by attempts at intensifying European relations with Spain’s primary
zones of extra-European foreign policy interest: the Mediterranean and Latin
America (Torreblanca 2001; Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla and Figueroa 2008).
According to Kennedy, however, Spain was more successful at ‘uploading’ its
policy interest vis-à-vis the Mediterranean than Latin America (Kennedy 2000:
120ff). The region was closer to the interests of other EU members with South-
ern borders, such as France. Meanwhile, Spain remained relatively lonely in
its search for important Member States with an interest in Latin America that
went beyond declaratory statements. Nevertheless, Spanish accession to the
EC and in particular the Spanish Council Presidencies did give European-Latin
American relations greater impetus: at least now there was an EC Member
State who kept on insisting in the importance of relations with the region, even
if this was not always successful. The literature is divided between a more
pessimistic assessment along the lines of Kennedy (2000) and more positive
assessments along the lines of Torreblanca (2001), who writes that “Spanish
membership of the EU has added to or substantially strengthened the Latin
American and Mediterranean profile of European foreign policy”. Given the
relatively low level from which European-Latin American relations departed
when Spain joined the Communities, Torreblanca is probably right on a relat-
ive basis, while Kennedy’s assessment more closely matches absolute achieve-
ments.
However, already in 1981, Spain began diversifying its relations with Latin
America within the framework of the Iberoamerican Community of Nations
(Baklanoff 1996: 105). The idea was born in the context of the preparations
for the 500-year celebrations of the discovery of Latin America, and the first
Iberoamerican Conference took place in 1983. At that time, it was mainly Span-
ish diplomacy that propelled the emerging community in the style of the Com-
monwealth or the Francophonie forward (del Arenal 2004: 5f). The Iberoamer-
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ican Community was substantially fortified in 1991 with the beginning of an-
nual Iberoamerican Summits. Through the Iberoamerican Community, Spain
began to establish an additional and uniquemechanism throughwhich it could
channel its policy towards Latin America. As the Iberoamerican Summit pro-
cess became institutionalised, the Iberoamerican component of Spain’s foreign
policy began exhibiting signs of tension with the country’s European commit-
ments (ibid.: 9). The creation of the Iberoamerican Community and the Sum-
mit process established a possibility for Spain to circumvent the EU. As dis-
cussed above, the European option has not always been able to fulfil Spain’s
needs as a mechanism for channeling Latin America policy. Thus, the develop-
ment of the Iberoamerican Community as a parallel mechanism has to be seen
as an alternative option, where the EU’s distribution of competences allows.
The establishment of the Iberoamerican Community and its tension with the
EU framework are manifestations of a more general identity conflict between
Spain’s European and Iberoamerican identities, as Esther Barbé (2009: 144f)
points out. We will see below how these tensions play out in today’s Spanish
policy vis-à-vis Latin America.
Overall, since its accession to the EC in 1986, Spain has very actively tried
to ‘upload’ its special relationship with Latin America to the European level.
However, success has been limited due to other Member States’ strong interest
in preserving the status quo, particularly in trade preferences, and their lack
of genuine interest in closer relations with the region. At the same time, mem-
bership created an additional way to channel policy towards Latin America.
Simultaneously, though, increased involvement in the EC and deepened in-
tegration created a new, ‘European’ dimension to Spanish foreign policy that
took away some of the attention Spainmight otherwise have dedicated to Latin
America. The establishment of the Iberoamerican Community of Nations and
the corresponding summit process, however, created a parallel policy channel
for Spanish relations with the region, which Spain could use as an alternative
to both purely bilateral and European-Latin American relations.
6.6 Testing the Framework
The mechanisms under study in this context, uploading and downloading, are
difficult to observe directly due to the confidentiality of the policy-making pro-
cess. The actual motivations for decision-making remain in the dark, unless
policy-makers are asked, which is what this study will do through interviews.
In the following section, I provide and discuss the results of the analysis of
interviews with policy-makers at the national level. These were triangulated
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with interviews carried out with EU officials involved with Latin America at
the Council and the EEAS (which includes staff previously based in both the
Commission and the Council who have been moved as a result of the Lisbon
Treaty’s institutional innovations), as well as with Latin American diplomats
based in Brussels, who are also involved in EU-Latin American affairs. In order
to disentangle the different mechanisms at work, the interviews were hand-
coded according to the codebook provided in Appendix E. In Table 6.4, I list
the observable implications searched for in both the national-level and the tri-
angulation interviews, before proceeding to a discussion of the results in the
following section. The implications listed refer to the ways in which national
policy-makers justify their actions and decisions during the interviews, and
to how the triangulation interviewees related their national counterparts’ de-
cisions.
6.6.1 National-Level Interviews
Table 6.5 shows the results of the interview analysis. Regarding the levels of
evidence for each hypothesis, the evidence for the impact of domestic interests
is somewhat surprising, as I expected it to be the strongest in Spain, which
has the most important economic and political interests in Latin America. Yet
it is actually the strongest in the UK, whose interests are the weakest out of
the three countries under study. Indeed, the order of importance is exactly
reversed: the less important domestic interests are, the stronger their influence
on the interaction between national policy towards Latin America and the EU
level.
In the case of institutional constraints, I did expect a fairly strong influence
on the UK’s up- and downloading activity, which is confirmed by evidence.
However, I expected the distribution of consequences between the national and
the EU level to have less of an impact in Spain than in Germany. The factors
underlying these results will be outlined below based on the interview data. In
the case of rational adaptation to EU-level rules I did indeed expect a stronger
impact in Germany and Spain than in the UK, so that the distribution of evid-
ence conforms to the hypothesis. For the impact of domestic socialisation into
pro-EU norms, I hypothesised a stronger impact on policy in Germany and
Spain than in the UK, which is confirmed, although I hypothesised the impact
to be stronger in Germany than in Spain due to Spain’s stronger interests in
the region that might to some extent ‘trump’ such norms. Finally, the distri-
bution of evidence for EU-level socialisation turns out to be as expected: the
strongest in Germany, followed by Spain, and little – indeed, no – evidence
in the UK. What cannot clearly be confirmed is the hypothesised connection
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Table 6.4: Summary of Independent Variables and Implications for Inter-
views
Independent Variable Implications for Interviews
H1: Domestic interests National-level interviewees refer to
national interests to motivate
uploading.
Triangulation interviewees refer to
domestic interests of Member State
in question motivating its action.
H2: Institutional
Constraints
National-level interviewees refer to
making particular efforts at
uploading in connection with issue
areas of EU competence.
Triangulation interviewees refer to
Member State in question making
particular efforts at uploading in
areas of EU consequence.
H3: Rational
adaptation
National-level interviewees refer to
EU-level incentives (keeping or
achieving a good reputation) to
justify uploading and
downloading.
Triangulation interviewees refer to
Member State in question being




National-level interviewees refer to
national norms in justifying
uploading and downloading.
Triangulation interviewees refer to
national norms in Member State in
question that lead it to share




National-level interviewees refer to
European norms in justifying
uploading and downloading.
Triangulation interviewees refer to
European norms in Member State
in question that lead it to share
national initiatives and incorporate
EU-level initiatives.
between pro-EU domestic norms and the impact of European socialisation:
domestic socialisation appears to be stronger in Spain than in Germany, but
European socialisation is lower, but in the UK there is no evidence for either.
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In order to disentangle the evidence further and assess the interaction be-
tween the different independent variables, these results require an in-depth
discussion to which I now turn.
Germany
Domestic Interests In Germany, evidence for H1 is the second strongest out
of the three countries under study. This is in line with the recent literature’s
findings that Germany is becomingmore assertive in the EU as awhole, includ-
ing foreign policy (e.g. Daehnhardt 2011; Bulmer and Paterson 2010). Policy to-
wards Latin America is not an exception to the general tendency that Germany
tends to upload rather than download (Daehnhardt 2011: 53). Disentangling
H1 further shows that there is also some evidence that countries are willing to
accept others’ strong interest on their national agenda in areas of lesser interest,
or if downloading in an area of lesser interest brings some other benefit, such
as the possibility to strike a package deal.
Both national level and triangulation interviews indicate that Germany’s
actions are mostly commercially driven, although Germany has an opinion on
most policy issues vis-à-vis Latin America. This is reflective of its own relat-
ively low-key but broad national approach towards the region.
Institutional Constraints Interestingly, and in contrast to what Hypothesis 2
postulated, evidence for stronger uploading in areas of EU competence is the
weakest in Germany out of the three countries under study, although it does
play a role. German diplomats are well aware that in some issue areas they
have to go through the EU, especially in trade. Nevertheless, this does not seem
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to be an issue for much concern for them, since uploading is not that frequently
explicitly connected with the EU’s distribution of competences. This is in line
with the evidence discussed in the previous paragraph that Germany has an
opinion on most issues which it expresses at EU level. Theoretical expectations
led to the hypothesis that institutional constraints should be relatively more
important in causing countries with overall lower interests in Latin America
to try to upload, because they have lower incentives to do so in other areas.
However, at least for the case of Germany this connection does not seem to
hold. In the next section, I discuss the reasons for this behaviour.
Rational Adaptation to European Rules There is some evidence for rational
adaptation to European foreign policy-making towards Latin America in the
German case, but it is much weaker than evidence for H1. At the same time
however, it is stronger than evidence for H2, showing that there is evidently
some concern about Germany’s status and reputation with the other EUMem-
ber States. Interestingly, interviews reveal that unlike I hypothesised given
the literature discussed above (Checkel 2005; Slaughter 2004), this is not about
being seen as a ‘good European citizen’. Instead, it is about being “an active
player”, making sure that Germany shows an opinion, and about showing a
profile, as one interviewee put it, “to live up to our significance as the largest
country in the EU”. This is one explanation for Germany’s aforementioned
tendency to have an opinion on everything and “making it heard” as one in-
terviewee said. German policy-makers want to show their country’s relevance
in all areas, even those where its interests are not that important, as is the case
of policy towards Latin America.
Domestic Socialisation In Germany, evidence for domestic socialisation af-
fecting the interaction between national policy towards Latin America and the
EU level is relatively weak, but it does influence policy-makers. As previous
studies (Wagner 2002; Rittberger 2001a) led me to predict, there is reason to
believe that national foreign policy-makers are socialised into a pro-European
domestic policy culture. As one interviewee phrased it, “in principle, we Ger-
mans are generally just a bit more Europe-friendly than some of the others.” In-
terestingly, however, some evidence to the contrary is also beginning to appear.
A ‘new Euroscepticism’ that has characterised recent German action at the EU
level, particularly during the Euro crisis, seems to have pervaded all areas of
policy-making in the European context. Asked about the further Europeanisa-
tion of policy towards Latin America, one interviewee explained that “today
we are at a level where [...] one says, this is all going in the direction [of fur-
ther Europeanisation], perhaps we even have to look where there are particular
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national interests that have to be guarded or taken into account.”
European Socialisation German officials also seem to have soaked up some
European-level norms, although evidence is relativelyweak. The relevant norm
concerns what behaviour is appropriate at the EU level. One interviewee jus-
tified the participation of less interested Member States in EU-Latin American
affairs as follows: “It just belongs to the EU [...] that there are of courseMember
States who are more interested in Latin America, that’s completely clear. And
the others then participate... because they also participate.” There thus seems
to be a shared norm of participation in European-level policy-making even if
interests are low. However, the same interviewee also connected participation
in areas of lower interest to the possibility to establish issue linkages (H1), so
that there may be a double motivation at play. Additionally, German policy-
makers appear to have internalised a norm of information sharing at the EU
level: “And that’s a thought one sometimes has, whether that’s a thing that
one should Europeanise. Not Europeanise, but at least inform the partners?
[...] So that’s at least the first step, that you inform partners about the things
you are doing”, as one interviewee put it.
Britain
Domestic Interests Interestingly, and contrary to what Hypothesis 1 postu-
lated, the ‘domestic interest’ variable is not the strongest in Spain, as one might
have expected given the distribution of material interests in Latin America, but
in the UK, whose interests are relatively low. This does, however, chime with
the very pragmatic or even sceptical view the UK is said to have towards the
EU (Forster 2000: 45). Indeed, Aktipis and Oliver (2011: 87) point out, UK
policy-makers have been rather influential in driving some aspects of the EU’s
external dimension, such as the development of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP), but have been reluctant to admit to this within its do-
mestic setting characterised by a deep suspicion of all things European. My
finding, therefore, that the UK tries very hard to influence the EU level in areas
of interest is in line with this discussion of UK behaviour in Europe rather than,
as expected by Hypothesis 1, interests in Latin America.
Institutional Constraints While in Germany, the hypothesised connection
between lower interests and relatively stronger evidence for the impact of in-
stitutional constraints was not found, the relationship does hold up for the
UK. British policy-makers do seem to try harder to upload their stance in issue
areas that are of Union competence than in others because of this distribution of
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competences. The UK indeed concentrates most of its uploading efforts in the
commercial realm. Relatively to other issue areas, the UK is thus very active
in commercial policy towards Latin America, which is also recognised by in-
terviewees from the other two countries and the triangulation interviews. One
British interviewee stated that “we hold the Commission to account, particu-
larly in the negotiations which are Commission competence [...] like the trade
negotiations [...] to ensure that issues which are important to us, like for ex-
ample spirits [...], we get the right deal on them, otherwise we won’t agree to
the agreement anyway.”
Rational Adaptation to European Rules I did not find evidence for rational
adaptation to European rules in the interviews with British policy-makers. In
Hypothesis 3, I postulated that I expected the impact of this independent vari-
able to be the weakest in Britain, because there is little evidence in the study
of the UK’s role within the EU for a British concern with being seen as a ‘good
European’, but rather a tradition as an “awkward partner” (George 1994) in
Europe. Therefore, the fact that I do not find evidence for such behaviour driv-
ing Britain’s policy activity towards Latin America in the EU context is not
surprising and chimes with previous findings of the UK’s rather pragmatic
and even critical approach to the EU and its external action (e.g. Wagner 2002;
Forster 2000): it can be useful, but when it is not, there is no need to make a
particular effort just in order to garner a good reputation.
Of course, there is a fairly obvious caveat which has also been discussed
in Chapter 4: a lack of evidence does not necessarily mean that the postulated
variable is not influential at all. However, it is possible to say with relative
confidence that rational adaptation to European-level rules in order to be seen
as a good European partner is not one of the key motivating factors of British
policy activity towards Latin America in the European context.
Domestic Socialisation As with rational adaptation to European rules, I do
not find evidence for domestic socialisation into pro-European norms that
might account for British policy activity towards Latin America within the EU
context. This is in line with Hypothesis 4, although it must be noted that the
above-mentioned caveat regarding the absence of evidence also applies here.
However, it must also be noted that I do not find evidence for socialisation into
domestic Eurosceptic norms either. Unlike their German counterparts, who des-
pite the large impact of interest-based factors do hold domestic norms about
how they should interact with EU foreign policy, British foreign policy-makers
seem to see their interaction with the European level in a very pragmatic fash-
ion.
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European Socialisation Finally, there is no evidence in the interviews for
European-level socialisation of British policy-makers. Indeed, I had hypothes-
ised that it would not be an important variable for the UK, as I also did not
expect there to be a strong pro-European domestic norm with which European
socialisation could resonate. Therefore, the finding seems to confirm the mech-
anism theorised in Hypothesis 5.
Spain
Domestic Interests As in the previous chapter, I find that in Spain, the drivers
behind policy activity are more varied than a purely utilitarian-liberal frame-
work would lead one to expect. Although domestic interests constitute the
independent variable for which I find most support, their relative importance
is lower in Spain than in the other two countries and the relationship between
the strength of interests and their impact hypothesised inH1 could not directly
be confirmed. Despite its important economic and political interests in Latin
America, other factors also, by and large, have a stronger influence than they
do in the other two countries.
Not surprisingly however, evidence for downloading in areas of lesser in-
terest is the lowest in Spain, which takes a very strong interest in all aspects
of EU policy towards Latin America, as both national officials and those in-
terviewed for triangulation were keen to point out. Indeed, those statements
indicating that Spain is willing to download aspects of EU policy where its in-
terests are weaker concern issues not related to Latin America policy, such as
relations with other regions. One interviewee pointed out that “obviously, we
cannot cover the whole world with the volume and intensity we would like.
In that sense, [...] we have to establish a balance between our bilateral designa-
tion of presence [...] and the construction of a European external action policy
that covers us.” In the same vein, statements affirming Spain’s drive to upload
policy to the European agenda often concerned the EU’s relations with Latin
America as a whole. Spanish diplomats see it as their job to make sure that Latin
America is not forgotten. Part of this is motivated by economic and political
interest, but part of it is also motivated by other factors. This finding consti-
tutes an interesting difference between Spain on the one hand and Germany
and Britain on the other. While in Spain, the concern is with policy towards
Latin America in general and interest-driven up- and downloading is weighted
against policy towards other regions, in Germany and Spain the weighting
concerns issue areaswithin policy towards Latin America.
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Institutional Constraints Evidence for uploading due to institutional con-
straints is the second strongest in Spain. Spain has important commercial in-
terests in Latin America, but it is also a very major donor in the region, and
with the EU operating a very active own development policy, Spain tries to
ensure that Latin America receives its share, in line with its general pro-Latin
American lobbying at the European level. However, as I hypothesised, insti-
tutional constraints can occasionally force Spain to take the EU’s autonomous
action into account, which may even lead to downloading. Especially in de-
velopment policy, interviewees insisted that Spain very much takes the EU’s
development policy activities in the region under consideration when draw-
ing up its own programmes in order to ensure complementarity. This is in line
with Hypothesis 2 and explains the co-occurrence in the interviews of issues of
EU competence with downloading in the Spanish case.
Rational Adaptation to European Rules There is some evidence for H3 in the
case of Spain, but it is rather weak. It appears that Spanish policy-makers are to
some extent concerned about Spain’s reputation as a ‘bridge’ between Europe
and Latin America. However, the reason why evidence for H3 in the sense of
this leading to weak uploading is fairly thin is that in the Spanish case, wanting
to keep a good reputation and status with the other Member States actually
leads to strong uploading. Rather than simply sharing national initiative to
facilitate information flows and be seen as a cooperative partner, Spain often
tries to take an active influence on the EU’s Latin America policy to show other
Member States that it matters. As one interviewee said, “our links with the
region also give us importance within the EU.” In a sense, thus, Spain uses
Latin America to punch above its own weight within the EU and to improve
its standing as an important EU Member State. In none of the three countries
did I find evidence for rational adaptation leading to a greater willingness to
download.
Domestic Socialisation In Spain, domestic socialisation does matter, but not
strictly in the way I theorised in Hypothesis 4. Rather than merely being social-
ised into a pro-EU norm, foreign policy-makers are nationally socialised into a
pro-Latin American norm, in the sense that they have a special cultural and his-
torical connection with Latin America that makes them particularly respons-
ible, which leads them to share their initiatives at the EU level and push Latin
American affairs there. However, it goes beyond weak uploading to strong
uploading. In fact, there exists a national norm in Spain of being both part of
Europe and what Spanish policy-makers call ‘Iberoamerica’. Spanish policy-
makers thus tend to see themselves as a part of Iberoamerica within Europe.
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Therefore, while evidence for H4 as it was initially postulated is weak, evidence
for domestic socialisation as such is stronger than the results in Table 6.5 indic-
ate. Yet it leads to a different interaction mechanism, because it is a different
type of socialisation than was initially considered.
European Socialisation In Spain, evidence for European socialisation is equal-
ly weak as for rational adaptation. In contrast to their German counterparts
who have been socialised into a norm of cooperative behaviour at the EU level,
Spanish foreign policy-makers appear to have adopted a norm of shared re-
sponsibilities at the EU level for different external regions on behalf of different
member states: “Every European country understands that it bears respons-
ibility in the external deployment of the European Union. [...] Our role in
Europe [...] is to contribute this relationship, our acquis with Latin America, to
the European environment.” In that sense, like with strong uploading, Spanish
policy-makers want to facilitate their entire relationship with Latin America to
contribute their share to the success of the EU’s external relations. As I dis-
cuss below, this is intimately linked to processes of domestic socialisation in
the Spanish policy-making community.
Further Considerations
While there is evidence that the mechanisms postulated in the theoretical part
of this study are indeed at work and intertwined in interesting ways in the
three countries under study, there are reasons to contemplate a re-conceptuali-
sation or the introduction of additional mechanisms that arise from the evid-
ence presented above. Regarding evidence for the link between national and
European-level norms, reconsiderations akin to those contemplated in Chapter
5 are useful. The idea that EU-level norms resonate more easily in countries
with similar domestic norms seems to ring true, but the picture is more com-
plex. German policy-makers appear to be nationally socialised into pro-Euro-
pean attitudes. They are also receptive to EU-level behavioural norms. Spanish
policy-makers, on the other hand, are socialised into a national norm of carry-
ing a special responsibility for Latin America, and they perceive a European
norm of shared responsibilities among Member States for different regions.
This could mean two things. Firstly, different EU-level norms may resonate
differently with policy-makers depending on their domestic socialisation. Al-
ternatively, policy-makers may project their domestic socialisation to the EU-
level and, so to speak, ‘invent’ an EU norm for themselves that resonates with
their domestic socialisation.
Moreover, an interesting feature of German interaction with the EU level
268 CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY: INTERACTINGWITH THE EU LEVEL
in Latin America policy that has not been theorised previously, is what I term
‘re-uploading’: policy-makers first download issues from the EU-LAC agenda,
but then try to influence them actively. This mechanism shows very nicely in
the area of migration, where Germany does not have strong interests vis-à-vis
Latin America, thus downloading it onto the national Latin America policy
agenda, but nevertheless plays a very active role in shaping the EU’s policy.22
Another example is the creation of a EU-Latin America and Caribbean Found-
ation, of which Germany was initially sceptical, but then proposed its own
candidature to accommodate its headquarters once it could no longer impede
its creation.23 ‘Re-uploading’ may occur for two reasons. On the one hand,
it can result from Latin America not being much of a policy priority for Ger-
many, but policy-makers wanting to play an active role in EU-LAC policy both
for reasons of appropriateness and wanting to maintain one’s status as a vital
player in the EU. On the other hand, there is overall evidence that countries
cannot always attain their preferences in the face of another Member State’s
strong position. Not even Spain can always upload its policy if other Member
States have strong feelings about an issue that runs counter to the Spanish po-
sition. Policy-makers may thus have to download policy if another country has
successfully imposed its position or blocked a decision. In that case, it would
make sense for a country to then try and influence future aspects of this policy
area to at least get the best deal possible out of a less-than-ideal situation.
Similarly, interviewees emphasise the importance of compromise. In partic-
ular, if aMember State has a particularly strong interest in achieving something
vis-à-vis Latin America, it may have to accept an imperfect result rather than no
deal at all. Germany, for instance, has a very strong interest in concluding as-
sociation agreements with the countries and regions of Latin America and the
Caribbean because of its trade dependence. However, other countries such as
France have strong reservations about such agreements because of their strong
agricultural basis. Therefore, in order to reach a negotiationmandate and come
closer to an agreement, Germany may have to make some concessions. One in-
terviewee, regarding the association agreements, stated that “we want that, we
[...] can handle making some compromises that might not be super great for
us.” Thus, strong domestic interests may in some cases even lead to download-
ing if this leads to a compromise.
22Note, however, that migration is important in Germany’s interaction with other areas of the
world and that Germany thus has a strong interest in influencing migration policy overall. This is
one potential explanation for ‘re-uploading’ in the case of migration policy towards Latin America.
23The EU-LAC Foundation has the remit of improving relations between the two regions and
making them more visible and continuous. The question of where it should be located was the
issue of heated debate among the Member States, as Paris, Milan and Hamburg presented candid-
atures backed by their own government. In January 2011, it was decided to set up the headquarters
in Hamburg, with the other two candidates receiving the status of privileged partners (AA 2011b).
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In general, policy-makers from all three countries very much see policy
towards Latin America at the European level as a way to add value to their
own relationships with the region. There are issues, such as human rights and
democracy promotion, where Member State officials see a common European
interest that can better be reached through the EU than bilaterally, thus punch-
ing above one’s individual weight. Whenever Member States see eye to eye
on an issue vis-à-vis Latin America, essentially, EU-level action is considered
adequate, even if compromises have to be made along the way.
For Britain and Spain – interestingly not for the German case – there is
also some evidence for willingness to ‘outsource’ aspects of policy to the EU
level. In the British case, interviewees contemplated the idea of representation
in parts of Latin America where the UK has been scaling down or closing em-
bassies,24 although this downsizing is now being reconsidered (FCO 2011: 2).
In Spain, as I have discussed regarding H1, policy-makers feel that while they
are very strong in Latin America, Spain does not have the capacity to cover all
areas of the world in the same fashion. Therefore, in other regions, it may be
willing to delegate some of this representation the the EU. Even within policy
towards Latin America, however, some Spanish officials see potential for the
EU to cover at least some areas like consular representation, freeing up capa-
cities to do more bilaterally in areas of interest, such as cultural policy. This
amounts to a desire to not just up- or download policy, but to actually out-
source some less vital obligations or aspects where policy-makers feel their ca-
pacities are being stretched. However, it must be noted that this was motivated
by expected benefits (more bilateral capacity), not norms. Furthermore, inter-
viewees made clear that this was interesting mainly for more administrative
areas and had to respond to Spanish as well as other Member States’ interests.
6.6.2 Triangulation Interviews
In order to strengthen the validity of the national-level interview data, I con-
ducted interviews with officials responsible for Latin America at the EU level,
as well as with Latin American diplomats based in Brussels who are involved
with EU-Latin American relations. The main value of these interviews lies in
the fact that they should be able to compensate some of the potential ‘stra-
tegicness’ inherent in the national-level interviews, as discussed in Chapter
4. For example, while national officials may be wont to obscure the impact of
EU-level norms and rules – be it through rational adaptation or because of con-
siderations of appropriateness – this should not be the case with EU officials
24This has been the case especially in Central America, where several British embassies have
been closed.
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and Latin American diplomats. If anything, there is a danger that EU officials
may overstate their impact, either because they genuinely overestimate it, or
because they deliberately set out to do so in order to justify their work or con-
firm its importance. However, they may find it difficult to assess the impact of
EU-level factors in the Member States because they cannot observe it directly.
Finally, the interviews with Latin American diplomats present, to some extent,
the most ‘neutral’ view on the interaction between national and EU policy to-
wards Latin America, because they are not directly involved in this interaction
process. However, their statements are limited by other factors. Firstly, they
are diplomats and, as such, must not burn any bridges with either the EU in-
stitutions or the Member States, because they rely on good relations with both.
They can thus be expected to be, in the true sense of the word, diplomatic
about the issue and are unlikely to be overly critical. Secondly, precisely be-
cause they are not directly involved in the interaction between national and
European policy-making towards their home region, they are also likely to be
the least informative, because they are watching the process from the sidelines
and know less about its intricacies than national or European officials.
Therefore, the results presented in Table 6.6 must be taken with the ap-
propriate caution and with a view to the limitations discussed above and in
Chapter 4. Nevertheless, the combination of three different interview sources
– national, European, and Latin American – should provide a suitably com-
plete picture that allows conclusions about the interaction between national
and EU policy towards Latin America to be drawn. Note also that the evid-
ence presented for the countries in Table 6.6 only includes instances where the
impact of one of the independent variables conceptualised in this study was
explicitly tied to the respective country in question by the interviewees. There
was further, not country-specific evidence for the above hypotheses, however.
I thus report the overall evidence for the hypotheses in a separate column.
Domestic Interests
Evidence for Hypothesis 1 from the triangulation interviews is rather similar
to evidence from the national-level interviews, although Spain is perceived as
more in line with Hypothesis 1 than its policy-makers are perhaps willing to
admit. Domestic interests are by far the most important motivating factor in
interaction between national and EU-level policy towards Latin America, even
more so than it appeared in the national-level interviews. It is equally strong in
the UK and Spain. It seems that what is seen – or at least portrayed – by Span-
ish officials as a promotion of Latin American affairs not necessarily driven by
interests is perceived that way by others, in particular by European officials.
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Table 6.6: Results of triangulation interview analysis (% of total evidence for
hypotheses)
Variable Germany UK Spain Total
Domestic
Interests
85.71 92.00 92.00 76.60
Institutional
Constraints




0.00 0.00 8.00 5.67
Domestic
Socialisation
9.52 4.00 0.00 2.84
European
Socialisation
0.00 0.00 0.00 9.22
Several interviewees mentioned Spain’s use of the EU level as highly tactical,
with Spain occasionally being reluctant to subscribe to European declarations
that could harm its interests in the region. Interestingly, Latin American offi-
cials take a different view on this, as they see Germany and the UK as more
interest-driven than Spain. However, Spain’s vital role in the EU’s Latin Amer-
ican policy is not always perceived positively by Latin American diplomats
either. Several of them mentioned that having only Spain as an interlocutor
on the European side is problematic and that Latin Americans are interested in
dialogue with the other Member States as well. There is thus an overall feeling
that Spain’s influence on the EU’s Latin America policy, while vital for keeping
it active, is a two-sided affair.
Overall, all three Member States try to influence the EU level in areas that
are of particularly high importance to them. However, Spanish Latin Amer-
ica policy is perceived as built on the broadest basis out of the three. “With
Spain”, one Latin American diplomat stated, “you notice [...] that it does not
just look for the defence of its economic interests in Latin America, of which
there are a lot, but that there is also a clear cultural and political call.” Ger-
many and the UK, in turn, are seen as mostly motivated by their economic
interests. The UK, indeed, is mentioned as being particular selective in its en-
gagement, only becoming active when it has an interest in a certain issue –
mostly trade, but also security issues such as drugs and terrorism, as already
indicated by interviewees at the national level. This is almost certainly what
is behind the above-mentioned phenomenon of Latin Americans perceiving
Spain as less interest-oriented. Spain constantly pushes for increased attention
to Latin America, which Latin American diplomats value highly. Spain tries
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to upload its national policy on all fronts – indeed, I did not find evidence for
‘downloading in areas of lesser interest’ for Spain at all. The other two coun-
tries, however, are happy to download some issues when their level of interest
is lower. This is more so in the UK, where 28% of the evidence for H1 is due to
downloading, than in Germany, where only 19% of evidence for H1 is the res-
ult of downloading in areas of lesser interest. This explains some of the UK’s
low activity on the overall EU dimension: its overall interest in Latin America
is low, so it does see the need to be as active and is happy to go along with the
rest of the EU as long as its economic interests are not harmed.
Institutional Constraints
As in the national-level interviews, I also find evidence for the impact of insti-
tutional constraints in the triangulation interviews, except for the case of Spain.
Given Spain’s attempts to upload its policy in all issue areas, this is perhaps not
that surprising: I theorised in Hypothesis 2 that Spain’s attempts at uploading
should be more balanced than those of Germany and Britain, as its interests in
all policy issues vis-à-vis Latin America were stronger. Indeed, from the per-
spective of EU officials, for Spain’s attempts at strong uploading it does not
matter whether an area is of EU competence or not. Germany and the UK, on
the other hand, are indeed perceived to be stronger ‘uploaders’ in areas of EU
competence than in others, and interviewees do link this to the distribution
of competences. British policy-makers are perceived to be particularly aware
of the EU’s distribution of competences, in line with the comparatively strong
evidence for Hypothesis 2 in the British national-level interviews. As one trian-
gulation interviewee remarked, “I think the British receive exact instructions
during their training onwhat is EU competence andwhat is not. And they play
the game.” In other words, British policy-makers try to influence the EU level
when there is no other way to proceed, while they stay out of it where they do
not have to go through the EU level. As seen above, as long as their interests
are not touched, however, they are also happy to let EU policy run its course
and go along with it. However, it is important to note that for both Britain
and Germany, the distribution of competences coincides with their main area
of interest; economic affairs. For both EU and Latin American officials, it may
thus be difficult to disentangle the reasons for their attempts at strong upload-
ing. Yet Latin American triangulation interviewees were very much conscious
that even in areas of EU competence, the Member States play a vital role: one
diplomat, for instance, explained that even though competence in commercial
affairs was with the EU, the Member States were the important working part-
ners because they are the ones who approve the negotiation mandate for the
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Commission.
Rational Adaptation to EU Rules
In the triangulation interviews, I find no evidence for rational adaptation as
a motivating factor for weak uploading or downloading for either Britain or
Germany. In the case of Britain, this is in line with the national-level interviews
that did not display evidence of rational adaptation either, and in line with the
expectations of Hypothesis 3. For the case of Germany, where there was indeed
evidence for rational adaptation as a result of keeping up its reputation as a
highly active Member State in all policy areas, this finding is a bit more sur-
prising. Nonetheless, note that there was overall evidence for Hypothesis 3 in
the triangulation interviews (see column “Total” in Table 6.6), although it was
not very strong – this more general evidence may very well apply to Germany,
although it was not explicitly mentioned. Indeed, evidence for rational adapt-
ation at the national level is likely to be fairly unproblematic. Interviewees do
not have a strategic incentive to misrepresent their rational adaptation to EU
rules, unless it is in the context of downloading, where they might not admit
to it (and indeed no evidence for it was found). Spain, on the other hand, is
mentioned by interviewees in the context of rational adaptation to EU rules.
As one EU official put it:
“Imagine a big country, like Spain, which has a special relationship
with Latin America. [...] [I]n principle one could imagine that such
a country doesn’t need, really, to rely entirely on the European in-
stitutions. That’s a wrong perception. [...] Spain is seen in Latin
America as the natural door to the European Union, and seen by
the Europeans as the natural bridge to Latin America. And its kind
of intermedior [sic] role is [...] very important both for the Latin
Americans and for the Europeans, and of course for the Spanish them-
selves as well.”25
This supports what was said by the Spanish interviewees at national level: that
Spain’s expertise in Latin America gives it importance within the EU, which it
is eager to maintain. It also harks back to the findings from Chapter 5, which
showed Spain to be rather preoccupied with its standing in the international
donor community. Thus, it seems that Spain is still in the process of finding its
role both in Europe and on the wider international scene and actively works
to achieve its reputational goals. Within the EU, it aims to take on a special re-
sponsibility for Latin America and to make it known that it has expertise with
25Emphasis added.
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the region that other EU partners and the EU institutions can rely on. Conveni-
ently for Spain, this helps it achieve its interests vis-à-vis Latin America at the
same time, as it offers the country a further level to pursue them.
Domestic Socialisation
In line with the findings of the national-level interviews, the triangulation in-
terviews show evidence that domestic socialisation does matter in the inter-
action between national and EU policy-making towards Latin America. Tri-
angulation interviewees are also able to assign some of the evidence directly
to the countries under study, in particular to Germany and the UK. Interest-
ingly, Spain, where evidence for domestic socialisation was the strongest in
the national-level interviews, does not display such evidence in the triangula-
tion interviews. However, the finding becomes more reasonable if one recalls
that the norm into which Spanish policy-makers are socialised is not exclus-
ively a norm about the desirability of a European dimension of policy towards
Latin America but rather a norm of Spanish responsibility for Latin America
at the EU level. This leads to strong rather than weak uploading and can be
perceived, especially by EU officials, as Spain trying to push its national in-
terest at the EU level – hence the strong evidence for Hypothesis 1 in the case
of Spain. Latin American interviewees do perceive the domestic socialisation
of Spanish policy-makers into a very active role in EU policy towards Latin
America, however. This explains the difference between EU interviewees and
Latin American diplomats regarding the impact of domestic interests on Span-
ish interaction with the EU’s Latin America policy. But as in the national-level
interviews, domestic socialisation does not lead to the uploading and down-
loading mechanisms predicted by the hypotheses – instead, it leads to strong
uploading on behalf of Spanish policy-makers.
With regard to Germany, triangulation interviewees’ remarks about the do-
mestic socialisation of its policy-makers refer to two aspects. The first concerns
the idea that German policy-makers see Germany as an important power that
has an opinion on everything, including Latin America. The second is closely
related and concerns the ways in which German policy-makers bring forward
their national position in all circumstances. One interviewee stated that “It is
very important that [...] time and time again national representatives say, ‘I
don’t even want to read out to you what my instructions are’ [...]. This is a
positive element of EU coordination [...] that one says, we want to achieve the
whole, common, best thing and not just push our position until the end. But
there is a different German culture” – German representatives seem to display
a tendency to stick to their instructions in most situations and inform their
6.6. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK 275
counterparts about the German point of view (weak uploading), or even try
to push it (strong uploading). The same interviewee pointed out that this is
also related to the fact that Latin America is not an important issue for Ger-
many, so that the participants in meetings often do not have enough standing
to single-handedly derogate instructions from the capital. In this sense, their
domestic socialisation into the norm that Germany has to speak combines with
low interests in Latin America to produce attempts at uploading that may be
suboptimal from the point of view of trying to reach a consensus.
British policy-makers, in turn, are also seen as socialised into a national
norm of ‘great power status’ that leads them to engage in weak uploading,
although this occurs with much less frequency and with a greater focus on cer-
tain issues than in the German case. Additionally, triangulation interviewees
do indeed see Britain as sceptical of Europe, as predicted by Hypothesis 4. I ex-
pected weak uploading and downloading at work if policy-makers have been
socialised into ‘Europeanist’ norms. What we see in the case of Britain is the
reverse: policy-makers are socialised into a norm that sees the EU as a more
distant entity, which is viewed sceptically. As a result of this socialisation and
low British interests in Latin America, British engagement with the EU’s policy
towards the region is overall low.
However, as with the previous hypotheses, triangulation interviewees also
pointed to some factors that were not specifically tied to a particular country.
Especially European officials noted a recent decline in European commitment.
One interview partner said that
“there used to be certainMember States that weremore Community-
minded [...] and these of course were the Member States that were
more open towards the institutions, towards [...] sharing inform-
ation, acting jointly, and [...] putting the EU dimension, the Com-
munity dimension first. [...] [N]owadays unfortunately, [...] this
has [...] greatly diminished, I would say. My perception is that the
Community spirit has almost disappeared.”
Although the official did not attach this notion to any Member State in partic-
ular, it strikes a chord with the evidence from the German national interviews,
where there is evidence that the norm of Europeanism that had so long gov-
erned German actions within the EU is waning.
European Socialisation
Evidence for European socialisation is overall stronger in the triangulation in-
terviews than in the national-level interviews, taking about 9% of total evid-
ence. However, as expected, it was difficult for triangulation interviewees to
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assign the impact of European norms on uploading and downloading in the
countries under study. Indeed, evidence for the impact of the EU level in terms
of socialisation tends to remain general, covering all Member States. One EU
official, for example, stated that the “effort Member States put in trying to find
compromises” is “quite astonishing to watch. [...] [I]t is an amazing process,
if you would think years back, it was not possible.” The official saw this as a
result of the constant interaction and the trust that had been built up among
the Member States and the EU officials. There is evidence for both download-
ing and weak uploading in terms of information sharing as a result of constant
EU-level interaction, and it appears that there is now a general willingness to
achieve consensus even in the face of widely disparate opinions on sensitive
issues such as Cuba, because consensus is generally seen as the appropriate
goal. The limitation of this evidence, obviously, is that it remains at the general
level. This, however, supports the theoretical conceptualisation of this study
and the findings of previous studies that it is national-level differences that ex-
plain the varying receptiveness of national policy-makers for EU-level norms.
What the triangulation interviews can contribute to this study is that EU-level
socialisation processes are indeed at work.
Triangulation interviewees were, unfortunately, not able to pinpoint exactly
the above-mentioned interaction between European and domestic socialisa-
tion. This may be due to several reasons. Firstly, triangulation interviewees
were not able to assess the impact of European Socialisation on the individual
Member States, as discussed in the previous section. Additionally, the num-
ber of cases under study here is indeed too small for conclusions to be drawn.
What would be needed in this context is a large-N study including a well-
designed survey of policy-makers for as many EU Member States as possible
in order to ascertain whether there is a mediating impact of national norms on
the way in which EU-level socialisation processes – which, as evidence from
both national-level and triangulation interviews shows, at work – are medi-
ated by distinct national contexts. As I have shown based on the national-level
interviews, there are differences depending on the national context, but further
investigation that branches out beyond Latin America policy may be needed
to better conceptualise this interaction.
Further Considerations
Overall, the triangulation interviews corroborate the evidence from national-
level interviews. Interaction between national and EU level policy towards
Latin America on behalf of the three Member States under study is mainly
driven by interest-based considerations. However, some nuances from the tri-
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angulation interviews complement the national-level evidence in novel ways.
The UK is seen as mainly interest-driven and active on a fairly small number
of thematic issues, especially commercial affairs, but also counter-narcotics and
the environment. While Britain is not very visible in the EU’s policy towards
Latin America, it is influential whenever it does get involved and can then suc-
cessfully upload its preferences. While part of this low level of visibility is due
to the fact that Latin America is not a British foreign policy priority, there is
also some evidence of a domestic norm in the UK that distances policy-makers
from the EU.
Germany, meanwhile, is seen as one of themore active countries, and a very
influential one. In addition to the evidence brought forth above, it is interest-
ing to note that some interviewees see it as balancing Spanish influence, an
evaluation concurrent with how German policy-makers see their role. Along-
side France, Portugal and Italy, it was universally mentioned as an important
actor in the EU’s Latin America policy, although there is evidence for this activ-
ity being driven mainly by commercial interests, confirming evidence from the
national-level interviews. Overall, Germany’s role in EU-LAC relations is eval-
uated as a highly influential, and, in the case of Latin American diplomats, also
very positive. Spain, finally, is seen across the board as the most active and in-
fluential EU Member State.
In the Spanish case it is important to recognise the difference between EU
officials, who tend to characterise Spain as highly tactical and interest-driven
in its interaction with the EU’s Latin American policy, and Latin American
diplomats, who interpret Spain’s role more concurrently with Spanish policy-
makers themselves: driven by a domestic norm of a special responsibility to-
wards Latin America. Nonetheless, Latin American interviewees do not deny
that interests play a major role in Spain’s tendency to attempt to upload its
national policy to the European level, as they indicate a preference for other
EU Member States to become more involved and welcome, for instance, Ger-
man initiatives to balance Spain in some aspects. Another peculiar factor of
the Spanish case is that Latin America policy in Spain is to some degree in-
ternally politicised, especially with regards to Cuba. While the conservative
Spanish government under Aznar pushed for a strict Common Position on
Cuba, the subsequent socialist government tried to change the Common Po-
sition towards a more flexible framework. However, Spanish intents to up-
load in this respect met with the fierce resistance from other countries, such as
the Czech Republic, who wish to keep the current Common Position. While
Cuba is very much a controversial issue between the different EU Member
States, Spain seems to be the only one where the position on Cuba is nation-
ally strongly contested depending on the government in power. Triangulation
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interviewees observe that in other countries, nuances might change, but the
position remains essentially similar, while at the time of the interviews, they
were preparing for the Spanish position to change as a result of a potential
government change in the November 2012 general elections. Cuba, however,
is a very special case in the context of the EU’s policy towards Latin America
that merits additional attention that is beyond the scope of this study.
An interesting feature of the triangulation interviews with EU officials is
the support they yield for European socialisation, although they did not at-
tach it to specific countries. Interaction between the representatives of the EU
institutions and those of Member States, as well as among Member State offi-
cials was often described as characterised by an atmosphere of community and
trust. Daily, intense communication, both using official and unofficial chan-
nels, between members of the European policy-making network appears to be
the norm. Consensus-finding appears to be an EU-level norm Member State
representatives readily adhere to. A communication reflex is also seemingly
evident – if something is happening, policy-makers pick up the phone, write
an e-mail or send a COREU to inform partners. This is surprising, given that
European socialisation was definitely among the very weak to non-existent (in
the case of the UK) independent variables as they emerged from the national
interviews. A potential explanation for this is that EU officials tend to over-
estimate the importance of EU-level interaction and communication. On the
one hand, they often cannot observe directly the impact of EU-level social-
isation on Member State policy, that is, they are unable to observe whether it
actually leads to downloading. What they are not aware of are all the other
networks that Member State officials are involved in that might have an even
greater impact, in particular the domestic policy-making network emphasised
by Liberal Intergovernmentalism, but also other international arenas such as
the Iberoamerican Summit process in the case of Spain. Additionally, it is not
unreasonable to suspect that at least some of the activity Member States do not
voluntarily communicate to the EU network is not picked up by EU officials,
so that they are missing a chunk of the information. Similarly, national-level
officials may be less keen to reveal downloading to the interviewee in order to
portray their own national actions as particularly successful.
6.6.3 Policy Documents
In this section, I turn back to the recent policy documents from each individual
country and discuss them briefly. While policy documents represent only the
official line, they can nevertheless reveal some aspects of the factors motivating
the interaction between national policy towards Latin America and the EU’s
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strategy towards the region. In the following, I analyse the documents that
were coded above to ascertain the mechanisms at work in more depth in order
to corroborate the evidence from interviews, as discussed in Chapter 4. In
the case of Spain, were no specific such document exists, I limit myself to the
speech by then ForeignMinister Trinidad Jiménez before the Senate Committee
on Iberoamerican Affairs as the most recent expression of policy towards Latin
America. I begin with the German strategy paper for Latin America and the
Caribbean (AA 2010).
“Germany, Latin America and the Caribbean: A Strategy Paper by the Ger-
man Government” (2010) Compared to the historical evidence provided in
Section 6.5.1, the 2010 strategy paper takes a somewhat different approach to
the interaction of Germany’s Latin America policy with the European level.
In fact, in a comparison between the 1995 and the 2010 strategy papers, Gün-
ther Maihold finds rather little difference between the documents, apart from
a different emphasis in the section on the European Union, where there is a
shift away from further Europeanisation towards bringing in a stronger na-
tional voice (Maihold 2010: 15). Indeed, while the document recognises that a
“substantial part of Germany’s relations with Latin America is realised today
within the context of the European Union” (AA 2010: 54), the desire for further
Europeanisation that permeated earlier documents, such as the “Guidelines”
for policy towards Latin America published in 2004 and updated in 2007 (AA
2007) is no longer there. Instead, the government postulates that in order “to
fully represent our values and interests in Latin America, we have to use our
influence in a targetedmanner to help shape European policy on Latin America
and the Caribbean” (AA 2010: 9). Germany wants to use its influence in EU-
Latin American relations to achieve a more coherent policy and to strengthen
the Strategic Partnership (ibid.). The paper immediately turns to this task by
explicitly stating where some of these German interests lie: in maintaining the
Common Position on Cuba, in rethinking the way the EU deals with regional
integration projects in Latin America, and in concluding as well as putting
into practice association and trade agreements with Latin America – preferably
with regions, but also with individual countries if bi-regionalism turns out to
be too cumbersome (ibid.: 54f). This is a rather strong expression of German in-
terests that is new to the interaction with the EU level. It is consistent with the
evidence from both national and triangulation interviews, which have poin-
ted to a change in the way German policy-makers consider interaction with
the EU level. It seems Germany now feels the need to steer these relations in
a direction congruent with its own preferences, confirming the evidence from
interviews. The European level also carries importance in the section on trade
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with Latin America (ibid.: 33ff), although the division between trade – subject
to the Community method – and external economic promotion – quite strictly
bilateral – remains. However, the EU’s growing competences in external eco-
nomic policy are making themselves felt in Germany’s interaction with the EU
level in this policy area. While competence for the protection and promotion
of investments is migrating to the EU under the Lisbon Treaty, Germany re-
mains determined to ensure that the levels of protection provided by current
bilateral arrangements are maintained (AA 2010: 37). With national room for
manoeuvre further circumscribed by Europeanisation, Germany is trying to
‘upload’ its own level of investment protection to the EU, consistent with Hy-
pothesis 2: where the distribution of competences lies with the EU, Germany
tries to achieve its interests through the European level.
However, there is no fully-blown turn away fromGermany’s generally pro-
European attitude. “Germany’s Latin America Strategy would be inconceiv-
able without a European dimension”, the paper recognises (ibid.: 54). It argues
in favour of EU action vis-à-vis Latin America for instance in the fields of hu-
man rights, counter-narcotics, and regional and subregional integration (ibid.:
54f). Thus, while there is a turn towards a clearer articulation of German in-
terests, this is more of a change in nuances than a fundamental redefinition of
Germany’s policy towards Latin America in the EU context.
“Britain and Latin America: Historic Friends, Future Partners” (2010) This
speech by Foreign Secretary William Hague at Canning House in November
2010 fulfils a very similar purpose to the German strategy paper: to bring the
UK’s Latin America policy up to date after a government change and outline
the government’s ideas on policy towards the region. In congruence with evid-
ence from the interviews, the EU’s role in the speech is punctual. Like Ger-
many, Britain is seeking “ambitious European Commercial Agreements” with
Latin American regions “in our role as undoubtedly the strongest and most
persistent advocate of free trade in the European Union” (FCO 2010). This
supports evidence from the interviews that commercial interests are key in the
UK’s involvement in EU policy towards the region, and that its motivations
are to be found in the more general foreign policy context rather than being
specific to Latin America – the UK tries to upload its commercial preferences
vis-à-vis Latin America not because of big trade interests in the region, which
it does not have, but due to a more general pro-liberalisation preference: again,
the UK constitutes itself as an “indirect uploader”, as already shown in the his-
torical overview. British policy towards Latin America in the EU context thus
does not change much with the new government in terms of content, although
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tain’s retreat from the region is over”; ibid.). There is little change in this re-
spect from an earlier government document on UK relations with Latin Amer-
ica published by the previous Labour government, where the EU’s role was
also largely seen in the trade area (FCO 2007: 19). This lends some support
to Hypothesis 2, the influence of the distribution of competences between the
national level and the EU level, for which there was also substantial evidence
in the national interviews and some evidence in the triangulation interviews.
A second area in which the EU level plays a role in British Latin America
policy is climate change, where the UK is “keen to help broker a strategic alli-
ance between Latin America and Europe on climate change” (FCO 2010). Inter-
viewees in both national and triangulation interviews confirm that the environ-
ment is indeed one of the areas where the UK is active vis-à-vis Latin America
in the EU context. Note that regarding climate change, however, the role of
the EU level is more indirect, as the alliance to be brokered here is between the
Member States and the Latin American countries, rather than in partnership
with the EU institutions. Interestingly, another policy area that did play a role
in the European context in the interviews and in the previous government’s
strategy paper on Latin America (FCO 2007), counter-narcotics, was not men-
tioned in Hague’s speech. Overall, the speech is more focused on bilateral and
global-level aspects of the relationship, supporting the evidence from the tri-
angulation interviews that British engagement with the EU is focused on areas
where the EU holds competences and where the UK has particular interests
vis-à-vis the region.
“Appearance before the Senate Commission for Iberoamerican Affairs”26
(2010) The then Foreign Minister’s speech before the Senate Commission for
Iberoamerican Affairs in December 2010 informed the relevant representatives
of Spain’s upper house on the lines of action for the department in Latin Amer-
ican affairs and recent events in connection with the region. Because Spain
had held the Council Presidency during the first half of 2010, during which
the biannual EU-LAC Summit took place, there is an extensive section on the
government’s actions within the EU framework. Overall, the evidence from
the interviews that Spain attempts to ‘upload’ its policy in a wide range of
areas is confirmed. Spain, “with its immense interest in the region will follow
very closely” the further consolidation of the relationship, the speech promises
(Jiménez García-Herrera/MAEC 2010: 102).
However, while the speech is eager to point to Spain’s achievements within
26Full translated title: “Appearance before the Senate Commission for Iberoamerican Affairs
to inform about the lines of action planned for the relations with the Iberoamerican Community
of Nations and Priorities of the Department in the realm of Iberoamerica and the Iberoamerican
Summit in Mar del Plata” (Jiménez García-Herrera/MAEC 2010).
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the EU-LAC context, EU action vis-à-vis Latin America is presented as a value
per se throughout, pointing to Spain’s double identity as both European and
“Iberoamerican” that characterises its approach to the region. While both Ger-
many and the UK highlight mostly the commercial aspects of the EU’s As-
sociation negotiations with Latin American countries and regions, the former
Spanish Foreign Minister’s speech takes this further by emphasising the far
reach of the agreements into commercial, but also political and development
cooperation aspects (ibid.: 103), supporting evidence for Spain’s broader mo-
tivations that go beyond economic interests, although these are fundamental.
In general, the speech shows the strength with which Spain tries to push the
overall relationship with Latin America onto the EU agenda, confirming the
evidence for uploading in all aspects from the interviews.
6.7 Conclusions
In this case study, I have analysed the interaction between national and EU
policy towards Latin America in three EU-Member States: Britain, Germany,
and Spain. Evidence shows that interaction is motivated by several factors,
responding to utilitarian and constructivist liberal as well as to more systemic
factors. However, as expected by the theoretical framework, domestic interest-
based calculations based on a logic of consequences are by far the most import-
ant motivating factor that causes national representatives in all three countries
to try and upload their national stance to the EU level. The more interests are
at stake in a certain issue area, the more strongly the ‘strong uploading’ mech-
anism plays out. In areas of lesser interests when this does not entail costs,
they may be willing to accept issues from the EU level onto their own agenda
and go along with what is decided at EU level. As a result of this domestic in-
terest constellation, Spain, whose interests in Latin America are the strongest,
attempts to upload its stance essentially in all policy areas. The interviews
show that the EU level is one further channel for Spain through which it car-
ries out its Latin America policy – it will chose other channels if it does not
achieve its preferences in the EU framework. However, what does not hold
true is the hypothesised connection between the strength of interests and the
strength of the interest variable: although Spain clearly has the strongest in-
terests in the region, this does not mean that its interests preclude the impact
of other independent variables. Quite to the contrary, the factors that motivate
its policy towards Latin America in the EU context are more balanced and var-
ied than those of the other two countries under study, especially of the UK.27
27However, triangulation interviews show that Spanish attempts to upload are often perceived
as interest-driven. Moreover, national-level interviewees may have an interest in misrepresenting
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Britain, conversely, uploads very selectively with a focus on economic issues
and counter-narcotics. It is also quite willing to let EU policy run its course
and accept European decisions, as long as its interests are not touched – and
since these interests are far and few between regarding Latin America, Bri-
tain’s activity is rather low-key at the EU level. Germany is more broadly act-
ive but still focuses on some issues more than others, especially on commercial
policy. The interest-based explanations arising from Liberal Intergovernment-
alism thus account for a lot of the variation in policy activity on the European
dimension shown in Chapter 3.
However, it is also important to note that there are other influencing factors
at play, which interact in different ways with domestic interest constellations
in the three countries under study. Firstly, the institutional distribution of con-
sequences between the EU and the national level is a noteworthy factor that
plays a role in all three countries. It limits Member States’ ability to take a
bilateral route if the EU level does not satisfy their requirements. As a res-
ult, attempts at strong uploading are particularly intense in areas of EU com-
petence, notably commercial relations. This, of course, interacts with the fact
that economic policy is the area where both the UK’s and Germany’s main in-
terests vis-à-vis Latin America lie. But since interviewees explicitly link strong
uploading to the distribution of competences, the evidence is relatively clear.
Indeed, especially British diplomats are said to be very well aware of the dis-
tribution of competences, in congruence with the conclusion of previous re-
search that the UK favours cooperation in foreign affairs, but strictly within an
intergovernmental setting (Aktipis and Oliver 2011: 90). Additionally, the dis-
tribution of competences also matters in the Spanish case, where it translates
into having to take into account the EU’s autonomous actions. This holds both
for commercial policy, where the EU negotiates on behalf of the Member States
and Spain has to accept the negotiation outcomes, and for development policy
where the EU has not just a considerable amount of competences, but also
wields major financial power. This links the present case study with the previ-
ous chapter discussing the motivations for development policy-making. While
Spanish policy-makers are always pushing for Latin America to receive more
funds, they must also take the EU level into account when considering their
own actions. The fact that the EU holds supranational competences therefore
places some limits on Spain’s strategy of choosing the channel through which
it can best achieve its preferences in Latin America policy, as in some instances
it cannot bypass the EU level.
Rational adaptation to EU-level rules plays a role both in Germany and in
their motivations. Even so, the difference between Spain and especially the UK in terms of the
variables influencing interaction between national policy and the EU level is striking.
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Spain, but does not seem to influence the UK’s up- and downloading activities,
thus chiming with evidence from the previous chapter on rational adaptation
to international rules about development, as well as with theoretical expecta-
tions. Indeed, for Spain the motivations behind rational adaptation are similar
to those found in development policy: Spain is concerned about being taken
seriously by its EU partners as an influential Member State, just as it is con-
cerned about being taken seriously by the international community. However,
the mechanism throughwhich this plays out is slightly different in the EU case.
While in development policy, Spain is essentially a rule-taker, in EU policy to-
wards Latin America, it tries to use its special relationship with the region in
order to demonstrate its importance through uploading. This is why in the
case of Spain, strong uploading in connection with maintaining a status and
reputation is actually more important than the postulated information-sharing
through weak uploading mechanism. Through its special relationship with
Latin America, Spain tries to punch above its weight in the EU. Similarly, in
Germany weak uploading in the context of rational adaptation is motivated
with maintaining a reputation as an influential and active Member State. It
therefore shares its initiatives and stances on all policy areas, even those that
are not of vital interest for it, such as Latin America policy. This diverges
somewhat from previous evidence for Germany wanting to maintain a reputa-
tion as a ‘good European citizen’ (e.g. Aggestam 2000; see also Checkel 2005;
Slaughter 2004) – in line with the evidence brought forward based on the his-
torical overview and the most recent German strategy paper on Latin America
that provides a great deal of evidence for uploading and indicates a stronger
willingness of Germany to use its influence within the EU to shape the policy.
This is indicative of a general tendency in Germany’s behaviour within the EU
that appears to have trickled down to all policy areas, including policy towards
Latin America. On the other hand, the UK as predicted did not yield evidence
for rational adaptation to EU rules to maintain a reputation with regards to
policy towards the region.
With regards to the impact of socialisation, this study largely confirms pre-
vious evidence that domestic socialisation is more relevant than European-
level socialisation (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005), although in Germany and Spain
both are present with Germany displaying the strongest evidence for European
socialisation making an impact on up- and downloading on policy towards
Latin America. From the triangulation interviews, it becomes evident that
European socialisation processes are indeed at work, although triangulation
interviewees could not trace their impact on individual Member States. How-
ever, national-level interviews showed that they do have a different impact
on the behaviour of different Member States, which is mediated by domestic
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factors. Such mediation was indeed contemplated by this study in hypothes-
ising that domestic socialisation into EU norms would make states more re-
ceptive to European socialisation. This hypothesis could not be confirmed in
the face of a lack of clear evidence. But it became clear that domestic social-
isation impacts upon the kind of European norms that are adopted by national
policy-makers. In Germany, policy-makers are receptive to an EU-level norm
about participation at the EU level even if interests are low, which is rein-
forced by domestic perceptions that Germany is a pivotal EU Member State
that should make its voice heard, which also influences rational adaptation re-
garding participation. Additionally, although there is evidence that this norm
is currently changing, there still exists a domestic norm in Germany stipulat-
ing that European action as such is the appropriate way of carrying out foreign
policy for Germany. Interestingly, therefore, weak uploading in the form of
participation at the EU level can arise from both rational and appropriateness-
based considerations. Both logics of action can thus exist in parallel and com-
plement each other when determining foreign policy-making.
In Spain, on the other hand, policy-makers seem to be more receptive to an
EU-level norm stipulating different areas of responsibility for different Mem-
ber States at EU level. Again, this is intimately connected with domestic social-
isation, for which there is quite strong evidence in the case of Spain. However,
in the case of Latin America policy, it is a different kind of socialisation than
expected: rather than being domestically socialised into a particular stance on
Europe,28 policy-makers are socialised into a stance on Latin America policy-
making that impacts their interaction with the EU level. Evidence shows the
existence of a Spanish foreign policy culture that sees Spain as having a par-
ticular responsibility for the EU-LAC relationship. This motivates them to act-
ively try to influence all areas of EU policy-making towards Latin America,
even if this is sometimes viewed with a dose of scepticism on the part of both
their European and Latin American partners. If anything, Spanish uploading
is limited by capacity, which leads some policy-makers to toy with the idea of
‘outsourcing’ some more administrative aspects of policy to the EU-level to be
able to focus more on bilateral relations. ‘Outsourcing’ is also contemplated by
British officials who see the EU’s presence in Latin American countries where
Britain has scaled down its presence as a possibility of, so to speak, ‘keeping a
foot in the door’.
28Esther Barbé (2011: 131) includes identity reconstruction in the European context as ons of the
dimensions of the Europeanisation of Spanish foreign policy. Indeed, Spain has been extremely
pro-European in its foreign policy outlook (see also e.g. Torreblanca 2001). Yet, in the case of
Latin America, Barbé’s assessment concurs with my findings in stating that “Once it joined the EC,
Spanish governments began to conceive of Spain as the spokesman for Latin American interests”
(Barbé 2011: 145).
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While I did not find that interests overall trump the impact of ideational
factors, there is evidence for a ‘division of labour’ between a logic of expec-
ted consequences and appropriateness. This applies in particular to the case
of Germany, which is active in a broad range of policy areas but does not dis-
play the peculiarities of the Spanish case. Depending on the importance of the
policy area in question, the logic of action may change: the more important the
area, the more likely German representatives are to respond to rationalist logic.
Moreover, they are quite willing to download some policy initiatives from the
EU-level, but they then ‘re-upload’ their own stance on these initiatives. When
policy-makers are unsuccessful in ‘uploading’ their national stance, they may
first download policy, but then try to influence its further shape actively. In
the case of Germany, this may also be the result of a relatively low level of in-
terest in Latin America combined with a desire to influence the EU level on the
basis of both domestic interest and the rationally motivated desire to match up
to Germany’s status as a pivotal EU Member State. By uncovering this mech-
anism, this study has made an interesting discovery in the field of interaction
between national and EU policy in the field of external relations.
The crucial difference that sets Spain apart from both Germany and Bri-
tain is that Spanish policy-makers see interaction with the EU-level in Latin
America policy more as a feature of Latin America policy than EU external rela-
tions, thus seeing the EU only as one branch of conducting policy towards the
region. This explains the low score on the European dimension of policy activ-
ity towards Latin America found for Spain in Chapter 3. British and German
representatives see it not just as that, but more strongly within a context of EU
external relations. This changes the norms that matter when actors are domestic-
ally socialised. While in Britain, domestic socialisation has little or no effect, in
Germany, what matters is socialisation into norms regarding behaviour at the
EU level. In Spain, what matters is socialisation into what Esther Barbé calls
“kinship-based duty” (Barbé 2009: 126), the domestic norm that Latin America
matters, and that it should not only matter to Spain, but to Europe as a whole.
What represents an interesting starting point for future research is the mechan-
isms of interaction between domestic and European norms. A greater number
of cases and a more specific research design are required to reach conclusive
evidence, but this study has pointed to at least one way in which the two inter-
act.
Finally, there are some implications for the biregional relationship that can
be drawn from the evidence discussed in this chapter, and they are connected
with the strong evidence for country-specific interests driving the interaction
between national and EU policy towards Latin America. Firstly, it would ap-
pear that Latin American diplomats are correct when they consider Member
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States to be the crucial working partners in Europe, even in areas of EU com-
petence. It is theMember States who are pushing to see their interests represen-
ted by the negotiation mandates for Association or Free Trade Agreements, for
instance. Latin American countries who want to see their own interests taken
into consideration by the EU are therefore well-advised to lobby the Member
States as well as the EU level, even under the new post-Lisbon institutional
structure. Secondly, and the practical implications of this can already be wit-
nessed, the Member States’ economic interests are likely to trump EU attempts
at promoting regional integration in Latin America. If powerful countries like,
for instance, Germany want a commercial agreement with Latin American
countries, they are unlikely to forego it if a biregional agreement is not pos-
sible. This has been the case, for example, with what was initially conceived as
a biregional agreement between the EU and the Andean Community and has
now turned into Multiparty Agreements with Peru and Colombia. Even more
importantly, bilateral agreements between the EU and individual countries, es-
pecially Brazil, are likely to be negotiated if the bloc-to-bloc negotiations with
Mercosur fail. Especially in the current climate of rising scepticism about the
economic and political capacity of the EU, normative considerations are likely
to be quickly forgotten when economic and political interests are at stake in
external relations.
Overall, the second case study has reinforced the usefulness of a theoret-
ical framework combining liberalism-based with systemic factors. It allows
for a much more complex picture of interaction and multi-causal explanations.
Indeed, I have shown that interaction between national and the EU’s Latin
America policy is more complex than the mechanisms postulated in the hy-
potheses due to the country-specific combinations of influencing factors that
work together in unique ways to produce the interaction patterns uncovered
by this investigation. Further research will now have to show to what extent
these findings can be extended to other areas of foreign policy-making in the
European context, such as policy towards other regions, or the Latin America
policy of other Member States.




290 CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Summary
This study set out to theorise, conceptualise, and analyse the factors that influ-
ence Latin America policy-making in Germany, Spain, and the UK. Through
this investigation, I hoped to shed more light on policy-making towards a re-
gion that receives very different levels of policy activity from various EUMem-
ber States. Likewise, by assessing the factors that motivate policy towards the
same region on behalf of several European states, the study contributes to the
larger endeavour within Foreign Policy Analysis of disentangling the factors
that impact upon foreign policy (Hudson 2007).
By studying policy towards Latin America, I focused on an area that con-
sists largely of day-to-day policy-making towards a region whose relations
with European countries span essentially all aspects of foreign policy: com-
mercial relations, investment, and development aspects, as well as political,
cultural, and civil society relations. In addition, all states under study interact
with Latin America within the EU framework in crucial aspects of the relation-
ship, so that an EU dimension of policy was also included. In this sense, the
present investigation differs from many other studies located within an FPA
approach, which tend to focus on special cases, crises, or particular events. The
investigation therefore broadens our understanding of the motivating factors
behind the main body of most Western democracies’ foreign relations: every-
day external policies. In keeping the ‘recipient region’ of policy constant across
all three cases, the study could keep factors pertaining to the ‘policy target’ con-
stant and hence isolate those factors operating in the countries where policy
originates.
By choosing Germany, Spain, and the UK as cases for study, I investigated
the foreign policies towards Latin America of three states that share a number
of attributes, thus further honing in on those explanatory factors emanating
from the domestic level. Firstly, all three countries under investigation come
with their own national policies towards Latin America, hence making an in-
vestigation of its motivating factors meaningful in the first place. Secondly,
all are relatively long-standing Member States of the European Union, so that
the interaction between the national and the EU level is fairly consolidated
in all cases.1 Moreover, they are relatively large Member States of the Union,
thus granting them a certain level of influence within the EU. Finally, they are
middle powers at the wider international level. It must be noted here, and
has been discussed in Chapter 2, that this point is where international-level
differences between the three countries are the greatest, as the UK is a per-
1Nevertheless, I took into account Spain’s status as a later joiner of the European Community
and the international community at large. See also fn 12, p. 30.
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manent member of the UN Security Council, Germany aspires to become one,
and Spain is certainly the least internationally influential country out of the
three. Nonetheless, I argued that for the purposes of this investigation, their
European middle-power status was sufficiently similar for fruitful comparis-
ons to be made. However, as I have shown, for Spain its status as a relat-
ive ‘newcomer’ to the international scene matters especially in development
policy.
Theoretically, I embedded the study within an extended liberal framework,
fundamentally based on the work of researchers such asMoravcsik (1993; 1997;
1998), Goldstein and Keohane (1993); Katzenstein (1996), and the more recent
investigations of Wagner (2002) and Koenig-Archibugi (2004). Liberalism con-
ceptualises the domestic origins of foreign policy, but while Moravcsik’s work
is firmly embedded within a rationalist logic of action, conceptualising policy-
makers as utility maximisers, the other authors open up the framework to the
impact of ideational factors. The study thus conceptualises a framework that
can incorporate factors based on a logic of expected consequences as well as a
logic of appropriateness and that allows them to be at work side-by-side, com-
plementing and interacting with each other rather than being mutually exclus-
ive, based on the work of researchers such as for example Jupille et al. (2003),
Fearon and Wendt (2003), and Zürn and Checkel (2005). I thus conceptualised
independent variables based on liberal foreign policy theory, including polit-
ical and economic domestic interests, as well as domestic norms about how
foreign policy should be conducted. The use of a liberal framework with its fo-
cus on domestic-level factors impacting upon foreign policy is appropriate in
the context of this study, having taken care to isolate these domestic factors as
much as possible. Nevertheless, it is important not to ignore the fact that states
and their policy-makers are embedded in the international arena, including the
EU, and that this context may also affect policy-making. Therefore, I conceptu-
alised independent variables emanating from the systemic level, thus includ-
ing rational adaptation to international rules, international socialisation and, in
the case of interaction between national foreign policy towards Latin America
and the EU level, also the institutional context. However, I argue that these
factors are by and large constant across the three countries under study so that
their varying influence ought to be due to domestic-level factors (Risse et al.
1999). I therefore conceptualised the impact of the international level as me-
diated by the national arena. Additionally, I considered whether states come
to the international community as rule- or norm-makers (“norm leaders”, as
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 901) call them) or norm-takers.
Since the analysis of policy towards Latin America in Europe has been car-
ried out mostly within the context of either national-level studies or edited
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volumes based on studies of individual countries, and literature is scarce in
particular for the UK, I first had to establish a common ground upon which the
policies towards the region of Germany, Britain, and Spain could be meaning-
fully and systematically compared. In order to do so, I conceptualised three di-
mensions of policy activity towards Latin America. The first dimension was an
economic dimension comprising trade and investment as well as development
policy towards the region. The second was a governance dimension includ-
ing political dialogue, cultural policy, and civil society involvement in policy.
The third and final dimension captured the European context within which EU
Member States carry out policy, as I found, to varying degrees.
In order to compare the three countries’ activity levels on all three dimen-
sions, I established an index based on fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Ana-
lysis (fsQCA), a rather novel approach to indexing. This technique allows for
the systematic comparison of data from a wide variety of sources: qualitative
data from government documents and secondary literature could be incorpor-
ated alongside numerical data on development assistance from the OECD stat-
istical database, for instance. Additionally, country-specific indicators could
be employed where no comparable data were available. Based on set-theory,
fsQCA scores varying continuously between 0 and 1 are attached to each case
depending on whether it is closer to full non-membership (0) or full member-
ship (1) in a set, with the point of maximum ambiguity (crossover point) at 0.5.
By placing all data on the same scale through fsQCA’s calibration procedure,
I could make the wide variety of indicators conceptualised during Chapter 3
comparable across countries and dimensions, and reduce the data’s complexity
through set intersection and union. At the same time, the step-by-step index-
ing procedure allows the researcher to record all the variation in the data in a
systematic, tractable fashion. I found policy activity towards Latin America to
vary in interesting ways across both countries and dimensions. While the UK
achieved the lowest overall score, Spain scored very highly on all dimensions
except the European one, for example.
Based on the variation uncovered in Chapter 3 and theoretical relevance,
I then proceeded to identify two policy areas for further study in Part II of
this investigation. In Table 7.1, I once more summarise the variation relev-
ant to the case studies found on the basis of the fsQCA index. This empirical
variation presents several questions. Regarding development, a subcompon-
ent of the economic dimension of policy towards Latin America, the question
arising from the wide variation on the different countries’ index values was
why the same region receives such different levels of policy activity from three
European OECD Donor Assistance Committee member states. If aid were
mainly oriented towards alleviating poverty efficiently, one might expect more
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European Dimension 0.05 0.42 0.16
similar levels of policy activity. As regards the European dimension, the vari-
ance uncovered by the fsQCA indexing procedure is similarly puzzling. Why
do three relatively ‘veteran’ Member States vary so widely in the levels of
policy activity towards Latin America within the EU framework? Why does
Spain, a traditionally Europeanist country, achieve such a low score, especially
given its high scores on all other dimensions? Why does even Germany with
its long-standing reputation of Europeanism not even reach a 0.5 membership
score?
Aside from the empirical variation, however, the two cases for further study
were chosen for their theoretical relevance. In the context of ‘marrying’ ra-
tionalism- and constructivism-based explanatory factors, development assist-
ance should be a particularly interesting field of study given the unresolved
disagreements of researchers regarding the factors that influence development
policy (e.g. Lumsdaine 1993; 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). Is de-
velopment policy fundamentally oriented towards alleviating poverty in de-
veloping countries, or is it primarily influenced by geopolitical or economic
interests? If norms about poverty alleviation are indeed driving development
policy activity, do they emanate from the international or from the domestic
level? Or do policy-makers rationally adapt their behaviour to international
standards in order tomaintain a certain reputationwith the international donor
community?
The European level, on the other hand, is theoretically interesting in terms
of the interaction mechanisms involved in foreign policy-making at the do-
mestic level and the EU level. Interaction between the national and the Euro-
pean level is now a constant feature of foreign policy-making in EU Member
States, yet the index showed that it plays out differently in different countries.
How can this interaction be conceptualised and explained? Why do countries
sometimes accept issues coming from the EU level onto their national agenda,
while in other cases they push to see their own policy stance implemented
at the EU? In both case studies, I conceptualised rationalist and constructiv-
ist liberal influencing factors, as well as rationalist and appropriateness-based
adaptation to the international level. By including equifinal hypothesis, the in-
vestigation contributes to a deeper understanding of the driving factors behind
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foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Europe, but also behind for-
eign policy-makingmore generally by uncovering potential influencing factors
that can then be applied to other cases.
Methodologically, given the small-N research design and the data availabil-
ity of this study, I opted for process tracing in the sense of tracing the impact of
often equifinal influencing factors through in-depth semi-structured elite inter-
views with foreign policy-makers. The main data source was interviews car-
ried out at the national Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Minis-
tries or Agencies. In order to mitigate the problems of strategicness associated
with elite interviews, I triangulated the data with interviews conducted both
at the EU institutions and with Latin American diplomats based in Brussels.
Furthermore, OECD data were used in the case of development policy, and
government documents in the case of national-EU level interaction. Although
these data sources all have their limitations – discussed in depth in Chapter
4 and in the individual case studies – they allowed me to trace and analyse
in depth the various postulated influencing factors on policy-making towards
Latin America in the three countries under study.
7.2 Findings and Implications
Overall, I find that foreign policy-making towards Latin America is mostly
driven by domestic economic and political interests, as expected by the exten-
ded liberal theoretical framework. However, other factors including domestic
and international norms, as well as rational adaptation to international rules,
also have an impact. Because of its qualitative design, the study was also able
to analyse the interaction among the independent variables in depth, showing
how they combine differently across various national backgrounds to produce
country-specific outcomes. Although the findings are not readily generalisable
to other countries or policy towards other regions, they indicate that the ways
in which different variables interact in the policy-making process are specific to
each country and often complex. I now briefly discuss the findings from each
case study in turn.
7.2.1 Development Policy towards Latin America
In development policy, as predicted by the theoretical framework, the concen-
tration of aid in Latin America as a whole region and among Latin American
countries is driven to a large extent by domestic political and economic in-
terests, but I also found considerable evidence for the impact of domestic as
well as international norms.
7.2. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 295
However, in the context of international norms, it is important to recog-
nise their interaction with rational adaptation to international standards, as
policy-makers seek to maintain or achieve a status of fully-fledged member-
ship in the international donor community. This is particularly important in
the case of the concentration of Spanish aid to Latin America, which is very
poverty-oriented within the region. Spain is still a relatively recent donor and
its policy-makers remain rather preoccupied with Spain being accepted as a
‘good’ donor internationally. They are therefore receptive to international rules
mostly for rationalist reasons. But at the same time, Spain’s historical ties with
Latin America have created a domestic normative environment which makes it
difficult for Spain to withdraw aid from the region, even on the basis of the
argument that Latin American countries are ‘too rich’ to receive substantial
development funding. This finding illustrates how the impact of international-
level factors is indeed mediated by the domestic context of each individual
donor country.
In Germany and the UK, there is evidence that poverty orientation matters
more in poorer countries, while interest-based considerations dominate when
allocating aid to the richer countries of Latin America. This explains why both
countries give some substantial shares of their aid to some very poor, but also
to some of the regions rich countries. Indeed, in the UK a strong national norm
about the poverty orientation of aid has caused the bilateral aid programme
with Latin America to be dismantled. Interest-based considerations, however,
motivate the UK to continue running a programme with Brazil as an emerging
global power. Germany, on the other hand, due to its somewhat greater in-
terests in the region, maintains a broader profile, but the essential pattern is
similar to the British one.
Interestingly, the lower policy activity towards Latin America in the field
of development, the less relevant Latin America-specific considerations are in
making development policy towards the region. The driving factors in Ger-
many and particularly in the UK are thus more reflective of general develop-
ment policy considerations than in Spain, where the focus is very much on
Latin American specificities when making development policy. As a result, dif-
ferent motivating factors matter in all three countries under study, but theways
in which they matter and, in particular, interact among each other are condi-
tioned by domestic preference constellations – both ideational and rational –
that are unique to each country.
Overall, the case study on development policy-making towards Latin Amer-
ica showed that the aid giving process is highly complex. The idea that all
donors behave the same in general or that different donor countries behave the
same towards the same recipient region or country is flawed. Different donors
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behave differently towards different countries and regions, and independent
variables combine in singular ways that are difficult to capture in a large-N
design. Large-N studies are excellent at uncovering that different factors matter
in development policy-making, but this study has contributed to a deeper un-
derstanding of how the different factors that impact upon development policy
can matter in different national contexts.2
7.2.2 The European Dimension of Policy towards Latin Amer-
ica
As for the case study on the interaction between the national and the EU level
in foreign policy towards Latin America, evidence likewise shows that interac-
tion in the sense of uploading and downloading policy is motivated by several
interdependent factors. Overall, calculations based on domestic interests were
found to be by far the most important motivating factor. As expected by the
Liberal Intergovernmentalism-based hypothesis, the stronger the interests at
stake in a certain issue area, the more strongly policy-makers attempt to up-
load the national stance to the EU level. In areas of lesser interests and when
this does not entail costs, theymay be willing to accept issues from the EU level
onto their domestic agenda. As a result Spain, whose interests in Latin Amer-
ica are the strongest, attempts to upload its stance essentially in all policy areas.
The UK, conversely, uploads very selectively with a focus on economic issues
and counter-narcotics. It is also quite willing to let EU policy run its course
and accept European decisions, as long as its interests are not touched. Ger-
many is more broadly active but still focuses on some issues more than others,
especially on commercial policy.
However, as with development policy, other independent variables are also
at play and interact in interesting and different ways with domestic interest
constellations. Firstly, I showed that the institutional distribution of compet-
ences between the EU and the national level plays a role in all three countries
by limiting their ability to take the bilateral route if working through the EU
framework does not satisfy their interests. As a result, attempts at strong up-
loading are particularly intense in areas of EU competence, notably commer-
cial relations, but also development policy, where the EU wields power over
substantial funds. There is also evidence for a ‘division of labour’ between
expected consequences and appropriateness to be at play. This was found to
apply especially to the German case: the more important the area, the more
2This is not to say that there are no general patterns in development policy activity that could
be uncovered by large-N studies. But because of the complexity of aid, it is difficult to disen-
tangle the intricate connections between different variables in different donor-recipient scenarios
quantitatively.
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likely German representatives are to respond to a rationalist logic. Rational
adaptation to EU-level rules plays a role both in Germany and in Spain, but
does not seem to influence the UK’s up- and downloading activities, thus also
chiming with evidence from the previous chapter on rational adaptation to in-
ternational rules about development.
With regards to the impact of socialisation, the EU case study largely con-
firmed previous evidence that domestic socialisation is more relevant than
European-level socialisation (Hooghe 2005; Beyers 2005), despite the presence
of both in Germany and Spain. European socialisation processes are indeed
at work, although their impact on individual Member States will require ad-
ditional research. There is evidence for variation depending on the domestic
context of different Member States, however. While the mediation of EU-level
socialisation by domestic socialisation was indeed hypothesised by this study,
I was not able to conclusively confirm this hypothesis due a lack of clear evid-
ence. Nonetheless, I did find evidence for the impact of domestic socialisa-
tion upon the kind of European norms that are adopted by national policy-
makers. Evidence from the Spanish case, for instance, showed that Spanish
policy-makers seem to be particularly receptive to an EU-level norm stipulat-
ing different areas of responsibility for different Member States at EU level.
This is intimately connected to the existence of a domestic foreign policy cul-
ture that sees Spain as having a particular responsibility for the EU-LAC rela-
tionship, motivating policy-makers to actively try to influence all areas of EU
policy-making towards Latin America.
I did uncover a mechanism that was not contemplated by the initial hy-
potheses and represents a valuable contribution to the research on interaction
between national and EU policy, which I termed ‘re-uploading’. In some cases,
I found policy-makers to be quite willing to download some policy initiatives
from the EU-level, but they then ‘re-upload’ their own stance on these initiat-
ives. ‘Re-uploading’ may arise in two contexts. Firstly, when national rep-
resentatives are unsuccessful in ‘uploading’ their national stance, they may
initially download policy, but then try to influence its further shape actively.
Secondly, it may also be the result of a relatively low level of interest in a policy
combined with a desire to influence the EU level despite this, for example in
order to maintain a reputation as an influential Member State. The exact condi-
tions under which this mechanism operates may be subject to further research.
In sum, the crucial difference that sets Spain apart from both Germany and
Britain is that Spanish policy-makers see interaction with the EU-level in Latin
America policy more as a feature of Latin America policy than EU external re-
lations. British and German representatives see it not just as that, but more
strongly within a context of EU external relations. Overall, the second case study
298 CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS
reinforced the usefulness of the study’s theoretical framework, allowing for a
complex picture of interaction and multi-causal explanations to emerge. In-
deed, I have shown that interaction between national and the EU’s Latin Amer-
ica policy is more intricate than the mechanisms postulated in the hypotheses
due to the country-specific combinations of influencing factors that work to-
gether in unique ways to produce the interaction patterns uncovered by this
investigation.
7.2.3 Contextualising the Findings
From the two case studies, some general conclusions can be drawn to anchor
the case studies in the wider context of this investigation. The first is that for-
eign policy-making towards Latin America in the three countries under study
responds to independent variables both from the realm of liberal theorising
and variables emanating from the international level, as conceptualised by the
study’s theoretical framework. In addition, I was able to confirm the study’s
premise that utilitarian-liberal variables in the shape of domestic political and
economic interests constitute the fundamental driver behind foreign policy to-
wards Latin America in Europe. The stronger a country’s interests, the more
likely it is to respond to them. On the other hand, as the case of the UK shows,
where stakes are minor, policy activity can be overall extremely weak and ori-
ented towards merely protecting these vestiges of interests. And as we have
seen in the case of Spain, interests and norms can coexist in their influence on
foreign policy. The tension between such coexistence can then lead to unique
policy outcomes, such as the strong poverty orientation of Spanish aid within
Latin America in the face of an overwhelming amount of total Spanish aid
given to this relatively rich region – although, as I have shown, other addi-
tional factors impact upon such patterns, thus making the picture even more
complex.
Similarly, the impact of international or European-level factors has been
shown to be mediated by the domestic context, as previous literature from
similar contexts has indeed suggested (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Hooghe
2005; Beyers 2005). However, the exact processes by which such mediation
occurs have to be further investigated to put to a test my evidence that do-
mestic factors do impact upon the kinds of international norms domestic policy-
makers may be socialised into.3 Additionally, states want to be recognised in
a certain way by other members of the international community and seek to
3Acharya (2004: 239) does suggest that what kinds of norms matter depends to some extent
on the “differential ability of local agents to reconstruct the norms to ensure a better fit with prior
local norms”, although his research focuses on a context where a transnational norm is integrated
into a regional group’s normative code.
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promote different kinds of self-images in order to gain or maintain importance
at the international level. They may thus promote themselves as experts in a
certain region or policy area, or as a pivotal state in the community. I have
found evidence, especially in the development case study, that such rational
adaptation is especially important in areas where countries feel the need to
‘prove’ their belonging to a certain ‘club’ such as the international donor com-
munity in the case of Spain. In a different arena – the EU – on the other hand,
Spain seeks to promote an image as the ‘expert on Latin America’. Patterns of
rational adaptation can thus vary across issue areas. Despite this impact of the
international level, foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Germany,
Spain, and the UK is fundamentally driven by domestic interests.
Finally, the comparison between the three countries has shown that the
stronger the relationship with Latin America, the more policy is based on Latin
America-specific considerations than on more general foreign policy lines such
as a general stance on development policy or general considerations regarding
the EU. Spain, therefore, operates the most Latin American policy towards the
region. Even its low score on the EU dimension testifies to that – the EU is
just one channel of conducting policy towards Latin America that can be sub-
stituted for others. What matters is Latin America. Likewise, most of the UK’s
policy towards the region reaches Latin America through indirect channels,
such as a reorientation of general development policy towards the poorest coun-
tries. The important factors here are foreign policy considerations that also
happen to affect Latin America, sometimes even negatively, as the withdrawal
of British bilateral development assistance to the region shows. In Germany,
finally, considerations are mixed. This shows that foreign policy-making does
not just depend on purely domestic factors, but also on the country-specific re-
lationship with the target region or country, a factor that needs to be taken into
account when analysing foreign policy in any context.
7.3 Directions for Future Research
While the present study of foreign policy-making towards Latin America in
Europe has made some substantial findings, it is just these findings that also
prompt possibilities for further research.
As I have discussed at several points, this study gives valuable indica-
tions that go beyond foreign policy-making towards Latin America. Yet due to
its focus on three relatively long-standing, large EU Member States with pre-
existing national policies towards Latin America, the applicability of its results
to smaller countries, new EUmembers, non-EU countries, and more generally,
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states with little pre-existing national relations with Latin America is some-
what circumscribed. Thus, it is worth looking at other countries to determine
to what extent the constellations of independent variables considered by this
study are specific to cases with the above characteristics. France or Italy would
be good test cases, for instance, of countries that are similar enough to the
three cases under study to apply the same theoretical framework. Moreover, a
comparison between old and new EU Member States, or large and small ones
could yield further insights into Latin America policy-making in Europe. In
addition, incorporating non-EU countries could help isolate factors specific to
EU Member States’ policy towards the region.4
Similarly, it is worth considering those dimensions of foreign policy and
their subcomponents that have not been covered by the present investigation’s
case studies in order to determine the extent to which the impact of the dif-
ferent independent variables varies depending on the policy area under study.
Finally, varying the ‘target region’ of foreign policy may yield additional op-
portunities to test my findings in a different context. Policy towards Africa
or policy towards Asia could be subjected to a similar framework to test the
validity of the results in other geographical areas.
One issue that could not be conclusively resolved by either of the two case
studies is the interaction between international (including European) and na-
tional norms. Although I have shown that international socialisation processes
are at work and are mediated by domestic factors, in order to test the expect-
ation that international norms fall on more fertile ground in countries where
a similar domestic norm also exists, or that pro-EU domestic norms make
policy-makers more susceptible to European socialisation, additional research
involving a greater sample of cases is required. What is more, the interaction
between national and international-level norms has to be further disentangled.
The idea that a particular national norm or domestic foreign policy culture may
make national foreign policy-makers particularly receptive to certain types of
international-level norms constitutes an excellent point of departure for addi-
tional inquiry.
Because of its liberal focus on domestic-level explanations with an exten-
sion into higher-level factors mediated by the national level, this study has
exogenised other factors that may play a role in the making of foreign policy.
As discussed above, by focusing on foreign policy-making towards a partic-
ular region on behalf of EU Member States, it exogenised systemic factors
by holding them constant to a large degree. Additionally, it has exogenised
4For a discussion of determining the ‘impact of Europe’, see e.g. Haverland (2006). Such a
decision would, however, eliminate the possibility to assess in detail how national and EU-level
foreign policy interact in each country under study, as this interaction is limited to EU Member
States.
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more micro-level explanatory variables such as the bureaucratic constellations
or small-group dynamics in each of the three countries under study by focus-
ing on meso-level factors. Follow-up research may therefore expand beyond
the extended liberal model conceptualised in this study to reach an even more
complete picture of the motivations of foreign policy-making.
In the following, I also briefly discuss those specific aspects of each case
study demanding further investigation.
7.3.1 Development Policy-Making in Europe and Beyond
The case study on development policy towards Latin America has found evid-
ence that the ‘colour’ of the government may have an impact on development
policy-making, in particular with respect to the factors that determine the alloc-
ation of development assistance. This is in line with the findings of some previ-
ous authors (Tingley 2010; Fleck and Kilby 2006) and suggests that rather than
nationally shared norms about aid, what might be at play are ideology-based
concerns over what aid should be employed for: poverty reduction or further-
ing national economic and political interests. Therefore, future research should
consider the impact of government ideology (conservative or liberal, left-wing
or right-wing) on the motivating factors for aid and, in particular, might fruit-
fully conceptualise norms as politically rather than nationally shared.
In addition, there is evidence from my interviews that the channel of aid –
whether states give multilaterally or bilaterally – could also give an indication
of the motivations of development assistance. There are studies demonstrat-
ing that multilateral aid is more efficient (e.g. Easterly and Pfutze 2008), thus
suggesting that states who deliver more aid multilaterally might be motivated
by ideational considerations about aid efficiency. Although the motivations
for different channels of aid have not been as widely studied as one might
expect, research investigating the issue has shown the usefulness of applying
a principal-agent framework, hence making the decision about a cost-benefit
calculation of maintaining control over aid versus sharing the costs of aid de-
livery by ‘going multilateral’. I have found some evidence that other factors,
such as the idea that a level of bilateral visibility should be maintained in the
recipient country, also matter in the decision. However, since the bilateral-
multilateral aid decision is not specific to Latin America but rather a more fun-
damental choice, it should be investigated within a wider framework.
7.3.2 Foreign Policy-Making in the EU Context
With regard to the EU case study, it is of course particularly appealing to ex-
tend the study to other EUMember States. While a forthcoming edited volume
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on the Europeanisation of national foreign policies towards Latin America (Ru-
ano forthcoming 2012) provides a starting point, it lacks the direct comparison
between the different Member States advanced by this study. How does EU
membership, for example, affect the relations with Latin America of the new
Member States, or those of smaller ones? Further research might also be con-
ducted in other areas of policy. Abstracting from the geographical context, it
might be worth looking at thematic policy fields such as development policy
towards different regions. It could also be fruitful to move away from external
relations altogether in order to test how the mechanisms of interaction play out
in various policy areas that are not related to external affairs.
In particular, the ‘re-uploading’ mechanism found by this study merits fur-
ther conceptualisation and investigation. Under what circumstances does it oc-
cur in other contexts than policy towards Latin America or even foreign policy
more generally? Does it play out differently in different EU Member States?
By uncovering this mechanism, the study makes a theoretical contribution that
may provide the basis for further refinement.
7.3.3 Theoretical Implications
This investigation is embedded within a Foreign Policy Analysis framework
with a focus on meso-level factors impacting upon foreign policy. In this vein,
I considered explanatory factors from utilitarian-liberal and liberal construct-
ivist foreign policy theory: domestic economic and political interests and na-
tional norms. However, I have also taken into account factors emanating from
the European and wider international level, thus moving further towards the
macro-level and systemic theories of foreign policy and international relations.
Due to its focus, the study conceptualised such higher level factors as me-
diated by the domestic context. The meso-level is thus where my research’s
main findings lie and contribute to FPA’s endeavour to achieve a closer grasp
of the variables that impact upon foreign policy-making. The study then em-
ployed middle-range theories from the two cases selected for in-depth study,
thus contributing to their further refinement. In particular, through themethod
of process-tracing employed by the study, I have contributed to the fine-tuning
of the mechanisms connecting the independent variables to policy-making in
development policy and the interaction between national foreign policy and
the EU’s external policy. By doing so, the investigation leads to a better un-
derstanding not just of what factors impact upon policy-makers’ decisions, but
how they do so.
I have, for example, been able to confirm the theoretical expectation that
domestic economic and political interests are the main drivers behind foreign
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policy towards Latin America in all three countries under study, and that such
interests tend to matter over other – both normative and rationalist – factors
at the limit. However, through in-depth analysis of the interviews conducted
for this study, I have also shown that the independent variables interact in
complex ways that monocausal theories focusing on a narrow set or even just
one independent variable – such as a strictly utilitarian-liberal framework –
would be unable to capture. Interests, domestic and international norms, and
concerns over a state’s status and reputation with its partners all matter.
By concentrating on policy towards a region that is not generally affected
bymajor crises or particular events, this study has moved away from FPA’s tra-
ditional focus on explaining the occurrence of particular events. In that sense,
it broadens the applicability of FPA by using its framework to explain foreign
policy-making as it occurs on a daily basis, which represents a major part of
many countries’ foreign relations.
Due to its focus on domestic variables, the theoretical basis of the present
investigation’s explanatory framework was a liberal approach incorporating
factors derived from both rationalist and constructivist liberal theorising. Yet
the subject under study was foreign policy-making, and it would have been
unwise to ignore the potential impact of international or European dynamics.
However, as laid out in Chapter 2, given that the three countries under study
have similar systemic contexts, their varying effect should be due to domestic-
level differences, thus justifying the liberal approach. I thus conceptualised the
systemic-level factors as mediated by domestic factors, and the study was able
to theorise and assess these interaction mechanisms, such as different national
foreign-policy norms leading to the receptiveness of different international or
EU-level norms. Indeed, as discussed in the previous section, such interac-
tion could benefit greatly from further research is required to fine-tune such a
mechanism. The evidence from this study, however, suggests that we may be
confronted with something like a normative ‘goodness of fit’ issue here. While
the original concept of ‘goodness of fit’ arose from research on the Europeanisa-
tion of policy and stipulates that countries more easily incorporate new policies
if they closely match their pre-existing domestic set-up (see e.g. Risse, Cowles
and Caporaso 2001), one could easily imagine a similar mechanism at work
when it comes to international vis-à-vis domestic norms.5
I now briefly discuss the contributions of both case studies in turn.
In the development case study, the theoretical contribution of this investig-
ation lies in further elucidating how the various different factors that have been
found to impact upon development policy-making interact with each other to
5See Acharya (2004) for previous research on how different transnational norms become incor-
porated at the regional level; see also fn 3, p. 298.
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produce different outcomes. As discussed above, I have shown that different
donors behave differently towards the same countries or regions due to the
ways in which domestic political and economic interests interact with other
factors, including domestic and international norms and calculations about
standing and influence in the international donor community. While previ-
ous studies have been able to indicate that different factors matter, this study
has contributed to finding out how they matter.
Concerning the interaction of national foreign policy with the European
level, the theoretical implications of this study also lie in the fine-tuning of
the interaction mechanisms conceptualised. As with development, the way in
which different explanatory factors work together depends on the domestic
constellations of these factors in the countries under study. A mechanism not
previously conceptualised has been uncovered and provides a fruitful starting
point for further investigation: ‘re-uploading’ in the sense that EU Member
States may first ‘download’ a policy stance or a decision from the EU level and
then actively try to shape its further development. The conditions under which
this occurs seem to be two-fold: either a previous attempt at uploading failed,
or domestic interest in the issue at hand is relatively low, but there are other
incentives to motivate attempts at influencing the EU level despite this.
Having discussed the theoretical implications of the study, some further
observations regarding its wider context can be made.
7.4 Further Considerations
In this study, I have discussed in depth the varying motivations of three im-
portant EU Member States’ policies towards Latin America. I have also ad-
dressed the importance of the EU level in Latin America policy nowadays. In
this context, it is worth taking a brief look at the implications of my findings for
the EU’s policy towards the region. The biregional strategic partnership celeb-
rated its ten-year anniversary in 2009 and the last EU-LAC biregional summit
took place in 2010 in Madrid; both fall within the timeframe of this investig-
ation’s focus. In the decade since its creation, the EU-LAC partnership has
come to cover an impressive array of issues ranging from economic to cultural
cooperation, although they have not always been tackled in a very organised
fashion. The Lisbon Treaty has reformed the EU’s institutions and the way
the Union makes foreign policy through the creation of a permanent post of
High Representative and the European External Action Service. However, the
EU’s Member States remain vital to the success of its external relations. As I
have shown, the motivations and intensities with which EU members involve
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themselves with Latin America vary widely across countries, but most of them
tend more towards the UK’s end of the activity spectrum than Spain’s or even
Germany’s, with the noticeable exceptions of Portugal, Italy, and France. As
long as the Member States are driven by different motivating factors and are
unwilling to leave the EU’s policy stance towards Latin America in the hands
of the most interested and active Member States – and as long as such states
are willing to exploit the EU to further their own interests, even when at odds
with the general European good – there is little reason to believe that the re-
lationship will take off as a truly biregional one.6 Bilateral paths are likely to
remain strong. Spain does not get ‘enough Latin America’ out of the EU, while
others are unable or unwilling to dedicate more attention to it, but are similarly
unwilling to leave the relationship to others. Different Member States have dif-
ferent interests in Latin America, as one can easily observe in the current Asso-
ciation negotiations withMercosur. France is sceptical of an agreement because
of its vast agricultural sector, Germany and the UK want ambitious free trade
agreements to conquer growing markets, and Spain is schizophrenically torn
between the interests of its domestic agricultural sector and its external rela-
tions drive towards a closer relationship with Latin America. The importance
of domestic factors discovered by this investigation thus does not bode well
for a common, concerted, and active EU relationship with the region.
An analysis of current foreign policy is necessarily an attempt to hit a mov-
ing target. The conclusions drawn from this study apply to the making of Latin
America policy in Germany, Spain, and the UK as it stands roughly since the
mid-2000s. However, the world is rapidly evolving and it is quite likely that
policy towards Latin America will be affected substantially. The most radical
change is the fact that the balance of the European-Latin American relationship
appears to be tipping rapidly in favour of Latin America. Europe must prepare
for the ‘partnership’ rhetoric that has characterised relations with the region at
least since the beginning of the EU’s strategic partnership with Latin America
to become a reality. As Latin America’s economic and political situation im-
proves, its most prosperous countries are increasingly both willing and able
make demands upon others and impose them. Due to the growing involve-
ment of other actors, specifically China, the region needs Europe’s partnership
less and less, while Europe might just be starting to need Latin America more.
Whereas Europe struggles economically and politically through the current fin-
ancial and economic crisis, Latin America seems, at least for the moment, to
weather the crisis rather well. If they want to preserve or even improve rela-
6At the same time, as the saying goes, ‘it takes two to tango’. As long as Latin America (and
the Caribbean) continues to be as fragmented as it currently is, it will be difficult to make the
relationship a biregional one.
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tions with the region, European countries thus ought to make sure they do not
miss their chance.
But the developments in Latin America point to a growing division between
the major economies of the region and ‘the rest’. While Colombia and Peru
with their impressive economic growth rates may retain some significance,
many of the smaller and poorer Latin American countries may lose touch with
their faster-moving neighbours. With Argentina and Mexico two of the re-
gion’s major powers may be too engulfed in internal problems to focus on their
role on the international scene. This principally leaves Brazil as the emerging
power in the region, andmay lead to a further ‘Brazilianisation’ of Latin Amer-
ica policy on behalf of those European countries that do not possess ties of the
kind that link Spain with the region. In the UK, such a tendency is evident even
in development policy, as this study has discussed. In Germany, Brazil is the
only country that is discussed in depth in the government’s 2010 strategy pa-
per (see also Maihold 2010 for a critique of this issue), although substantial ties
with other countries of the region remain and have experienced aminor revival
under the liberal-conservative government since 2009. The question is there-
fore to what extent we will soon be able to still speak of a Latin America policy
on behalf of these countries at all, meaning a policy towards the entire region
rather than just the most important countries or indeed just Brazil. For Spain,
the question is whether it will remain on its track of ever further internation-
alisation and Europeanisation that has been relativising its relationship with
Latin America to some degree in recent years. Yet at the same time, Spain’s cur-
rent crisis situation has seen domestic concerns tie the Socialist government’s
attention, especially during its last year, leading to stagnation in the devel-
opment of Spain’s external affairs. Since the general elections in November
2011, the new Conservative government under the leadership of Mariano Ra-
joy and ForeignMinister JoséManuel GarcíaMargallo hasmerged the offices of
Secretary of State for Iberoamerica (previously merged with the Secretariat of
State for External Affairs) and Secretary of State for International Cooperation
(i.e. development policy) to create a single post for International Cooperation
and Iberoamerica. This is surprising, since International Cooperation was ini-
tially supposed to be merged with External Affairs (El País, 6 January 2012).
This seemed to indicate development policy would be put on the back burner
as a result of the crisis, with Latin America – a fundamental support pillar
of Spain’s multinationals, which are struggling domestically – taking on re-
newed importance. What exactly the merger of International Cooperation and
Iberoamerica means for Spanish policy towards Latin America in the medium
to long term can only be speculated on at the time of writing. Overall, Latin
America policy-making in Europe thus remains a topic to be further observed.
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7.5 Final Remarks
Policy-making towards Latin America in Europe, as this study has shown, is
complex. Different explanatory factors from different theoretical backgrounds
combine in unique, country-specific ways in order to produce varying levels of
policy activity towards one and the same region on behalf of three important
EU Member States. While policy is mainly based on domestic interests, both
national and international norms also play a role, as does the rational adapt-
ation to international standards for a range of reasons, including the desire to
maintain or obtain a certain reputation on the international scene.
In sum, by exposing the complex interaction and influence of independent
variables on foreign policy-making towards Latin America in Germany, Spain,
and the UK, I have shown that ‘bridge-building’ between different theoretical
approaches is highly important in order for studies to be able to capture the full
picture of what determines foreign policy-making. The challenge for future
research is to broaden such insights by incorporating foreign policy towards
other regions, the foreign policies of other countries, or policy-making in areas
other than foreign affairs. Moreover, the mechanisms uncovered by this invest-
igation can be fruitfully subjected to further research and systematisation both
in small and large-N contexts.
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Table A.1: Countries classified as Latin America and three-letter country ab-

























Source: United Nations Statistics Division (UN Statistics Division (2009, 2011))
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314 APPENDIX B. FSQCA DATA
Appendix B.1 – Development Policy Activity Data
Table B.1: Percentage of DAC ODA going to Latin America, 2007-9 average

































Table B.2: Percentage of national ODA going to Latin America, 2007-9 aver-
age







Table B.3: Number of Latin American countries among top-25 ODA recipi-
ents, 2007-9 average



























Total DAC average 2.47
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Appendix B.2 – Civil Society Involvement





































































































































































** figures are in 1.000 Euros
Source: BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und

































































































































































































































































































































***Excluding Middle and Near East
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* UK Gross Public Expenditure on Development (GPEX). GPEX is reported
in gross figures per calendar year.
** figures are in 1.000 British Pounds
Source: DFID Department for International Development (DFID) and Na-
tional Statistics (2009).





























































































































































































































































*** excluding Middle East
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Government funds* channelled through CSOs – Spain







2006 33.52 30.60 14.98
2007 29.87 31.86 12.15





* Non-Governmental Organisations for Development
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Appendix B.3 – Coding SchemeText Analysis European
Dimension
The texts were coded according to a coding scheme adapted fromLarsen (Larsen
(2009)), who developed a coding scheme to determine the way in which EU
Member States carry out foreign policy within the EU framework. In the con-
text of mapping policy activity, what is interesting are the different channels
throughwhich foreign policy is carried out. Policy documents were thus coded
along the codebook in Table B.4. Note that if sentences belonged to more than
one category, multiple coding was allowed.
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more strongly than it has

















“We have worked closely
with Mexico and Brazil
on the [UN Security]
Council this year and
look forward to doing the
same with Colombia
when it takes up its seat






is constructing a positive
agenda, [...] also using
the dialogue and
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Appendix C
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326 APPENDIX C. THE SUITS INDEX
The Suits Index S is calculated as follows.
S is defined in terms of the triangle K between the lead diagonal, x=100 and
the top right-hand corner of the concentration curve box (x=100, y=100), and
L, the area under the aid concentration curve, so that:
S = (K− L)/K = 1− (L/K) (C.1)
On the x-axis of the concentration curve, we have the cumulative percent-
age of the $1.25/day poor. This is a variable y that varies between 0 and 100.
The cumulative share of aid flow x received by each country then becomes





Recalling equation C.1, S is therefore given by




However, the values of Ax(y) are only known for the values shown in C.1.







[Ax(yi) + Ax(yi−1)] (yi − yi−1) (C.4)
Using the data in Table C.1, the approximation can easily be calculated and
the resulting value plugged into equation C.1. The value for K is easily cal-






Doing so, we receive a Suits Index Sx of 0.19 for the data in Table C.1 (p.
327), meaning that aid to Latin America from the DAC member countries is
mildly regressive.
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El Salvador 50.93 64.50
Ecuador 55.31 67.96
Peru 66.44 71.75
Dom. Rep. 68.70 73.88
Colombia 82.05 81.53








* This figure is based on the share of poor in each country. The shares were
summed across all countries to reach the figure based on which the cumulative
percentages were calculated.
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